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Preface
This study was originally intended to be an Inquiry into the relative 
merits of different policies for dealing with the effects of export fluctuations 
on underdeveloped countries* But as I read more and more of the literature I 
became increasingly aware of the lack of systematic empirical analyses of 
the causes and consequences of export fluctuations* The literature was full 
of assertions on these subjects but little or no evidence. As a result I 
became increasingly interested in this aspect for it seemed to me that the 
design of appropriate policies required a reasonably accurate diagnosis of 
the causes and effects of the ailment® I began the search reasonab'y confident 
that I should in fact find the general views expressed in the literature to 
be upheld by the evidence* but the more evidence I examined the less confident 
of this I became® The result has been that the emphasis in the study has 
shifted from being mainly a discussion of policy to a relatively equal emphasis 
on statistical analyses of theories about export instability and on economic 
policies to deal with problems which may arise from it*
The statistical material available for considering the impact of 
short-term fluctuations in export proceeds in underdeveloped countries is 
often of doubtful reliability and the series are frequently of inadequate 
length to enable firm conclusions to be drawn from the analyses* Most of 
the data used came from UN and IMF publications^ some from national sources^ 
but in general they are subject to all the qualifications which normally apply 
to statistics from underdeveloped countries particularly in the area of national 
accounts® Such factors should be borne in mind when considering the statistical 
results presented in the text* The reader is usually reminded of them at
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appropriate points in the study. Appendix I discusses the methods and data 
used in this study*
In essence^ the approach of this book is to present and discuss briefly 
various propositions about the causes or effects of export fluctuations in 
the context of underdeveloped countries. The propositions are then tested 
by a combination of cross«county regress ion analyses and time-series analyses 
sometimes presented fomially in regression or correlation coefficients* sometime 
in tabular comparison of direction or strength of changes in one variable 
compared to another® The statistical results are then discussed in an attempt 
to fit them into a rational and consistent framework for use in considering 
their implications for economic policy® Ihe chapters on stabilization policies 
give a fairly general account of the main disputes concerning their respective 
advantages and disadvantages* but continually refer back to the earlier 
analyses for empirical evidence on which particular measure would be appropriate 
Emphasis on the diversity of the structure and experience of underdeveloped 
countries* economies as demonstrated in Sections I and II fot'ms something of 
a refrain throughout the whole study*
Because many references are cited very frequently in the course of the 
study and because their names are often very similar an abbrevi r^ ted form of 
citation has been adopted. Most often this is enclosed in parentheses in the 
text thus - (Michaelyg 1962: pp, 100-105), The reader who wishes the exact 
title and place of publication will find this in the list of works cited at 
the end of the study. These are in alphabetical order by the second name of 
the author or by the initial letter of the organization responsible for the 
document:
VIII
Michaely* Michael,
1962 Concentration in International Ti
North Holland Publishing Company» Amsterdam 1962,
United Nations (UN)
1958 World Economic Survey
Where more than one book^ document or article is attributable to an author
organization in the same year* small letters a* bg c etc, are added to the
second and subsequent works cited®
EXPORT FLUCTUATIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
PART I Causes and Consequences
Chapter 1 The Prima Facie Case
A. I. MacBean
Chapter I 
The Prima Facie Case
Next to the maintenance of world peace it can reasonably be claimed 
that raising the standards of living of the populations of the underdeveloped 
countries of Asia^ Africa and Latin America is the most important problem of 
our time. In this study one small, but potentially important obstacle to 
underdeveloped countries in their attempt to satisfy their ambitions for 
rapid and stable growth is cut out for scrutiny. This is the problem 
of short-term fluctuations in their export earnings,^ Export instability of 
this nature, quite apart from longer-term changes in exports, may have very 
damaging effects on both the internal stability and the economic growth of 
underdeveloped countries. The consequences and causes of export fluctuations 
form the subject matter of the first two sections of the book. The 
benefits and costs of various national and international schemes for dealing 
with the problems are analyzed in the third section.
The object of this chapter is to present the prima facie case for 
believing that export instability inflicts serious damage upon the economies 
of most underdeveloped countries. Subsequent chapters formulate these 
_a priori arguments separately and attempt to test each against the facts 
as recorded in the era since the Second World War,
Export Fluctuations
It is generally accepted that the prices of primary products vary 
much more sharply from year to year than do the prices of most manufactures,
\ A major reason for this lies in the relative short-run inflexibility of
both output and demand to changes in price for primary commodities 
such as foodg agricultural and industrial raw materials as compared with
=>2“
manufactured goods. On the output side the lack of short-term response 
can be attributed to the lengthy period required to bring about a significant 
increase or decrease in production in several major crops such as coffee, 
cocoa, tea, natural rubber and hard fibers. Even annual crops can only 
respond with something of a time lag as the most important production
decision is generally taken many months before the harvest time and a new
level of prices can affect only next season®s plantings.
For most metals and minerals the supply elasticity or response of 
output to price changes is generally rather higher than for agricultural 
products, but it is still unlikely to be substantial. The major costs 
tend to be fixed overheads. Mines are likely to continue operating as 
long as prices remain at a level which covers the running costs of mining and 
extraction. If the running costs are low, prices may have to ’fall very far 
before^ the mining concerns would find it advantageous to close-down some of 
their operations. This is reinforced by the probability that for many of 
the mining operations the closure and subsequent reopening of pits would 
involve substantial costs. Overtime working or a change to shift working 
may be possible in some mines in response to increased prices, but most 
underground mines will probably operate a shift system in the normal course 
of events and are strictly limited in their ability to vary labor inputs.
For open«cast mines a possible higher ratio of running to fixed costs 
may make for greater price responsiveness of output.
For both agricultural and mining products it seems clear that the 
response of output to changes in prices should be low compared with the
output elasticities of factory-produced goods. It is true that the elasticity
of supply of commodity exports may be greater than the output elasticity 
because exporters* stocks, domestic demand and even, in some cases, 
imports for reexport may respond to price incentives, but the additional 
flexibility from these is generally likely to be small. Few underdeveloped
countries hold large stocks of exportable commodities : such policies are 
often barred by technical difficulties and expense. Domestic consumption 
of exportable commodities is also, in general, minute. The possibility 
that imports for reexport should affect elasticities significantly is 
likely to be small for most underdeveloped countries.
On the demand side there are even better reasons for accepting 
response to changes in the prices of most food and raw materials to 
be slight. Price elasticities of demand for food and beverages are 
notoriously low. National custom rather than relative prices seems to 
determine whether people drink coffee or tea, or eat maize, wheat, rice, 
barley or potatoes as their staple food. Many other commodities depend 
on a derived demand. Their cost forms only a tiny part of the cost of 
the final product. Examples are the raw cotton in a shirt, wool in a suit, 
jute in floor coverings, aluminum in an airplane. The percentage change 
in the price of any of these finished products due to even a substantial 
change in the price of the raw material will usually be infinitely small,
A low supply elasticity means that any change in demand for a product, 
due to a change in consumers® incomes, industrial activity or speculation 
will induce a disproportionally large fluctuation in price. Conversely, 
if the price elasticity of demand is low a change in supply caused by 
exceptional weather conditions, pests or disease will cause a sharp change 
in price.
Given the further factor that both supply and demand for most commodities 
are characteristically unstable, a high degree of price instability is 
inevitable. For both food and agricultural raw materials it is evident 
that output variations are very likely^due to the normal hazards of farming.
In most underdeveloped countries these are further bedevilled by lack of
technique or resources for flood control, use of pesticides and fertilizers 
which have helped to reduce output variability of agriculture in richer 
and more developed agricultural systems. In addition some current changes 
* in output may be related to price conditions of several years earlier.
Tree crops such as coffee and cocoa exemplify this form of instability.
While minerals are less subject to output variability, demand for them 
tends to be more closely related to cycles in industrial activity and 
speculation and can fluctuate widely.
Low price elasticities combined with variability in demand, supply 
or both provide an entirely credible rationale for sharp instability in 
both prices and proceeds of primary products.
It is true that rather more primary commodities are exported by 
the developed world than by the underdeveloped countries, but for the 
average underdeveloped country, primary products form a very much greater 
proportion of exports than they do for the average developed country. 
Consequently specialization in primary exports forms a reasonable explanation 
for underdeveloped countries* export instability. Other intuitively 
appealing reasons are concentration on a small range of commodities and 
regional concentration of export markets. Such lack of diversification 
in both product and market reduces a country*s prospects of "gaining on 
the swings what it loses on the roundabouts," For many underdeveloped 
. countries one product alone accounts for well over 50 percent of the total 
value of their exports. Most underdeveloped countries sold the greater 
part of their exports to the United States^ the United Kingdom or France, 
Between them these factors seem to provide a reasonably convincing 
explanation for a high degree of export instability in the average 
underdeveloped country.
Consequences
Not only are underdeveloped countries® exports more unstable than the 
exports of the developed countries^ but the economies of underdeveloped 
countries are more vulnerable to such fluctuations. They are moie likely 
to suffer damage than would a richer, more developed country from the same 
degree of export instability. The principal reasons for this situation 
include a greater quantitative and qualitative importance of foreign 
trade to underdeveloped countries and the lack of the techniques or the 
facilities for effective countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies.
In the literature* underdeveloped countries are usually described 
as foreign trade-oriented. This has several aspects,
"In one form it appears in the considerable extent to which the
market-type sectors of the economy rely on the production of a
few primary products which usually are almost completely exported.
The ratio of this export production to total output is normally
high; the share of the national income generated by exports normally
exceeds the shares generated by private domestic investment or
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governmental expenditures,"
The implication of this statement is that the national income in underdeveloped
countries should be very sensitive to changes in export proceeds, A
change in the total value of exports will have a direct impact on export
producers* incomes, Tliis in turn will tend to affect their expenditures
on consumption and investment and so have repurcussions on
the incomes of other national industries. These direct and indirect
effects on incomes will tend to affect the willingness and ability of 
farmers and businessmen to undertake current investments. The combination 
of these "multiplier" and "accelerator" effects should, unless offset 
by government policy* tend on the average to produce changes in the 
national income which are in the same direction and)more than propor­
tional to the initial changes in export proceeds.
This instability in money national income may have repercussions on 
employment and the price level. Few writers expect employment levels 
to be seriously affected in most underdeveloped countries since the proportion 
of the total population actually involved in wage-earning employment is 
generally very small. Many of those who are wage or salary earners 
are frequently in government service and largely secure from temporary 
unemployment. By far the greater part of the labor force in most underdeveloped 
countries is self-employed or works within family units in small-scale 
farming. Movement between the wage and the subsistence sector is easy.
However employment in some export industries may be adversely 
affected by short-term fluctuations in exports.
Prices* on the other hand* can reasonably be expected to be affected 
by fluctuations in export incomes. If most incomes move in sympathy 
with fluctuations in exports the demand for many home-produced goods 
and services may be expected to follow suit, Since these are mainly 
agricultural products and housing the short-run supply elasticities are 
normally very low and increased demand for them will tned to produce sharp 
increases in domestic price levels. Conversely a sharp fall in export 
earnings will tend to contract domestic demand and reduce these prices.
In addition to sympathetic fluctuations in prices it is possible that 
export fluctuations tend to stimulate or add to inflationary pressures 
over longer periods. This would be particularly likely if underdeveloped
countries were liable to be more effective in countering deflationary than 
inflationary changes in demand. Anxiety to avoid underutilization of 
industrial capacity plus institutional and political factors make this a 
likely state of affairs in many underdeveloped countries.
Apart from heavy dependence on international trade underdeveloped 
countries may be vulnerable to export fluctuations because of incapacity 
to deal with export-induced internal instability. In many* the central 
banks* control over the supply of credit is very weak even when the statute 
book appears to give them a full quiver of monetary controls. The willingness 
of the governments to adopt tough budgetary policies is sometimes compromised 
by fears that this will endanger economic growth or even political stability. 
The political and administrative power to make quick changes in taxation 
or public expenditure is often lacking in emergent nations. Their tax 
systems seldom respond quickly through higher or lower yields at existing 
tax rates to changes in national income. Their social security systems 
are non-existent or too small to offset sudden reductions in income.
In other words* they lack the built-in stabilizers which, in the last 
twenty years or so* have become an important feature of the economies of 
the richer countries.
Unchecked fluctuations in incomes and prices may have undesirable 
social and political effects, A sudden rise in the proceeds realized 
from the export of an important crop may appear to redistribute income in 
an entirely arbitrary manner. One group of farmers may be enriched while 
the consequent rise in domestic price levels makes another group* not only 
relatively* but absolutely* worse off. Equally a sudden drop in proceeds 
can create tensions. These effects of export fluctuations are potentially 
very serious in countries where race or tribal connections often determine 
occupations and social tensions are already high.
Aside from these broader effects there is the direct impact on those 
groups in the community whose cash earnings fluctuate along with exports.
In many cases these are small farmers* in some* wretchedly poor peasants.
It is almost certain that a fluctuating cash income yields them less economic 
welfare or satisfaction than would a stable income of the same average 
level. If they are not sufficiently prudent to put away some cash as a 
reserve when their incomes rise they cannot support their new standard of 
living when the recession follows the boom. They may even starve unless 
they normally grow sufficient food for themselves or can borrow. The 
latter solution may bring other hardships given the very high interest 
rates normally charged to peasants by moneylenders in underdeveloped 
countries.
Effects on Economic Development
The last point may have implications for the long-run economic 
growth of some countries. If peasant production is important in their 
export industries and if commodity instability causes uncertainty and hardship 
to the farmers the internal allocation of resources may be distorted away 
from the optimum. The farmers may be deterred from specializing in the 
crops which yield the highest average return because they do not wish* 
or cannot afford* to take the risk of depending exclusively on an exportable 
crop which is subject to severe instability. Where this happens the country 
may suffer loss of income and foreign exchange over the long-run.
Uncertainty* generated by export instability* may affect investment 
by other groups in the economy and by the government. Export fluctuations 
can have two uncertainty-creating effects on entrepreneurs. First* it 
increases the difficulty of estimating the expected returns on an investment.
■= 9 =
Secondly* the possibility of foreign exchange problems affecting their 
country makes their ability to import any necessary capital goods or raw 
materials at a given time uncertain and forms a hazard to their plans.
In addition* the existence of these risks may make the suppliers of capital 
and credit charge higher interest rates and impose more stringent conditions 
creating further deterrentsito investment.
If national income fluctuates in sympathy with exports* parallel 
changes in domestic savings may be expected. Unless offset by variations 
in the inflow of foreign capital* changes in domestic savings must lead 
to equal changes in total gross domestic investment. The importance to 
investment of changes in national income depends mainly on whether the 
marginal propensity to save is greater or less than the average propensity 
to save. Will the propertion of income saved out of an increase in income 
tend to be larger or smaller than the average proportion of national 
income normally saved? Will a decline in income lead to a more than 
proportional decrease in savings? It is generally assumed that the marginal 
propensity to save is larger than the average for most underdeveloped 
countries. If so* the domestic incomes available for investment will 
fluctuate more than proportionally to fluctuations in income,
Tliere are some reasons for supposing the marginal propensity to 
be larger than the average propensity to save. In many countries the 
export sector is dominated by large scale firms. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that their marginal propensity to save out of profits should 
be larger than the average for the economy as a whole.
Normally a major part of any increase in export earnings will accrue 
directly to the government in most underdeveloped countries through export 
duties and royalties on minerals. Such changes in government revenue 
are unlikely to link directly to increased current expenditures by the 
government. They are more likely to enable further expenditures on investment
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Another suggested reason is that ordinary citizens expect some level 
of "permanent" income. Changes of actual income above or below this 
standard are treated as transitory. Hie income recipient regards such 
temporary gains or reductions in income as of a windfall nature and does 
not adjust his standard of living to them. The logic of the "permanent" 
income assumption leads to the expectation that almost the entire amount 
of any increase in income will be saved. Equally any decline in current 
cash income will be met by dissaving to support the accustomed standard 
of living.
If these reasons are taken to justify the assumption of a higher 
marginal than average propensity to save* savings and investment would 
tend to be much more unstable than national income. Such instability 
could be expected to lower the efficiency of investment.
Apart from the effect on national income and savings severe export 
instability will tend to produce temporary bottlenecks on foreign exchange. 
Many underdeveloped countries are short of reserves of gold or convertible 
currencies and cannot use them as an effective cushion against fluctuations 
in export proceeds. Until recently few made much use of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a means of smoothing their import capacity over 
booms and slumps. For most underdeveloped countries it is argued 
that luxury imports or non-necessities have already been cut out of their 
imports. Given this situation any drop in foreign exchange available for 
imports is likely to cut into capital-goods imports and raw materials.
Few underdeveloped countries at present possess the industrial 
capacity for the production of machines* transport equipment* steel and 
other essential capital goods. Imported capital goods account for 
approximately 40 percent of domestic fixed investment in the average 
underdeveloped country. This makes their development programs tend to
be sensitive to changes in ability to pay for imports. If this results 
in delays or attempts to substitute inferior domestic goods for imported 
capital* lasting damage may result,
A high degree of export instability may be expected to deter investment 
on several grounds. It increases risks for the entrepreneur. It is likely 
to raise borrowing costs. Because export fluctuations tend to cause 
balance of payments difficulties they may lower confidence in the maintenance 
of the exchange rate. Fears of devaluation can add a further stimulus 
to the capital flight which is endemic in many underdeveloped countries.
If export instability stimulates inflation it may encourage spending and 
discourage saving.
Capital accumulation in the average underdeveloped country is still very 
largely a matter of domestic savings. Foreign aid and private investment 
form only a very small contribution to total savings and investments. Consequently 
any damaging effect on domestic savings rates would imperil underdeveloped countries' 
prospects for economic growth. The threat which export fluctuations 
represent to the economic growth of underdeveloped countries has in fact 
been the focus of most official and academic concern.
Repercussions on Rich Countries
Few would expect short-term fluctuations in underdeveloped countries* 
export prices and proceeds to have a major impact on the economies of the 
rich nations. However* the interdependence of nations is generally 
emphasized in the official studies and certain effects are pointed to 
as giving the richer industrial nations motives for finding solutions 
to the problem of commodity trade instability. Fluctuations in the prices 
of their commodity imports may disturb their balance of payments.
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Individual industries which use imported raw materials will be affected 
by price fluctuations. Both of these results may influence the general 
level of activity and domestic price levels.
Fluctuations in underdeveloped countries' exports tend to generate 
parallel fluctuations in their imports. This may have some impact upon 
industries in the industrial nations. The effect may be more important 
because underdeveloped countries® import fluctuations are likely to be 
concentrated on capital goods and these happen to be typically the most 
unstable groups o,f industries in the industrial nations.
The industrial countries have an interest in increased production of 
primary products and if instability deters specialization and investment 
in them it works against their interests.
Finally* the mutual interest of all in the rapid economic development 
of the poorer countries should be clear to the rulers and citizens of the 
richer nations. Consequently if export instability is an obstacle to 
the growth of underdeveloped countries the rich also have a strong motive 
for desiring to get rid of it or to alleviate its effects.
These represent the major points which have been made in the very 
many discussions of the domestic and international consequences of underdeveloped 
countries® export fluctuations which have taken place. Most of the arguments 
put forward here have been synthesised from some fifteen works which are 
appended at the end of this chapter. Many others could have been cited.
Indeed most of the books and articles in the bibliogranhv at the end of 
this book contain such introductory sections on the importance of export 
fluctuations to the stability and growth of underdeveloped countries.
This combination of a priori reasoning and casual empiricism has 
almost universal acceptance. From the official studies of the UN*
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of reports by experts appointed by the UN and from books and articles 
written by academic economists it is clear that it is the consensus of 
opinion that short-term export instability is a very serious matter for 
che average underdeveloped country. This has formed the basis of a 
persistent advocacy of a wide variety of proposals designed to deal with 
commodity trade instability or to moderate its effects. These proposals 
have ranged from nationally operated marketing boards* to international 
commodity agreements and the most recent suggestions of international 
compensation for export fluctuations.
The argument is inherently reasonable and intuitively appealing.
It relies on well-known tools of economic theory such as price theory * ^ 
the foreign-trade multiplier and the accelerator. Most of the basic 
assumptions about underdeveloped countries which the argument uses are 
widely held. Nevertheless, when confronted with the factr practically 
none of the conclusions reached in the preceding argument are verified.
The statistical evidence presented in Section I and in the five 
case studies included in the book appears to contradict the consensus 
of opinion that export fluctuations inflict significant damage on the stability 
and growth of the average underdeveloped country.
If my conclusions are valid they call for a complete reappraisal of 
the role of measures for international economic stability. But one point 
should be made clear now. My conclusions do not mean that stabilization 
policy is irrelevant to the problems of all underdeveloped countries.
At no point do I deny that some underdeveloped countries or particular 
industries or groups within some underdeveloped countries may suffer 
severely from export instability. On the contrary* I feel certain they do.
But if the problem is not general and widespread* but particular and specialized; 
its whole nature is changed and the appropriate policy measures become
14<
quite different. It is in this light that the discussions of stabilization 
policies are presented in Sections III and IV of this book.
Note on Sources
The following works are cited as a representative sample of the 
opinions of international organizations and academic economists. Ihe 
first reference* which includes a brief quotation from a very distinguished 
economist* is a mere aside in a disquisition on the long-term problem 
of the terms of trade* but it emphasizes the confidence with which the 
prima facie case is generally stated. Items 4 and 5 are very widely used 
textbooks and to a considerable extent expound received opinion.
1. A. K. Ca"rncross : "The prices of primary products are notoriously 
volatile and the damaging effects of this volatility on the economies 
of the exporting countries are beyond question". "International Trade
and Development"* in Factors in Economic Development (London*1962)* p. 213.
2. E. Ho Harmon* Commodity Reserve Currency (New York, 1959), pp. 1-5.
3. B. Higgins* Economic Development (Now York* 1959), pp. 545-58.
4. G. M. Meier and R. E. Baldwin, Economic Development (New York, 1957), 
pp. 310-314,and 329-30.
5. M. Michaely* Concentration in International Trade (Amsterdam*,1962) pp. 112-26<
6. International Monetary Fund (IMF) "Fund Policies and Procedures
in Relation to the Compensatory Financing of Commodity Fluctuations",
I.M.F. Staff Papers, November 1960, pp. 5-15.
7« R« NurksOfl ’’Trade Fluctuations and Buffer Policies of Low»Income 
Countries” Kyklos, Vol, XI - 1958 Fasc 2g ppo 141-44.
So Organization of American States (GAS) Final Report of the Group of 
Experts on the Stabilization of Export Receipts (Washingtong January» 
March 1962)p p. 1.
9o Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Commodity Agreements (Paris* 27 November* 1963)* pp. 1-8.
10o United Nations (UN)* Instability in Export Markets of Underdeveloped 
Countries * 1952*.p„ 1.
11,  ^ . Commodity Trade and Economic Development,
1953, pp. 6-11 and 14-21,
12, . World Economic Survey, 1958, pp, 59-64,
13, . . international Compensation for Fluctuations
in Commodity Trade, 1961^ pp, 3=15,
14, . World Economic Survey, 1962, Vol, I, pp, 48-51,
15, C, Ro Warren* Jr.* ’’The Inelasticity of Southeast Asian Agricultures
Problems of Monecultural Perennial Export Dominance”* unpublished 
report presented to the Agricultural Economics Society of Thailand* 
Bankokg November 1962 (mimeographed)* pp, 11-12,
A few writers have taken exception to certain points of the argument
as it is outlined in this chapter. Sir Sydney Caine has questioned the
contention that export instability will reduce investment, Albert Hirschman
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has .argued that the growth of industry may be encouraged more by fluctuations
than by stable export proceeds, Joseph Coppock and Michael Michaely (item 5)
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have published empirical research which casts doubt on the orthodox 
explanations of export instability but with relatively few exceptions 
the general argument on the causes and consequences of underdeveloped 
countries’ export instability which this chapter has outlined does repre­
sent a consensus of opinion,
16, Sir Sydney Caine, ’’Instability of Primary Product Prices— A Protest 
and A Proposal”* Economic Journal * September 1954,
17, Joseph D, Coppock* International Economic Instability (New York, 1962),
18, Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New York, 1958)
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Footnotes for Chapter I
lo Short-term fluctuations are defined here as deviations from the 
general trend in export proceeds, A constant increase and decrease in 
exports is not regarded as a fluctuation and such general tendencies are 
eliminated from the data by calculating the trend over the period and using 
percentage deviations of actual exports from the trend as the measure of 
fluctuations. The average of these is taken as the index of instability 
for each country over the period. Appendix 1 discusses this and related 
statistical questions,
2, Gerald M, Meier and Robert E, Baldwin* Economic Development: 
Theory, History* Policy (New York* 1957)* p, 310, This is a widely used 
textbook.
Chapter 2
Causes of Excessive Fluctuation in 
Export Proceeds of Underdeveloped Countries
As was indicated in Chapter I many reports of the United Nations, studies 
by groups of experts* articles by academic economists and text books on economic 
development have drawn attention to the severe export instability experienced 
by underdeveloped countries,^ It is widely held that such instability can 
be largely explained by special characteristics of the commodities which 
underdeveloped countries export and of the structure of their exports. Certain 
policy proposals flow from these views. They range from the necessity to 
diversify exports of underdeveloped countries to the need for international 
commodity agreements or schemes for compensating underdeveloped countries 
for shortfalls in their export earnings. The main object of this chapter 
is to review some of the generalisations about the causes of underdeveloped 
countries’ export instability against the results of recent research on 
fluctuations in the post-war period.
Definition of Instability
Export instability is defined here as short-term fluctuations in export 
earnings corrected for trend. The necessity for some form of trend correction 
is evident to avoid interpreting a constant year-to-year increase as 
indicating instability. The number of methods of trend correction possible 
is almost as numerous as the number of studies on export instability. As 
long as each index is calculated for the same variable over the same period 
of time the results are* however* invariably highly correlated. Most techniques 
assume a linear time trend. For countries where no single linear trend fits*
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the index will tend to exaggerate the amount of short-term instability. For 
this reason I prefer an index of instability which is measured as the average 
percentage deviation of the dollar value of export proceeds from their five- 
year-moving average centered on the mid-year. This has the disadvantage of 
losing two years from the beginning and end of the time series and of being 
less convenient for computer calculation. The indices used in this study 
are specified in the footnotes as they are used.
The Relative Severity of Export Fluctuations
It is generally held that fluctuations in export proceeds are much 
greater for underdeveloped countries than for rich developed countries* but 
the data for the post-war period show that the differences are much less 
than commonly supposed. On four different indices of instability Australia* 
Finland and France* for example* have much greater export fluctuations than 
Brazil* Ceylon or Panama (See Tables 2:1 and 2:2),
Per capita income may be taken as a rough indicator of the stage of 
economic development. Analysis of association between this indicator of 
development and export instability for some 80 countries yields a correlation 
coefficient of =0o23 which is barely significant at the ,05 level of 
significance,2 It indicates a relatively low degree of association between 
level of development and export instability.
Another calculation was made to compare the average degree of short-run 
instability for underdeveloped countries with that experienced by the average 
developed country. The mean index for 45 underdeveloped countries was 23,1 
with a standard deviation of 12,9 while for 18 developed countries the mean
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index o£ instability was 17,6 with a standard deviation of 7,1^ Once again 
this suggests a tendency for underdeveloped countries to have less stable 
export earnings. But it also suggests that this is a fairly weak tendency* 
that the differences are not large and that there is a considerable overlap 
in experience of instability between rich and poor countries.
The phenomenon* however* really exists. Underdeveloped countries* on 
the average* do seem to have a somewhat greater degree of export instability 
than do the developed countries. Why should this be so? Possible answers 
include: a tendency for underdeveloped countries to export only or mainly
primary products* a tendency for underdeveloped countries’ exports to be 
concentrated on a relatively small number of products* or for their exports 
to be concentrated in their geographical destination on one or two countries
Specialization in Primary Products
An explanation of the extra instability experienced by underdeveloped 
countries’ exports in terms of their specialization in the export of primary 
products makes two assumptions. First* it assumes that the typical 
underdeveloped country is specialized in this way and* secondly* it assumes 
that receipts from the export of primary products are inherently subject to 
greater short-term fluctuations than are receipts from the export of 
manufactures. The first assumption is clearly realistic: apart from Hong
Kong* with 82 per cent of its exports manufactures* India* 44 per cent* 
Pakistan* 27 per cent and Israel (if it is included in underdeveloped 
countries)* 61 per cent* underdeveloped countries’ exports are predominantly
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composed of foods* minerals and other raw materials. Admittedly several 
rich developed countries are also predominantly exporters of primary products, 
Australia* New Zealand* Denmark* Ireland and Finland* for example* fall into 
this category. However* it is clear that the typical underdeveloped country 
is much more heavily specialized in primary product exports than is the 
typical developed country.
That the second assumption is also realistic is far less evident* despite 
the insistence on this point in the UN studies listed in footnote 1, The 
Crawford Report states* "Primary commodity markets clearly continue to be 
permeated by a degree of instability appreciably greater than is evident in 
markets for other p r o d u c t s , Unfortunately the UN studies provide no 
comparative statistics for fluctuations in export proceeds from manufactured 
products, JoD, Coppock has calculated instability indices for the total 
value of world trade in primary commodities and in manufactures (1948 to 
1958), These show manufactures to have been more unstable* with an index 
of 6 , 8 compared with an index for commodities of 3,8, Such aggregative 
figures may of course be quite misleading since they conceal enormous 
variations in the experience of individual goods. The timing of fluctuations 
for various commodities may coincidentally have led to offsets which reduced 
the degree of instability of the total. Alternatively the total could 
have been stabilised by one or two primary products which have great weight. 
Oil exports amount to a very large proportion of world exports of primary 
products and may have exerted a strongly stabilising influence.
In a finer division of goods Coppock’s work reveals a more complex 
situation in which some classes of primary goods are more* some less unstable 
than manufactures. Capital goods for example are relatively unstable* while
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food and agricultural raw materials over the period* 1952=57* are relatively 
stable,^
These figures relate to world trade in each class of commodity, The 
more relevant question from the viewpoint of this study is whether specialization 
in the export of primary goods leads to a higher average level of instability 
in the exports of individual countries, A recent study by the International 
Monetary Fund reveals that fluctuations in all exports from (A) the average 
primary»producing country were rather larger than from (B) the average 
industrial country. When the measure used was the average year-to-year 
percentage change the index values were: (A) = 13,3* (B) « 10,8, When the
index used was the average percentage deviation from a five-year-moving-average 
trend the values were: (A) = 9,0 and (B) “ 6,2,^ Because exports oF
manufactures have grown rapidly over the period 1948-58 th^ trend^corrected 
measure is probably rather more reliable. Fluctuations in the export earnings 
of the average primary-producing country appear to have been some 45 per cent 
greater than for the average industrial country. This method involves the 
choice of some arbitrary percentage as a "cut»off-point" which determines 
whether a country is a primary-good exporter or an industrial-good exporter 
and border-line cases may have an undue importance.
Correlation of Primary Product Ratio 
And Degree of Export Fluctuations
Another approach to this problem is to exajnine the association between 
the proportion of a country’s exports which are primary products and the 
degree of instability experienced,? Cross-sectional (or cross-country) 
correlation analysis of the relationship between instability and primary 
good specialization with data for the 37 countries in Table 2:3 reveals very
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low correlation coefficients which are clearly non-significant at the ,05 
level. They are shown in a correlation matrix below Table 2:3, Evidently 
very little if any of the variation between countries’ export instability 
can be explained by the ratio of primary to total goods exported.
The probability is that instability cannot be linked strongly with such 
a broad division of goods into primary goods and manufactures. The 
experience of instability revealed by different commodities is extremely 
diverse as is shown in Table 2:4, A division of countries under broad 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) reveals that specialization 
in the export of minerals is likely to mean greater instability than 
specialization in manufactures. But specialization in crude materials or 
food (including beverages and tobacco) does not,& The important distinction 
is not between goods which are produced in factories and goods which are 
grown on the land or extracted from the earth. The crucial distinctions 
lie in the variability of demand and supply and in the short-run responses 
of demand and supply to changes in prices. These factors vary much more 
among primary products and among manufactures than they do between the two 
classes of goods. This point is taken up again below in a further discussion 
of instability of commodities and of the reasons for the very high instability 
experienced by a selected group of countries.
Commodity Concentration
Another commonly advanced explanation for instability in the exports 
of underdeveloped countries is lack of diversification. Apart from the 
character of their exports it is argued that they are too concentrated, A
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priori it seems reasonable to expect that specialization on a limited range 
of goods should make for instability on the general grounds that it is always 
risky to put all one’s eggs in a single basket. Concentration on a few 
products reduces a country’s chances of having fluctuations in one direction 
in some of its exports offset or ameliorated by counter-fluctuations or 
stability in others.
Correlation analyses of the association between the indices of instability 
and the commodity concentration index in Table 2:3 yield very low correlation 
coefficients. These results suggest very little or no effect on the stability 
of export earnings from commodity concentration.
Results published by Coppock and by B, F, Masse11 support this conclusion, 
Coppock finds correlation coefficients of from +,02 to +,11 for samples of 
between 66 and 79 countries for the relationship between his index of 
instability and four different measures of export concentration,^ Massell’s 
regression coefficients for association between his two measures of export 
fluctuations and two measures of export concentration are also very low and 
clearly non-significant,
M, Michaely* on the other hand* does find export prices and commodity 
concentration to be significantly correlated for a sample of 36 countries.
He finds a rank correlation coefficient of ,404 which is significant at above 
the ,01 level* but still indicates a fairly low level of association, Michaely 
expresses surprise at the weakness of the association and suggests that it 
may be due to deficiencies in the measure of concentration (i,e, pecularities 
in classifying products may give a misleading indication of the actual degree 
of concentration)* or to inter-correlation in the raovemements of the prices
11of many goods as happened in the Korean boom and subsequent price declines.
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All of the measures of commodity concentration are subject to this difficulty. 
Nevertheless with samples of countries ranging from 36 to 79 it is unlikely 
that the correlation results will be seriously distorted. All of the 
correlation analyses yield roughly the same answer of very weak if any 
association between commodity concentration and export fluctuations. Since 
none of the samples is quite identical to another the possibility that the 
results are seriously distorted by the presence of a few countries whose 
concentration ratio is incorrect is relatively small. The other reason* 
inter-correlation* is probably one important explanation for the low 
correlation between commodity concentration and price or even proceeds 
instability. If the prices of most commodities move in the same direction 
most of the time* diversification will have little effect on stability of 
exports,
Geographic Concentration
Another possible explanation for export instability can be made in terms 
of regional concentration of underdeveloped countries’ exports. Underdeveloped 
countries generally have particular trade ties with individual rich countries 
or groups. The exports of most Latin American countries are directed largely 
to the United States* those of the French Franc Area go mainly to France 
while most Sterling Area primary exporters sell the bulk of their exports 
in Britain and Western Europe, Once again this may be thought risky* as 
placing too many eggs in one basket. Fluctuations in demand in one region 
could be offset by contrary changes in demand in another consuming country 
if exports were regionally diversified. Regional concentration misses this
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possibility, A regional spread of exports can reasonably be expected to 
increase stability and regional concentration to increase the probability of 
instability in export proceeds.
But once again statistical analysis fails to substantiate the theory. 
The correlation coefficients for association between export instability and 
geographic concentration of export destination are actually negative and one 
is significant at the ,05 level. Data used and results are set out in 
Table 2:3, These correlations indicate some* though rather weak, tendency 
for geographical concentration to be associated with less rather than more 
instability of export proceeds.
Both Coppock and Massell have similar findings on geographical 
concentration,^^ All of their results show that if any association exists 
between geographical concentration and export fluctuations it is negative, 
Michaely does not examine this relationship.
Of these three characteristics* primary good specialization* commodity 
and geographic concentration, only one, if any* appears to be significantly 
correlated with instability. Moreover the correlation in this case turns 
out to be negative in several different analyses using different samples of 
countries, different measures of export instability and different measures 
of geographical concentration.
Multiple-Regression Analyses
It is, however, rather likely that these variables should have high 
intercorrelation. Countries which have high primary-product ratios are also 
likely to have high commodity concentration. In many cases geographical
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concentration of exports will also be characteristic of the same countries 
In an attempt to isolate the separate influences of each of these variables* 
and to see how much of the variation in the degree of export instability can 
be explained by all three to-gether a multiple regression analysis was carried 
o u t , 14 Tbe regression equations found were :
(1) Y = 9,69 + 0,007 Xp + 0 ,011 - 0,036Xac = 0,051
(0,020) (0,031) (0,027)
(2) y 1 « 24,8 + 0,135 Xp » 0,032 Xc » 0,264 Xgc R^ = 0,248
(0,069) (0,105) (0,091)
where Y and y1 = instability indices for exports* Xp = primary-product ratio 
for exports, Xq = commodity concentration of exports* X^^ = geographic 
concentration of exports. The figures In brackets are the standard errors 
for the regression coefficients. Only Xgg. appears to be related significantly 
to export instability (better than the ,01 level) in equation (2) which uses 
the Coppock index and rather less firmly in equation (1) which uses the 
moving-average-trend-corrected index.
Considering only the equation most favourable to the hypotheses it 
appears that the first two variables [in equation (2)] between them explain 
less than 6 per cent (R^  = 0,057) of the variation between countries in 
export instability* while the addition of geographic concentration raises 
the total explanation to near 25 per cent (R^  = 0,248), These results more 
or less confirm the evidence of the simple correlations. Only geographic 
concentration appears firmly associated with export instability and in the 
opposite way to a priori expectation. However* the partial correlation of 
export instability with primary»product concentration is rather higher than
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the simple correlation. When the influence of and Xg^  ^are allowed for Xp 
and have a partial correlation coefficient of r = 0,324, but this is still 
too low to reach the ,05 level of significance. Perhaps it does suggest the 
existence of some slight tendency for specialization in primary products to 
enhance the risks of export instability.
Countries and Commodities
If the relationship between value* price and quantity changes in the 
exports of underdeveloped countries and in the individual commodities which 
underdeveloped countries export are examined some contrast between the 
position of the individual country’s exports and the situation of the world 
market for individual products emerges.
Individual Countries
For countries* a comparison of indices of instability for (1) total
export proceeds, (2) prices and (3) quantities reveals that quantities have
been more unstable than prices and that instability in total proceeds is not
associated positively with instability in prices (unit values were used),
“ 1 2 ” '’0.019, but is correlated very significantly, r^^g = 0,596, (higher
15than .001 level) with the instability index of quantity of exports. This 
seems to suggest that attempts to stabilize export prices might be worse than 
useless. This would not, however, be a necessary conclusion. These results 
are consistent with another explanation of instability. Comparatively small 
changes in export prices could well produce exaggerated responses in the 
quantity of goods exported, one, two or more years later. If this were common 
for underdeveloped countries’ exports it could produce a high correlation
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between the instability indices for quantity changes and total value* but 
low or even negative correlations between prices and total values. This is 
because each index sums up the temporal experience of each country for a large 
number of years, 1946-58, At most* all we can conclude is that the statistical 
evidence gives no support to the view that stabilization of export prices 
would eliminate all or most of the instability in countries' export proceeds. 
Indeed* it might even increase it if quantity fluctuations were due to 
non-economic factors. These conclusions are by no means novel and this last 
point has been made repeatedly, particularly by P, T, Bauer,
World Totals
In the case of world exports of individual commodities the degree of 
instability of export prices seems slightly higher on average than for 
quantities and the instability index for export proceeds has a higher 
correlation coefficient, r = 0,838 with the instability index for prices 
(unit values) than with the instability index for quantities, r - 0,501,
These are both significant at well above the ,01 level. The correlation 
coefficient for the instability index for quantity with the instability index 
for unit values is only ,213 which is not significant at the ,05 l e v e l , -
The fact that the instability in prices seems to be the main determinant
of fluctuations in the total value of world trade in commodities while not 
for total exports from individual countries may yield us some information. 
Firstly, it is consistent with what should be the normal expectation, that
the part of the world exports of a good which comes from any one country is
likely to be much more unstable than is the total quantity of world exports 
of that good. Various factors peculiar to a particular country at a 
particular time may produce an enormous percentage change in that country's
exports* but make only a very small dent,in the total world supply. Natural 
disasters such as droughts* floods* pests* earthquakes added to man-made 
hazards of revolutions* wars and changes in economic policies may all be 
mainly confined in their impact to particular countries' exports of products. 
Secondly* it strengthens our tentative conclusion that quantity variations 
really were the more important determinant of fluctuations in export proceeds. 
For if moderate swings in prices produced sharp fluctuations in quantities 
they would do so for world export totals just as much as for individual 
countries. The country prices and the world prices will seldom differ 
significantly for most commodities in most countries and there are no 
particular reasons for expecting supply elasticities for the average 
underdeveloped country to be much higher than for the world total. It is 
really only in the case of agricultural crops that lagged responses are 
common and therefore the evidence of the group of commodities studied (which 
covers all the important traded agricultural commodities) makes this seem 
very unlikely.
If the foregoing argument is valid we can accept that fluctuations in 
export proceeds of individual underdeveloped countries have stemmed mainly 
from fluctuations in the quantities of goods exported. The reasons for the 
fluctuations in quantities remain to be established. There are many 
possibilities, but from our examination of instability in world trade in 
commodities it seems implausible to argue that the main cause of the 
fluctuations in the quantities of exports lay basically in price instability. 
However* these remarks apply only to average relationships and by no means 
exclude the likelihood that for some countries fluctuations in export prices 
due to changes in world demand have been far more important generators of
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instability in export proceeds than have changes in their supply of 
exports.
Conclusions
The above discussion makes it very difficult to ascribe the extra
instability of underdeveloped countries' exports to large general causes.
In any case* as was noted above* the actual difference between the average
level of instability in underdeveloped countries' export proceeds and those
of rich countries is not large.
On the basis of simple correlation and multiple-regression analyses
it appears that three inherently plausible reasons for expecting the exports
of underdeveloped countries to be highly unstable turn out to have very little
general explanatory value. Export instability appears to be hardly related
to commodity concentration at all* to be very weakly, if at all, related to
the proportion of exports which are primary goods, and to be negatively
related, if anything* to geographic concentration. Such lack of correspondence
between general abstractions with a plausible appearance and the results of
empirical analyses is by no means uncommon in economics. However, it is,
perhaps* incumbent upon the writer to supply some explanation for the conflict
between theory and facts.
First, the facts may be wrong. Economic data are often highly innacurate,
For data collected in underdeveloped countries even this may be a serious
understatement. However figures on exports are probably among the more
reliable series for reasons of relative ease of collection and the long history
18of collection of such data for taxation purposes. Secondly, the statistics 
calculated from these data may not accurately measure what they purport to
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measure 0 The various indices used and quoted in this ehapter have been des cribed 
in the text or in footnotes. They seem to the author to be valid measures 
of export instability and of primary-good specialization or of concentration. 
Differences in commodity classification even within the SITC categories occur 
and they may make a few countries look slightly more or less specialized or 
concentrated than they are in fact. But when several different analyses using 
slightly different techniques and measures for different groups and numbers 
of countries and over different years produce rather similar results it 
greatly increases the probability that the statistical findings are a 
reasonable approximation to reality. On these grounds it seems to this 
writer that the empirical findings have the stronger claim to acceptance.
It could be*, of course, that fluctuations in primary export proceeds 
have been modified by various policy measures. During the period studied 
(1946-58) special multilateral or bilateral arrangements have been in force 
which may have had the effect of reducing fluctuations in the total value of 
several primary exports. The International Tin Agreement and the agreement 
between coffee exporters started near the end of the period* 1956 and 1957 
respectively. Both were in any case ineffective against year-to-year 
fluctuations within this period. Commonwealth Sugar Agreements and US import 
quotas probably moderated fluctuations in sugar prices and proceeds for a 
large part of the market but at the expense of destabilizing the residual 
free market. The International Sugar Agreement of 1953 was intended as a 
palliative for the problems of those exporters outside the bilateral 
arrangements. Sugar prices* however, fluctuated just as much from 1953 to 
1960 under the Agreement as they had from 1948 to 1953 before it. Copper and 
aluminum prices may have been smoothed somewhat by tacit producers’
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arrangements 0 Certain countries* tropical products have been sold at 
relatively stable prices in protected markets e,g, British colonies in the 
1940*s and early 1950*s and French Franc Area territories. But such partial 
stabilization of a sector of a matket is likely to destabilize the export 
earnings of countries which have to sell in unprotected markets. Most of 
the arrangements described here have had price support rather than moderation 
of fluctuations* as we have defined them* as their aim. This is also true 
of the Wheat Agreement which has been the longest lasting and apparently 
successful of the post-war international commodity agreements. However* 
some moderation of fluctuations in the value of some primary product exports 
may have resulted from the combined action of these various schemes. Section 
IV and Chapter 12 in particular discuss such schemes at some length in this 
study.
If these countries whose exports are highly concentrated should happen 
to have picked commodities for export whose proceeds were effectively 
stabilized by some international or bilateral arrangement any tendency for 
commodity concentration to cause instability would be averted.
Similarly special arrangements between the countries of destination* 
such as Britain and the US* and their trading partners would dampen any 
tendencies for regional concentration of exports to create instability.
Such arrangements have in fact only been important for sugar. Probably of 
much greater importance is the relative stability of industrial production 
and national income which has characterised the post-war economies of the 
QC and the US,
One factor which bears upon this issue is that the total value of primary 
products exported varies much less than appears from most discussions.
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Actual ly the prices at which primary exports are sold fluctuate rather less 
than the quoted prices. The latter are generally an arithmetic average of 
monthly or weekly prices to give an average yearly price. But what affects 
a country’s receipts is a weighted average price* weighted by the quantity 
sold in each period. Usually the quantities sold at the extreme highs and 
lows are relatively small and a yearly average price weighted by these quantities 
would show far smaller fluctuations than a simple average of prices.
Another relevant fact is that in countries ranked by the percentage of 
their total exports in three commodities the twenty most concentrated have 
specialized in relatively stable goods, (See Table 2:5,) Out of the twenty 
countries which have highly concentrated exports (i,e, 80 per cent or more 
in three commodities)* the only highly unstable commodity exported by any 
is rubber. Ten out of the twenty had either coffee or bananas as their 
principal export. Two of them had both and two other countries had coffee 
as an important second export. Petroleum was a principal export for two 
other countries and an important second export for a third. Thus coffee* 
bananas and petroleum figure very prominently among the exports of countries 
with highly concentrated exports. These three products have been relatively 
very stable in world trade compared with a mean index of instability of 14,0 
for the 27 primary goods listed in Table 2:4, Of the other products which 
figure in Table 2:5 only cotton and cocoa show average or more than average 
instability.
It appears that it is not specialization in primary products or 
concentration on a few goods which causes instability, but specialization 
or concentration on particular goods which have a record of severe fluctuations. 
Moreover, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for severe
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instability in the exports of individual countries as examination of the 
post-war experiences of a group of underdeveloped countries reveals.
Underdeveloped Countries with Severe Instability in Export Proceeds
The countries discussed in this section and which are shown in Table 
2 :6 * have been selected on the basis of a high ranking on four different 
indices for export instability. The four different measures were used on 
the grounds that no single measure is free from criticism* but that any 
country's exports which are ranked as highly unstable by all four measures 
will be so by any reasonable standard. The four indices used were: 1, the
average annual deviations from a five-year moving average (1948-58), 2, the
Coppock Log, variance index (1946-58), 3, the average-annual deviations
from a straight line trend fitted by least-squares regression, (1946-58),
4, the UN measure of the average™annual-percentage changes, dividing always 
by the higher figure (1946-58),
On four different measures of commodity concentration the exports of 
these countries are also on average slightly more concentrated than the 
averages for the exports of all the available countries in Coppock's list. 
However* within the 12 countries there is considerable variation* from the 
highly concentrated exports of Iraq to the relatively diversified Korea and 
Argentina, Several countries with much more highly concentrated exports 
than any included in this 12 have much less instability of export proceeds 
than they e,g, Costa Rica* Dominican Republic and Panama, Still* it remains 
true that the 12 countries have* on the average* slightly more concentrated 
exports than do all the countries included in Coppock’s study.
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When the individual experience of each, of these countries is examined it 
seems clear that both general and specific factors have made for instability.
In the cases of the two oil countries* Iran and Iraq* it is obvious that the 
causes of export instability do not lie in any general instability in world 
markets for petroleum* since petroleum has been almost the most stable commodity 
in world trade. For Iran the proximate cause has been great instability in 
the volume of exports (instability index - 110,2), Prices have been relatively 
stable (instability index = 11,6) as can be expected from the heavy concentration 
on petroleum. Clearly the fundamental cause of Iran’s high export instability 
(the highest for all countries) can be attributed to the political struggle 
for ownership and control of the oil wells and the rather successful efforts 
of the oil companies in preventing the marketing of Iranian oil in the early 
1950’s, This is a very special cause of instability; one which raises 
important questions of international law and politics* but one which clearly 
does not fall into the generally accepted explanations for underdeveloped 
country export instability,^^
The story in Iraq is probably much the same. Fluctuations in volume 
(instability index = 35,7) have been much greater than in price (instability 
index = 6,5) and can probably be largely attributed to internal political 
troubles* bargaining disputes with the oil companies and transport difficulties 
in the period of the Suez Crisis due to blockage of the canal and the 
introduction of petrol rationing in the United Kingdom, Certainly Iraq’s 
exports fell sharply in 1956 and 1957,
The general situation in world markets for the type of products exported 
by Argentina has been one of reasonable stability. The instability index 
for the proceeds of world imports of meat (beef and veal) for the period 
1948-57 was 10, and for wheat* 15* to be compared with the average for 27
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commodities of 14, These* together with an instability index for wool of 
17 could not * without an exceptional coincidence of experience in the markets 
for all of them* explain high export instability. The extra instability which 
they experienced was largely due to relatively severe changes in export 
quantities. These* in turn* stem largely from a severe drought in 1952 and 
the industrialisation* export bargaining policies and policies of discrimination 
against export industries adopted by Peron, Negotiations over bulk-purchase 
agreements with the United Kingdom in particular disturbed the volume of 
exports in this period,
Malaya* Indonesia and Vietnam are the major rubber-exporting countries 
in the group. For them high export instability is only to be expected, given 
the volatility of world markets for natural rubber. For Malaya and Indonesia 
prices have been highly unstable and undoubtedly are the major proximate 
cause of their export instability. Their situation comes much closer to the 
characteristic model of the literature on the export instability experienced 
by underdeveloped countries. Their instability seems to be a by-product of 
the instability in industrial countries’ demands for raw materials caused by 
cyclical fluctuations in their economies and speculation in stock piling of 
strategic raw materials. Both Malaya and Indonesia had very sharp peaks in 
export proceeds in 1951 due to the Korean War,
Fluctuations in both prices and quantities in these two countries have 
been additive rather than offsetting; hence their export instability has to 
be attributed largely to fluctuations in demand. But* in both countries some 
non-price induced fluctuations must also have occurred. In Malaya* throughout 
the relevant period* there was a fairly active guerilla war being fought 
between British forces and Malayan independence fighters. In Indonesia in
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the early period production was recovering from the low levels under Japanese 
occupation and later exports were disturbed by the struggles for independence 
from Dutch control and the subsequent struggle for power between rival 
Indonesian factions.
In Vietnam* instability in export proceeds (37,8) seems to have been 
due mainly to fluctuations in volume (35,9), Unit values were fairly 
stable (13,4), Exports are heavily concentrated* 60 per cent in rubber, and 
25 per cent rice. The instability of exports from Vietnam is consistent with 
the orthodox model* but the close relationship between the instability in 
proceeds and in volume could also indicate fluctuations in rice and rubber 
output caused by political unrest* direct sabotage and difficulties of harvesting 
or collection in areas touched by fighting or guerilla activity during the 
long war in French Indochina,
Korea’s exports are fairly widely diversified, well below the average 
levels of the various measures of concentration. Fluctuations in the value 
of its exports must have been heavily influenced by the actual war* the 
subsequent political revolutions and attendant changes in government economic 
policy,
Pakistan and Sudan are both countries whose exports are highly dependent 
on the world markets for natural fibres. Jute has been one of the most 
unstable commodities in international trade in the post-war world. Cotton* 
in general* has been about averagely unstable from 1948-57, In the case of 
both of these countries the instability of export proceeds Is probably mainly 
explained by their concentration on these products. But some doubts do 
remain, Egypt* which is even more highly specialized in cotton exports has 
experienced almost half the instability registered by Sudan’s exports, Sudan
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is* however* more concentrated on the special category of * very-long-staple 
cotton,’ Another point of difference is that fluctuations in volume were 
larger than price fluctuations in Sudan* but that instability of proceeds was 
much greater than either. This implies few offsetting changes in prices and 
quantities. For Egypt the opposite holds ; fluctuations in prices were the 
greater and fluctuations in export proceeds were partly stabilized by offsetting 
movements in prices and quantities of exports. This may be due to the dominant 
position of Egypt in world markets which allows prices to be influenced by 
the size of the Egyptian cotton crop, Sudan's extra instability may be due 
firstly* to highly unstable output caused by natural hazards and secondly* 
to specialization on a particular brand of cotton which is highly unstable.
The case of Ghaqa is another which is explicable mainly in terms of 
specialization on a product which has a record of sharp fluctuations in world 
trade. Variations in price appear to have been much larger than variations 
in volume and the instability index for total value slightly exceeds that 
for unit value. This seems to indicate a general tendency for price and 
quantity variations to offset each other save for occasions when world demand 
expands, Ghana seems to fit orthodox general explanations of export 
fluctuations,
Bolivia and Haiti are also countries whose instability probably stems 
from high specialization in commodities which have experienced average or 
slightly less than average instability in world markets. Probably their 
exports* of respectively tin and coffee* were a little more unstable than 
the world average. Certainly in Haiti fluctuations in quantities exported 
were greater than in prices while for world coffee markets the converse was 
true. This suggests that factors affecting Haitian output of coffee have 
been the most important causes of Haiti's export fluctuations.
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From this quick survey of 12 highly unstable underdeveloped countries 
it seems that in four of thems Argentina; Irang Korea and Vietnam* high export 
instability was largely due to political factors or war* In a further three; 
Indonesia* Iraq* and Malaya* politics and war again played a part* but a less 
vital one* In the remaining five; Bolivia* Ghana* Haiti* Pakistan and Sudan* 
export instability is more evidently the result of basic supply and demand 
characteristics of the types of products they exporta Apart from Haiti each 
of these countries was very specialized in the export of commodities which 
were of* at least* average or more than average instability among the 27 
commodities included in Table 2:4* In other words not only were they 
specialized on primary products* but on particularly unstable primary products, 
In the case of Haiti variations in supply appear to be the main explanation 
of export instability since coffee markets in the post-war world do not seem 
to have been subject to very sharp short«period fluctuations*
Conclusions
On the basis of these cases and the earlier statistical evidence one 
might be justified in concluding that where high export instability has 
existed very specific factors have* more often than not* been the main 
explanation* Such theoretical explanations as specialization in primary 
products in general or commodity concentration may have some slight systematic 
tendency to produce export instability* but their explanatory value in 
particular cases is very small* Even when looking at the broader picture 
of explaining why underdeveloped countries' exports should be more unstable 
than rich countries' exports they are not particularly helpful* As was
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pointed out above* the ratio of exports which were primary products and the 
commodity concentration ratio between them explained less than 6 per cent of 
the differences between countries in export instability*
Policy
If it is true that short-term fluctuations in export proceeds are seriously
harmful to underdeveloped countries then it may be held desirable to adopt
policies to reduce instability* From our analyses and the published results
of Coppock* Massell* and Michaely it seems clear that statistical evidence
on instability yields little* if any* support for policies of diversification
or industrialisation as means of avoiding this particular p r o b l e m * O f
course* these policies may be desirable for other reasons*
Other conclusions relevant to policy are that export instability in
underdeveloped countries seems to stem more from quantity fluctuations than
from changes in price* This suggests that policies which aim solely at price
stabilization may remove relatively little of the export instability and in
some cases may even increase fluctuations in total proceeds* A recent
International Monetary Fund study states that* "For the postwar period, there
is a negative correlation of 0*5 between changes in export prices and changes
21in export quantities in the average primary producing country*" If this 
relationship were to continue price stabilization unaccompanied by quantity 
stabilization would destabilize export proceeds for many countries*
A further conclusion is that a weakening of trade ties between 
underdeveloped countries and their main historical trade partners through 
the acquisition of new markets may actually increase rather than decrease
3“
tendencies to export fluctuation* On other counts* such as increased free 
trade or greater political independence* such market diversification may be 
of course* highly desirable from the viewpoint of developing nations*
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Table 2:1 Instability Indices
Exports of Underdeveloped Countries, (1946-58)
Country Total Value Unit Value Volume
%3
Argentina 41,3 6 .0 29.6
Bolivia 26 o6 18.4 15.6
Brazil 13.8 17.4 10.7
Burma 14.7 17.9 26.6
Ceylon 13.0 15.6 5.6
Chile 20.2 16.1 22.1
China (Taiwan) 16.3 38.2 27.6
Colombia 13.4 13.9 9.4
Costa Rica 14.3 11.1 18.7
Cuba 26.0 12.4 12.4
Dominican Republic 16.9 18.9 9.5
Ecuador 25.2 15.7 20.9
Egypt 20.1 27.3 15.0
El Salvador 13.9 13.8 14.1
Ethiopia - Eritrea 24.3 12.9 14.9
Ghana 31.9 27.6 11.6
Greece 18.2 16.0 9.2
Guatemala 10.7 74.2 8 .2
Haiti 26.7 17.5 21.5
Honduras 16.1 6 .0 18.1
India 16.2 17.5 7.0
Indonesia 57.2 26.6 8.9
Iran 73.8 11.6 110.2
Iraq 27.2 6.5 35.7
Malaya 41.9 29.4 11.1
Mexico 11.1 16.2 9.5
Morocco 25.7 9.8 7.5
Ni caragua 14.2 17.8 17.8
Nigeria 20.9 14.0 7.6
Pakistan 36.5 24.0 17.2
Panama 9.9 9.7 8.7
Paraguay 16.0 16.7 16.5
Peru 10.0 17.7 10.1
Philippines 18.3 17.5 36.8
Portugal 15.2 8 .8 12.4
Rhodesia - Nyasaland 12.5 16.0 9.4
Sudan 40.4 25.2 28.9
Syria 15.7 8 .8 17.5
Continued on following page
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Table 2:1 (Continued)
Country Total Value Unit Value 
%2
Volume
%3
Thailand 36.6 11.4 14.4
Tunisia 33.0 19.5 31.5
Turkey 19.4 12.1 22.4
Union of South Africa 10.3 14.8 27.4
Uruguay 19.7 26.1 37.9
Venezuela 16.1 3.5 8.1
Vietnam 37.8 13.4 35.9
Means 23.1 17.6 19.4
Standard Deviation (12.9)
Source: Coppock, 1962: Table A-2
Correlations :
Xl
Xn
Xi
1.0000
-0,0193
0.5955
%2
1.0000
- 0 . 1 0 1 0 1.0000
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Table 2:2 Instability Indices
Instability in Exports of Rich Countries
Proceeds
XI
Prices
X2
Quantities 
 ^ ____
Australia 24.6 26.9 9.7
Austria 21.4 14.8 19.5
Belgium-Luxembourg 18.5 11.8 19.2
Canada 7.5 5.5 5.3
Denmark 10.0 4.8 11.7
Finland 30.4 23.4 11.7
France 20.9 8.3 20.1
Germany (West) 19.4 8.0 18.4
Iceland 22.1 12.7 18.7
Ireland 6.3 5.6 9.9
Israel 12.0 4.9 14.4
Italy 21.5 6.9 9.3
Japan 31.0 15.7 26.1
Norway 16.4 12.0 11.7
Sweden 15.1 15.5 8 .2
Switzerland 6 .2 3.0 6 .8
United Kingdom 17.7 5.4 14.6
United States of America 16.8 7.0 16.7
Means 17.6 10.7 14.0
Standard Deviation (7,1)
Source: Coppock, Table A-2
Correlations :
X-
+ 1 . 0
+0.7329
+0.5858
+ 1.0
+0.1271 +1.0
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Table 2:3
Export Instability, Composition of Exports and Concentration
1.
I“I 1=1 Ratio
Exports Exports Prim.
(1948-58)(1946-58) Prod./
Total
Commodity Geographic 
Concen- Concen­
tration tration 
(1954) (1954)
Exports (1954)
lo Argentina 12.0 41.3 87.9 28.7 32.1
2. Australia 9.2 24.6 88.3 50.8 41.2
3. Austria • 6 .1 21.4 32.8 27.7 31.8
4. Be1gi urn-Lus embourg 10.2 18.5 18.8 25.5 29.4
5. Brazil 6.4 13.8 97.5 61.2 41.5
6 . Burma 11.4 14.7 95.0 74.4 47.6
7. Canada 7.5 7.5 52.9 24.9 63.9
8. Colombia 6 .2 13.4 98.4 85.0 79.8
9. Costa Rica 5.9 14.3 24.0 60,5 62.4
10. Denmark 3.3 10.0 74.7 27.1 41.8
11. Egypt 8.9 20.1 92.3 84.2 26.0
12. Finland 12.7 30.4 65.1 38.1 34.0
3 3. France 5.2 20.9 31.3 18.0 21 .8
14. Germany (Federal Republic) 9.4 19.4 15.3 22.3 21 .0
15. Greece 8.2 18.2 83.3 46.2 34.1
16. Honduras 7.3 16.1 94.6 62.7 78.0
17. Iceland 10.6 22.1 90.6 80.3 29.1
18. Indonesia 9.8 57.2 95.6 41.7 38.3
19. Ireland 7.5 6.3 79.7 38.3 89.7
20. Italy 8.5 21.5 36.5 20.5 21.1
21. Japan 11.4 31.0 13.7 24.8 24.0
22. Libya 11.9 22.5 89.0 34.1 47.9
23, Malaya and Singapore 19.7 41.9 72.8 49.8 26.0
24. Mexico 8.5 11.1 67.6 35.0 73.7
25. Netherlands 9.9 21.4 49.8 16.9 27.0
26. Nigeria 8 .2 20.9 87.6 49.3 74.0
27. Norway 13.7 16.4 44.1 25.5 28.0
28. Panama 11.1 9.9 98.3 62.8 95.5
29. Portugal 7.2 15.2 53.0 24.7 27.4
30. Rhodesia and Nyasaland 9.2 12.5 04.0 63.6 58.4
31. Spain 5.5 10.9 77.8 31.4 29.5
32. Sweden 11.7 15.1 47.1 28.1 28.4
33. Thailand 6 .6 36.6 96.0 68.3 43.5
34. Turkey 8.0 19.4 96.8 39.7 29.3
35. United Kingdom 7.5 17.7 15.0 19.2 18.7
36. United States 8.9 16.8 29.2 18.8 27.5
37. Yugoslavia 10.1 46.1 64.9 21.4 31.3
Sources: See following page
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Sources for Table 2:3
1. Instability Index: deviations from five-year moving average,
Data from IMF* International Finq.ncial Statistics, various
issues
2. Coppock* Table A-2.
3. Calculated from UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1955, 
Ratio of SITC 0, 1* 2* and 3 to total commodity exports.
Estimates for Thailand and Burma who did not publish under
SITC heads.
4. Michaely* Concentration in International Trade (Amsterdam, 1962), 
Table 1.
5. Michaely, op. cit., Table 3.
Correlations :
Primary Product Ratio 3. 
Commodity Concentration 4, 
Geographic Concentration 5,
Instability 
Index (devso from 
lo_ mv. av.)
0.0168
-  0.0011
- 0.1960
Instability 
Index 
2. (Coppock)
0.1445
- 0.0754
- 0.3846
Only one of these, R2 5 =-0.3846, is significant at the .05 
level using the normal "Student's t" test with 35 degrees of freedom.
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Table 2:4 World Trqde in Primary Commodities: 
Short"Period Fluctuations in Value, Unit Value and Volume 
(Average Inst ability-Indices, 194 8-19.57; percentages,)..
Commodity Value
^1
Unit Value 
^2
Volume
^3
Natural rlibber 30 25 7
Barley 25 15 14
Jute 21 X 16 16
Copra 19 16 10
Silk 18 9 19
Cocoa 17 19 7
Zinc 17 18 9
Wool 17 17 10
Coconut oil 17 17 10
Lead 16 18 14
Copper 15 15 6
Maize 15 13 10
Wheat 15 8 12
Cotton 14 13 8
Tin 14 10 15
Mutton and lamb 14 7 10
Rice 12 11 8
Tea 12 9 11
Aluminum 12 6 , 9
Beef and veal 10 8 13
Butter 10 7 10
Cheese 10 7 7
Coffee 9 11 7
Sugar 6 6 4
Tobacco 6 4 6
Crude petroleum 4 5 3
Bananas 4 2 4
Means 14.0 11.6 9.6
Source: UN, World Economic Survey, 1958, Table 13, p. 40
Correlations :
X2
1.0000
0,8382
%2
1.0000
%3
%3 0.5005 0.2132 1.0000
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Tab le 2:5
Commodity Concentration: Principal Exports in
the Twenty Most Concentrated Countries
1.
Most Important 
Commodities
2.
Index of 
Commodity's 
Instability
3.
No. of 
1^^ Export
4.
Countries' Having Commodity
Significant 2^  ^Export^
Coffee 9 7 3
Bananas 4 3 1
Petroleum 4 2 1
Rubber 30 2 1
Cotton 14 1 2
Cocoa 17 1 0
Rice 12 1 0
Sugar 6 1 0
Tea 12 1 0
Mean Index of Instability
for 27 commodities 14.0
Source: 1,3, and 4, extracted from Coppock, 1962: Table,.5«.l,.
2, Indices of Instability from UN World Economic Survey, 1958, 
Table 13.
By significant export we mean that it was more than ten per cent of 
total exports.
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Table 2:6
Underdeveloped Countries with Highly Unstable Exports 
(1946-58 for Most Countries)
Main Exports as Percentage of Total Export ' ‘
1st % 2nd % 3rd %
1. Argentina Meat 26 Wheat 16 Wool 13
2. Bolivia Tin 60 Lead 9 Tungsten 7
3. Ghana Cocoa 62 Wood 12 Diamonds 11
4. Haiti Coffee 61 Sisal 18 Sugar 9
5. Indonesia Rubber 36 Petroleum 30 Tin 6
6. Iran Petroleum
products
36 Petroleum 29 
(crude)
Cotton 7
7. Iraq Petroleum 88 Dates 3 Barley 2
8. Korea (1950-58) Tungsten 14 Talc 12 Fish 6
9. Malaya Rubber 49 Tin 11 Petroleum
products
10
10. Pakistan (1948-58) Jute 49 Cotton 21 Wool 6
11. Sudan Cotton 47 Cottonseed 11 Gum 10
12. Vietnam (1948-58) Rubber 60 Rice 25 Coal 3
Source: Extracted from Coppock* 1962: Table 5-1. Basic sources, UN
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* 1957 and IMF* International 
Financial Statistics. Totals exclude invisible exports.
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Footnotes to Chapter 2
1, For example* UN* 1952; UN* 1962: Vol. 1* pp. 48-58; UN* 1961;
pp. 3-6; Ragnar Nurkse* 1958; B. Higgins* 1959: pp. 552-68.
2. Data from J. D. Coppock* 1962: Table A-2. The index of
instability which he uses is a complex one which approximates closely to the 
average year-to-year percentage variation in earnings from exports of goods 
and services adjusted for a constant percentage trend. The index equals the 
antilog of the square root of the logarithmic variance of the series which 
is given by:
V log = ^
N"
^  log Xt+1 - log Xt - ^ S l o g  Xt+I - log Xt) ]
where N is the number of years* X is the value of export proceeds and the 
subscripts indicate the date. See Chapter 2 of Coppock's book. He uses IMF
data for the value of exports and the indices sum up the experience of each
country for the period 1946-58* with a few exceptions.
3. Data from Coppock* 1962: Table A-2. Soviet bloc countries
excluded. Tables 2:1 and 2:2 show the lists of countries used.
4. United Nations* 1961: p. 3. The. quotation refers to average
year-to-year fluctuations after allowance for trend and consequently means 
the same type of instability as we discuss in this paper.
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5o Coppock* 1962: p. 41. He uses both his own "log variance
index" and a UN index which simply takes the average percentage annual changes 
uncorrected for trend* but always dividing by the higher figure for each pair 
of years. The conclusions stand on either index.
6. Fleming and Lovasy* 1960: p. 6.
7. Food* beverages and tobacco* crude materials* mineral fuels
and lubricants* SITC categories 0* 1* 2 and 3 were treated as primary and 
all other goods as manufactures. This involves some errors, but they are 
probably too small to affect the results.
8. CF.* Coppock* 1962: p. 103.
9. Coppock* 1962: Table 5-3* p. 114
10. B. Massell* 1964: Table 5. Both Massell's indices of
instability correct for trend. One uses the standard error of estimate for
a linear regression line of export earnings on time divided by the mean of
the observations. The other is an average annual percentage rate of change 
in exports corrected for a linear trend (pp. 49-52). The two concentration 
indices are Gini coefficients defined as C =^ST^i/^)^ where = the value 
of exports of commodity ^ and x = the total value of exports, but the first 
uses only the first digit SITC and the second uses the 3 digit SITC. They 
are calculated for 1959.
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11. Mo Michaely* 1962: pp. 72-4. He uses a Gini coefficient and 
a 3 digit SITC grouping for his concentration index with data for 1954. His 
instability index for export prices is simply an average annual percentage 
change uncorrected for trend. This is not unreasonable for prices as opposed 
to proceeds.
12. Coppock* 1962: Table 5=3* Massell* 1964: Table 5 and pp.
56-61. None of Coppock's results reach the .05 level of significance but
he correlates 3 different measures of geographical concentration with export 
instability and all give negative coefficients ranging from -.13 to -.20.
He also tests association between instability and the proportion of exports 
going to the US and finds a coefficient of -.27 for this.
13. Actual coefficients of correlation for these in our analysis 
were: between primary-export ratio and commodity concentration* r = 0.565 
(significant at .001 level); between primary-export ratio and geographic 
concentration* r = 0.378 (significant at .05 level) and between commodity 
concentration and geographic concentration* r = 0.451 (significant at the 
.01 level). Data used are in Table 2:3.
14. The data used are the same as for the simple correlations 
discussed above and set out in Table 2:3.
15. Correlations for 45 underdeveloped countries. Data from
Coppock* 1962: Table A-2 are set out in Table 2:1. Indices relate to the
period 1946-58. Trend has been eliminated.
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16. Correlations calculated from data for the years 1948-57* 
published in UN* 1958: Table 13* p. 40. Trend has been eliminated from the
data by fitting linear regression lines before the indices of instability 
were calculated. Reproduced here in altered form as Table 2:4
17. Cf,* Oskar Morgenstem* 1963.
18. Morgenstem* 1963: p. 163 et seq finds fault with commodity 
trade statistics too* but mainly for lack of comparability in the reporting 
of the same goods by trading partners. Such discrepancies are generally due 
to differences in classification and should not affect the year-to-year 
comparability of one country's reported figures for the total value of its 
exports.
19. E. Penrose* 1959: discusses some of the economic* political
and legal implications of this struggle.
20. The case of Puerto Rico is of interest here. Its exports
were predominantly primary goods* mainly food products to the US mainland.
They have been remarkably stable. Now Puerto Rico is switching to manufactures 
for which demand is income elastic. There is a fair possibility that this 
will increase the sensitivity of the Puerto Rican economy to US fluctuations. 
There is already some evidence of this happening though Puerto Rico has been 
surprisingly resistant to the effects of US fluctuations despite the close 
dependence on the US. See Chapter 7 of this study and W. Baer* 1962: p. 78.
21. Fleming and Lovasy* 1960: p. 8* footnote 8.
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Chapter 3 
The Short-term Consequences
In Chapter 1 some plausible reasons for expecting fluctuations in 
export proceeds to cause sympathetic fluctuations in income, employment, 
domestic prices, imports and domestic investment were set out. Employment 
seemed to be the least likely to be seriously affected for reasons 
stated there. Moreover statistical data on employment or unemployment 
are unavailable or extremely inaccurate in most underdeveloped countries. 
Analyses in this chapter will therefore omit direct consideration of 
employment and concentrate on the other four variables. Where possible 
employment and unemployment data have been used in the case studies in 
Section II, In the present chapter assumptions and conclusions of theories 
concerning export-induced domestic instability are discussed against 
the recent historical experience of the less developed countries.
Foreign Trade Orientation
The vulnerability of underdeveloped countries to export fluctuations is 
often thought to stem from their dependence on export earnings for a large 
proportion of their national income, A UN study (1953, p, 10), gives figures 
for the ratio of trade to income for several underdeveloped countries, compares 
these with some rich countries and suggests a quantitatively greater dependence 
on trade for the former, Hans Singer (1950, p, 473) says, "Foreign trade 
tends to be proportionately most important when incomes are lowest," A 
widely used textbook (Higgins, 1959, p, 155) claims, "Underdeveloped countries
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outside the arid zone are unstable mainly because of their orientation 
towards exports."
This belief, that foreign trade is quantitatively more important for 
poor than for rich nations is not supported by the facts, The unweighted 
average for the ratio of trade to income for a large group of underdeveloped 
countries is smaller than for a large sample of rich countries. The 
actual ratios are 46,6 per cent for 52 underdeveloped countries and 52,7 
per cent for 17 developed countries. The calculations were made from data 
in Coppock (1962, Table A-2), omitting communist bloc countries, whose trade 
is sufficiently peculiar as to justify treating them as a special case.
Correlation analysis of the association between per capita income, as 
a rough indicator of stage of economic development and the ratio of exports 
plus imports to national income yields a coefficient of ,28 which seems to 
indicate a slight tendency for trade to be proportionately larger for rich 
than for poor countries though the correlation is barely significant at the 
,05 level. The data were drawn from the same source and cover the same 69 
countries. In both tests the countries used were all those for which data 
wore readily available.
These results are independently corroborated by findings published by 
Kuznets (1959 pp. 89-107) and Michaely (1962, Table 17), Kuznets, using 
both historical and cross-sectional analyses finds no evidence to support the 
view that trade formed a higher proportion of national product in underdeveloped 
than in developed economies. Michaely classifies 33 countries into large 
and small, developed and underdeveloped. Within each class his figures show 
that on average it is the developed countries which have the higher ratio of 
exports to gross national product (GNP),
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A more sophisticated version of the view that exports play a larger role 
in generating instability in underdeveloped countries than in developed 
economies may be characterised as the Wallich thesis. It underlies much of 
the reasoning of his famous study of the Cuban economy (Wallich, 1950), but 
is stated more explicitly in his paper, "Underdeveloped Countries and the 
International Monetary Mechanism," (Wallich, 1951, pp. 16-17), There he 
says, "The fact that in such an underdeveloped country exports bulk much 
larger than investment suggests that they are the more powerful generator 
of fluctuations," He suggests that the ratio of exports to national income 
is higher than for either investment or government expenditure to income.
Since the latter two factors are generally regarded as more amenable to 
national control the greater importance of exports is supposed to expose the 
economies of underdeveloped countries to the vagaries of international 
commodity markets. Moreover it handicaps any attempts at countercyclical 
policy,
C, P, Kindleberger (1962, pp, 220-21) examines Wallich's thesis briefly 
and finds that there is something, but not a great deal to the Wallich view.
Table 3:1 sets out data for 64 countries on exports as a percentage of 
investment and government expenditures respectively and to-gether. The only 
reason for inclusion in the table was availability of the relevant figures. 
Countries were separated into large and small, with population (of 10 millions) 
as the dividing line. They were then subdivided into developed and 
underdeveloped, more on a basis of what are generally regarded as their status 
than on the simple criterion of per capita income.
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What emerges from this table is that the importance of exports relative 
to investment and government expenditure is significantly related to the size 
of nations, but not particularly to wlietlier they are developed or underdeveloped. 
Among the large countries it is clear that there is no significant difference. 
For countries with less than 10 million inhabitants the Wallich thesis gets 
a little support, but not much, particularly if the ratio of exports to the 
sum of investment and government expenditure is regarded as the more important 
indicator. The use of medians rather than the means as the measure for the 
typical relationship would not alter these conclusions substantially.
Of course other factors play some part in determining a country's degree 
of participation in international trade. The policies of its government with 
regard to protection of domestic industries is one, and the distance of a 
country from its main customers and suppliers is another such factor. Size, 
measured by population figures should not be expected to explain more than 
a part of the relative importance of trade,^
Between the analyses carried out here and the results of the other 
studies quoted, the weight of evidence seems sufficient to justify a conclusion 
of little or no significant difference between rich and poor countries in the 
quantitative importance of trade in a general sense. Trade may nevertheless 
play a key role in underdeveloped countries which makes it more important to 
them in particular ways e.g. through the need to pay for imports of capital 
goods. Such matters are explored below.
Fluctuations In National Income 
Cross-Country Comparison
Although the assumption that exports are a larger proportion of income 
in underdeveloped countries than in developed countries appears to be
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inconsistent with the facts such countries may still be peculiarly sensitive 
to export fluctuations for other reasons. Table 3:2 shows indices of instability 
for export proceeds and national income for 35 underdeveloped countries for 
the period 1946-58 with a few exceptions,% Fluctuations in income for the 
average underdeveloped country have been much less than for export proceeds.
When the indices are compared it emerges that there is no evidence of 
association between the magnitude of fluctuations in income and of fluctuations 
in exports. Countries with relatively stable incomes have had very unstable 
exports and vice versa. Statistical analysis confirms this lack of association, 
yielding almost zero correlation for the whole sample. When the sample is 
limited to the 15 countries where the ratio of trade to national income is 
higher than average the correlation coefficient becomes slightly negative and 
again close to zero. It would seem that the magnitude of fluctuations in national 
income bears no relation to the magnitude of fluctuations in export earnings. Even 
when the relationship is tested for underdeveloped countries where trade is a large 
proportion of national income the data yield no support to the thesis that export 
instability is the most powerful generator of domestic instability,
A recent study by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, 1962, 
pp, 167-80) contains a table which ranks 18 Latin American countries by the 
magnitude of fluctuations in their gross domestic product (GDP) and gives the 
concurrent magnitude of their fluctuations in exports during 1948-59, The 
study comments :
"It will be obvious from an examination of the data in the two 
columns that there is no apparent intercountry relationship between 
the degree of instability in output and that of the purchasing power 
of exports, Cuba and Guatemala experienced the greatest degree of
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annual fluctuations in output among the Latin American countries, 
yet fluctuations in the purchasing power of their exports were 
somewhat smaller in magnitude than those experienced by Colombia 
and Ecuador, the two countries with the greatest stability in output 
over the p e r i o d ,
Their finding is in complete accord with our correlation analyses.
Time-Series Comparison
The expectation of the cross-country analyses was that high income 
instability would be associated with high export instability if fluctuations 
in export earnings were truly ah important determinant of domestic instability. 
But, in addition to the question of the degree of instability there is the 
question of timing. If changes in exports are an important cause of change 
in domestic income then some sequential relationship should be evident.
Income should tend to follow exports in the current period or with a short 
lag.
Table 3:3 presents statistics for 11 underdeveloped countries chosen 
on the basis of a high ratio of trade to income in an attempt to appraise 
the consistency of the timing and direction of change in the two variables,
GNP and exports. The aim of the table is very simple. It seeks to ascertain 
the number of years on which GNP fluctuated in the same direction as export 
proceeds. The possible score is given for each country as data were not 
available for the whole period for every country. The fluctuations have been 
crudely adjusted for trend by calculating the average annual increase in 
exports and GNP and subtracting this from the actual annual change in each 
case.
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The results tend to suggest that on a current-year basis, in such highly 
trade-oriented underdeveloped countries, some consistent relationship between 
direction of change in GNP and exports may well exist. In Burma, Ceylon, 
the Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba and Panama the association seems too high for 
coincidence. When the results for all eleven countries are pooled the score 
of 61 out of a possible 99 suggests a relationship slightly higher than could 
be expected to arise from shere chance. When this year's GNP is related to 
last year's exports the result appears quite random. The possibility that 
the reaction may be swift in some countries and slower in others is considered 
by choosing the best country scores from each column but this leads to very 
little improvement upon the current year score. The ECLA study cited above 
presents charts showing the timing of annual fluctuations in gross domestic 
product and purchasing power of exports 1948-59 for the same 18 Latin 
American countries. Their comment was,
"It will be obvious from an examination of the figure that 
the annual concordance of movements in the two variables is not 
very great, Cuba and Ecuador are the only instances where the two 
series move in fairly close harmony," (pp, 170-71)
Given that our sample of 11 underdeveloped countries was chosen as 
having very high ratios of trade to GNP and consequently likely to be 
sensitive to short-term changes in exports the results of the two different 
analyses are not inconsistent. Any relationship between the direction of 
change in exports and GNP for the average underdeveloped country seems 
likely to be very weak. Our results on both cross-sectional analysis and 
time*Series analysis are in accord with the conclusion to this section of the 
ECLA study. It says,
"It emerges that the relationship between short-period variations 
in output and the purchasing power of exports is not a very intimate
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one in respect of either the magnitude or the timing of
fluctuations." (p. 170)
Effect of a Sharp Short-Term Drop in Export Earnings
Probably most interest in the problem of export fluctuations focuses 
on the effects of a sudden temporary shortfall in export proceeds. It may 
be that even if average or typical swings in exports have little or no apparent 
impact on domestic income occasional severe drops such as occurred after the 
Korean War booms may make an obvious mark, Table 3:4 examines this 
possibility for the same group of 11 countries as were used in Table 3:3,
The table records the periods when export earnings declined sharply for each 
of these countries. Where the decline was reversed in the following year 
only the single year's decline is recorded, but where exports declined for 
more than one year the total fall from the previous peak to the trough is 
given e.g, in Costa Rica the largest decline in exports took place over the 
two years from 1954 to 1956. Column 1 shows the period of these sharp drops 
in exports for each country. In column 2 of Table 3:4 the actual drop in 
exports is compared with the associated change in GNP, This may be either 
concurrent or lagged depending on the most probable relationship based on 
the whole period 1950 to 1960 for each country. The comparison is effected 
by dividing the absolute value of the change in GNP by the absolute value of 
the change in exports, both expressed in current prices in local currencies; 
the larger the ratio the bigger the apparent impact on GNP, On several 
occasions the change in GNP, associated in time with the change in exports, 
was in the opposite direction to the export decline. This is shown in the 
table by a minus sign before the recorded ratio.
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The results recorded in column 2 of Table 3:4 reflect the strong upward 
trends in GNP in most of these countries* For six out of the eleven countries 
GNP continued to rise despite sharp drops in export earnings* In Peru exports 
actually declined slightly below the previous year in 1952* but it would be 
fairer to say that exports paused over 1951, *52 and '53 and thus fell below 
trend for that period* GNP however continued to rise. In the four remaining 
countries; Burma, Ceylon, Congo and Cuba, GNP fell at the same time as exports.
On one occasion in Ceylon the ratio of the change in GNP to the change in 
exports exceeded unity and on one occasion in the Congo a similar multiplier 
relationship appears to have held. In the others the actual change in GNP 
was considerably smaller in absolute terms than the decline in exports.
In column 3 the actual changes in GNP and in export earnings have been 
roughly adjusted for trend by subtracting the average annual increase in GNP 
and exports. Association between these trend-corrected changes seems much 
stronger. In only two instances, Cyprus and Peru, does the ratio turn out 
negative. For the other occasions the ratios range from +0.26 to +2,62 with 
five falling below unity and five slightly above.
If exports are "the more powerful generator of fluctuations," to use 
Wallich*s phrase, it is a little surprising to find that in these highly 
trade-oriented countries fluctuations in GNP appear to be quite heavily dampened. 
The evidence implies either low values for any foreign trade multiplier and 
accelerator effects, or that the operation of some other forces tended to 
offset the influence of exports. Such forces could have been deliberate 
reflationary policies undertaken by their governments in an attempt to check 
the deflationary impact on income, employment and prices of the fall in export 
earnings. Alternatively, random variations in some of the other major
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determinants of GNP such as private investment or an increase in consumption 
of domestic goods due to a boom harvest could have acted to ameliorate the 
drop in exports.
If it were policy reactions to export shortfalls it would reveal a 
remarkably high degree of fiscal and monetary sophistication in these countries 
Indeed, it would indicate a degree of success in timing and judgment in 
countercyclical policy which would be the envy of policy makers in practically 
all developed countries,^ On the other hand, if it were autonomous changes 
in some of the other determinants of national income then their economies 
have been subject to a very happy series of coincidences. Although policy 
reactions of their governments and fortunate offsetting changes in other 
variables may have helped to moderate GNP fluctuations in some countries it
I
seems implausible that they should form the main explanations of the 
absence or weakness of GNP fluctuations in response to export instability.
It seems more probable that some systematic factors have been at work which 
have tended to reduce the impact of export fluctuations on GNP, even in highly 
trade-oriented countries. This question will be taken up again after an 
examination of the other possible repercussions of export fluctuations on 
the domestic economy.
Fluctuations in Investment
In underdeveloped countries it is generally thought that fluctuations 
in export earnings are an important factor in generating instability in 
domestic capital formation. The recent Crawford Report remarks,
"By and large, total domestic investment has been quite closely 
related to available supplies of imported capital equipment; and
-66-
partly through this relationship, the year-to-year changes in total 
investment have tended to reflect the instability in export proceeds 
or in importing power of exports 
Supposedly, export instability leads to fluctuations in the amount of foreign 
exchange available to pay for imports of capital goods. This assumes that 
underdeveloped countries are unable to utilize reserves of foreign exchange 
to pay for imports when exports decline, that "non-essential" imports have 
already been cut to a minimum, and that domestic capital formation is quite 
dependent on imports of capital goods. In support of these assumptions the 
point is made that the output of machinery and other capital goods from 
underdeveloped countries is very low at present and that remaining imports 
are largely necessities. If these arguments are soundly based, it would 
seem unavoidable that a fall in export earnings should result in cuts in 
capital formation.
Fluctuations in exports are also said to cause sympathetic changes in 
savings and in the incentive to invest through their effect on GNP, In 
Chapter 1 some arguments were presented which suggest that fluctuations 
in income are likely to lead to more than proportional changes in saving.
All these reasons make for a fairly strong a priori case for a relatively 
close relationship between fluctuation in investment and in export earnings.
The Evidence: Cross-Sectional AnalysisI
In Table 3:5 twenty underdeveloped countries are ranked by the degree 
of instability of the purchasing power of their merchandise exports. In 
the other column of the table are shown indicators of the degree of 
instability of their gross-domestic-fixed-capital formation over the same 
period. Both indices have been calculated in the same manner for the same
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period, They represent the average-annual-percentage changes in each 
variable corrected for trend estimated by linear-regression lines fitted by 
"least squares," It can be seen that there is no clear association between 
the magnitude of fluctuation in investment and in the importing power of 
exports. When the countries are ranked by export instability and grouped 
in thirds it is the middle group which turns out to have the highest average 
degree of investment instability. Statistical analysis of the association 
is inconclusive. The resulting regression equation and correlation coefficient 
are shown at the foot of Table 3:5. They are not significant at even the 10 
per cent level of significance. At most less than 12 per cent of the 
variation among countries in instability of investment seems attributable 
to the degree of instability of the importing power of their exports. The 'B'
coefficient indicates an elasticity of investment with respect to export 
instability of about 0,36 which is a fairly weak response.
No matter how interpreted the data show at be&t a very weak relationship 
which must itself be regarded as "not proven,
Time-Series Analysis
One step in the supposed relationship between export fluctuations 
and investment is the effect of the fluctuations in the purchasing power of 
exports on the ability of underdeveloped countries to import capital goods.
If capital“goods imports fluctuate in sympathy with export proceeds and if 
the import content of domestic fixed investment is relatively constant, then 
the latter would be forced to fluctuate with some current or lagged relationship 
to exports.
Unfortunately information on capital-goods imports is often very 
imperfect, because the classifications of imports published by most countries
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vary and seldom reveal very precisely what are capital goods or why they 
are so regarded. The same good may be quite correctly described as a capital 
good in one use and as a consumption good in another. An automobile may 
be a capital good if, for example, it is imported for use as a taxi, but a 
consumption good if it is for private use. However, the Economic Bulletin
for Latin Arnerica (ECLA 1^60î Table 14) has published some figures for
imports of construction materials, agricultural equipment and machinery, 
industrial equipment and machinery, and transport equipment and machinery 
for several of the Latin American economies. Table 3:6 sets out the results 
of statistical analysis of the direction, but not the magnitude, of changes 
in the current dollar value of exports and capital-goods imports, (Table 
3:6 merely summarizes the number of occasions on which exports and capital-goods 
imports moved in the same direction and the total number of occasions on 
which a similar or opposed movement would have been possible. The actual 
changes are set out for each country in Table 3* )* The crude method
of correction for trend which assumes a constant absolute average annual 
increase or decrease in the variable over the period was adopted again. In 
fact, the sign pattern of the changes was relatively little altered by the 
correction.
On the basis of the counts recorded in Table 3:6 it appears that 
capital-goods imports are related very weakly, if at all, to the current 
value of exports. Imports of capital goods do, however, appear to have
changed in the same direction as the exports of the previous year sufficiently
often (64 times out of 90) to justify the belief that a fairly consistent 
relationship exists. The result is statistically significant at the ,001 
level. If we assume that in some countries the reaction is faster than in
others, it may be of interest to see what mixed score would result from
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taking the highest figure, current or lagged, for each country. This gives 
75 out of 94. It certainly appears true that the direction of change in 
capital-goods imports is fairly highly correlated with the direction of 
change in the value of exports. But, of course, this is only direction and 
tells nothing about the magnitude of the influence and it is only a link 
in the possible chain of causation from export instability to investment 
instability.
In Table 3:7 similar results show the directional relationship between 
changes in investment and changes in capital-goods imports for all of the 
countries for which data could be obtained. Unfortunately series on capital 
formation were not available for two of the countries, and the period was 
severely curtailed for others. However, it does appear that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between capital-goods imports and 
investment. The direction of causation in this case is less clear than in 
the previous table. It is perfectly possible that changes in decisions to 
invest should be the determinant of capital-goods imports rather than 
changes in ability to pay for imports being the determinant of investment.
But since fluctuations in capital-goods imports are so highly correlated 
with fluctuations in the value of the previous year’s exports, it seems 
probable that the causal relationship runs from exports to investment, at 
least partly through the ability of the economy to obtain foreign exchange 
to pay for Imports,
Interest in the relationships between fluctuations in exports, capital-goods 
imports, and fixed-capital formation is not confined to the direction of 
change. If investment instability is associated with export fluctuation, it 
is important to know how powerful the influence is. This is rather difficult
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to determine, given the limitations of the data and the small number of 
years. However, rank correlations for each country confirm the association 
in the case of capital-goods imports, but reveal very little consistent 
relationship between export fluctuations and fixed investment. Table 3:8 
lists the rank-correlation coefficients found. They are positive and significant 
for 8 out of the 10 countries with respect to capital-goods imports but for 
only 3 out of 8 possibilities with regard to investment. This emphasizes that 
many factors other than short-term fluctuations in exports are likely to 
affect the stability of investment in underdeveloped countries. Some 
investment may have been financed by foreign loans or use of reserves. Some 
countries may have consciously or unconsciously followed policies of accumulation 
and decumulation of stocks of capital goods. Such policies would weaken 
the relationship between investment and recent export proceeds much as would 
buffer stocks of foreign exchange. Since there are no available series of 
data on stocks of capital goods, this last possibility cannot be checked 
at present. The absolute changes in capital-goods imports which were 
associated with the maximum increase and decrease in exports within the 
period were also calculated (summing the increases or decreases over 2 or 
even 3 years where the direction of change was uninterrupted). Apart from 
Venezuela the associated absolute changes were generally very much smaller 
than those which took place in exports. A comparison was also made for each 
country of the percentage changes in investment which appeared to have a 
current or lagged association with the maximum upward and downward cyclical 
swings in exports for the years and countries where this was possible. They 
varied enormously and appeared to show no systematic relationship to the 
strength of the responses in imports of capital goods. Chance enters so
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powerfully into these results, because the sample is so small (only one or 
two years for each country), that little reliance can be placed upon them.
In sum, cross-sectional analysis yields a non-significant correlation 
coefficient which is too low to support the view that the degree of investment 
instability can be associated with the degree of export instability. Analysis 
of time-series data for 10 Latin American countries Shows a definite tendency 
in most of the countries for changes in capital-goods imports to be associated 
with fluctuations in exports. It also indicates a barely significant 
relationship between capital-goods imports and investments. But, the 
relationship between changes in investment and the supposed initiating 
force of export fluctuations is significant for only 3 out of the 8 countries 
for which data were available. This is scarcely sufficient evidence to 
support the view that investment in underdeveloped countries is seriously 
disrupted by export instability.
Some possible explanations for the weak relationships between GNP and 
fluctuations in export proceeds were very briefly suggested in the last 
chapter. In the case of investment we might add that there are other 
powerful determinants of investment at work. The policies of the government, 
both in its own investment programs and in its tax policies, tariff policies, 
and to some extent even interest-rate policies may influence the amount, 
direction, and timing of changes in gross fixed-capital formation. Private 
firms and government agencies may have stock piled capital goods and thus 
partially offset the effects of export fluctuations on investment. Some of 
the offsets may involve a country in costs, but they are probably very minor, 
as, for example, the interest cost on extra stocks.
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Fluctuations in Prices
It can be argued that given the inflexibility of domestic supplies 
which is a characteristic feature of most underdeveloped countries domestic 
price levels are likely to be sensitive to variations in demand induced by 
export fluctuations. If import restrictions, imposed for purposes of 
protection or for balance of payments reasons, are also common the likelihood 
of fluctuations affecting the domestic cost of living is enhanced. The 
previously quoped ECLA study puts forward another less direct reason:
"In many countries of the region, a substantial share of public 
revenue is derived from the export sector through one or more forms of 
taxation.....In this way public consumption is also tied to the variations 
in export proceeds or export volume..Thus, in the face of limited 
revenue sources and the downward inflexibility of government expenditure 
in these countries, variations in public consumption--whether deliberately 
compensatory or not— may produce ramifications in other sectors of the 
economy which in the first instance are revealed in the form of 
price instability,"^
Table 3:9 shows 21 underdeveloped countries ranked by the degree of 
instability of their exports for the period 1953-60 in column 2 with the 
indices of instability in the cost of living for the same countries in 
column 1. The data used were for the years 1951-62 and include most of the 
underdeveloped countries for which data were available for the whole period 
in the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Two years are lost from 
each end of the series in calculating the indices as average annual percentage 
deviations from a five-year-moving-average trend.
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Examination of the data in Table 3:9 reveals little or no relationship 
between the magnitude of short-term price instability and of export fluctuations. 
The Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation is low and negative, -0.21,
This is clearly non-significant. On this evidence the hypothesis that the 
magnitude of price instability is associated with the magnitude of export 
instability is unsupported.
When the direction of change of exports and prices is examined no 
correspondence can be found between deviations from trend in exports and 
for the cost of living in either the same or the immediately succeeding 
year. Table 3:10 sets out the number of occasions on which they moved in 
the same direction for each of the 21 countries on a current basis and with 
the cost-of-living indices lagged one year behind exports. On neither basis 
are the results significantly different from those which chance could produce.
It is clear that the data yield no support for the view that there is 
a strong tendency for the domestic price level to fluctuate in sympathy with 
exports in most underdeveloped countries. The price data are, of course, 
very inadequate. Cost of living indices often relate to the consumption 
patterns of a very small sample of the city-dwelling populations in such 
countries. These are in general in the sectors of the economy which ought 
to be sensitive to fluctuations in foreign trade. But, such indices are 
often geared quite closely to import prices which would not reflect domestic 
demands. However, it is questionable how much of the fluctuation in exports 
could be expected to influence the cost of living of the small farmers who 
form the majority of the population in most underdeveloped countries. They 
generally produce food for themselves and families on their own land and 
such cash income as they receive is frequently either saved for major 
purchases such as livestock, weddings and funerals or spent on imported goods.
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Recent work by Eliot Berg reveals that West African cash crop farmers spend 
on the average between 30 and 40 per cent of their cash income on imported 
goods, African workers in the cities appear to spend around 60 per cent of
g
their income on food and about 20 per cent on imports. Possibly an index 
of food prices would be more sensitive to changes in money incomes than a 
cost-of-living index which in some cases reflects European expenditure 
patterns as a hang-over from colonial times. However considerations of 
time prevent further pursuit of this question. For what it is worth, the 
best available indices of the general level of prices in underdeveloped 
countries show no impact from export fluctuations.
Probably the main explanation for the lack of association in this case 
stems from relatively low marginal propensities to consume domestically 
produced goods and services in many underdeveloped countries. The corollary 
of this is their tendency to have high marginal propensities to import as 
long as the high income elasticities of demand for importables are not 
frustrated by import controls. We turn now to the relationships between 
exports and imports.
Fluctuations in Total Imports
In the preceding sections association between income, investment, 
prices and export fluctuations have been examined. In considering investment 
some attention was given to the influence of fluctuations in the ability to 
import capital goods on domestic investment. However, capital goods imports 
may have been protected by policy against fluctuations in export earnings.
If that were the case imports of consumption goods might be made more 
unstable. Such instability could have some impact on consumers' economic
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welfare, by thwarting their desires to maintain recently achieved expenditure . 
patterns. This would, supposedly occur, first, through variations in 
consumers' cash earnings and, secondly, through changes in government 
restrictions on imports.
Fluctuations in overall imports could be associated with fluctuations 
in exports for both of these reasons: changes in residents*purchases of
imported goods induced by fluctuations in their incomes which were in turn 
due to fluctuations in exports^ and changes due to import restrictions 
alternately tightened and relaxed as exports fall and rise, because the 
countries are short of foreign-exchange reserves.
Cross-country correlation analysis of export instability and import 
instability yields a correlation coefficient of 0.47 for 56 underdeveloped 
countries,^ This is significant at the .001 level. The result suggests a 
genuine, if not very powerful, association between the two variables. 
Apparently some 22 per cent of the variations between countries in the 
degree of import instability experienced from 1946 to 1958 can be explained 
by fluctuations in their export earnings. This is the highest significant 
correlation found so far in this study.
When examined over time it also appears that movements in the imports for 
most countries are related to fluctuations in their export proceeds. Some 
evidence on this can be found in a recent IMF study (Fleming and Lovasy,
1960: pp. 58-76). Here movements in: 1. the importing power of visible
exports, 2. the importing power of total export receipts and 3. actual 
imports, are shown on 38 charts, one for each primary producing country 
studied. Six or seven of these countries are actually developed. They 
include, for example, Australia and New Zealand, Fluctuations in imports
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shown on these charts do not appear very closely related to either of the
two other variables. However, they appear somewhat closer to fluctuations
in total receipts than to visible exports as might be expected. The charts
can reasonable be interpreted as giving a little support from time-series
analysis to the conclusion gained from cross-sectional correlation.
From the case studies presented in Section II of the present work it
seems that fluctuations in imports clearly move in sympathy with exports in
Uganda, Pakistan and Chile, but in Tanganyika and Puerto Rico there seems
to be little or no association between fluctuations in imports and either the
current or previous year's exports.
Probably some, but not a very close, relationship between export
variation and imports is what should be expected. While commodity exports
are easily the largest item on the receipt side of the balance of payments
in most underdeveloped countries, changes in other items may also be influential
and may, on occasion, have offset particular changes in exports. Undoubtedly
in some countries this has happened. However, according to a UN study (1952:
p, 7), "Data on capital movements and invisible earnings indicated that such
receipts did not compensate for instability in export proceeds (for the
typical underdeveloped country)," Actually, while this statement may well
be true the data presented in support of it are not very convincing. If
fluctuations in the other items did not compensate at all one would expect
fluctuations in total receipts to be larger, at least in absolute terms, than
fluctuations in visible exports alone. While no evidence is given on the
absolute changes it appears from Table 45 of the UN study that in percentage
terms there was no significant difference between the experience of countries
10in total receipts' fluctuations and merchandise exports'fluctuations,
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Since total receipts are seldom much larger than visible exports in most 
underdeveloped countries the percentage figure is a reasonable guide to 
the absolute changes.
However, figures presented by the Fleming and Lovasy paper (1960: Table 3)
tend to confirm the greater instability of total receipts including capital 
flows. Their general comments are:
"In some countries, external receipts fluctuate less than export 
proceeds, possibly because capital movements include elements of a 
compensatory or equilibrating character, or because the amount of 
profits transferred abroad varies with exports. In the majority of 
countries, however, external receipts fluctuate more than export 
proceeds alone. Year-to-year variations in the importing power of 
external receipts amount in the average primary producing country to 
13,2 per cent, against 12,1 per cent for those of exports alone^ and 
average deviations from trend amount to 10,0 per cent for external 
receipts, against 8,5 per cent for export proceeds alone. While 
movements in net receipts from invisibles, including capital items, 
show little or no consistent relation to exports, fluctuations in
external receipts are in most countries dominated by, and are therefore
11broadly similar in timing to, those in export proceeds alone,"
The lack of consistency in the relationship of fluctuations in exports and 
these other items when added to the possible use of a country’s own reserves 
of foreign exchange explains some of the variation between countries in 
import instability which is left unexplained by fluctuations in merchandise 
exports alone. But the Coppock index of export instability used in the 
cross-country correlation analysis presented at the beginning of this section
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is for exports of goods and services, only net borrowing on long and short-term 
account plus variations in reserves are omitted from the index.
Reserves
So far little evidence of severe impact upon domestic variables has 
been found. Perhaps underdeveloped countries have succeeded in compensatory 
policies using their reserves of foreign exchange as a cushion against 
the shock of import fluctuations. Accordingly it may be of interest to inquire 
as to how much underdeveloped countries could have and actually have made use 
of their reserves to cushion the impact of fluctuations on their economies.
Two lines of inquiry suggest themselves. Firstly, how ample are their 
reserves and secondly, have their reserves fluctuated in sympathy with 
fluctuations in export earnings?
One reasonable rough measure of reserve adequacy is the ratio of 
the gold and convertible currency assets to average annual imports. It 
neglects many other possible determinants of a country's need for international 
liquidity such as the degree of instability of its foreign receipts and 
payments, the duration of likely balance of payments deficits and the 
banking . laws or conventions of the society among others. However, these 
vary greatly among countries and in a large sample their influence should 
tend to cancel out,
Michaely (1962: Table 20) calculates the average ratio of reserves to 
imports for 1950-57 for underdeveloped countries and developed countries 
and finds that the average underdeveloped country held considerably larger 
reserves than the average developed country. He finds a mean ratio of 
70 per cent for 14 underdeveloped countries and of 42 per cent for 18 rich 
countries. These are perhaps a little misleading. Medians calculated from 
the data which he presents suggest a much smaller difference between the 
typical underdeveloped country and developed country. The median figures are
Median
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Calculations based on data for 1956-57 ratios of reserves to imports 
published by Coppock (1962: Table A-2) yield the following results for 41
underdeveloped countries and 20 developed countries:
Range (lowest 
Mean to highest)
Underdeveloped countries 45,6 3 to 147
Developed countries 40,6 12 to 161
Between them these calculations suggest that the typical underdeveloped 
country holds rather higher reserves, around 20 per cent more, than the 
typical developed country. However, the spread is very wide in both cases 
so that talk in terms of a typical underdeveloped country for this relationship, 
as for many others, would be misleading. Even if it is accepted as a rough 
guide, indicating that most underdeveloped countries have more reserves 
than most developed countries, it cannot be assumed that underdeveloped 
countries have no problem of international liquidity. The greater export 
instability experienced by the average underdeveloped country makes it 
likely that they should require more reserves than the average developed 
count ry,
The quantity of reserves held, however, does not appear to be 
significantly related to the degree of instability of exports either for 
underdeveloped countries or for all countries. Our analysis, limited to 
38 underdeveloped countries, gives a correlation coefficient of ,13 which 
is non-significant, Coppock (1962: Table 5-3) gives a correlation coefficient
of ,02 for the relation between export instability and the ratio of reserves
12to annual imports for 62 countries. Neither result suggests that countries 
which normally experience relatively severe export fluctuations hold larger 
reserves than countries where export instability is less.
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Perhaps short-term changes in imports unrelated to exports, or 
autonomous changes in capital flows have exerted as important an influence 
on the need for reserves. Alternatively countries which have relatively 
high export instability have the misfortune to possess no more reserves 
than other countries and simply put up with the inconvenience of import 
controls, fluctuating exchange rates or fluctuations in incomes and prices. 
But, of course, our reasons for examining relationships between export 
instability and reserves stem largely from the apparent lack of impact 
on incomes and prices.
Perhaps, even though they possess little or no extra reserves, 
countries which have high export instability make more use of their 
reserves. Michaely (1962: p. 120) finds an insignificant rank correlation
of oll5 between short-term, trend-corrected fluctuations in the terms of 
trade and similar fluctuations in reserves for a sample of 32 countries. 
However, it is questionable whether an index of instability which measures 
percentage changes is approximate here if no allowance is made for the 
adequacy of reserves. If a country has very large reserves in relation 
to imports . a large percentage change in the balance of payments could be 
met by a small percentage change in reserves. IVhere reserves are small 
the opposite would hold. It would seem essential to deflate the quantity 
of reserves by some factor such as the level of imports. Changes in the 
terms of trade, of course, may not be a good guide to the need to use 
reserves and this may be another weakness in the analysis. Fluctuations 
in the total value of exports, at least for most underdeveloped countries, 
should be a better indicator of the need to use reserves than mere changes 
in the relative prices of exports and imports.
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Coppock (1962: Table 5-3) gives a correlation coefficient of .07
for the association between the magnitude of fluctuations in export
earnings and of fluctuations in the ratio of reserves to imports for
63 countries. This meets our criticism of Michaely but is still clearly
non-significant and confirms his finding that there is very little association
between the two variables.
It seems that for most countries there is no clear association between
the degree of instability of exports and of foreign exchange reserves.
But for individual countries it is possible that changes in both direction
and magnitude of reserves should be highly correlated over time with exports.
As a check on this possibility Table 3:11 sets out annual dollar values
of export proceeds and of reserves for 10 countries chosen for high
export instability, and for Latin America as a whole. The direction of
change in the annual values of exports and reserves were compared.
When the results for all ten countries are pooled it appears that the
two variables moved in the same direction in 56 out of a possible 79
occasions. On this evidence they are significantly related for direction
of change. A Chi-square test gives a significance greater than the .01
level for this statistical result.
Rank correlation analysis of the actual values of the positive or
negative changes in exports and reserves for each of the 10 countries and
for Latin America as a whole yields only two significant correlation coefficients,
for the Sudan and Iran. .The results were:
Argentina, R = 0.37 Iraq, R = 0.07
Bolivia, R = 0.26 Korea, R = 0.40
Ghana, R = 0.38 Malaya, R - 0.66
Indonesia, R = 0.62 Pakistan, R - 0.53
Iran, R = 0.83 Sudan, R = 0.89
Latin America, R - 0.52
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It seems that while the direction of change in reserves has generally 
been compensatory the amount of the changes in reserves has seldom 
corresponded closely to the increases or decreases in export proceeds.
However, the mere fact that they were in the correct direction would form 
a partial explanation of the imperfect association between exports and 
imports.
A possible second line of reserves exists in the form of short-term 
borrowing from the IMF, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, bilateral intergovernmental 
arrangements and arrangements with private banks or companies which deal 
in exports or imports from certain underdeveloped countries. During 
the period with which this study is mainly concerned, 1946-58, few 
underdeveloped countries made much use of the IMF. Moreover, according to 
Fund testimony fluctuations in the payments side of the balance of payments 
were a more common reason for an approach to the Fund than shortfalls in 
exports (Fleming and Lovasy, 1960: p. 24), This has probably also been
true of several of the borrowers from the U.S., Export-Import Bank. Brazil 
and India, for example, have not experienced a high degree of short-term 
instability in their exports, but figure largely in the Bank’s accounts,
A few underdeveloped countries have probably succeeded in obtaining short-term 
finance from commercial banks or from large expatriate concerns such as 
the oil companies.
Between these several different means of obtaining finance some 
underdeveloped countries have probably succeeded in maintaining relatively 
stable imports in the face of export fluctuations. Despite this it remains 
true that fluctuations in imports seem to be more closely associated with 
export fluctuations than any of the other national variables examined.
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A Rationale for Domestic Insensitivity
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates at most rather weak 
and uncertain relationships between fluctuations in exports and fluctuations 
in domestic income, investment, and prices. Out of the variables studied 
only imports appear to be significantly related to export instability.
At the very least the various hypotheses linking domestic variables'to 
export fluctuations whi^h were stated in the introduction have been found 
to be unsupported by the post-war data. If the statistical evidence is 
accepted then it is clear that strong formulations of these hypotheses 
must be abandoned and the explanation of domestic fluctuations becomes 
more complex. However, the a priori reasoning in favor of a powerful 
and systematic relationship between export instability and domestic 
fluctuations did seem rather convincing. Is some reconciliation between 
the theory and the apparent facts possible? Perhaps not, but at least 
some explanations for the lack of domestic response to export fluctuations 
in most underdeveloped countries can be suggested.
In some countries policy reactions by their governments must have 
had some stabilizing influence. Several countries, for example, imposed 
or increased export taxes at the time of the peak Korean War prices.
If government e^ipenditures did not increase to match these increased 
receipts the domestic impact of the rise in export values would be 
reduced. In several others marketing boards or similar devices helped 
to absorb peak export earnings and attempted to moderate the swings in 
producers' incomes. They were not always particularly successful in 
smoothing producers' incomes from year to year. The Cocoa Marketing Board 
in Ghana and the Coffee Marketing Board in Uganda, for example, probably
caused producer incomes to fluctuate more than the export proceeds from their
13crops. Some may have successfully manipulated the government budget so
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as to offset export instability, but from the evidence of the case studies 
in Section II below and from the discussion of monetary and fiscal policies 
in Chapter II it seems unlikely that many were in fact able to do this. 
Consequently, it seems improbable that more than a small part of the 
explanation of the lack of correlation between internal and external 
instability stems from effective counter-cyclical policies in underdeveloped 
countries. Equally, as we argued earlier, random factors, such as a 
coincidental increase in a main food crop, may have tended to raise GNP 
at the same time as a decline in the value of exports tended to reduce it. 
But, again, this is unlikely to explain much of the apparent weakness 
in the effects of export instability on the internal economies of 
underdeveloped countries.
Wliat seems much more likely is that the character of the economies 
of underdeveloped countries is such that there are various systematic 
offsets to fluctuations in the values of their main exports. Instead of 
being peculiarly vulnerable to export fluctuations it may be that they 
have a "natural" resistance to its effects.
Before setting out what we consider to be these built-in-stabilizers, 
two other points should be got out of the way. Most underdeveloped 
countries turn out from our study to be much less likely to be specially 
affected by export fluctuations than the argument of Chapter 1 suggested, 
for two reasons: 1) Many underdeveloped countries have, in fact,
relatively stable export proceeds and even the average underdeveloped 
country's exports are only slightly more unstable than those of the 
average developed country. 2) For several very large and important 
underdeveloped countries, containing the greater part of the population of 
of the world, foreign trade is a relatively small proportion of GNP,
India, Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and,
if a communist bloc country is included. Mainland China, are clear examples.
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For these countries export instability may still have some important 
consequences, but they are unlikely to be of the macro-economic type 
which several UN reports have emphasized.
But apart from these factors many underdeveloped countries 
have particular characteristics which are likely to dampen the 
influence of export fluctuations. In many, the largest and most 
important firms in the foreign trade sector of their economies are, 
or were until recently, expatriate firms. This is clearly true of 
almost all the oil countries. It is generally true also of most of the 
important mineral exporting countries e.g. copper in Chile, Northern 
Rhodes!aCyprus and the Belgian Congo, tin in Malaya, aluminum or 
bauxite from several African territories and the West Indies. It is 
also characteristic of many of the plantation products, such as rubber 
from Malaya and Indonesia, sugar from Indonesia and Cuba, sisal from 
Tanganyika, bananas and sugar from several Latin American countries.
In most African and Asian countries the purchase and export of most 
crops are, or were, in the hands of expatriate firms. The significance 
of this important and widespread feature of underdeveloped countries, 
in the context of export instabilit)^ is that there may be relatively 
little connection between the year-to-year receipts from exports of 
these companies and their current expenditures within the countries in 
which they operate. This is very clear in the case of Chile. In Chapter 8 
below it is shown that the operations of the copper companies seem in 
general to have tended to mitigate the impact of fluctuations in the 
value of copper exports through variations in their remitted profits 
and through their inventory policies.
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Profits are almost certain to fluctuate in line with fluctuations in 
the total value of export proceeds in such companies. Provided this means 
that repatriated profits are larger in good export years and smaller in 
bad years, the foreign-exchange receipts of these countries, net of 
profits, are made relatively more stable. Their repatriated profits will 
fluctuate the more, the more stable are these companies’ payments to 
the government and factors of production in the countries in which the 
firms operate. In many cases factor incomes are unlikely to vary much 
in the short run. Continually to lay off and recruit labour and to 
shut down and reopen mines or processing plants is often uneconomical 
and many firms find it preferable to produce for stocks in conditions 
of slack demand and to run these down in boom periods. In plantations 
this may be less true - particularly where labour is casual and 
migratory^but prices will seldom be so low that crops will not be 
harvested and in fact most calculations of short-run supply 
elasticities for plantation crops are sufficiently close to zero as 
to suggest little flexibility in output or employment. This is true 
even of rubber where the rate of tapping can be varied. Reasons 
suggested for this are rather similar to the ones put forward in 
regard to mining. Chan Kwong Wah puts forward some possibilities in 
a recent article in The Malayan Economic Reviews
"The cost structure of most estates might be such that to 
maximize long-run returns on the capital invested, it was 
better to maintain a steady and a high rate of production 
year in and year out rather than maximizing short-term gains 
in some years at the expense of future output through 
overtapping and under-utilizing productive capacity in other 
years."
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He aslo argues that overheads involved in providing housing, medical 
facilities and other social services for estate workers and their 
families make it uneconomical to take on and lay off workers in 
response to short-term price-changes.
In the short-run the principal input in plantations is labour 
and very inelastic production must imply relatively little response in 
the numbers employed. However, in some plantation industries wages are 
partly geared to market prices for the crop and in these cases wage
17incomes may tend to reflect some of the fluctuation in export proceeds.
In any case it is fairly clear that the private sector of the 
economy is partially cushioned against the shocks of export fluctuations 
through the existence of these large-scale expatriate-owned enterprises 
in a great many underdeveloped countries. As the governments in these 
countries seek larger and larger percentages of the profits of these 
concerns through export and corporation taxes government revenues 
become more sensitive to export instability. But this impact on 
government revenue will only lead to domestic instability if the 
government allows it to do so. Technical incompetence, institutional 
or political factors may result in governments spending the entire 
increase in revenues when exports rise and cutting spending 
proportionately when exports fall, but these are not necessary 
consequences of export instability. In actual fact, in these countries 
included in the case studies in Section II neither government revenues 
nor expenditures appeared to be closely related to fluctuations in 
exports 0
Probable explanations for this in countries where government
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revenues are heavily dependent on the income of the export sector are 
varying time lags in the collection of revenue and in adapting 
expenditures to it. Even where balanced budgets wore probably 
intended export instability does not seem to have been reflected in 
fluctuations in government expenditures. For example, suppose fifty 
percent of government revenue came from the export sector, half from 
taxes on exports and half from taxes on company profits. Then if export 
taxation is collected in the current period, but corporate income and 
profits taxes are collected in arrears the effect on government revenue 
of an export boom following on an export slump may be almost undetectable, 
This year's revenue from export taxes may be up but revenue from income 
and profits taxes which reflect last year or the year before's exports 
may be well below trend levels. The effect of the varying lags would 
clearly in this case produce a relatively stable government tax revenue 
from the unstable export sector. If import duties are a substantial 
source of revenue and follow exports with a one year lag as they appear 
to do in many underdeveloped countries then a similar offsetting
movement in changes in revenue from exports and import duties could
18ensue.
Apart from the true expatriate owned firms large sectors of the 
economy in many underdeveloped countries are often owned and operated 
by a class which is very clearly separated from the mass of the people 
and whose tastes and outlook are closer to the upper middle classes of 
Europe and America than to those of the general indigenous population. 
Their needs for imported consumer goods and for foreign travel result in 
such privileged groups having very high income elasticities of demand
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for goods and services which have to be paid for in foreign exchange# 
Fluctuations in the incomes of such people result in relatively little 
change in their consumption of domestically produced goods. Rather it is 
their savings and demand for imports which fluctuate in sympathy with 
export proceeds# If, indeed their marginal propensity to consume 
domestically were close to zero the secondary effects of a contraction 
in their incomes would be negligible# It is unlikely that their marginal 
propensity to consume domestically should in fact be close to zero for 
it is probable that income elasticities for better quality housing are 
fairly high and this may be true of some other domestic goods and 
services# But even in housing, it is probable that the import content 
of luxury housing and its furnishings should be high in many 
underdeveloped countries#
Outside of Africa the distribution of income within most 
underdeveloped countries is extremely unequal# Even in African territories 
in general there are sharp differences between the incomes of one class 
consisting of the merchants and bureaucracy and the other of the 
unskilled workersJ’^ This reinforces the point made in the previous 
paragraph# Since the vast majority of the population scrape a bare 
subsistence income, very little of it in cash, in most underdeveloped 
countries most fluctuations in cash income are concentrated on the 
relatively rich# The latter spend increases in income mainly on imports 
and the marginal propensity of the society as a whole tends to be very 
high because of the combination of the skewed distribution of income 
and the Western tastes of the rich# But even among the relatively poor 
increases in income are often spent on such imported consumer goods as
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textiles, footwear, bicycles and even transistor radios.
The average expenditure in one African country,The Congo 
(Leopoldville) has been estimated to follow the pattern shoivn in 
Table 3:12, The average propensity to import indicated is fairly high 
and while the average propensity to save seems low it is probable that 
the marginal propensities in both cases should be much higher# In which 
case the leakage from an initial change in domestic income is likely to 
be very lai'ge and secondary repercussions severely dampened# The previously 
cited findings of Berg (1964) of average expenditures of 30 to 40 per cent 
of West African farmers’ incomes on imports and of 20 per cent or above 
of African urban workers, leads to expectations of even higher marginal 
propensities to import*
The savings of the expatriates and the well-to-do indigenous 
inhabitants are frequently invested abroad rather than in the intemal 
economy# Thus an increase in the savings of the community because of an 
export boom does not lead automatically to any increase in local 
investment* It depends on the general prevailing political and economic 
climate, including attitudes to private investment and profits as well as 
on prospects for financially profitable local investment* The accelerator 
principle, which is used to explain investment in many models of growth 
and stability, has found little empirical verification even in studies 
of developed economies# In underdeveloped countries the relationship 
between changes in income and induced changes in investment seems 
likely to be even weaker* If anything does exist it is likely that it 
should be changes in stocks of imported goods that would be affected by 
changes in income (or expectations of such changes)„ Investment in stocks
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of imports would have no secondary repercussions on domestic income «
As Augustine Tan Hui Heng has pointed out^  the import content of some 
exports from some underdeveloped countries may be quite high. He deduces 
a fourth component of the elasticity of export supply for Malayan rubber <
"The elasticity of imports of rubber for re-export purposes," In the case
of Malaya in 1960 imports of rubber apparently amounted to almost 10 
per cent of gross rubber exports by volume?^de argues that this is a 
positive supply elasticity which would suggest that when world demand 
for rubber exports from Malaya increases# Malaya’s imports of rubber 
increase at the same time. This would mean that the increase in total 
value of exports of rubber should be reduced by the value of the 
increase in imports of rubber for re-export to arrive at the figure for 
rubber export proceeds which accrues to individuals and companies
resident in Malaya (before deduction of repatriated profits),
This phenomenon is not confined to Malaya, In many African
territories trade across the land frontiers# legal and illegal# is
frequently substantial in commodities which are subsequently exported
to industrial countries. For example cocoa# cotton and groundnuts have
frequently been smuggled from one territory to another because of price
controls or marketing board policies which make it profitable to sell
21in a neighbouring territory. However# the importance of imports for 
re-export is likely to be relatively small in most underdeveloped 
countries.
Industries which produce for the domestic market often require 
imported inputs so that any increase in demand for their outputs leads 
to an automatic increase in imports - usually of fuel# raw materials
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or components. Where they are simply assembly plants for reassembling 
knocked down imported transport equipment the import content of the 
final good may be 90 per cent or even more. It is not at all uncommon 
for commercial vehicle imports into many underdeveloped countries to
be in this form because of tax policies of the importing countries.
The Relative Importance of the Leakages,
It seems clear that the main explanation for low sensitivity to
export fluctuations in underdeveloped countries stems from their 
characteristically high marginal propensities to import* That they 
should have high marginal propensities to import is inherently likely 
from the structure of the economies of most underdeveloped countries# is 
widely believed by economists and gains empirical support from our 
finding that imports were the only variable significantly related to 
fluctuations in exports.
However# even the primary effect of a change in the gross value 
of exports is likely to be considerably less than it seems at first 
blush* The gross value which appears in the national accounts or the 
balance of payments is subject to certain deductionss first and most 
important# repatriated profitsj second# the import content of exports 
should be deducted; third# normal export taxation plus taxation on 
profits generated in the export industries and royalties , All of these 
deductions are probably elastic in response to changes in the gross
value of exports# i.e* they will tend to increase more than
22
proportionally to an increase in export proceeds. The consequence of 
such deductions is to moderate fluctuations in the net income from
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exports of the private sector of the economy.
After these deductions from the primary change in export incomes 
come the familiar leakages of imports, saving and other taxation from the 
foreign trade multiplier. Together these primary and secondary leakages 
from export proceeds potentially exert a very powerful dampening influence 
on the domestic impact of export fluctuations on the private sector of 
the economy in most underdeveloped countries. In any particular country 
the actual influence depends on the numerical values which can be 
attached to these propensities to leak export income. But intuitively 
one can see here a likely explanation for the unexpectedly low domestic 
income responses of underdeveloped countries which were in fact heavily 
involved in foreign trade - for generally it is in such countries that 
the leakages will be large. Between them these primary and secondary 
leakages could explain insensitivity of domestic income and prices to 
short-term export fluctuations both as regards timing and the degree 
of instability.
Low Multipliers
The foreign trade multiplier in most underdeveloped countries 
may be much lower than it would seem from the reasoning of Chapter 1.
What values seem plausible on the basis of the evidence of this 
chapter and the argument of the immediately preceding section? The 
following numerical discussion of the values of the foreign trade 
multiplier in underdeveloped countries is intended only to be 
illustrative. The marginal propensities used are mere guesses based 
on average propensities and what seem to the author to be reasonable
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assumptions about the economic characteristics of underdeveloped 
countries.
In simple form, ignoring foreign repercussions, the change
in the level of income arising from a continuous change in exports
can be represented by;- ^ Y = AX,___ 1____
m *f* s + t
where domestic investment and government expenditures are assumed 
to be constant and the symbols are defined as Y = income, X = exports, 
m and s the marginal propensities to import and save, and t = the 
proportion of increases in domestic income which accrue to the 
government,
However, from our discussion the formulation should be a 
little different. Instead of merely the change in exports as the 
multiplicand a more complex multiplicand is required. This would be 
smaller by the amount of export proceeds which are a direct deduction 
as repatriated dividends and profits, as the values of import inputs 
in exports, e,g, Indonesian rubber exported from Malaya, and as a 
deduction for taxes levied directly on the revenues of the export 
sector. These will include export duties, royalties and profits 
taxes in so far as these respond to changes in the value of export 
proceeds.
The multiplier formula for export induced changes in 
national Income becomes;
A Y  = A X  (1 - Pjj - + Sy + t )
Where = the proportion of export proceeds repatriated to foreigners, 
m^ is the proportion of export proceeds paid to imports which were
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re-exported in natural or processed form, t^ is the proportion of 
export proceeds which accrues to the government through taxes on 
exports and on exporter’s incomes, and where m^ , s^  ^ and t^ 
are the proportions of the change in domestic income which are 
spent on imported goods and services, which are saved and which 
accrue to the government through taxes whose revenues respond to 
changes in domestic income and expenditure. As previously, domestic 
investment and government expenditure are assumed constant. We have 
stated reasons for believing that domestic investment is unlikely 
to be sensitive to short-term changes in income. The assumption 
that government expenditures are not a function of short-run 
changes in exports is not unreasonable. The governments may have 
consciously had compensatory budget policies. Or they may have held 
expenditure relatively constant. Either policy would moderate 
fluctuations in domestic income. Alternatively governments may have 
attempted to maintain balanced budgets, but through lags in 
collection revenues may have remained relatively stable despite 
fluctuations in exports or expenditures may have proved too inflexible 
to follow export revenues closely. The assumption that governments 
hold their expenditure constantly on its average trend is the closest 
to a neutral assumption that we can make - neither deliberately 
compensatory nor disequilibrating.
For some underdeveloped countries these adjustments to the 
concept of the foreign trade multiplier may make little difference.
For others the difference may be significant. For a few the effect 
would be quite large. Figures for the average ratios of imports to
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income# general taxes to income, export taxes to exports and investment
22
income paid abroad to exports published in a recent IMF study for
29 underdeveloped countries enable some rough estimates to be made.
Six countries where the data suggest rather low multipliers are Ghana,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaya and Venezuela. All have rather high ratios
of foreign trade to national income, and four of them, the first three
and Malaya have experienced severe export fluctuations in the period
1946 “ 58. If we substitute the average values for the average ratios
for these six countries in the adapted multiplier formula and assume
a relatively low import content for exports and a low marginal
propensity to save the calculated value of the multiplier becomes
24
close to unity, 1,02. The secondary repercussions of a change in 
exports, even if given time to work themselves out fully would be 
negligible. The ratios for p^ , t^ and ny are all average, not 
marginal propensities. It seems probable that changes in these 
variables, particularly savings and imports in response to changes 
in exports or income should be higher than the average propensities 
for reasons discussed above on pp.00 • If this were so, the final 
change in domestic income in response to an initial change in the 
level of exports would be a fraction rather than a multiple of the 
export fluctuation. Export instability would be very heavily 
dampened. In any case, before the repercussions of the initial 
change in exports had worked their way through the various rounds 
of expenditures,and receipts further changes in exports or in 
other determinants of income would be being felt and would obscure 
the.small ripples left by the original change in exports.
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For the average underdeveloped country in the whole IMF sample 
of 29 underdeveloped countries the multiplier calculated as in footnote 24» 
using the IMF average ratios and assuming the same low values for the 
import content of exports and for saving the multiplier would be 1*6 
which still indicates relatively small secondary repercussions. These 
low values for the foreign trade multiplier to-gether with the dubiety 
attaching to the existence of the accelerator in underdeveloped 
countries could account for much of the insensitivity of domestic 
incomes and prices to export fluctuations. However, it would appear 
to do so partly by emphasising the sensitivity of imports. In turn, 
this could mean that anything which was fairly dependent on imports 
would also tend to fluctuate in sympathy with exports: in particular 
investment. But, in fact as we shall find in the next chapter there 
are two links in the chain between fixed capital formation and imports. 
These are the ratio of capital-goods imports to total imports and the 
ratio of imported capital-goods to total fixed capital formation.
Neither are constants. Both have varied over time in both directions.
It is, therefore, quite feasible for exports and Imports to be 
significantly correlated while investment and exports are not.
Finally, if investment has somehow been insulated against 
fluctuations it may have been at the expense of the consumer of 
imported goods. If the investment component of imports has sometimes 
been maintained while imports as a whole fluctuated presumably consumer 
imports were made additionally unstable. Such an effect would be likely 
where underdeveloped country governments used import controls when 
exports declined and relaxed the restrictions when exports boomed.
" 98-
A policy of this sort would actually increase the importance of the 
import leakage as a stabilizing influence on income and prices, but 
could lower consumers* welfare by destabilizing their consumption of 
imports. Whether the loss of welfare would be significant is a matter 
of judgment in the absence of quantitative information. In my view 
the loss is likely to be minor in relation to short-term fluctuations, 
Only marginal purchases are affected and in many cases the classes 
most affected would be relatively affluent.
Conclusions
It seems that most of the anticipated short-term effects of 
export fluctuations are unsubstantiated by the post-war data. Put in 
formal statistical language - the null hypothesis that fluctuations in 
various domestic variables; income, prices and investment are unrelated 
to fluctuations in export proceeds is not contradicted by the data. Put 
at its weakest this means that the views stated in Chapter 1 must be 
regarded as "not proven". It seems likely that any causal relationship 
which does exist between either the degree of instability of the 
variables or in the consistency of timing and direction of fluctuations 
must be very weak. In the final section of this chapter we have argued 
that the apparent weakness and inconsistency of the relationship can only 
be partly explained by random changes in other variables and by policy 
reactions of governments. It seems probable that the economies of many 
underdeveloped countries have built-in-stabilizers which tend to 
moderate the internal impacts of export fluctuations. The main
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stabilizer is probably the high marginal propensity to import 
characteristic of many underdeveloped countries* This may be reduced 
as these countries increase their domestic industries and produce more 
substitutes for imports* But their demand for imports in general and 
in particular of sophisticated manufactures will probably be maintained 
or even increased by the process of economic development*
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Table 3 ! 1 Ratios of Exports to Investment 6 Government Expenditure
(1958-59) Averages
Large Countries (over 10 million) Small Countries (less than 10 million)
X X X X X X
A, Deve^^^j^^ “T* — nr m
10 Canada 76 131 48 1.Australia 59 159 43
2, France 75 93 42 2.Austria 115 184 71
3, W6Germany 107 169 65 3.Belgium 193 279 114
4* Italy 68 95 40 4.Denmark 189 260 228
5, Japan 48 128 35 5.Finland 96 181 63
6* Netherlands 209 352 131 6 ,Iceland ^ 88 28 67
7, South Africa 134 260 88 7.Ireland 221 237 114
8, United 8.Israel 47 61 27
Kingdom 133 121 64
9.Luxembourg ^ 336 654 222
9, United
States 27 24 13 10.New Zealand 122 308 79
Average 97.4 152.5 58.4 11.Norway 133 147 93
Median 45.0 12.Sweden 
13.Switzerland 
Average 
Median
123
131
142.
147
25
5 211.
67
87
5 98 
75
Table 3 î 1 (continued)
- 101-
Countries (over 10 million) Small Countries (less than 10 million)
1 « Underdeveloped X XG
X
Î+G
1.Algeria 77 55 32
2 .Argentina 59 88 35
3.Brazil 48 64 27
4.Colombia 111 313 82
5.Congo 209 240 112
(Leopoldville)
6 *India 34 72 23
7* Indonesia 312 —
8,Korea 19 17 9
9.Mexico 100 271 73
10.Nigeria 124 291 87
11.Pakistan 59 66 31
12.Philippines 143 138 70
13.Spain 30 48 18
14.Thailand 108 181 68
15.Turkey 27 36 16
16.Burma 97 120 54
Average 97.3 134 49.1
Median 33,5
Bo Underdeveloped
1.Barbados *
2 .Br.Guiana ^
30 Ceylon
4.Chi le
5.China(Taiwan)
6 .Costa Rica ^
7.Cuba (1957-58)
8 .Cyprus ®
9.Ecuador
1 0.Federation 
of Malaya
11«Ghana
12.Greece
13.Guatemala
14,Honduras
15.Jamaica 
lô.Malta ®
17.Mauritius
18.Panama
19.Peru 
20oPortugal
a
X X X
"T" r a
171 491 126
189 322 119
268 212 118
129 144 68
74 61 33
141 205 83
189 33 129
268 179 107
147 162 77
529 358 213
200 328 124
54 86 33
134 145 70
155 214 90
134 307 93
250 385 153
259 345 148
202 244 110
124
107 152 63
Table 3 : 1 (continued)
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Small Countries (lessi than 10 million)
bo Underdeveloped X— Xr r
X
TOT
21,Puerto Rico 230 348 138
22.Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 151 369 107
23«Tanganyika 178 267 107
24.Trinidad and 
Tobago ^ 238 681 177
25«Uganda 243 180 103
26«Venezuela 122 187 74
Average 185 251 105.5
Median 107.0
a These countries had populations of less than 1 million people in 1958. 
(Population estimates from U.N. Demographic Yearbook)
Investment figures are for fixed capital only as data on stocks are very 
unreliable and in many underdeveloped countries consist largely of imports 
or exports valued at unrealistic prices.
Source: Table 3:13
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Table 3î2 Indices of Instability for 35 Underdeveloped Countries
for National Income and Export Proceeds (Corrected for Trend)
x^
I-I National Income I-I Export Proceeds
1, Argentina 8.7 41.3
2, Belgian Congo ^ 9.1 10.7
3, Brazil 4.3 13.8
4é Burma ^ 8.7 14.7
5, Cambodia 8,5 25.0
6 * Ceylon ^ 9.0 13.0
7a Chile 12.2 20,2
8 . China (Taiwan) 13,4 16,3
9, Colombia 53.4 13,4
10, Costa Rica ^ 1 ,6 14.3
11. Cuba ® 12.2 26.0
12, Dominican Republic 2.7 16.9
13. Ecuador 4.1 25.2
14. Egypt 8.3 20.1
15, Ghana ^ 6 ,6 31,9
16, Greece 14.6 18.2
17. Guatemala 11 .8 10.7
18, Honduras ^ 4.4 16.1
19. India 5.7 16.2
20, Iraq ^ 6 .0 27.2
21. Lebanon ^ 3.7 25.9
Table 3:2 (continued)
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I-I National Income I-I Export Proceeds
22, Mexico 7,3 11,1
23, Pakistan 30,0 36,5
24* Panama ^ 9,6 9.9
25. Paraguay 21.1 16.0
26* Peru ^ 14.8 10,0
27* Philippines 66 ,8 18,3
28, Portugal 3,2 15.2
29, Puerto Rico ^ 6 ,0 9.2
30, Rhodesia § Nyasaland 8.3 12,5
31, Thailand 13,0 36,6
32, Turkey 11 ,0 19,4
33, Union of South Africa ^ 4,8 10.3
34, Venezuela ^ 4.1 16.1
35. Yugoslavia 8,9 46.1
Average 11.9 19.5
Standard Deviation 7.9 17,6
Source: Coppock# 1962: Table A-2
^ These countries had higher than average1 ratio of Trade/GNl
Regression equations:- (1) ^1 = 11.5 + 0 ,02 R = .015
(.25)
*(2) "l = 14,2 - 0.25 %2 R = -.15
Sample
Size
15
(.44)
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Table 3:3 Direction of Fluctuations in Export Proceeds and in
Gross National Product for Underdeveloped Countries and 
Average Ratios of Trade to G N P (1950-1960 in most cases)
Current Lagged 
(GNP for following year)
Best mixed score: 63 out of 97 (See text)
Ratio
Trade/GNP %
Same Total Same Total
Burma 51 8 out of 10 7 out of 9
Ceylon 72 7 tt It 10 5 It " 9
Congo 99 
(Leopoldville)
6 tt It B 5 tt •I 7
Costa Rica 57 3 • r It 10 5 tt »• 9
Cuba 70 6 It It 8 4 It It 7
Cyprus 108 4 It It 7 4 It " 6
Honduras 48 4 tt It 8 3 It tt 7
Panama 95 7 tt It 10 2 It " 9
Peru 50 5 tt It 8 2 tt " 8
Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland
121 5 It It 10 3 It " 9
Venezuela 85 6 tt It 10 5 It » 9
Pooled result 
for 10 countries 61 tt It 99 45 tt '• 89
Source : Table 3 :14 gives data for each country# year-to-year
changes adjusted for trend, Seq sources listed there for the basic data 
and description of method. The data for Burma# Congo and Panama in
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Tab le 3:3 (continued)
national income were found to be particularly unreliable by J. Brode, 
"The Service Sector in National Income" (mimeoed# Harvard, 1963)*
This may weaken the significance of their results particularly if 
the ease of collection of the export sector data biases the 
statisticians estimates of changes in other components of GNP*
2
[for 61 out of 99, X » 6,442 which makes it significant at the 
,05 level]
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Table 3:4 Ratios of Changes in GNP to Changes in Export Earnings 
During Periods of Sharp Declines in Export Earnings Between 1950 
and 1960 for Eleven Underdeveloped Countries, Ratios of Unadjusted
and Adjusted-for-Trend Data
A GNP
Burma
Ceylon
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Honduras
Panama
Peru
Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland
Venezuela
Period Ratio
Mn-n r  wt tsBÉffinrjwoimijCT
Unadjusted Data
1957-58 0.35
1951-52 0.72
1955-56 2.04
1952-53 1.12
1957-59 0.37
1954-56 -5.23
1951-54 0.68
1956-57 -4.00
1953-54 -0.31
1957-58 -0,96
1951-53 nii ^
1956-58 -0.48
1957-60 -3,09
AGNP 
Ratio Z m
1.20
1.25
2.62
0.48
1,09
0
1.51
0.51
0.92
0.56
'0.44
0,74
0,26
Source: Table 3 : 14
On the only occasion on which exports declined Peru’s GNP rose. 
The resulting ratio would be -23.0 which is too extreme for 
inclusion.
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Table 3î5 Relationship between Fluctuations in Export Earnings and
Fluctuations in Investment
Xl
(1950-59) 
(with exceptions)
Fluctuations in 
GD Fixed-Capital
(1950-59)
Fluctuations in 
Importing Power of
Country Formation Merchandise Exports
1. Ecuador 9.3 14.1
2. Chile 7,8 12 .8
3. Congo '58 10.7 12.5
4. Cuba '57 12.6 8.49 11,7 12.16
5. Ceylon 8.4 11.6
6, Ghana '54-'58 4,6 11.4
7. Costa Rica '58 6 .0 11.0
8. Burma '58 6,7 10,9
9. Brazil '58 10.3 10.5
10, Honduras '57 11,9 8.57 10.1 9.52
11. Panama 9,7 10.0
12, Philippines 11,3 8.5
13. India '50-51 to '57-'58 7,8 8.3
14, Portugal 2 .2 8.3
15, Mexico '58 7,1 7.8
16, Greece 12.3 7.0
17, Union of South Africa 4.2 6,83 6,3 6,27
18, Colombia 10 .2 6 .1
19. Peru '57 2 .2 5,5
20, Venezuela 5,0 5,0
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Table 3:5 (continued) 
a
Where either the beginning, terminal or both dates differ from the 
full period 1950-59 the actual dates are given beside the country's 
name.
Source: Division of General Economic Research and Policies of the 
U,N, Secretariat.
Correlation coefficient r = 0.3433
Regression equation:, " 4.0415 + 0.4198 x^ R^ = 0.1179
(.2707) F Ratio => 2.40
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Table 3:6
Number of Occasions on which Capital-Goods Imports Changed in the Same 
Direction as Exports, on a Current-Year Basis and with Capital-Goods
Imports Lagged One Year: 1948-58 in Ten Latin American Repub]
Countries Current -.....Lagged One
Argentina 4 out of 10 6 out of 9
Bolivia 8 It It 10 4 " ' 9
Brazil 4 It 11 10 8 " ' 9
Chile 7 II II 10 5 " ' 9
Colombia 7 It II 10 6 " ' 9
Cuba 9 11 II 10 6 " ' 9
Mexico 5 II II 10 6 " ' 9
Peru 5 It tt 10 7 *' ' 9
Uruguay 3 II It 10 9 " ' 9
Venezuela 6 II II 10 7 " ’ 9
Pooled result in
10 countries 58 out of 100
Best possible mixed score: 75 out of 94
64 out of 90
Source: Table 3:15
Significance of results:
Ic On current basis 
2o With one-year lag 
3, Mixed best scores
X
i did
2,96 < oOS significance level 
16,04 > ,001 significance level 
33o36 *001 significance level
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Table 3:7 Changes in Gross Fixed-Capital Formation (in Constant Prices)
and Changes in Capital-Goods Imports
Country Current Lagged
Argentina 6 out of 8 4 out of 8
Brazil 2 II II 4 3 " " 5
Chile 3 II II 9 7 " " 10
Colombia 7 II II 8 5 " " 8
Cuba 5 II II 6 2 " " 5
Mexico 4 II II 6 2 " 1. 7
Peru 5 II II 8 4 " " 8
Venezuela 4 It II 8 4 " •I 9
8 countries 36 out of 57 31 out of 60
Sources: Table 
On current basis
3:15
36:57 giveslX^ = 3.948,> .05 level.
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Table 3:8 Correlation Coefficients Between Export Fluctuation#
(1) Capital Goods-Imports# and (2) Fixed-Capital Formation a
Argentina .41 *39
Bolivia *94 ^ n 0 a 0
Brazil *82 ^ -0*5
Chile - o 12 *20
Colombia o66 ^ *81
Cuba «66 ^ «31
Mexico ,05 «81
Peru ,47 ^ «59
Uruguay «82 ^ n«a«
Venezuela «33 ^ «13
Source: Table 3:15
a The coefficients are for whichever gave the higher correlation# 
current or one-year lagged data.
Positive and significant at >*05 level of significance
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Table 3:9
Indices of Instability in the Cost of Living and in Export Proceeds. 
(Average-annual-percentage deviations from a five-year-moving average 
trend in each case). 1951-62
Country Instability Index Export Instability
_________________of Cost of Living______  Index
Venezuela 2 .0 2.5
Brazil 8.3 3.3
Philippines 12 .2 3.4
Burma 6.4 4.1
Argentina 12.1 4.6
India 3.1 4.6
Portugal 7.6 4.7
Colombia 3.3 5.3
Greece 2.8 5.7
Indonesia 12.7 6.7
U.A.R, 1.5 6.9
Ghana 1.7 7.3
Thailand 2.3 7.5
Peru 2 . 2 8 . 2
Pakistan 3.7 8.5
Chile 10.4 8 , 6
Honduras 2 .2 9.4
Bolivia 27.4 9.9
Iraq 3.2 10.0
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Table 3:9 (continued)
Country Instability Index Export Instability
  _________________ of Cost of Living________________ Index_______
Malaya 1.7 14.4
Iran 2.7 16.5
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, R = - 0.21 (t ^ 0.937)
. non-significant at 10 % level,
Source: calculated from IMF, IFS. 1962.
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Table 3:10
Number of Occasions on which the Cost-of-Living Index De\dated from 
Trend in the Same Direction as (1) Current Exports and (2) the 
Previous Year's Exports..1951 - 62 in 21 Underdeveloped Countries,
Countries (1) Current Exports (2) Previous Year’s Exports
Argentina 4 out of 8 2 out of 7
Bolivia 7 " 8 4 " II 7
Brazil 5 " 8 2 " Tt 7
Burma 5 " 8 5 " II 7
Chile 7 " 8 3 " II 7
Colombia 2 " 8 3 " I I  7
Ghana 3 " 8 5 " II 7
Greece 2 " 8 1 " II  7
Honduras 5 " 8 3 " I t  7
India 3 " 8 6 " II  7
Indonesia 5 " 8 3 " II 7
Iran 3 " 8 4 " II 7
Iraq 3 " 8 3 " II  7
Malaya 2 " 8 5 " II 7
Pakistan 4 " 8 1 " I t  7
Peru 3 " 8 2 " II  7
Philippines 3 " 8 4 " II 7
Portugal 6 M 8 3 " II 7
Thailand 3 " 8 5 " II  7
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Table 3:10 (continued)
Countries______________ (1) Current Exports (2) Previous Year's Exports
U.A.R. 7 out of 8 3 out of 7
Venezuela 2 (1 8 3 tl II 7
Pooled result in
21 countries 84 out of 168 70 out of 147
Source: calculated from IMF, IFS. 1962.
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Table 3:11
Annual Dollar Values of Exports and Foreign Reseirves for 10 Highly 
Unstable Countries and for Latin America. 1951 - 59.
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Argentina:Exports 1169 688 1125 1027 929 944 975 994 1009
Reserves 520 420 532 524 457 382 286 129 349
Bolivia : Exports 121 107 84 70 76 81 74 50 59
Reserves 35 29 25 12 7 1 6 7 3
Ghana : Exports 234 216 225 293 243 222 229 263 286
Reserves 374 379 409 514 532 484 434 450 427
Indonesia;Exports 1292 934 840 867 946 802 969 755 872
Reserves 511 314 212 248 307 255 224 217 300
Iran : Exports 590 100 100 160 372 512 650 738 : 760
Reserves 196 177 185 186 205 230 246 254 214
Iraq ; Exports 183 278 392 488 519 478 360 567 606
Reserves 114 129 181 233 294 354 261 288 296
Korea ".Exports Tl # Q * 28 40 24 18 25 22 16 19
Reserves n.a. 83 109 108 96 99 116 146 147
Malaya ; Exports 1104 697 522 531 774 739 712 616 809
Reserves 400 424 379 428 473 514 494 502 650
Pakistan : Exports 763 532 439 359 401 340 358 302 321
Reserves 638 356 376 360 397 415 359 312 400
Sudan : Exports 227 133 128 116 145 192 148 125 192
Reserves 240 185 178 170 152 192 121 88 158
Latin America:Exports 7806 7056 7620 7886 7976 8643 8662 8199 8320
Reserves 2980 3005 3295 3130 3175 3675 3815 3105 3000
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. January 1962, Reserves 
figures from Table of Official Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves.
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Table 3:12
African and Non-African Patterns of Consumption in Congo (Leopoldville) 
in Percentages in 1958
African Non-African
Subsistence 27
Domestic Goods 40 8
Imports 22 24
Services 5 38
Taxes, Savings and Other  6 30
100 100
Source: Reproduced in EGA, 1962: Table 15, p. 26 from 
Ady and Courcier, 1960
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Table 3:13
Investment, Government Expenditure and 
(1958 plus
Exports In Current Market Prices 
1959)
Country Fixed Capital 
Formation
Government
Expenditure
Exports Currency
Algeria 6, 6 9.3 5.1 M.new francs
Argentina 180.7 122.1 107.0 Bil.de pesos
Australia 3,433.0 1,278.0 2,028.0 M.L A.
Austria 59.1 37.0 67.5 M. de shillings
Barbados 65.6 22.7 113.2 M.BWI dollars
Belgium 188.1 129.8 363.3 M. de francs
Brazil 469.0 349.9 223.1 M. de cruzeiros
British Guiana 109.4 63.9 206.4 M.BWI dollars
Burma 2,138.0 1,723.0 2,073.0 M. kyats
Canada 16,608.0 9,633^0 12,622.0 M. dollars
Ceylon 1,488.1 1,884.0 3,991.3 M. rupees
Chile 714.9 643.4 924.3 M.escudos
China (Taiwan) 14,859.0 18,094.0 11,032.0 M.NT dollars
Colombia 7,247.0 2,566.0 8,050.0 M, pesos
Congo (Leopoldville) 25,350.0 2 2,110.0 53,140.0 M. francs
Costa Rica 855.4 587.9 1,214.3 M, colones
Cuba (1957 & 1958) 950.0 540.0 1,796.0 M. pesos
Cyprus 28.1 42.3 74.7 M, h
Denmark 12,802.0 9,313.0 24,192.0 M, kroner
Dominican Republic 223.5 222.3 -- M. pesos
Ecuador 3,250.0 2,946.0 4,766.0 M. sucres
Federation of Malaya 884.0 1,307.0 4,678.0 Malayan dollars
-120-
Table 3 s 13 (continued)
Country Fixed Capital Government 
Formation,   Expenditure
Exports Currency
Finland 633 0 3 336.3 607.9 Bil.markkaa
France 90.2 73.1 68 .1 Bil.new franc
Republic of Germany 107,400.0 67,340.0 113,850.0 M.dtch.mark
Ghana 136.0 83.3 272.4 M* LG ft
Greece 34,703.0 22,038.0 18,852.0 M.drachmas
Guatemala 181.5 168.1 244.2 Mftquetzales
Honduras (1957 f, 1958) 186.1 135.1 288.6 M«lempiras
Iceland 3,525 « 0 1,099.0 3,084.0 M.kronor
India 44.29 20.66 14.86 Bi1 ft rupees
Indonesia 17.2 53.6 Mfl rupiah
Ireland 158.9 147.5 351.1 M. h
Israel 1,897.0 1,476.0 900.0 M. L I ft
Italy 7,267.0 5,196.0 4,953.0 Bilo lire
Jamaica 93.5 41.0 125.6 M. h
Japan 5,928.5 2,241.2 2,868.9 Bilft yen
Kenya 80.3 M. h
Korea 484.4 544.9 92.7 Bilft hwan
Luxembourg 10,474.0 5,405.0 35,306.0 M. francs
Malta 20 .0 12.8 50.1 M. h
Maritius 238.0 179.0 617.0 Mo rupees
Mexico 35,162.0 12,950.0 35,226.0 Mft pesos
Netherlands 17,160.0 10^237.0 35,922.0 M. guilder
New Zealand 503.0 272.0 615.0 Mft h NftZft
Table 3:13 (continued)
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Country Fixed Capital 
Formation
Government
Expenditure
91.4
Exports Currency
Nigeria 214.2 264.8 M. h
Norway 17,985.0 7,853.0 24,000.0 M. kroner
Pakistan 5,290.0 4,781.0 3,168.0 M. rupees
Panama 115.2 95.4 231.6 M« balboas
Peru 15,316.0 9,323.0 18,899.0 M. soles
Philippines 1,827.0 1,897.0 2,618.0 M. pesos
Portugal 20,431.0 14,290.0 21,772.0 M. escudas
Puerto Rico 642.3 424.8 1,480.3 Mt U.S.dollars
Rhodesia S Nyasaland 269.3 110.2 405.9 M. h
South Africa 2,114.0 1,085.0 2,833,0 M* rand
Spain 141.9 86.8 42.2 Bil .pesetas
Sudan 74.3 58.6 6.3 M. h S.
Sweden 24,402,0 20,439.0 29,866.0 M. kronor
Switzerland 15,3 7.9 20.1 Bil. francs
Tanganyika 54.0 35,8 96.2 M. h
Thailand 14.1 8.4 15.2 Bil.baht
Trinidad § Tobago 414.8 145.3 987.0 M.BWI dollars
Turkey 12,705.0 9,564.0 3,490.0 M.Turkish liras
Uganda 36.6 50.5 89.6 M. k
United Kingdom 7,117.0 7,824.0 9,505.0 M. h
United States 152,893.0 172,234.0 41,027.0 Mo dollars
Venezuela 12,460.0 8,234.0 15,290.0 M. bolivares
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Tûble 3:13 (continued)
Sources: 1) U N , National Accounts Yearbook 1961
2) U N , Economie Survey of Asia and the Far East 1961, pp.172*3
3) I M F , International Financial Statistics* March 1962
4) National Sources
5) U N , Demographic Yearbook, 1961
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Table 3:14
Fluctuations in Exports and Gross National Product in 11 Underdeveloped Countries
Burma (M,kyats! current prices
GNP A.GNP ZÏGNpb Exports A  EXP A exp^
1960 5972 +414 + 129 1266 + 177 + 123
1959 5558 + 199 - 86 1089 + 105 + 51
1958 5359 - 92 -377 984 -261 -315
1957 5451 + 301 + 16 1245 + 13 - 41
1956 5150 + 338 + 53 1232 + 67 + 13
1955 4812 +215 - 70 1165 + 52 - 2
1954 4597 - 25 -310 1113 -233 -287
1953 4622 +543 +258 1346 + 192 + 138
1952 4079 +397 + 112 1154 + 134 + 80
1951 3682 +558 +273 1020 +292 +238
1950 3124 «n M  MB 728 ^ m w »
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Table 3:14 (continued)
Rliodesia and Nyasaland (M, Ls) current prices
GNP Z\GNP A  GNP^ Exports A  EXP A exp^
1960 538.8 +28,6 - 2,5 251,8 +23,4 + 10.7
1959 510,2 +78,1 +47,0 228,4 +50.9 +38,2
1958 442,1 + 10,7 -20,4 177,5 -18,4 -31,1
1957 431,4 + 6,5 -24,6 195,9 -17,2 «29.9
1956 424,9 +40,5 + 9,4 213,1 + 9,9 - 2 , 8
1955 384,4 +48,7 + 17,6 203,2 + 19,2 + 6.5
1954 335,7 +37,8 + 6,7 184,0 + 11.6 - 1.1
1953 270,4* +29,4 - 1,7 167,6*
T W Ï Ï
+ 8,6 - 4,1
1952 213.2 + 0,7 -31,8 137,4 + 14,3 + 1.6
1951 178,5 +29,6 - 1,5 123,1 + 25,0 + 12,3
1950 148,9 98,1
Honduras (M, dempiras) current prices
GNP A  GNP A  GNP^ Exports A  EXP A-exp^
1958 715,8 +29,0 - 8,7 149,6 + 10,6 + 7,4
1957 686 ,8 +46,8 + 9,1 139,0 -17,9 -21.1
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
640.0
628.0 
576,3 
567,6 
487,8
+ 12,0  
+51,7 
+ 8,7 
+ 79,8 
+22,9
-25,7 
+ 14,0 
-29,0 
+42,1 
*14,8
156.9 
113,0 
119,5 
148,7
138.9
+43,9 
6,5 
-28,2 
+ 9,8 
- 4,0
+40.7 
« 9.7 
-31.4 
+ 6 . 6  
- 7,2
1951 464,9 +50,5 + 12,8 142,9 +18,7 + 15.5
1950 410,4 «£> nn 124,2 • *  rin
Table 3:14 (continued)
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GNP A GNP
Cuba (M.pesos)
A g n p ^
current
Exports
prices 
A  EXP A  EXP^
1958 2688 -166 -243 858 - 80 - 99
1957 2844 +373 +296 938 +167 +148
1956 2471 +203 +126 771 + 11 8
1955 2268 + 78 + 1 670 + 67 + 48
1954 2190 - 1 - 88 613 - 87 -106
1953 2191 -253 -330 700 - 21 - 40
1952 2444 +123 + 46 721 - 81 , -100
1951 2321 +399 +322 802 +135 +116
1950 1922 - - * “ -  “ 667 -  -  - -  -  -
Costa Rica (M. colones) current prices
■ GNP A  g n p A  g n p ^ Exports A  EXP A  EXP^
1960 2655 +125 - 11 690 + 44 + 10
1959 2530 + 80 - 56 556 - 2 - 36
1958 2450 +163 + 27 658 + 62 + 27
1957 2287 +165 + 29 596 +119 + 85
1956 2122 + 90 - 46 477 - 46 - 82
1955 2032 +182 + 46 531 6 - 40
1954 1846 +146 + 10 537 + 32 -  2
1953 1700 +180 + 44 505 + 38 +  4
450®
1952 1520 +110 -  26 412 + 56 + 22
1951 1410 +112 -  24 356 + 44 + 10
1950 1298 W M «* *  — — 312 M  M — —  —
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Table 3:14 (continued)
Ceylon (M. rupees) current prices
GNP A  GNP A\ gnp^ Exports A  EXP A  EXP^
1960 6301 +305 + 80 2079 0 - 36
1959 5996 +374 +149 2079 +167 +101
1958 5622 +291 + 66 1912 +116 + 80
1957 5331 +243 + 18 1796 -150 -186
1956 5088 -459 -684 1846 -225 -261
1955 5547 +596 +371 2071 +157 +121
1954 4951 +260 + 35 1914 +148 +112
1953 4691 +203 - 22 1766 +139 +103
1952 4488 -246 -471 1627 -341 -377
1951 4734 +687 +462 1968 +351 +315
1950 4047 -- -- 1617 - - - --
Venezuela (bil.bolivares) current prices
GNP A  GNP A GNP^ Exports A  EXP A  EXpb
1960 24.0 - 0.3 - 1.7 7.4 - 0 .1 - 0.5
1959 24.3 + 1.8 + 0.4 7.5 - 0.3 - 0.7
1958 22.5 + 1.9 + 0.7 7.8 - 0.7 - 1.1
1957 20 .6 + 2 . 6 + 1 .2 8.5 + 1 . 6 + 1 . 2
1956 18.0 + 2 . 0 + 0 . 6 6.9 + 1.0 + 0 . 6
1955 16.0 + 1 . 2 - 0 . 2 5.9 0 - 0.4
1954 16.8 + 1 .0 - 0.4 5.9 + 1 . 2 + 0 . 8
1953 14.3*13.3 + 1 . 2 - 0 . 2 4.7 + 0 , 2 - 0 . 2
1952 12.1 + 1.1 - 0.3 4.5 + 0.3 - 0 .1
1951 11.0 + 1.3 - 0 . 1 4.2 + 0 . 6 + 0 . 2
1950 9.7 «•mm M M M 3.6 — —  — M M M
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Table 3:14 (continued)
Cyprus (M. pounds) current prices
GNP A  GNP A  GNpb Exports A  EXP A  EXpb
1960 84.0 - 2 .2 - 5.4 38.8 + 0.9 - 1.7
1959 86 . 2 - 1.7 - 4.9 37.9 + 1.1 - 1,5
1958 87.9 - 4.6 - 7.8 36,8 + 2 . 6 0
1957 92,5 + 5.2 + 2.0 34.2 - 1.3 - 3.9
1956 87.3 +14.4 +11.2 35.5 +10.0 + 7.4
1955 72.9 + 4.6 + 1.4 25.5 + 0.5 - 2.1
1954 68.3 + 6 .2 + 3.0 25.0 + 6 . 2 + 3.6
1953 62.1 M  M  M “ “ “ 18.8 --- - - -
Panama (M. balboas) current prices
GNP A  GNP A  GNP^ Exports A  EXP A exp^
1960 423.1 +21.2 + 5.2 113.0 - 4.0 0
1959 401.9 +26.2 +10.2 117.0 + 2.4 + 6.4
1958 375.7 + 9.2 - 6 . 8 114.6 - 9.6 -13.6
1957 366.5 +33.1 +17.1 124.2 + 4.8 + 0 . 8
1956 333.4 +10.9 - 5.1 119.4 + 2 , 2 - 1 .8
1955 322.5 +21.3 + 5.3 117.2 + 7.1 + 3.1
1954 301.2* +13.3 - 2.7 110.1* +19.1 +15.1
256.7 103,8
1953 243.4 - 0.5 -16.5 84.7 + 6.7 + 2.7
1952 243.9 +16.9 + 0.9 78.0 +11.8 + 7.8
1951 227.0 + 8 . 0 - 0 . 8 67.2 - 0 . 2 - 3,8
1950 219.0 H  «■ M M  M  n* 67.9 M mm ■mm mm
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Table 3:14 (continued)
Congo (Leopoldville) (bil. francs) current prices
GNP A  GNP A  GNpb Exports A  EXP A exp^
1959 60.9 + 1.3 - 2.1 28.0 + 2.8 +1,4
1958 59.6 - 0 . 6 - 4.0 25.2 - 2 . 2 -3.6
1957 60.2 - 1 .0 - 4.4 27.4 - 2.4 -4.1
1956 61.2 + 3.4 0 29.8 + 3.1 +1.7
1955 57.8 + 3.7 + 0.3 26.7 + 2.0 +0 . 6
1954 54.1 + 2.8 - 0 . 6 24.7 + 3.1 +1.7
1953 51.3 + 1.9 - 1.5 21.6 - 1.7 -3.1
1952 49.4 + 4.5 + 1.1 23.3 + 2.3 +0.9
1951 44.9 +11.2 + 7.8 21.0 + 5.7 +4.3
1950 33.7 M  M  M - - - 16.3 M M  —
Peru (bil. soles) current prices
GNP A  GNP Z1 GNP^ Exports A  EXP A  EXP^
1959 42.2 + 5.3 + 2 . 2 10.6 + 2.3 - 1.5
1958 36.9 + 3.2 - 0 . 1 8.3 + 0.9 - 0 . 1
1957 33,7 + 2.1 - 1.0 7.4 + 0.3 - 0.5
1956 31.6 + 3.1 0 7.1 + 0.9 + 0 .1
1955 28.5 + 3.4 + 0.3 6 . 2 + 0.4 - 0.4
1954 25.1 + 3,5 + 0.4 5.8 + 1 . 2 + 0.4
1953 22 .6 + 1.6 + 1.5 4.6*
3.7
+ 0 . 1 - 0.7
1952 21.0 + 2.3 - 0 . 8 3.6 - 0 . 1 - 0.9
1951 18.7 + 3.6 + 0.5 3.7 + 0.9 + 0 . 1
1950 15.1 2.8
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Table 3:14 (continued)
Footnotes
a
Break in series probably due to change in system of compilation,
^ Adjusted for trend by subtracting the average annual increase in 
GNP or Exports from the actual increase or decrease in each case. 
This is not claimed to be an accurate trend correction, but simply 
a commonsense method of allowing for the considerable growth of 
exports and GNP in this period. Its validity is improved by the 
fact that the percentage increase in both of these variables is 
declining for most of these countries over the period 1950-60.
Sources: U N Yearbook of National Accounts 1961, 1960 and 1957.
I,M F I F S. 1962 and 1957.
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Table 3:15
(1) Exports, million U.S. dollars, current prices.
(2) Imports of capital goods into Latin American countries, million dollars, 
current prices,
(3) Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Domestic currencies, constant prices 
where available.
Country 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Argentina (1) 1407 934 1361 1169 688 1125 1027 929 944 975 994
(2) 585.1 370.3 285.8 316.8 278.5 218.8 225.2 268.8 281.1 307.1 244.2
Bil. pesos 
(1950 prices)
(3) 14.3 (14.1) (12.1) 11.6 13.9 14.8 13.9 16.9 16.8 14.3
Bolivia (1) 98 103 75 121 101 84 70 76 81 74 51
(2) 18,6 23,9 14.2 21.1 25.8 16.6 18.1 26.4 33,2 33.3 32.5
(3) not available
Brazil (1) 1173 1089 1347 1757 1409 1539 1562 1423 1482 1392 1243
(2) 385.7 409.0 408.8 779.7 866.3 516.9 593.3 414.2 351.4 577.4 536.6
Bil.Cruzieros 
(1949 prices)
(3) 62.2 61.2 67.6 75.2 85.0 119,5
Chile (1) 327 295 281 370 453 408 ' 398 472 542 455 386
(2) 79.7 119.8 83.7 104.9 112.0 119.8 96.0 121,0 143.7 205.2 183.1
Mil escudos 
(1960 prices)
(3) (348) (375) (390) 427 420 486 424 473 436 461
Colombia (1) 289 321 396 .463 473 596 657 58'0 599 511 461
(2) 140.6 120.9 146.1 163.3 178.3 254. 299.4 315.2 319.8 191.5 175.2
M.Pesos 
(1958 prices)
(3) (1838) (2439) (2802) 3891 4670 4936 4684 3512 3339 3588
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Table 3:15 (continued)
Countrv 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Cuba (1) 724 593 668 806 694 675 563 611 695 845 763
(2) 78.2 75.8 74.1 107.9 99.1 74.8 83.1 125.8 150.3 204.4 193.7
Mil.pesos (3) 
(current prices)
320 239 276 358 458 486 464
1
Mexico (1) 486 463 521 629 656 585 656 807 880 727 735
(2) 215.1 176.9 197.6 320.5 290.8 293.0 296.0 347.1 425.1 472.5 473.1
Mil. Pesos (3) 
(current prices)
8166 7854 9765 12260 13720 15057 17346 17816
Peru (1) 157 151 189 248 234 219 245 268 308 320 281
(2) 157.1 72.9 67.1 99.9 118.1 134.1 105.7 119.2 157.5 171.4 134.2
Mil. soles 
(1954 prices)
(3) (2813) (4556) (5256) 5448 5351 5363 5500 5390 5295 (4082)
Uruguay (1) 148 192 254 236 209 270 249 183 211 128 139
(2) 71.0 50.6 63.8 113.0 78.1 57.3 88 .8 67.5 53.2 65.3 24.1
(3) (not available)
Venezuela (1) 1040 1003 1161 1353 1450 1445 1690 1873 2116 2366 2321
*
(2) 370.7 382.5 251.5 325.2 397.6 407.7 452.9 488.6 632.9 1114.3 825.3
M. Bolivares 
(1957 prices)
(3) 2886 3197 4192 4784 5466 5161 5597 5950 6098 6789
> = total capital goods imports
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Table 3:15 (continued)
Source: (1) Exports: I M F .  International Financial Statistics.various issues,
(2) Capital Goods; United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America.Vol. V., No. 1, March 1960,
Table 14
(a) Construction materials
(b) Agricultural equipment and machinery
(c) Industrial equipment and machinery
(d) Transport equipment and machinery j
Statistical supplement to Vol. IV contains series for more Latin 
American countries -- all in 1955 prices; 1948-1958, Table 32, p.89.
Statistics for other countries in Latin America are available from 
1953-1958 in the same table.
(3) Fixed capital formation: U N Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 
1961 and earlier issues. Figures in brackets are estimates arrived at 
by splicing an earlier series with a different year's prices onto the 
basic series.
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Table 3:16
Changes in Exports and Capital Goods Imports on Current US Dollars and Gross Fixed
Capital Formation in Local Currencies in Constant Prices where obtainable,
Argentina (Strong Inflation)
current U/Se dollars 1950 Prices B, Pesos 
aA.EXP A exp^ ACGM A  CGM* A  GFC A  GFC
1949 -473 -432 -215 -181
1950 +427 +468 « 85 - 51
1951 -192 -151 + 31 + 65 -0 .2 -0 . 6
1952 -481 -440 - 38 - 4 -2.0 ‘”2.4
1953 +437 +478 - 60 - 26 -0.5 -0.9
1954 - 98 - 57 + 6 + 40 + 2.3 + 1.9
1955 - 98 - 57 + 44 + 78 +0.9 +0.5
1956 + 15 + 56 + 12 + 46 -0.9 -1.3
1957 + 31 + 72 + 26 + 60 +3.0 + 2.6
1958 + 19 + 60 - 63 - 29 -0 .1 -0.5
1959 -2.5 -2.9
Bolivia (Strong Inflation)
6  EXP A  EXP* ACGM ACGM* ACF c ^GFC®
1949 + 5 + 9*7 + 5.3 + 3.4 no data
1950 -28 -23.3 - 9.7 -11.1
1951 +46 +50.7 + 6.9 + 5.5
1952 -14 - 9.3 + 4.7 + 3.3
1953 -23 -18.3 - 9.2 -10.6
1954 « 14 - 9.3 + 1.5 + 0.1
1955 + 6 + 10*7 + 8.3 + 6.9
1956 + 5 + 9.7 + 6*8 + 5.4
1957 - 7 - 2.3 + 0*1 - 1.3
1958 -23 -18.3 “ 0 . 8 - 2.2
Table 3:16 (continued)
135.
Colombia (Mild Inflation)
M.pesos* mkt prices 1958
A  EXP A  EXP* A cgm A  cgm* A gfc A gfc*
1949 + 32 + 14.8 - 19.7 -23.2
1950 + 75 + 57.8 + 15.2 + 11.7
1951 + 67 + 49.8 + 17,2 + 13.7 + 601 + 385
1952 + 10 - 7.2 + 15.0 + 11.5 + 363 + 147
1953 + 123 +105.8 + 75.9 + 72.4 + 1089 + 763
1954 + 61 + 43.8 + 45.2 +41,7 + 779 + 563
1955 - 77 - 94/2 + 15.8 + 12.3 + 266 + 50
1956 + 19 + 1.8 + 4.6 + 1.1 - 252 - 468
1957 “ 88 -105.2 -128,3 -131,8 «1172 -1388
1958 » 50 - 67,2 - 16.3 " 19.8 - 173 - 389
1959 + 249 + 33
A  EXP A  EXP*
Cuba (Stable prices)
A cgm A cgm*
M. of
a g f c
pesos, current 
AGFCa
1949 -131 -135 - 2.4 -14.0
1950 + 75 + 71 - 1,7 -13,3
1951 + 138 + 134 +33.8 +22,2
1952 -112 -116 - 8.8 -20.4
1953 - 19 — 23 -24,3 -35,9 -81 -105
1954 -112 -116 + 8.3 - 3,3 +37 + 13
1955 + 48 + 44 +42.7 + 31,1 + 82 + 58
1956 + 84 + 80 +24,5 + 12.9 + 100 + 76
1957 +250 +246 +54,1 +42.5 +28 + 4
1958 - 82 » 86 -10.7 -22,3 -22 - 46
Table 3:16 (continued)
- 136'
Mexico (Mild Inflation)
Bil. pesos, current prices
A  EXP A  EXP* A cgm A cgm* AGFC AGFC*
1949 - 23 — 48 - 38.1 - 63.9
1950 + 58 + 33 + 20.7 - 5,1
1951 + 108 + 83 +122.9 +107.1
1952 + 27 + 2 - 29.7 - 55.5
1953 - 71 - 96 + 2 .2 - 23.6 -0,7 -2 ,1
1954 + 71 + 56 + 3.0 - 22,8 + 1.9 +0,5
1955 + 151 + 126 + 51,1 - 25,3 +2,4 + 1,0
1956 + 73 + 48 + 88,0 + 62.2 + 1,9 +0,5
1957 -153 -178 + 47,4 + 21,6 + 1,8 +0,4
1958 + 8 - 17 + 0 , 6 - 25.2 +0 . 8 -0*6
1959 + 1,8 +0,4
Peru (Mild Inflation)
Ma soles (1954 mkt
A  EXP ZlEXP® A cgm A  CGM* A gfc A gfc*
1949 - 6 — 18 -84,2 “81.9
1950 + 38 + 26 - 5.8 - 3,5
1951 +59 + 47 + 32.8 +35.1 + 1743 + 1602
1952 -15 - 27 + 18.2 +20 0 5 + 700 + 559
1953 -15 - 27 + 16,0 + 18,3 + 192 + 51
1954 +26 + 14 -28.4 -26.1 “ 97 - 238
1955 +23 + 11 + 13.5 + 15,8 + 12 - 129
1956 +40 + 28 + 38.3 +40,6 + 137 4
1957 + 12 0 + 13.9 + 16.2 - 110 - 251
1958 -39 - 51 “37.2 -35.9 “ 95 - 236
1959 “1213 -1354
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Table 3:16 (continued)
Uruguay (Strong Inflation)
A  EXP A  EXP* A  CGM A  CGM* AGFC A  GFC
1949 + 14 + 18 -20,4 -15,7 no data
1950 +62 +66 + 13,2 + 17,9
1951 -18 —14 +49,2 +53*9
1952 -27 -23 -34,9 “30,2
1953 +61 +65 -20,8 -16,1
1954 -21 -17 +31,5 +36,2
1955 “66 -62 -21.3 -16,6
1956 + 28 + 32 “14,3 - 9*6
1957 -83 -79 + 12,1 + 16 * 8
1958 + 11 + 15 -41,2 -36,5
Venezuela (Stable)
M,bolivares, 1957
EXP A  EXP* A  CGM A  CGM* A gfc AGFC
1949 - 37 -165 + 11*8 - 33,8
1950 + 158 + 30 -131,0 -176*6
1951 + 192 + 64 + 43,7 + 28.1 +311 - 79
1952 + 97 - 31 + 74,4 + 28.8 +995 +605
1953 - 5 -133 + 10,1 - 35.5 +592 +202
1954 + 145 + 17 + 45 * 2 - 0,4 +682 +292
1955 + 183 + 55 + 35*7 - 9*9 -305 -695
1956 +243 + 115 +144,3 + 98,7 +436 + 146
1957 + 250 + 122 +481,4 +435*8 + 353 - 37
1958 - 45 -173 -289*0 “334,6 + 148 -142
1959 +691 +301
Source: Calculated from Table 3:15
Adjusted for trend by subtracting a constant annual average change from 
each country from each year's actual change.
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Footnotes to Chapter 3
1. In some of the lower income countries some investment in 
the subsistence sector is frequently omitted or underestimated in the 
national accounts e.g. the construction of farm buildings by unpaid 
family labour, or the bringing into cultivation of virgin land. Where 
agriculture is large such omissions may give a downward bias to 
estimates of gross-fixed-capital formation in underdeveloped countries.
2, These are log. variancp indices which measure instability 
after correcting for a constant percentage increase or decrease in the 
variable considered over the period 1946 - 58.
3. ECLA, 1962; p, 169 and Table 1. The measure of instability 
used is the average-annual-percent deviation from a straight-line trend, 
fitted by least-squares regression to the data from 1948 to 1959. The 
export figures have been divided by an index of import prices to give a 
figure which approximates their purchasing power in terms of imports*
The study gives no results of correlation analysis, but relies on 
visual comparison of the indices,
4* Chapter 11, ’’Fiscal and Monetary Policies” contains 
discussion of the possible uses and limitations of government policy 
in underdeveloped countries in countering export induced instability* 
Their effectiveness seems very limited in most underdeveloped countries 
at present* In Burma, however, the State Agricultural Marketing Board 
fixed producers' prices and may have reduced fluctuations in their 
incomes.
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5* UN, 1961;pp*11-12, Similar statements can be found in
UN, 1958: pp. 60-64; UN, 1959; pp. 66-73 and Fleming and Lovasy, 1960:p. 14
6 . UN, 1961; pp. 11-13 and chart 2 presents this data in the
form of a scatter diagram and comments, "the year-to-year changes in total 
investment have tended to reflect the instability in export proceeds or
in importing power of exports (see chart 2)", Actually the points are 
widely scattered on the chart and it requires a certain boldness to fit 
any regression line by eye to them. The calculated regression, as we have 
seen, is non-significant.
7. ECLA, 1962; p. 172.
8 . Berg, 1964.
9. Data from Coppock, 1962; Table A-2.
10. On 26 occasions total receipts fluctuated more than 
merchandise exports, on 10 occasions fluctuations were equal in each and 
on 29 occasions total receipts fluctuated less than merchandise exports.
The average annual percentage change in total receipts was 15,6, while 
for exports alone it was 17,2 per cent. See UN, 1952; Table 45, p.73.
11. Fleming and Lovasy, 1960; p. 12. They define "external 
receipts" as "the net balance of all items other than imports and 
compensatory financing."
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12« Data for both of these cross-country correlations are from 
Coppock, 1962t Table A-2,
13. See ChaptersS and 10 below*
14. UN, 1961: pp. 3-15, UN, 1953: pp. 6-21, UN, 1962: p.51, 
for example.
15. Wah, 1962: pp. 84 - 94, He actually finds a negative 
regression coefficient for production on current prices. He comments, 
p. 93, "Within the period studied production by Malayan rubber estates 
did not respond to current year prices changes." Sterne, 1963, pp. 16-17, 
finds low or zero rubber supply elasticities even when stock responses 
are included,
16. Wah, 1962; p. 93
17. However, in some countries the wages of export industry 
workers are fixed by law. This apparently was the case in Ceylon tea 
estates* Levin, 1960; p. 187.
18. The sources of government revenue in a typical underdeveloped 
country may resemble the following; 23 per cent direct taxes, probably 
mainly paid by large businesses, 26 per cent import duties, 15 per cent 
export duties, 19 per cent other indirect taxes, and 17 per cent non-tax 
revenues. These are averages for 15 underdeveloped countries in Africa 
calculated from EGA, 1962, Table 14.
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19* "Leaving aside the subsistence sector, the differences in 
levels of income between different social groups within the monetary 
sector are immense» A convenient destruction can be drawn between a 
high-income and a low-income group, the former consisting of the 
merchant and the business class in urban areas, together with holders 
of senior positions in both public and private sectors," EGA, 1962:p.25
20* Tan, 1962; p. 14
21 « Nigeria and the French Niger, Ivory Coast and Ghana, 
Eastern Nigeria and the Cameroons and the Congo have seen large 
quantities of export crops moved across the border to take advantage 
of higher prices. See Berg, 1964 a; pp. 26-27»
22. The taxes on profits surprisingly may be less responsive 
in many underdeveloped countries because of inefficiencies in tax 
administration and tax evasion. See Chapter 11, pp. 00 - 00, below.
23. Fleming, Rhomberg and Boissoneault, 1963* Table 13, p.144
24. A V « a X (1 - Pj^  - m^  ^- tjç). l/m^ + s^ + ty
= AX (1 - 0.19 - 0*05 - 0.29). 1/0.32 + 0.05 + 0.09
= AX. 0.47/0.46 
= AX. 1.02
This assumes a neutral fiscal and monetary policy on the part of the 
government. It does not allow the money supply to change or government 
expenditure to change as a consequence of the export fluctuations.
-142.
25e Maizels, 1963: 415
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Chapter 4 
Economic Growth
Probably the most important question in this study is whether export 
fluctuations have any adverse direct or indirect effects on the ability of 
underdeveloped countries to achieve rapid and stable economic growth » This
forms the subject of inquiry in the present chapter* The main focus is on
the accumulation of capital and the relative efficiency of its use* Any 
economic phenomenon which retards the accumulation of capital* distorts 
its allocation or otherwise reduces its efficiency strikes at the interests 
of an underdeveloped country* Sharply fluctuating export proceeds seem a 
very proper subject for concern as a possible influence on the rate and 
efficiency of investment* They have in fact* for reasons discussed in 
Chapter 1* fallen under strong suspicion of damaging prospects for economic 
growth in underdeveloped countries, A statement by Ragnar Nurkse (1958;p,143)*
exemplifies the apprehension of those who consider export fluctuations to be
seriously detrimental:
*The instability of export markets for primary commodities makes 
any steady development policy difficult; discourages investment
in primary production itself; generally limits the ’economic
horizon'* and destroys the continuity so necessary in private 
as well as public planning, 'People have learned out of the past 
that wealth comes quickly in Brazil through a boom* and that a 
sudden turn of events may bring disaster*‘ The violent
fluctuation of the export trade may well be a major cause of the
speculative attitude and the ’get=rich-quick’ mentality so 
widespread among businessmen in underdeveloped countries*
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Through the cyclical instability of foreign trade it may 
be that dynamic growth in the advanced countries has tended 
in this way to impede the progress of the poorer countries,
This is a complex statement containing several ideas, but it is evident 
that Nurkse thought that both the quantity and quality of investment were 
likely to be adversely affected in countries where export instability is 
relatively severe* Some insight into the actual relationships may be 
obtained by starting off the analysis with very simple* indeed crude 
hypotheses and subsequently modifying these. One such hypothesis is that 
countries which have highly unstable exports tend to invest a smaller 
proportion of national income than do countries with stable exports*
Clearly there are many other factors which may affect investment, but 
if these other factors are unrelated to export instability it is 
possible that their effects should be random allowing the effect of 
instability, if it is powerful, to be revealed by simple correlation 
analysis*
To test this first hypothesis simple correlation analysis of the 
relationships between indices of fluctuations in the importing power of 
merchandise exports and the ratio of investment to income cumulated over 
the period 1950-58 for the 21 underdeveloped countries for which data are 
shown in Table 4:1 was carried out* Data for investment and income are in 
constant 1950 prices in this and all subsequent statistical analyses in 
this chapter* The correlation coefficient found was +*05 which is 
non-significant and has the wrong sign. As far as the hypothesis is 
concerned the coefficient should be significantly negative*
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A second hypothesis, that countries with relatively unstable exports 
tend to have a slower rate of growth of fixed capital formation likewise gains 
no support from correlation analysis. For 25 underdeveloped countries listed 
in Table 4:1 the correlation coefficient was +*17 which again has the wrong 
sign, but is well below the ,05 level of significance. Some support for the 
possibility of a positive association between export instability and the rate 
of growth of fixed capital is revealed when the 25 countries are ranked 
by the degree of instability and grouped in thirds as in Table 4:2. It 
appears from the table that the higher the average degree of export 
instability the faster the average rate of growth of investment.
These simple cross-country correlations evidently yield no support 
to the view that export instability deters investment. It would not be very 
surprising to find a very low correlation between investment and a single 
explanatory variable such as the degree of instability of exports. It is a 
little surprising, however, that the signs for these coefficients should 
be positive rather than the negative signs suggested by the two hypotheses. 
Crude though they are, these results at least indicate that other variables 
are probably rather more important determinants of a country’s investment 
than the degree of instability of its exports. Of course, it remains 
possible that export instability does have an adverse effect on either or 
both the level and rate of growth of investment but that this is swamped 
by other more powerful influences.
Some of these influences are social,cultural and institutional: the 
savings habits of the society, the proportion of saving and investment 
carried out by the government, the tax policies and levels of protection 
against imports of consumer goods are potentially important. However,
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given that the average underdeveloped country relies on Imports of 
capital goods for approximately 40 per cent of its domestic fixed 
investment  ^the sources of foreign exchange would seem likely to be 
significant determinants of capital accumulation in most underdeveloped 
countries. Proceeds from the rate of merchandise exports remain by far 
the most important of these (13N, 1962; Table 1-6), but invisible 
transactions, private and official capital movements play a significant 
role in some countries. Moreover, the trend or rate of increase in the 
purchasing power over imports of the sum of these items may be the most 
important determinant of the ability of underdeveloped countries to 
increase their rate of fixed investment. The social institutional and 
cultural determinants are less likely to change significantly in the 
span of less than a decade. They are probably more influential on the 
level of savings and Investment as a proportion of GNP but less useful 
as an explanation of the rate of growth of investment than is the rate 
of growth of import capacity. They are in any case very difficult to 
measure. No doubt in principle a classification or crude indexing of 
such factors could be carried out and their introduction as qualifying 
variables would improve our explanation of fixed investment, but in 
practice it is doubtful if it could be done. Certainly it would require 
a much more intimate knowledge of each of the countries used than the 
author could acquire. If it is true that in general they tend to be 
fairly stable over the period of time considered here, then it is 
probably more justifiable to omit social and institutional determinants 
from a model which attempts to explain the rate of growth of fixed 
capital formation than one explaining proportion of income devoted to
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investment. In fact the rate of growth of import capacity is correlated 
much more closely with the rate of growth of fixed investment than with 
the average ratio of fixed investment to GDP for the whole period 1950-58 
when the influence of other variables is taken into account. In any case 
the major concern of this study is with the impact of external events on 
the domestic economy.
Multivariable Analysis of Investment
In the first model formulated to explain the rate of growth of 
investment in underdeveloped countries the independent variables were:
(1) the rate of growth of import capacity, i.e. the total value of 
exports plus net invisibles and net capital transfers, divided by an 
index of import prices, (2) the instability of importing power of 
merchandise exports, and (3) the rate of increase (or decrease) in 
reserves of gold and foreign exchange over the period. The group of 
countries was the maximum number of underdeveloped countries (25) for 
which data were available. The figures are shown in Table 4:1. The 
multiple regression equation found was:
i = -5.62 + 1.09Xi + 1.21X2 - 0 .14X3 = 0.30
(0.39) (0.70) (0.16)
where I is the rate of growth of fixed-capital formation, X% the rate
of growth of total import capacity, X2 the instability of importing
power of merchandise exports, and X.^ the rate of increase in 
foreign-exchange reserves. Of these only the coefficient of X^, the rate 
of growth of total import capacity, was significant at the .05 level.
The variable in which we are particularly interested, X^, once again 
seems to have a positive, though weak, relationship with the rate of
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investment, not the significant negative relationship required by the
hypothesis of deterred investment. The equation as a whole does not reach
the ,05 level of significance.
However, when two further variables are added to the regression
analysis, the resulting equation becomes highly significant and appears
to explain over 80 per cent of the variation in the rate of growth of
investment among these countries. The two further explanatory variables
are: X^, the percentage change in the ratio of capital-goods imports to
domestic fixed capital formation, and X^, the percentage change in the
ratio of capital-goods imports to total imports. Data for each and
definitions are shown in Table 4:1. The reasons for adding these
variables are fairly obvious. Despite suggestions that underdeveloped
countries have already cut their ordinary imports to a minimum and are
2
unable to produce capital goods at home, many have in fact done both 
of these things and thus enhanced their potential to increase investment.
The simple correlation coefficients between each of these and I are 
sufficiently high to justify their inclusion in the multiple-regression 
analysis (-0.37 for X^ and +0.62 for Xg). With the addition of these 
variables the new equation found was:
i = -4.59 + 0.71Xj^  + 0.95X2 + 0.10X3 ■ 0'19%4 + O.I6X5 R “ 0.81 
(0.24) (0.39) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
This equation is statistically highly significant as a whole, and each 
of the coefficients is significant at least at the .05 level except for 
X3 , the reserves. The variable, Xg, was dropped, and the final regression 
equation was:
I ±: -4.14 + 0.84Xi + 0.85X2 " 0'19%4 + 0,15X5 = 0.81
(0.19) (0.38) (0.04) (0,02) F-Ratio = 20.87
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These four variables seem to explain over 80 per cent of the variation in
the rate of growth of investment among the 25 underdeveloped countries 
3
examined. The variable in which we are particularly interested is Xg* 
the instability of the importing power of exports. It would seem from our 
analysis that it is associated significantly, better than the .05 level, 
with the rate of growth of investment. But this association is positive: 
the greater the instability, the higher the rate of fixed-capital formation. 
These statistical findings simply cannot support belief in the detrimental 
effect of export fluctuation.
The multiple-regression analysis was repeated, but with average 
investment to average income for the whole period as the dependent 
variable instead of the rate of growth of investment. This gave a very
poor explanation of l/Y;
2
l/Y « 12.36 + 0.03X% + 0.038X2 + O.OSX^ - 0,05X5 R = 0.105
(0.04) (0.081) (0.07) (0.05)
though a slight improvement on the simple correlation with Xg, The
coefficient of Xg was again positive, but well below the ,05
significance level. At the very least, the view that Investment should 
be lower with high export instability is not upheld. If anything, the 
tendency appears to be the other way.
Both the simple correlations and the multiple regressions yield 
no support to either of our first hypotheses. Statistical analysis has 
certainly not established that Instability in exports is a deterrent 
to either the quantity or rate of growth of fixed-capital formation in 
underdeveloped countries. To go further and argue that fluctuations in 
exports would actually lead to higher investment was no part of our 
intention. But it is interesting to speculate a little on why this
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actual or apparent relationship might exist.
One possibility is that export booms generate optimism leading 
to increased investment which is not matched by disinvestment in years 
of export slumps. This view gains some support from Clark Reynold's study 
of the Chilean economy. His findings suggest that:
"Investors in the export industry regard upswings as beginnings 
of trends rather than as temporary phenomena, and behave 
accordingly; downswings, on the other hand, are apparently 
considered short-run phenomena, since no major disinvestment 
occurred for any of the companies even during the severe 
depression of the 1930's." (Reynolds, 1963, p.100).
Sir Sidney Caine, commenting on an article by Ragnar Nurkse says:
"There is in fact plenty of evidence on the other side in, 
for example, the high level of investment which has 
prevailed in such countries as Malaya and Indonesia 
during periods of very sharp fluctuation in the prices 
of their principal products." (Caine, 1958: p. 188).
A more general and theoretical objection to the view of fluctuation 
as detrimental may be raised. This is that people whose incomes are subject 
to large fluctuations are likely to hold a larger amount of reserves 
against contingencies than are others whose income is relatively stable.
In order to do this they must at some time increase their saving, which
4 !
in turn releases resources for investment. In economies where there is
constant pressure on available investment resources such acts of saving
are likely to lead to investment by someone - perhaps the government -
-151-
unless the cash accrues to deposits in banks overseas and so reduces foreign 
exchange reserves. There is therefore a case to be made out in support of 
our statistical finding of a positive, if rather weak, relationship 
between fluctuations in exports and the rate of growth of investment.
Another possibility exists, however. The relationship may be 
spurious and derive mainly from increased costs of capital goods or loss 
of efficiency in investment in underdeveloped countries which suffer from 
high export instability. This is not simply a question of inflation 
raising the monetary prices of capital goods, since our data for these 
are in constant prices. It is rather more a question of the effects of 
instability on the quality and allocation of investment. Perhaps we can 
characterize these as qualitative effects and consider them in the 
following section.
Possible Qualitative Effects on Investment
1, Those countries which have suffered much export instability may have 
often had repeated devaluations with a corollary increase in the 
domestic price of their capital-goods imports,The raised domestic 
prices would inflate the value of capital goods to-wards the end of 
the period. This would apparently increase the rate of growth of 
investment and raise the proportion of investment to income. The 
apparent increase would be spurious for the physical assets would be 
the same or even less.
2. Countries with unstable exports will have had unstable "stop-go" 
investment policies enforced upon them which tend to lower their 
efficiency and increase construction costs of capital projects.
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3. Repeated shortages of foreign exchange imposed by fluctuations might 
lead to diversion of demand towards home-produced —  more costly and 
less efficient -- capital goods.
4. Increased uncertainty created by fluctuations could increase risks of 
investment and of lending in such a way as to increase risk premia
on loan rates of interest and thus to raise costs of capital projects. 
Where economic planning is important, increased uncertainty could 
render it less efficient and more costly. A high degree of 
uncertainty could also affect the pattern of investment and might 
favor more costly and less productive types,
5. Instability in exports tends to generate inflation which in turn is 
likely to affect the allocation of resources between different types 
of investment goods and may lower productivity.
Bringing these effects under scrutiny, the first possibility, the 
effects of devaluation, seems a very dubious explanation for the positive 
correlation found between growth of investment and export instability. 
Most underdeveloped countries which have devalued their currency have 
found that their domestic price levels soon readjusted upwards via more 
inflation so that the increased cost in local currencies of imported 
goods was rapidly overtaken. If this generalization is true, then the 
use of deflated figures for capital formation, as was done, should 
eliminate all or most of the effects of devaluation in raising the 
costs of capital formation. In any event, in our sample only two 
countries with high export instability associated with rapid growth in 
capital formation have experienced devaluations within the period.
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These are Colombia, which has had frequent devaluations associated with 
prolonged and fairly rapid inflation, and Turkey, which devalued in 
1957 and 1958 at the end of the period. Turkey, however, is one of the 
countries where trade is a tiny part of national income; exports plus 
imports amounted to a mere 7 per cent of the Turkish gross national 
product in 1957, and Turkish capital-goods imports averaged in the two 
years 1957 and 1958 only 21 per cent of domestic fixed-capital 
formation. These are the only years which could have been affected in 
our study.
The remaining possibilities could be checked in detail only by a 
very close examination of actual investment projects and by surveys of 
types of investment undertaken under different experiences of stable and 
fluctuating export earnings. Data on the composition pf investment are 
very scarce and chronically inaccurate. Many countries publish no 
breakdown of fixed-capital formation or only under the very broadest 
headings. However, if it were true that severe instability in export 
earnings affected the composition of investment, one area which would 
probably reflect this is the ratio of stocks to total capital. This is 
particularly likely if the export instability causes or is accompanied 
by inflation. Instability is deemed to make for uncertainty for 
investors. Given a mood of uncertainty, investors will seek liquidity, 
normally in the form of cash or readily encashable assets which enable 
investors to seize opportunities for profitable investment in fixed 
assets as they arise. However, in an inflationary context money or 
assets whose values are fixed in money terms become unattractive. Their 
purchasing power may dwindle rapidly and inflict serious capital loss
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upon their owners. In these circumstances stocks of storable goods become
an attractive compromise. They can fairly readily be converted into cash,
but they also have the merit of holding their value in real terms (barring
obsolescence or alterations in consumers' tastes). The combination of
instability in export proceeds with secular inflation which is made to
proceed at alternating fast and slow speeds by the export instability
would produce, if ever they are going to be produced at all, conditions
under which a relatively high ratio of investment in inventories to
6
total investment would prevail.
Before examining the effect on stocks it may be worthwhile 
examining the association between export instability and inflation. 
Inflation itself is suspect as an adverse factor in the economic growth 
equation. Whether inflation in fact damages prospects for growth is a 
subject of controversy, but recent empirical studies by members of the 
IMF staff have produced evidence which is at least suggestive of adverse 
effects from inflation on growth.  ^This increases the, importance of a 
possible causal relationship between short-term fluctuations in exports 
and secular inflation in underdeveloped countries.
Export Fluctuations and Domestic Inflation
Export instability may certainly increase the difficulties of 
avoiding inflation. If one social group achieves an increase in income 
through a fortuitous increase in world prices or through a good harvest 
other groups may be unwilling to concede this relative worsening of 
their position. If those whose interests are damaged are organized and 
powerful they may succeed in obtaining increased incomes which are 
unmatched by any rise in the overall productivity of the economy. Where
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this happens inflationary pressure will be generated.
Inflation may also result from a kind of ratchet effect on money 
incomes produced by fluctuations in export earnings. A possible sequence 
of events could run as follows: export earnings rise generating increased 
incomes in the export sector, unionized labor in this sector demands 
a share in the increased profits and obtains a wage increase. When export 
earnings subsequently fall, wage incomes do not fall in turn and some 
risk of unemployment threatens. This leads the government into efforts to 
support domestic incomes to avoid the economic and political troubles 
attendant on unemployment. However, the constant drain upon reserves of 
gold and foreign exchange which would result from the continued demand 
for imports at the supported level of income would force the government 
to restrict the quantity of imports by controls. This could tend to 
divert demand to home-produced goods raising their prices, increasing 
the cost of living and perhaps setting off a further sequence of wage-price 
increases. These eventualities are unlikely in any but the richer and 
more economically developed of the underdeveloped countries.
The government's own policies may lead it into increasing 
inflationary pressure. The increased foreign exchange available during the 
export boom, together with increased government revenues from taxation, 
particularly export and import duties, may lead the government to embark 
upon fairly expansionary policies such as investing in construction work. 
These works will require sustained expenditures upon them and perhaps 
capital-goods imports for some time after the export boom has receded 
into the past. This may force the government to adopt discriminatory 
controls upon imports -- restricting those for private consumption to
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enable it to husband its foreign exchange for the purchase of capital 
goods from abroad. The maintenance of the domestic expenditures combined 
with the controls on imports of consumption goods are once again likely 
to increase inflationary tendencies at home, A devaluation in this 
context would also tend to increase inflationary stresses.
Whatever the actual mechanism which may relate instability of 
export earnings to inflation in underdeveloped countries the 
statistical evidence yields some support for believing in the 
relationship. Table 4:1 sets out the data on which calculations were 
based. When all 29 of the underdeveloped countries in the sample were 
used to correlate their average rates of inflation (average-year-to-year 
per cent change in their cost-of-living indices) with their instability 
of importing power of exports the correlation was low and insignificant, 
but when the ex-British territories of Malaya, Ghana, and Ceylon were 
left out of the sample the correlation become 0,5 and is statistically 
significant at the ,01 level. Omission of the ex-British territories 
may be justified on the basis that under the currency-board system 
which governed their economies for most of the post-war period 
colonial and trust territory governments were fairly effectively 
prevented from adopting inflationary policies. If all 29 of the 
countries are ranked by export instability from highest to lowest 
and grouped into three groups of ten, ten and nine the average indices 
of instability and inflation for each group show some positive 
association,. The group with the highest export fluctuations have an 
associated mean rate of inflation of 10.6. The second group's average 
inflation rate is 4.7 and the group with the least instability of
-157-
exports has the lowest mean rate of inflation,2.2 per cent per annum.
But even if the association is taken as established it remains a
matter of opinion whether the export fluctuations are a fundamental or
merely a proximate cause of the inflation; or indeed, if a causal
relationship exists. In Argentina probably both the inflation and the
export instability were the results of the government's economic
policies for rapid industrialization. In Chile the effects of export
instability are greatly reduced by the intervention of the expatriate
copper firms and the inflation can be largely explained by persistent
8government budget deficits. In Brazil exports form less than 
7 per cent of GNP, so it seems unlikely that their instability could 
be an important cause of inflation. These three countries weigh very 
heavily in the correlation as Table 4:1 shows.
Investment in Stocks and Construction
Since inflation is itself a possible cause of investment in 
stocks it is introduced as a qualifying variable in analyzing the 
possible influence of export instability on secular inflation. A 
multiple-regression analysis of the relationships among the ratio 
of stocks to total capital, the instability of the importing power 
of exports and the average annual increase in the cost-of-living 
index was carried out with Table 4:1 data for sixteen underdeveloped 
countries for which figures were available. The simple correlation 
coefficient between stocks/investment and instability of the 
importing power of exports is -0.186, the partial correlation 
coefficient, allowing for the influence of inflation, is +0.0035,
-158-
The change of sign together with the smallness of the r values makes 
the existence of an association improbable.
2
The regression equation is: Y - 8.4 + 0.0082X2 “ 0.1408X^ R = 0.198
(.6524) (0.0864)
Where Y « the ratio of stocks to total investment, Xg ™ the instability 
of exports and Xg = the rate of inflation. These results give some 
suggestion of an inverse relation between the ratio of stocks to fixed 
capital and the rate of inflation, but it is non-significant at the 
.05 level. The instability of importing power of exports and the ratio 
of stocks to total investment seem quite unrelated.
Construction
It is sometimes suggested that uncertainty and inflationary 
conditions tend to create incentives for investment in the construction 
of luxury housing^ diverting resources to this from more socially 
approved tasks. It is also held that such distortion lowers the 
possible rates of growth in economies where it occurs. Without 
accepting the validity of this argument it may nevertheless be 
interesting to inquire whether export instability does influence the 
allocation of investment in this way. Unfortunately data on construction 
as a proportion of total capital formation could be found for only 
twelve underdeveloped countries. They are set out in Table 4:1. When 
a multiple-regression analysis of the association of the ratio of 
construction to total investment with export instability and the 
rate of inflation was carried out no significant relationships were 
found. The equation found was:
Y = 67.5 + O.lAXg - 0.29Xg = 0.23
(1.46) (0.20)
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Where Y is the ratio of construction to investment and X2 and X^ have 
the same meanings as before. Neither export instability nor inflation 
appears to be significantly related to construction as a proportion 
of investment. But of course the data are unreliable and the sample of 
countries small.
The Productivity of Capital
A further possible way of measuring changes in the allocation and 
efficiency of investment is suggested in the study of inflation and 
Investment by Shaalan (1962: pp, 255 et seq.) This is an examination of 
changes in the marginal output-to-capital ratio, "If changes in 
output/capital ratios are examined, one may obtain not a measure of 
the structure of investment but an approximation to an Index of the 
efficiency of investment. Other things being equal, a high marginal 
output/capital ratio would suggest that recent investment by the 
economy had been highly productive (and vice versa)." Shaalan uses 
this technique to examine the efficiency of investment during different 
inflation periods between 1950 and 1959 for Argentina, Chile and Colombia. 
We, however, use it in cross-sectional analysis which may be even less 
legitimate. The hypothesis which we test is of the form: -- those 
countries which have high export instability will tend to have lower 
average, values for their marginal output/capital ratios over the 
period examined (1950-58). In fact we could only arrive at 
conclusions about the relative efficiency of investment if a great 
many 'other things remained equal': no differential change in the degree 
of utilization of existing capacity in different countries, similar
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industrial structure and pattern of change (e.g., an increase in mineral 
extractions may mean a vast increase in capital, but nevertheless be very 
profitable, because labor costs are low) similar changes in technology, etc.
However, for the sake of completeness this relationship was examined. 
Data were analysed for some twenty-four underdeveloped countries. The 
simple correlation coefficient between the average incremental capital/ 
output ratio (i.e., inverse of the marginal output/capital) and the 
degree of instability of the importing power of exports was +0.425 
which is just barely significant at the ,05 level. This correlation and 
its significance hang largely upon the data for one country, Argentina, 
which has an exceptionally high marginal capital/output ratio over this 
period.With the omission of Argentina the correlation is quite 
insignificant, When the countries were ranked by degree of foreign trade 
instability and grouped into thirds the averages for the groups showed 
only an insignificant association. The mean capital/output ratios for 
the groups when ranked highest to lowest by degree of export instability 
were; 4.45 per cent, (omitting Argentina, 3,24 per cent), 2,98 per cent 
and 2,98 per cent.
A multiple-regression analysis including the rate of inflation as 
a qualifying variable lowered the degree of association with export 
instability.
The regression equation was:
Y = -0.35 + 0.4457X2 + 0.0528X, = 0.2415
(0.2705) ( 0.0407)
where Y is the incremental capital/output ratio and ^6 have the
same meanings as before.
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The regression coefficient for X^, the instability of importing power of 
exports is non-significant at the ,05 level. Argentina was included in the 
regression analysis. The results would have much lower values were it 
omitted. Since this period was one of a deliberate governmental policy 
to build up Industry at the expense of agriculture In Argentina it would 
not be surprising to find that the very high average incremental 
capital/output ratio was due to the high initial investments required 
in setting up industry and the low value of output caused by lack of 
incentives to agriculture and disruption of normal production by the 
political and economic struggles of that time. In addition, Argentina 
suffered a severe drought in 1952 which lowered agricultural output 
severely. Given that the relationship is non-significant even when 
Argentina is included, it seems reasonable that we should regard the 
hypothesis, that marginal capital/output ratios in countries with 
relatively high export instability tend to be higher than in countries 
with stable exports, as not confirmed by the evidence.
®ie foregoing analyses of the effects of export instability upon the 
proportion of investment in stocks, in construction and upon the marginal 
capital/output ratios yield little or no support to the view that these 
effects have been significant and damaging to economic growth. Admittedly 
the lack of data has limited the size of the samples and the data is 
probably subject to serious inaccuracies so that too rmich weight should 
not be put on this evidence. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely 
ignored and it does cast some doubt upon the view that, even if 
investment is not lower, it will be less efficient in countries where 
export instability is high. The burden of proof is shifted back to the
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proponents of that view.
Growth of Gross Domestic Product
As a final and more general check, the relationship between foreign 
trade instability and economic growth in underdeveloped countries was 
examined more directly. Simple correlation analysis for twenty-two 
underdeveloped countries using Table 4:1 data yielded a correlation 
coefficient of -0.29 which is well below the .05 level of significance 
and explains only 5 per cent of the variation in the rates of growth 
between the countries. When the countries were ranked by the degree of 
instability of exports and grouped in thirds the inverse correlation 
appears confirmed, but it is evidently very weak. The most unstable 
group is associated with the lowest rate of growth, 5.24 per cent per 
annum; the mid-group 5.37 and the least unstable group with the highest
growth rate 5.46. But the differences are less than 0,1 per cent per
annum.
When the qualifying variable of the rate of growth of exports was
introduced the regression coefficient for the instability of importing
power of exports became tiny and clearly non-significant. The rate of 
growth of exports was associated significantly (at .01 level) with income 
growth. When the ratio of foreign trade to income and the rate of growth 
(or decline) in reserves were added the multiple-regression equation 
became much less significant. Changes in reserves appear to be of very 
little value in explaining growth in these countries. The empirical 
results are shown in the regression equations below. The data are from 
Table 4:1 save for T which is from Coppock, 1962; Table A-2.
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Ÿ “ 3.6 - .0082 Xy + 0.4278X R = .4285 F Ratio 7.12
(.2811) (.1267)
(2) Y = 4.1 - .0089Xy + 0.3021X + 0.0002T + 0.1028/lR = .4837 F Ratio 3.98
(.2833) (.1580) (.0186) (.0828)
The variables used are defined as: Y = rate of growth of output (1950/51 - 57/58),
= instability of importing power of exports (1948-58), X = rate of growth 
of import capacity (1950/51 - 57/58), T = ratio of foreign trade/income (1957),
^ Rechange in reserves of foreign exchange and gold (1950/51 - 57/58). In 
neither equation is X^, the instability of exports significantly related 
to the growth of GDP. It seems that for these twenty-two underdeveloped 
countries, chosen only on the basis of available data, little or no 
relationship exists between short-term instability in their export proceeds 
and the rate of growth of their national incomes. However, there are 
several other possible ways in which growth could be affected which we 
should examine.
Instability in Producers' Incomes and Specialization
One suggestion is that instability of primary producers' incomes 
will inhibit specialization. The uncertainty created by fluctuations in 
the income derived from the production of cash crops for export may act 
as a serious disincentive to specialization in these lines. Uncertainty 
is always a serious problem in agricultural production, but in low income 
countries the risks become much more vital. The individual farmer 
producing for the market runs three risks; (1) the risk of a bad crop,
(2) the risk of a fall in the price of his crop, (3) the risk of a rise in 
the price of the food he needs to buy to support his family* The subsistence 
producer runs only the first of
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these risks. It can therefore be argued that, in areas like East and West
Pakistan where the cash crops, jute or cotton respectively, are grown on
land which can be used for rice or other food grains, uncertainty can deter
specialization and encourage subsistence fanning. This adds a rational
argument to the widely used arguments of ignorance, laziness and
traditional and religious obstacles to the entrance of peasant
9
producers into the money economy. Intuitively this is an appealing 
argument in the context of Pakistan, Prices of staple foods have varied 
widely and frequently in the opposite direction to prices of the main 
export crops -- jute and cotton. However, where farmers are rather 
less poor and have already developed savings habits, e.g. the Yoruba 
cocoa farmers, described by Galletti,Baldwin and Dina (1956), the 
converse may hold true. The storage property of money may reduce 
considerably for the individual the risks of dependency upon his own 
food crops. If the peasant can save in good years to support his 
standard of living in bad years his position is more secure than that 
of the subsistence farmer. Sir Sydney Caine says,
‘'^ Private individuals living in primary producing countries 
are naturally not unaware that prices fluctuate, and they 
are perhaps more prudent than economic theorists give them 
credit for, so that they do not spend the whole of the 
higher incomes received in good times as soon as they are 
received. They do in fact put a certain amount away, as 
shown by the evidence of bank deposits and other forms of 
short-term saving, and they draw on those reserves in 
periods of lower prices, so maintaining a good deal more
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stability of consumption and expenditure than crude figures 
of income might suggest. I have myself lived in Malaya during 
a period of considerable fluctuation in the prices of rubber, 
when the highest price was nearly three times the lowest, 
without its being possible to observe either by ordinary 
Inspection of people's habits or from public statistics 
any striking change in the levels of private expenditure 
and consumption.^^ (1958: p. 189)
There is a further possibility, that once peasants have entered
the cash sector they may acquire tastes for products which can only be
obtained by earning money. If this happens their reaction to a fall in
prices of their cash crops may be an increase in output. They may also
have to pay taxes in cash which may force increased efforts to maximize
cash income when prices fall. If the reaction to increased prices is to
expand production while the reaction to reduced prices is also to expand
production, or at least not to contract it, the result of instability
would be increased specialization.
Almost the whole gamut of reactions by producers in underdeveloped
countries to changes in their prices and/or incomes can be postulated
with more or less degrees of scepticism. Unfortunately there is little
or no evidence available on this save in specific cases. Generalizations
11
on this problem in our current state of knowledge are impracticable.
Foreign Trade Instability and Foreign Exchange Reserves
It may be argued that because of their relatively greater instability 
of exports underdeveloped countries are forced to hold larger reserves 
than do rich countries, and this imposes a serious burden upon their economies
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It can also be argued that this is a partial explanation for the apparently 
minor domestic impact of export instability. Utilisation of reserves may 
have acted as a cushion between external fluctuations and their internal 
economies.
However, it does not appear to be true, at least among underdeveloped
countries, that there is a strong tendency for the countries with very
unstable exports to hold the larger reserves. Analysis of the
relationship between these two factors yields a very low correlation
12(0.128) for 38 underdeveloped countries. It appears that underdeveloped
countries on the average hold only a very slightly higher ratio of reserves
to imports than do rich countries. For some 41 underdeveloped countries
the average holding over 1956 and 1957 was 45,9 per cent, while for some
13
20 rich countries the average was 41,2 per cent. Given these statistical 
results it is hard to maintain either that underdeveloped countries 
have in fact held so much larger reserves than rich countries that this 
is a serious burden, or that their utilisation of these extra reserves 
could be an important explanation for the apparent lack of response 
in their internal economies to external instability. In our earlier 
analyses of both investment and national income growth changes in 
reserves of foreign exchange proved to have no significant relationship 
to either. (See pp.00 to OOand 00above).
Instability of Export Prices and Long-Term Demand for Exports
One final link between export instability and economic growth which 
should, perhaps, be included in this discussion is the question of a 
stimulus to the production of substitutes in importing countries or 
rival exporting countries which may be promoted by unstable commodity
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export prices* It can be argued that high commodity prices may increase 
the search for synthetic substitutes in the advanced countries or lead to 
adaptions of plant and equipment to use other materials which involve 
firms in capital investment and make their return to the use of the 
traditional material, even when its prices fall, much less likely,This 
is not an area in which general conclusions can easily be found and the 
issue is not at present capable of general statistical prood or disproof. 
It is a widely held belief, particularly in the field of textiles and 
rubberg that this has happened and is happening. How much of the 
substitution can be attributed to actual short-term instability of 
raw material prices is, however, very difficult to establish. The 
problem is overlaid by other determinants of substitution; cost-reducing 
Innovations in synthetics, quality improvements, changes in consumers* 
tastes and the development of new products. In the case of jute there is 
some evidence of its happening!At this stage all that can be said is 
that for some products price instability may have played some part in 
encouraging substitution, but compared to the other factors at work 
its influence seems likely to have been small,,
All in all, our search for evidence demonstrating the adverse 
influence of short-term instability of export earnings on the 
prospects of growth in underdeveloped countries has turned up little 
in support of that thesis. Almost every chain of reasoning leading to 
the conclusion that serious damage is inflicted by instability has been 
found wanting when confronted with analyses of UN and IMF data. Put at 
its weakest, the case for believing export instability to be a severe 
deterrent to economic growth in most underdeveloped countries is not
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proven. Moreover, for certain of the ways In which it is supposed 
to affect growth, e.g. through the quantity of investment, the weight 
of evidence is against. I would emphasise that this does not deny that 
for individual underdeveloped countries it may very well be important. 
Indeed3 it may be possible to demonstrate that for some underdeveloped 
countries short-term export instability has seriously reduced their 
ability to achieve high rates of economic growth, but for underdeveloped 
countries in general the evidence seems to indicate that this has not 
been an important obstacle to their economic development.
A brief, purely statistical study of relationships between export 
fluctuations and economic growth by Brode and MacBean (1964) using 
slightly different techniques and including rich industrial countries 
in the study reaches similar conclusions to these found here. Neither 
cross-country nor time-series analyses there reveal significant 
relationships between income or investment and export fluctuations.
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Table 4:1
Variables Used in Statistical Analyses in Chapter 4
Country (1)
#
I
(2)
"l
(3)
%2
(4)
*3
C5)
X4
(6)
5^
C7)
Y
(8)
I/Y
C9) (10) (11) 
p S/K
(12:
C/K
Argentina 2 - 2*9 11*8 -12*1 0 - 3 1*7 22 31 12*9 - 0.5 61
Bolivia 6 - 2*5 11*2 -20*9| 0 8 n*a* n 0 a 6
Brazil 2 2*3 8*1 - 2*9 -31 -16 4*8 14 20 2*9 6*2
Burma 15 6.5 9*6 - 3.4 0 73 5*6 17 0 3*0 10.2 72
Ceylon 5 1*5 7.9 1.8 0 9 9*0 10 0 3.6 5,8 74
Chile 3 2 . 6 8 .8 0 30 5 2*4 10 40 4*2 1 .6 52
Colombia 9 7,2 8*8 3*9 0 9 5*2 22 7 4.2 7.6 64
Congo 9 - 0.1 6.9 7.3 -24 - 9 n t> a e n.a* 6 , 6
Costa Rica 7.5
Cuba 11 1,1 7*3 - 1,5 -16 26i2.2! 15 6*8 1.5
Dominican Rep* 7*2 0
Ecuador 9 5.7 9*7 1*1 0 - 9 5*1 12 2 2*4 14.4 50
Egypt 16*8 3*3 12 - 1 3*6
El Salvador 6*8 1^
Finland 11*0 4
Ghana 10 2*3* 10*3 2*1 -36 —18 3*8 12 1 3*2 65
Greece 6*7 6*9 15 2*2 71
Guatemala 8 7*5 6*9 5*7 25 27 4*9 10^ 1 2*0
Honduras 7.8 1
Iceland 7.6 4
India 13 2*4 5*0 -11*4 0 79 n 0 a * 3 2.1
Indonesia 10.3 12
Table 4 t 1 (continued)
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Country CD (2) (3) (4) C5) C6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
I ^1 X2 %3 & "s Y I/Y
f
P S/K C/K
Iraq 29 10, 6 9,0^ 1 1 , 4 -33 35 11,1 14 i
i
1
1 . 3
Israel 3 4*7 7 , 5 7 . 6 0 13 9 . 9 17^ 1 . 7 74
Malaya 1 9 , 8 - 2
Mexico 6 3 , 6 7 , 7 4 . 6 0 -4 5 . 5 15 8 2 . 7 13 . 7
Morocco -  9 3 . 8 3 , 2 1 9 . 3 0 -56 n , a c n, a.
Nicaragua 8 , 5 5
Peru 7 9 , 6 6 , 6 "6 . 8 0 -4 4 . 3 20 7 4 , 7 8 . 4
Philippines 9 2 , 4 7 . 6 - 1 6 , 2 0 40 6 . 7 7 1 1 . 0 13,1 60
Portugal 6 4 , 3 6 . 5 3 . 2 0 -  6 3 . 9 15 1 3 , 8 6*0 69
Rhodesia G 
Nyasaland 9 2 , 5 8 . 7^ 6 , 7 0 3 7 , 0 31 4 . 4 4 . 7
Sudan 5 , 9 1
Thailand 7 2 , 6 5 . 9 "0 ,4 0 8 5 « 0 14 5 2 . 8 11 , 2
Turkey 16 3 , 2 8 . 4 3 , 4 -43 2 7 . 8 12 1, 5
Union of South 
Africa 4 3 , 1 5 . 4 - 4 . 5 0 6 5 . 1 21 4 , 1 58
Uruguay 14 . 4 17
Venezuela 10 14, 4 3 . 6 1 6 . 3 32 24 10 . 3 22 0 2 , 1 6*5
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Table 4 î 1 (continued)
Sources: (1) X : Annual rate of growth of fixed capital formation 1950-51
to 1957-58, UN, 1959; Table 2-1,
(2) X^: Rate of growth of import capacity, (Merchandise exports,
net services, private and official donations, private 
capital and long-term official capital divided by import 
price index), 1950-51 to 1957-58, calculated from 
UN, 1959: Column 1 of Table 2-7,
(3) X^î Fluctuations in the importing power of exports (percentage
deviations from trend fitted by a five-year-moving average 
of merchandise exports deflated by an index of import 
prices) 1948-58, Fleming and Lovasy, 1960: Table 2,
(4) X^ : Annual rate of increase of foreign exchange reserves,
1950-51 to 1957-58, calculated from IMF, IFS, 1962,
(5) X^! Percentage change in the ratio of capital goods imports
to gross domestic fixed capital formation, 1950-51 to 
1957-58, calculated from UN, 1959, Table 2-5,
(6) Xg: Percentage change in the ratio of capital goods imports
to total imports, 1950-51 to 1957-58, calculated from 
UN, 1959: Table 2-7,
0
(7) Y : Compound annual rate of growth of gross domestic product,
1950-51 to 1957-58, UN, 1959: Table 2-9,
(8)I/Y: Gross domestic fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
gross domestic product, both cumulated over the whole 
period 1950-58, UN, 1959: Table 2-9
-172-
Table 4 : 1 (continued)
Sources t (9) P ; Average year-to-year percentage change in the
cost-of-living index, 1951-59, IMF, IFS, 1962; p.31
(10) aK / ^ 0 ; Average incremental capital/output ratio, 1950-58,
UN, 1959; Table 2-9.
(11) S/K ; Average ratio of investment in stocks to gross
capital formation, 1951-59, UN, Accounts,1959 and 
1960 and Statistics of National Income and Expenditure, 
various issues,
(12) C/K : Ratio of construction to gross fixed capital
formation, 1950-58, UN, 1959: Table 2-13.
Footnotes to Table 4 : 1
a Export Earnings 
b Estimate 1950-55 
c Estimate 1950-57
d including inventories 
e Estimate 1951-57 
f Estimate 1952-59
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Table 4 : 2
Association Between Export Instability and Growth of InvestmentîGroups
Ranked by Degree of Export Fluctuation,
Average Instability 
of Importing Power 
of Exports
(1948-58)
Rate of Growth of 
Fixed Capital Formation 
in constant 1950 prices
(1950-51-57/58)
Top third (8 countries) 9.90
Middle third (8 countries) 7.90
Lowest third (9 countries) 5.75
10.04
7.64
6.11
Source; Table 4 ; 1
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Footnotes to Chapter 4
1. UN, 1959: Table 2 - 5  gives evidence for this statement.
2. "The realization of an increasing volume of investment 
has generally continued to depend closely upon a corresponding expansion 
in imported supplies of capital equipment." UN, 1959: p. 68. This 
implicitly denies the importance of our variables and X5 , but they 
turned out to be highly significant in our analysis.
3. The t ratios on the coefficients are:
X]^ = 4.42 Significance .001
X2 = 2.24 " ) .05
X4 = 4.75 " > .001
X^ = 7.50 " ^ .001
The F ratio for the equation is 20.87, significance ^  .01
4. Cf. Michaely, 1962: p. 118
5. Bernstein and Patel, 1951: pp. 363-98; Shaalan, 1962: 
pp. 243-61; Dorrance, 1963: pp. 1-44.
6. Cf. the more extensive argument along these lines on 
domestic inflation in Shaalan, 1962,
7. Dorrance, 1962; Wai, 1960; Shaalan, 1962.
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8. Reynolds, 1963 and Chapter 8 below,
9, This argument is derived from a very interesting analysis 
of peasant production by Walter P, Falcon, 1962 and 1964. It is discussed 
again below in Chapter 9,
10, See appendixes to PAO, 1958,
11, A recent study by M. Yudelman, 1964: Part III,
Chapter 4, discusses these questions in the African context in some 
detail; Mxs,K,Nair, 1962, comments on the enormous variety of reactions 
in India,
12, Data from Coppock, 1962: Table A-2, Correlation is for 
instability of exports and the ratio of reserves/imports,
13, Calculated from Coppock, 1962: Table A-2.
14, MacBean, 1962: pp. 258-9 and Chapter 9 below.
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Section II 
Five Cases 
Introduction and Summary
The following brief studies of particular underdeveloped countries 
are an attempt to carry the analysis a little more deeply into the affairs 
of individual countries in the hope of discovering relationships which 
may be obscured by the cross-sectional analyses and brief time-series 
analyses carried out in Section I. Africa, Asia and Latin America are 
represented. Uganda was chosen as illustrating a peasant agriculture 
specialised on two primary products which are fairly unstable, coffee 
and cotton. Tanganyika was chosen because it has a plantation system 
for its main export, sisal. This is largely expatriate owned and 
implies some dualism for the economy. Puerto Rico was chosen as an 
example of extreme economic dependence. Almost all of its trade is 
with U.S.A. and it is rapidly developing manufactured exports. Since 
this is a likely trend for other underdeveloped countries its 
implications for export instability are of considerable interest.
Chile represents dualism once more. This time the export is a mineral, 
copper, which has a record of high instability. Effects of expatriate 
ownership upon the internal impact of export instability are the main 
focus here. Finally, Pakistan illustrates peasant production for 
export of a very unstable product, jute. Its other main export, cotton 
has also been subject to severe fluctuations. Because of the divided 
nature of the economy, into East and West Pakistan, data are available 
which allow some exploration of the regional impact of fluctuations.
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This is seldom possible in underdeveloped countries.
Some readers may prefer to omit some or all of these case studies, 
at least on a first reading, since they mainly provide supplementary 
evidence on the questions of causes and consequences of export instability 
discussed in Section I. For those most interested in the general policy 
issues considered in Sections III and IV the case studies may be rather 
specialised. However, the main findings and the reasons for them have 
been summarised under the heading of "conclusions" in the last few 
pages of each of the five chapters. On the whole they confirm the 
results of Section I. Only one country, Uganda, shows much sensitivity 
to fluctuations in export proceeds. The reasons for Uganda's sensitivity 
and the other countries’ relative insensitivity to export instability 
bear out the suggestions on the determinants of domestic income response 
made at the end of Chapter 3. The case studies serve another useful 
purpose. They remind us of the very great diversity of economic conditions 
which exist in those countries we are apt in general discussion to throw 
into one mold under the label underdeveloped.
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chapter 5: Uganda
Uganda closely approximates the model underdeveloped country implicit 
in many discussions of export fluctuations. Its economic characteristics 
are such that export instability seems certain to have internal repercussions. 
Total exports form 27 per cent of GDP. Foreign trade, exports plus imports, 
exceeds 45 per cent of GDP and over 64 per cent of the GDP of the money 
economy. 75 to 80 per cent of the export proceeds are derived from two 
cash crops, coffee and cotton, which are almost entirely produced by 
small-scale, family-run farming units* The national product is generated 
largely in agriculture and ancillary activities* Industry is, as yet, 
minute and elementary, with the corollary that manufactures and capital 
equipment must be imported from abroad and paid for mainly by exports*
Moreover, the exports on which Uganda depends are highly unstable (Chart 5:1)* 
Measured by the average annual deviations from trend they have an instability 
index of 21*1 compared with Ghana's 10*8, Indonesia's 9*8 or Brazil's 6.4, 
Finally, with an average per capita income of only $65 per annum few of 
Uganda's inhabitants can be expected to have much of a reserve against 
contingencies*^
Domestic Consequences 
Income
Fluctuations of the magnitude which Uganda has experienced in her 
export earnings could be expected to have a fairly sizeable impact upon 
national income* The indigenous nature of the production for export and 
the lack of any possible stabilising monetary policy due to the existence 
of the Currency Board monetary system make it even more probable that short-term 
export instability should be reflected in the country's income* Chart 5:11, 
drawn on the same scale as Chart 5:1, shows the movements of the best (albeit
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very imperfect) indicators of national product provided by the statistics 
of the Uganda economy*^ The solid lines indicate the movements in net 
domestic product 1950-56 and of gross domestic product 1954-61* The dotted
lines reproduce both of these, minus the estimate for subsistence production*
As should be expected this cash domestic product shows considerably 
more sensitivity to changes in the value of exports* Annual percentage changes 
in export proceeds and in cash domestic product for 1950-60 are highly 
correlated (r - 0*95), but the degree of response of income to export 
change seems not unmodified* Tlie regression coefficient of 0*54 suggests 
a 5 per cent response of cash GDP to a 10 per cent change in exports* The
dampening effect is increased when the subsistence sector is added in
as shown by columns 2 and 3 in Table 5:1 and Chart 5:11* The multiplier
suggested by the data is only slightly larger than unity*
Imports
One explanation for the damped response of income could lie in the 
influence of a high marginal propensity to import* Changes in exports 
might be associated with large changes in imports thus reducing the 
multiplier effects of the initial change in exporters' incomes* Short-term
changes in imports do seem to have followed export fluctuations* When 
movements in imports and exports about trend are compared from 1948 to 
1959 in Table 5:2 it is only in two years, 1949 and 1958, that the direction 
of change was not the same for both* The correlation coefficient was 0*50 
which is significant at the *05 level* 7*4 as against 12*0* It seems probable 
that fluctuations in imports tended to absorb some of the fluctuations in 
exports and helped to reduce the impact on domestic income*
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Investment
In some countries shortages of foreign exchange have probably 
forced temporary cuts in capital goods imports. Balance of payments 
pressure due to a decline in export proceeds may in this way frustrate 
investment. In Uganda this was no problem in the period studied. The 
colonial monetary system ensured that the country always had sterling 
reserves. Inconvertibility into sterling from Uganda currency was impossible,
The third line of Table 5:2 shows the percentage deviations from 
trend for machinery and transport equipment imported by Uganda from 1951 
to 1958. Export proceeds and imports of these items in the same year show 
no association, but when related to the previous year's export earnings 
they seem quite closely associated, with a rank correlation coefficient 
of 0 . 68 which is significant at the .01 level.
Figures for gross-fixed-capital formation for Uganda are available 
only from 1950 to 1960. Year-to-year changes in these, as shown in Table 
5:1, were in the same direction as the previous year's exports in 7 years 
out of a possible 9. Tlie peaks and troughs seem to be reasonably closely 
related and at least suggestive of some measure of association between 
fluctuations in exports and in investment. Capital formation and capital 
goods' imports move in very close sympathy, confirming the relationship 
between investment and exports. However, it should be noted that in many 
underdeveloped countries investment figures are largely estimated from the 
balance of trade figures for imported machinery and other capital goods. 
Investment in private housing, farm buildings and in agricultural activities 
tends to be underestimated. If they were fully represented investment 
might show a less close relationship to exports.
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Prices or Cost of Living 
Instability in export proceeds could well have an impact upon the 
prices of goods and services consumed in Uganda, If a rise in export 
incomes affects domestic purchasing power it could stimulate demand for 
home produced and imported goods and services. If any inelasticity of 
supply exists for these, their prices would tend to rise. Conversely a 
fall in export proceeds could depress domestic prices.
Chart 5:111 plots two indices for Uganda prices against export 
proceeds. They can only be regarded as very rough indicators of changes 
in price levels in Uganda^ but are the only available figures. The more 
important one is the African index since it reflects changes in the cost 
of living of unskilled Africans in Kampala which is probably the largest 
group of Uganda natives who are completely within the market economy.
Most farmers, by far the greatest part of the population, obtain almost 
all of their food and even beer from their own crops. This African 
price index shows little or no relationship to fluctuations in export 
proceeds either in the current or previous year. The sharp rise in 1953 
was due to a poor harvest at the en^ of 1952,^ The European index seems 
almost completely insensitive to fluctuations in export incomes. On the 
basis of this evidence, inadequate though it may be, the only conclusion 
possible is that there seems to be no direct relationship between short-term 
instability in exports and the domestic price level in the period 1952-61 
for which data are available. Probable explanations for this include a 
high elasticity of supply of imports in normal times, moderately elastic 
food supplies, possibly relatively low income elasticities of demand for 
home-produced consumption goods and services and the relatively stable 
national income over most of this period, (See Table 5:1),
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Employment
The top line in Chart 5:111 plots the total African employment.
This is, of course, only a fraction of the true working force for most 
Africans in Uganda work in family units in agriculture and are not wage 
labourers. Others are migrant workers from Ruanda Urundi or native 
Ugandans, Unofficial estimates place these at over 80,000 wage workers 
who are largely omitted from the government figures, (Elkin, 1960), 
However, on the average, 225,000 Africans were recorded as in paid 
employment, many of them in agriculture and allied occupations such as 
cotton ginning. Some association between export incomes and employment 
might be expected. But even the percentage changes in this labour force, 
at least after 1951, have been relatively small, as shown by the graph, 
and any association between these changes and the current or previous 
year's export earnings has been slight and on occasion perverse: e,g,
1951-52, 1952-53, and 1959-60,
Government and Marketing Boards
As is normal in underdeveloped countries most of Uganda’s 
government revenue is derived from indirect taxation and within that 
mainly from export taxes and customs duties. In 1950 more than half 
of government revenue came from these two combined, $17,2 million out of 
total revenue of $30,8 million. By 1959-60 it was lower, $26,6 million out 
of total revenue of $61,4 million. Also the importance of export taxes 
had been reduced relative to customs duties: from a ratio of 2:1 in 1950 
to 1:1,4 in 1959-60, Income tax has become nearly as large a source of 
revenue as export taxes, $10,1 million to $11,2 million in 1959-60,
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Given the dependence on export taxes throughout the period, and to 
a lesser extent, the importance of customs duties on imports, fluctuations 
in exports seem likely to affect government revenue in a fairly direct and 
consistent manner. Table 5:3 and Chart 5:IV depict total export proceeds 
and total government revenue. There is evidently a close association in 
their trends, but fluctuations seem to be less closely associated.
Between 1952 and 1953 government revenue rose despite a sharp fall in
exports. Between 1955 and 1956 it rose again despite a moderate decline
in exports. Between 1956 and 1957 it declined despite an increase in 
exports. Between 1957 and '58 and 1959 and '60 revenues rose despite 
constant or declining exports. If it is thought that a one-year-time-lag 
should be introduced the revenue graph can be shifted one place to the 
right, but the contradictory movements in exports and revenue remain.
The data, as plotted on the graph from 1954 onwards, already have a built-in 
six month lag, since the revenue and other budget data from 1954 onwards 
are on a July '54 to June *55 basis and these figures were plotted against
the first year of the pair in each case.
The Uganda Budget seems to have been successfully operated as a 
force for cyclical stabilisation over the whole period, but for year-to-year 
adjustments its use as a stabilising force in the economy has been fairly 
slight e.g. the period 1952-53 saw the largest single decline in exports, 
but the budget remained in surplus. Net domestic product, especially cash 
product, declined sharply in that year (Chart 5:11). In the next year 
exports rose substantially, but the budget went into deficit. There seems 
to be very little systematic relationship between the overall budget surplus 
or deficit and the injection of income from exports. These surpluses or 
deficits in the budget are shown in the chart 5 ;IVa by the unshaded blocks.
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Th© shaded blocks indicate the surpluses and deficits in the reserves 
of the Cotton and the Coffee Marketing Boards from 1950 to 1960, Their 
behaviour has been very similar to that of the budget. In each year the 
sum of the Board surplus or deficit with the government budget surplus or 
deficit gives the net official impact of the official organs on the total 
level of demand in the economy. On the whole, this seems to have operated 
In a disinflationary manner up to 1954 and a reflationary manner subsequently, 
On a year-to-year basis neither the Boards' net position nor the total 
net effect of official funds upon the economy seems to have been closely 
synchronised with export earnings.
Incomes of Farmers 
In an economy like Uganda the impact of export instability on the 
cash crop farmers may be crucial. They are an important section of the 
community, are scarcely affluent, may suffer severely from fluctuations 
in their income and through variations in their expenditures they affect 
others. A major motive for setting up Marketing Boards was to insulate 
their incomes against the full impact of fluctuations in world prices for 
their crops. How successful were the Boards in smoothing producers' incomes? 
Total coffee export proceeds and growers' incomes are compared in Table 5:4, 
Instability, measured by percentage deviations from a five-year-moving 
average over the period 1949-59, is greater for African growers' incomes 
at 19.6 per cent than is the index for coffee export earnings at 16,6 per 
cent. If the simpler measure of year-to-year percentage change in incomes 
is used, the conclusion is verified; exports varied by 23.5 per cent on 
average and producers' incomes by 28 per cent. As far as short-term 
instability of income is concerned the effects of the Coffee Marketing 
Board were adverse.
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Although coffee producers' incomes have been at least as unstable 
as export proceeds, their timing and direction of changes have not always 
coincided. In three years; 1952, 1953 and 1958, the direction of change 
was opposite and in other years the proportion of the change differed 
markedly: 1950, 1954, 1955 and 1957.
The Cotton Marketing Board, on the other hand, appears to have had 
some success in moderating fluctuations in producers' incomes as is shown 
in Table 5:5. Whether measured on the simple annual basis or corrèçting 
for trend, cotton producers’ incomes seem to have been less unstable than 
cotton export proceeds. Changes have generally been in the same direction, 
but with several exceptions: 1950, 1957 and 1958.
Taken together, the Boards have on the average neither alleviated 
nor exacerbated the effect of unstable export earnings on producers’ 
incomes on a year-to-year basis.
Causes of Short-term Instability in the Exports of Uganda
It was evident from Chart 5:1 of this chapter that the instability 
of Uganda's total export earnings was largely derived from the instability 
in coffee and cotton export proceeds. Any explanation of Uganda’s 
export instability requires analysis of the reasons for their instability.
For both of these products Uganda's relative share in world supply 
is small enough to make it highly unlikely that any change in her supply 
alone will lead to any significant change in world coffee and cotton 
prices. In cotton, Uganda produces about 305,000 bales out of a total 
African production of 4.2 million, and of a world production of 47 . 7 million. 
Even within the category of long-staple cotton Uganda production forms only
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6 per cent of world output. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that 
the price elasticity of demand for Uganda's cotton is close to infinity 
and that Uganda's exports will have little or no impact on world prices.
5
Uganda's share of world coffee exports averaged only 3*8 per cent 1956-60, 
but the robusta variety, which predominates in Uganda's output of coffee, 
is not perfectly substitutable for Brazilian and Colombian coffees* Even
within the robusta variety Uganda's exports probably amount to much less 
than 20 per cent* Here again, it is probable that the volume of Uganda's 
exports has relatively little effect on their price*
Given this relatively high price elasticity of demand for Uganda's 
main exports, instability in export proceeds must stem mainly from shifts 
in demand for exports and/or changes in Uganda's supply* Correlation 
analysis of the coffee data in Table 5:6 yields the following results: 
the total value of Uganda coffee exports is associated more closely with 
volume (r = 0*77) than with unit value (r = 0*40)* The unit value of 
Uganda's coffee seems to haye a higher inverse correlation with the 
volume of world coffee exports (r = -0*41) than with Uganda's coffee 
exports (r = -0*20)* Although neither of these relationships can be 
regarded as strong, or even as firmly established--they tend to confirm 
the view that prices for Uganda's coffee are largely determined by world 
supply and demand and only very slightly by what happens in Uganda, The
positive associations between total export value and either volume or
current unit value,are also consistent with this view* The closer
relationship between proceeds and volume suggests that changes in output 
rather than in prices have been the principal cause of fluctuations in the 
total value of Uganda's coffee exports* Variations in the quantity of 
coffee exported have tended also to be larger than fluctuations in their
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price* Calculated as the average percentage deviation from a five-year moving 
average the instability index for volume is 16,1, while that for unit value 
is 11,0, from 1949 to 1958*
There remains the possibility that the changes in output were 
themselves induced by changes in prices in previous years* There are two 
distinct points to be made on this problem* First, the relevant prices 
would be those paid by the Coffee Marketing Board to producers* Presumably 
it is only prices paid to producers which affect their production decisions* 
But producer prices have not followed export prices very closely* Ihe 
second point is that the supply of coffee from Uganda could hardly be 
expected to follow prices at all closely because Ugandan stocks of coffee 
are very small and output cannot be expanded in the short run* Two to 
four years are required before new plantings begin to bear if seedlings 
are used, and four to five years if plantings are from seeds* "Substantial 
crops cannot be expected until, say, 5 to 8 years (after planting)*"^
Moreover, the vicissitudes of weather and pests produce sharp variations 
in yields* But some guide to the effect of prices on the production 
intentions of farmers may be derived from study of area figures* (Table 
5:7) In the post-war period these have shoim a remarkably steady percentage 
increase in the face of both rising and falling prices, indicating very 
weak response to short-term price changes*
Apart from altering the area under cultivation few methods are 
available to the farmer for varying current costs and outputs in Uganda* 
Although the use of fertilizers and pesticides is on the increase it 
remains small* The inescapable conclusion is that random variations in 
production have been the main cause of instability in Uganda's coffee 
export proceeds with fluctuations in world demand a secondary and less 
important cause*
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In the case of cotton, the total value of Uganda’s cotton exports was 
more closely associated with their unit value (r = 0*896) than with their 
volume (r - 0*603)* The strong positive relationship between total value 
and unit value is supporting evidence for the existence of a fairly high 
price elasticity of demand for Uganda's cotton exports* The positive 
and reasonably high correlations between total value and both volume and 
unit value suggest that instability in the total value of Uganda’s cotton 
exports results mainly from shifts in world demand combined with an 
inelastic world supply of cotton, but is also influenced by variations in 
the supply of Uganda’s cotton exports* The instability of the unit values 
for cotton exports has in fact been much larger than that for volume, 13*4 
as against 6*7*
The fluctuations in the quantities of cotton and coffee exported 
have reflected the fluctuations in their production* Uganda held stocks 
of these products are too small to affect this significantly and, in any 
case, examination of the figures for annual production make this evident*
In the case of coffee the fluctuations in production stem almost entirely 
from variations in the yield*
For cotton, fluctuations in production have been moderate* Area 
has fluctuated rather more than that under coffee, but changes have been 
relatively minor around the trend* In the case of cotton the prices paid 
to farmers might be expected to influence acreage and production intentions. 
The Marketing Board announces producer prices in advance of the cotton 
planting season with the intention of influencing area and production in 
accord with its views of prospective demand for Ugandan cotton* Cotton 
acreage, however, shows little influence from prices over the period
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59o Some cotton, particularly in Buganda, competes with coffee, 
so an attempt was made to relate cotton acreage to the ratio of cotton to 
coffee prices in the current year* But no relationship could be shown to 
exist in this period* Perhaps deflation of the cotton price by prices of 
competing food crops would yield some relationship, but no such series for 
producer prices are available and variations in cotton area and output 
must be taken as due to random or so far unexplained causes*
On balance, it appears that instability in the export proceeds of 
Uganda's two major cash crops are about equally due to changes in external 
demand and changes in domestic output and supply*
Conclusions
The questions which this analysis has sought to answer are : 
serious is export instability to the internal economy of Uganda and what 
are its causes? The data which have been examined, while subject to 
serious limitations in their accuracy, enable some conclusions to be drawn* 
The domestic income of Uganda has fluctuated in sympathy with export earnings, 
But the degree of instability in gross domestic product was not unduly 
severe* The largest decline was 4*4 per cent in domestic product in
1952-53 (11*3 per cent in cash product), when export proceeds fell by
29*5 per cent* Imports actually rose in that period* However, in general 
imports also fluctuated in sympathy with exports, but, again the fluctuations 
were dampened* Year-to-year, changes in capital-goods imported and in 
domestic capital formation show some evidence of a systematic relationship 
to the previous year's export earnings* Neither domestic prices nor 
employment can be shown, from the admittedly very limited data available, 
to have fluctuated in sympathy with exports* It is frequently suggested
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that instability in exports seriously disturbs government revenues and thus 
affects expenditure on economic development* There is no evidence that 
this has occurred in Uganda* Government revenue has been fairly stable 
about its trend and year-to-year changes have no systematic current, or 
one-year-lagged, relationship to exports*
The existence of the Marketing Boards and of export duties has 
tended to break the connection between export proceeds and producers' 
incomes and has held producers’ incomes well below the peak proceeds* 
However, in the case of coffee they did not succeed in making producer 
incomes more stable than coffee export earnings* With cotton a little 
more success was achieved. It is impossible to say whether producers' 
incomes would have been more or less liable to short-term instability in 
their absence. The major point of interest here, however, is--what 
effect does instability of prices and incomes have on cotton and coffee 
producers? Does it cause significant hardship and does it have any 
adverse effect upon their production and investment?
The data on acreages and production analysed above show no 
systematic relationship to prices paid to producers in either coffee or 
cotton* The remarkably steady expansion of the acreage directed to coffee 
shows evidence of the working of much more powerful factors than price* 
Coffee is a new crop in Uganda and probably the expansion is related more 
to the spread of knowledge of its potentialities as a cash crop than to 
its year-to-year price changes* Although the area under cotton did 
fluctuate there is no evidence of this being connected systematically 
with variations in prices*
It may be that given more and better statistics of prices of 
competing crops or some other indicators for the opportunity costs of
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growing coffee and cotton sophisticated statistical analysis could reveal 
relationships between production intentions and short-term fluctuations 
in prices, but on the present evidence it is very doubtful* Investment 
and output in the short-run seem very insensitive to prices in these two 
crops in Uganda*
It is impossible to arrive at any conclusions about the effects of 
short-term instability in the exports of Uganda on the growth or allocation 
of capital without a period of comparative stability with which the present 
rate of accumulation could be compared*
Do prdducers suffer serious hardship as a result of export instability? 
The answer depends upon the degree of specialisation of producers, the 
absolute size of their incomes and the relative importance to them of 
variations in their cash income* Even in the 1950's almost all African 
farmers in Uganda retained enough food crop production for their own use*
"Not only did the country as a whole remain self-sufficient in respect of 
its basic food supply, but each household still endeavoured to grow its 
own food in addition to whatever crops it produced for sale*" In Buganda 
there was rather more specialisation* "Many farmers now planted only such 
quantities of food crops as would be sufficient for their requirements 
in a normal year, covering the deficit in unfavourable seasons with maize 
flour which they bought from the s h o p s * " 7  some of these people might suffer 
real hardship if a fall in cash income coincided with a bad food crop*
But for most farmers basic requirements were met without resort to cash 
purchases* Fluctuations in their cash income would bear mainly on "luxuries" 
or postponable expenditures e*g* saving for marriage, for dowries or for 
purchases of durable consumer goods*
It may be argued that the uncertainty created by unstable cash 
incomes was the reason for their failure to specialise fully on cash
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crops 0 with a consequent loss of efficiency. However, the loss, if any, 
is probably minor. "In the existing state of communications and 
distributive machinery, and considering that coffee and bananas, cotton 
and millet fit very well together in farming system, this policy, though 
in theory questionable, was in practice almost certainly sound." (Wrigley, 
1959» p. 76).
In the end, the question of hardship could only be settled if at 
all by an investigation "on the spot," but the evidence outlined here 
suggests that it is unlikely to be very serious.
As to the causes of Uganda's export instability the analysis 
indicates a close approximation to the model implicit in most discussions 
of instability in poor countries. It stems mainly from specialisation on 
two crops,coffee and cotton, which are themselves subject to unstable 
world prices and rather unstable production. In the case of coffee, supply 
has been more important than demand in generating unstable export incomes; 
vice versa in the case of cotton. On balance, changes in supply and changes 
in demand have been roughly equally responsible. Stabilisation measures 
should take this into account.
The general inference of the analysis of the impact of export 
instability on Uganda's economic welfare is that some, but not much, real 
harm can be shown to have occurred. It may be that adjustments in other 
items in the balance of payments--invisibles and capital flows--compensated 
to some extent for the fluctuations in merchandise exports, but lack of 
data on Uganda's balance of payments prevents examination of this. Figures 
on grants and loans to Uganda were obtained and are shown in Tpble 5:9.
They show little sign of having compensated for changes in e>q)orts and
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apart from 1961 and 1962 were exceedingly small in comparison with the 
absolute size of variations in exports.
It is not at all surprising that Uganda is affected by export 
instability. Its economy offers few of the built-in-stabilizers that 
we suggested, in Chapter 3, exist in many underdeveloped countries. 
Rather, the degree of resistance to externally-induced instability 
apparently shown by Uganda’s economy is an occasion for wonder.
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Chart 5 : I
Uganda’s! Exports: Total, Coffee and Cotton, L Millions, 1948-60.
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Chart 5 ; III
Export Proceeds and Domestic Prices and Employment in Uganda, 
Log, scale
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Chart 5 : IV
Export Proceeds, Government Budget and Marketing Board Reserves, 
Log. Scale h Millions
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Table 5 ; 1
Exports and Domestic Product of Uganda 1950-61 (Totals in Millions of &s in
Current Prices)
lo Export 
Proceeds
2a Domestic 
Product
3o Dorn,Prod, minus 
Subsistence Estimate
4. Cross Fixed
Total % Change Total 
Net DP
% Change Total 
Net DP
% Change Total
GFC
% Change
1950 28.9 67.4 47.6 9.9
1951 47.4 64.0 87.8 30.2 67.3 41.3 11,9 20.2
1952 47.7 0.6 98.9 12.6 73,9 9.8 18.0 51.2
1953 33.6 -29,5 94,5 - 4.4 65. 5 -11.3 20.5 13.8
1954 103.1 73.1 18.8
GDP GDP
1954 41.0 25,0 128.7 1 0.2^ 92.7 11,6^ 18.6 - 9.2®
1955 42.3 3.1 140,2 8.9 102.0 10.0 23.2 24.7
1956 41.5 — 1*8 141.6 1.0 102.8 0 . 8 21,8 - 6.0
1957 46.8 12.7 146.7 3.6 109.4 6.5 20,4 - 6,4
1958 46.4 - 0 .8 146.8 - 0.07 106.3 2 . 8 19,6 - 3.9
1959 43.2 — 6.8 150.1 2 .2 109.1 2.5 17.1 -12.7
1960 42.9 - 0,6 152.2 1.3 110.4 1 . 1 17,0 - 0,5
1961 41.3 - 3.7 154.9 1.7 n 0 a « n.a.
Sourcei UN, National Accounts , Uganda, Statistical Abstracts , and East Africa
Statistical Department, Quarterly Economic and Statistical Bulletin,
Calculated by subtracting the 1953 figures from the 1954 NDP figures 
in order to splice the Net DP and Gross DP series together to give 
a reasonable sample of years.
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Table 5 : 2
Percentage Deviations from a Five-Year-Moving-Average for Exports and Imports.
Av,
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1948-58
Exports ”23,6 -7.0 -10.5 +30.9 +20.2 -20.8 - 0.5 + 3.2 - 4.8 +6.4 +5.2 -2 .0 12.1
Imports "10.0 +9.8 - 7.2 +10.5 + 8 . 0 - 5.3 - 8.4 +19.7 - 1.7 +0.7 -0.4 "4.9 7.4
Cap.Goods 
Import s - 7.3 +19.7 + 4.1 "23.5 +28.0 +11.1 -8.5 -4.0
Sources East Africa, Statistical Department._Quarterlv Economic and_ 
Statistical Bulletin.
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Table 5 î 3
Uganda Government'a Total Revenue, Expenditure and Overall Budget, Surpluses 
and Deficits, 1947 - 1960/61 in Thousands of Pounds Sterling
Callendar Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus (+) or Deficit
1947 5,331 4,474 + 857
1948 6,405 6,530 - 125
1949 8,094 6,687 +1,407
1950 11,037 8,000 +3,037
1951 15,826 12,346 +3,584
1952 17,289 15,951 +1,338
1953 17,735 17,432 + 303
1954 (January to 
June) 10,349 8,628
January to 
June only (+1,721)
54/55 1st July to 
30th June 20,836 20,920 84
55/56 21,598 22,997 -1,399
56/57 23,690 24,008 - 318
57/58 22,441 25,518 -3,077
58/59 24,106 25,684 -1,578
59/60 21,937 24,896 -2,959
60/61 22,154 27,779 -5,625
Sources East African Statistical Department, 
Statistical Bulletins.
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Table 5 : 4
Coffee Export Proceeds and African Producers'' Incomes, 1947-61
1 2 3 4 5 6
Exports Producers % Change % Change % Deviation % Deviatioi
h M. Incomes Exports Incomes Exports Incomes
1947 1.50 0.76
1948 3.25 1.59 +53.9 +49.1
1949 2.89 1.05 "11,1 -27.6 -48.8 -41.9
1950 8.33 2.04 +65.2 +48.5 + 2.9 -19.0
1951 13.65 3.61 +39.4 +43,5 +40.0 + 7.7
1952 12.34 4.33 - 9,7 +16.4 + 3.9 - 9.7
1953 11.54 5,73 - 6,5 +24,4 -18,9 -24.6
1954 13.48 8.29 +14,4 +31.5 - 7.9 - 5.2
1955 20,13 16.07 +33,0 +48,1 +22,0 +60.7
1956 15.72 9.34 -21,6 -41,5 -14,3 -16,8
1957 21.59 10.57 +27,0 +11.4 +11.3 -14.1
1958 20.83 11.81 - 3.5 +10.5 +11,0 + 0 .1
1959 18.69 13.73 -10.3 +14.0 + 1.5 +15.6
1960 16.99 13.49 - 9.1 -12.8
1961 13.97 9.74 -17.7 -13.5
Averages (ignoring sign) 23,5 28.0 16.6 19.6
3 and 4, calculated by UN method of always using the higher figure in 
the denominator.
5 and 6, Percentage deviations from a S-year-moving-average,
Sources 1 and 2, Uganda, Department of Agriculture.
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Table 5 : 5
Cotton Export Proceeds and Producers' Incomes, 1948-61.
1
Exports
M.
2
Incomes 
■ M.
3
% Change 
Exports
4
% Change 
Incomes
5
% Deviation 
Exports
6
% Deviatioi 
Incomes
1948 7.5 1 .8
(From 5- 
year-moving- 
average)
(From 5-
year-movin}
average)
1949 17.3 7.0 +56.6 +74.3
1950 16.7 7.6 - 3.5 + 7.9 -16.5 - 3,8
1951 26.8 10.7 +42.0 +29.0 +31.5 +12.6
1952 29.9 12.3 + 3.7 +13.0 +32.3 +12.9
1953 16.8 10.7 -43.8 -13.0 -25.7 - 9.3
1954 20.9 13.3 +19.6 +19.5 + 1.5 + 9.0
1955 1.6,4 11.9 -21.5 -10.5 - 9.9 - 4*8
1956 19.3 13.0 +15.0 + 8.5 + 4,9 0
1957 17.5 13.5 - 9.3 + 3.7 + 1 , 2 + 6.3
1958 18.1 13.2 + 3.3 “ 2 , 2 + 6.5 + 5.6
1959 15.4 12.1 -14.9 - 8.3 - 6.7 - 3.2
1960 14.9 10.9 - 3.2 - 9,9
1961 16.7 12.9 +10.8 +15.5
Average (ignoring sign) 19.0 16.6 13,8 6 .8
Sources % Golums 1 and 2; D. Walker, 1962: Table 1, and Uganda, Department
of Agriculture.
Columns 3 and 4; Calculated by UN method, using larger figure 
as denominator in calculating percentage change.
Columns 5 and 6; Percentage deviation from five-year-moving-average,
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Table 5 î 6
Coffee and Cotton Exports
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Coffee exports 
tons '000 37.8 23.9 31.9 43.7 39.5 35.7 34.7 74.5 61.6 84.0 79.2 89,0 118.0
Value h Millions 3.25 2.89 8.33 13,65 12.-34 11.54 13,48 20,13 15,72 21.59 20,83 18,69 16.99
Export Unit Value 
h per ton 86 121 261 278 312 323 388 270 255 257 263 210 144
World total 
Exports 194 205 175 191 194 207 174 203 228 216 215 252 259
Cotton exports 
*000 of 100 Ife 
bales 697 1561 1393 1384 1512 1337 1573 1225 1506 1347 1550 1493 1320
Value B Milliuns 7.46 17.34 16.70 28.74 29.95 16,80 20.88 16.38 19.29 17.48 18.14 15.43 14,93
Export Unit V^ alue10.7 11.1 12 .0 20.8 19.8 12.6 13.3 13.4 12.8 13.0 11.7 10.3 11,3
Source: Uganda Statistical Division and East African Quarterly Bulletin.
Table 5 ; 7 
Coffee Production
Season 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Producers' 
Price cts/l&i 17 19 21 25 40 50 70 100 125 75 80 80 68 56 50
Irea acres 
'000 180 180 187 202 224 252 279 305 337 379 459 496 529 568 607
Production 
'000 Tons 25,2 37.7 23.8 32.2 42.4 37,0 35.6 34.2 74.3 62.8 78,6 83,2 106.4 117.9 92.2
Sources Uganda, Department of Agriculture,
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Table 5 : 8 
Cotton Production
Season 45/
46
46/
47
47/
48
48/
49
49/
50
50/
51
51/
52
52/
53
53/
54
54/
55
55/
56
56/
57
57/
58
58/
59
59/
60
Producers'
Price cts/lM6.4 18.5 20.4 29.6 31.8 43.1 47.6 48,6 49.4 58.8 52.1 53.3 54,9 44.2 44,8
Area '000 
acres 1146 1253 1037 1555 1628 1535 1514 1473 1611 1739 1586 1569 1617 2014 1565
'000 400 lb 
bales Prod. 228 232 170 391 340 347 380 320 398 300 363 372 351 401 360
Source: Uganda Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports.
Table 5 : 9 
Grants and Public Loans to Uganda 
(B'OOOs)
m s  1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Grants 510 378 434 512 279 429 325 143 0.2 0.5 6 227 577 1,354
Loans
O.S. A* S.
6,000 3,394 
1,449
Source: Office of the Ministry of Finance, Uganda 
® Overseas Service Aid Scheme.
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Footnotes: Chapter 5
L  Indices calculated as deviations from a five-year-moving 
average. The figure for Uganda is in Table 5:2 on p.00 and the others 
are from Fleming and Lovasy, 1960: Table 2,
2o Description based on IBRD, 1962: Chapters 1 and 2, where a
much fuller account of the country can be found. The characteristics 
presented here are limited to those with a direct bearing on the issue 
of export instability,
3. Kennedy, Ord and Walker , 1963:p,384,draw attention to some 
of the inadequacies of Uganda statistical series. Their major point is 
the underestimation of the value of subsistence outputs. But
this weakness may bias official GDP figures towards closer reflection 
of export sector changes and may tend to exaggerate the domestic effects 
of export fluctuations,
4. I owe this point to H.W, Ord who is a specialist in the East 
African economies,
5. F A Q ,  1961; Table IIIc, See also IBRD, 1962, pp. 152-4.
International Cotton Advisory Committee, 1961.
6. FAG., 1961: p. 29.
7. C.C. Wrigley, 1959: p. 76,
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Chapter 6 
Tanganyika
Tanganyika has many similarities to Uganda: a tiny manufacturing
1
industry, low per—capita income and export orientation. In the 1950*s 
and '60's exports have averaged about 30 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and over 45 per cent of the GDP of the money economy of 
Tanganyika. Foreign trade (exports plus imports) makes up about 50 
per cent of GDP and 80 per cent of the GDP of the money economy. 
Tanganyika is evidently highly oriented towards foreign trade. Unlike 
Uganda, however, the main export from Tanganyika, sisal, is almost 
entirely grown on plantations which are owned and run by expatriates. 
Capital and management are foreign and most profits are remitted 
overseas. The sisal industry may be regarded as an enclave whose 
impact upon the domestic economy depends on its purchases from the 
domestic sector. These may, or may not, follow closely upon export 
earnings.
Sisal is the most important single industry, accounting for
8 per cent of GDP (13 or 14 per cent of the money economy), employing
over a third of the wage earners (excluding domestics) and yielding
2
significant tax revenues to the Territory,
As can readily be seen from Tables 6:3 and 6:4 coffee and cotton 
are, while important exports, much less so than sisal over this period. 
Both of these crops are mainly grown by peasant cultivators and bear 
a close resemblance to the system of production in Uganda, but most
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of the coffee produced is of the mild arabica type which competes closely 
with Latin American coffee, and the cotton is mainly of the 1 inch 
to 1 3/16 inch staple which competes with American types. Between them, 
sisal, coffee and cotton, account for around 60 per cent of merchandise 
exports from Tanganyika. Diamonds at 9 per cent are the next most 
important export. Compared with Egypt or Ghana, Tanganyika's exports 
are moderately diversified, but the concentration on three agricultural 
exports is still very high by most standards and the degree of 
dependence on one, sisal, is well above average.
Tanganyika's sisal exports form approximately one third of the
world's total trade in hard fibres, and almost a half of the world's 
3output of sisal. In the other two cash crops Tanganyika's exports 
are a very minor part of the world market.
Tanganyika's exports are rather more unstable than average for 
primary producing countries with an average deviation, from a 
five-year-moving-average trend, of 11 .2 per cent to be compared with 
an average over the same period (1948-58) for 47 countries of 9.0 
(Fleming and Lovasy, 1960: p. 11); only slightly less unstable than 
Uganda.
Income
In Chart 6:1 the total GDP and the GDP of the Money Economy are 
charted on the same logarithmic scale as the value of exports from 1952 
to 1960. It is evident that both money and total GDP have grown over 
this period at a very steady rate and that fluctuations in exports have 
had practically no visible effect on either. There are various possible
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reasons for this. The sisal corporations may have absorbed much of the 
impact of fluctuations in sisal export earnings in changes in their 
profits, the cotton stabilization fund may have had some success in 
reducing fluctuations in producers' incomes, the government's budget 
may have been operated counter-cyclically etc. These possibilities 
will be discussed below. It is only the fact of relatively stable 
GDP in the face of fluctuations in exports which this section is 
intended to establish.
Imports and Investment
Total imports over this period appear to have been slightly
more unstable than exports (12,7 per cent as against 11,2), Their
paths are both shown In Chart 6:11, The view that imports have a
relatively simple connection with exports is contradicted on 5
occasions out of 13 on a current year basis and 4 out of 13 with
imports lagged one year behind exports. Measured by deviations from
a five-year-moving-average trend the relationship seems even weaker#
On a current year basis they moved in opposite directions on 6
occasions out of 12. The direction of change seems closer for imports
and the previous year's exports, but the calculated correlation is 0.15
4
which is insignificant,
Capital-goods imports i.e. machinery and vehicles show no 
relationship to merchandise export earnings. Whether on a current, or 
one year lagged basis, they move against each other as often as with, 
(Chart 6:II).
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Fixed investment, whether for the economy as a whole, or for the 
money economy only, shows little correlation with either merchandise 
exports or with imported machinery and vehicles. But since the investment 
figures are for only 1954 to 1961 this is very weak evidence either way. 
(Chart 6:11).
Prices and Employment
Two price series are available in Tanganyika. Neither of them 
reflects changes in the cost of living of more than a very small section 
of the total population. The Cost-of-Living Index for Europeans is based 
on the consumption patterns of European Civil servants in Dar es Salaam. 
The Retail Price Index is designed on budget studies of African workers 
in Dar es Salaam, However, both of these groups are among those most 
likely to be affected by inflationary of deflationary movements in 
the money econony. As far as can be seen from Chart 6;II neither 
index shows much sign of being influenced by fluctuations in export 
earnings.
There are no available series on unemployment in Tanganyika, 
and figures on total African registered employed are the only indicators 
available of fluctuations in the demand for labour. As in Uganda they 
are only a fraction of the true working force. These are plotted on 
Chart 6:1X1 and show no relationship to fluctuations in exports.
Figures on employment in the sisal industry are plotted in the 
lowest line on the chart. They show no correlation with changes in 
the value of sisal exports. It would appear from this comparison 
that the sisal Industry retained much the same labour force through
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and low export earnings. There is certainly little evidence of any 
close relationship, and this gives one reason for the lack of sensitivity 
of domestic variables to export fluctuations. Labour is the main purchase 
made by the sisal industry in Tanganyika and could therefore be an 
important channel for the transmission of external shocks to the 
internal economy. If, however, the sisal industry does not contract 
and expand Its labour force in response to short-term fluctuations, 
the channel is largely blocked -- only variations in their earnings 
remain as a possible method of transmission, and data on these are 
not available here.
The Government.Budget
Fluctuations in government revenue depend on changes in the 
tax base, changes in the tax rates and time lags involved in 
collection of taxes. Up to 1954/55 export duties were a significant 
source, of revenue in Tanganyika, but since then have been relatively 
unimportant. At that time there was a change of policy which altered 
taxes on sisal from mainly export duties to mainly corporation tax 
on profits in the sisal industry. This may help to explain why 
movements in revenue in Chart 6:IV appear to follow exports 
reasonably closely up to 1954, but scarcely at all in the later 
period. The very strong upward trends in practically all Tanganyikan 
variables over the early period, 1948-54, however, weaken any evidence 
on correlation shown by the graph over these few years.
Exports reached a peak in 1952, but the government revenue peak 
did not occur till 1954/55. One reason for this was that the high
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profits engendered by the export boom in 1951 and 1952 gave rise to large 
income tax liabilities, particularly in the sisal industry, which were
5
not in fact collected until 1954/55. Throughout most of the period the
main sources of revenue were import duties and income tax. Receipts from
both of these should respond eventually to fluctuations in exports, but
since the time lags could be very different their combined revenue might
well follow a quite different time path from exports. The personal tax
is not very responsive to income changes, although theoretically, at
least, it varies with income levels. It may tend to stabilize government
revenue at the expense of private consumption. Excise duties are
levied on "European-type beer, spirits, cigarettes and tobacco, matches 
6and sugar." Throughout most of this period the revenues from these 
products would come largely from the consumption expenditure of 
salaried Europeans and some Africans and Asians whose incomes and 
expenditure would be unlikely to fluctuate in sympathy with exports. 
Government property income also accounts for a substantial proportion 
of revenue and is unlikely to fluctuate in response to changes in 
export earnings. It seems quite probable that the combination of 
autonomous changes in the non-export sensitive revenues with 
variations in the lags in the response of the export sensitive 
revenues should make it difficult or even impossible to estimate 
the impact of export fluctuations. Changes in the system of taxation 
and in the rates and incidence of taxes complicate the problem to 
the. point of insolubility. Even the export-sensitive tax revenues, 
from import duties and income tax, in fact show very irregular 
relationships, both with exports and with each other, at least after 
1952+
-211“
The overall budget surpluses and deficits, including development,
8
are sketched on the lowest line of Chart 5. The deficit in 1953 
probably helped to maintain domestic incomes in the face of the sharp 
decline in export earnings between 1952 and 1933, At least incomes would 
have fallen more if government had cut expenditure by the full amount 
of the decline in revenue. However, it is unlikely to have been conscious 
policy. The decline in imports and in import duties in that year would 
itself go far to explain it. There seem to be no other years in which 
the operation of the government's budget would have acted as an 
important offset to changes in export incomes.
Apart from the dip in 1953, government revenue and expenditure 
have been relatively stable over this period. Between 1952 and 1953 
exports fell by approximately B 11,8 million, or 25 per cent. Government 
current revenue fell by only B 1,7 million, or 6.5 per cent. This is 
the largest impact of exports on government revenues revealed by the 
figures. In other years the link between short-term changes in export 
earnings and the budget seems tenuous.
Producers' Incomes
The gross incomes of the sisal corporations must fluctuate in very 
close sympathy with the volume of sisal exports. Since the main variable 
cost is labour and the sisal estates do not appear to have varied their 
labour force in response to fluctuations in their sales it seems 
probable that the principal impact of variations in the total value of 
the sisal crop has been on the profits of the firms. Since these are In
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the main fairly large firms, well able to carry reserves or to borrow 
in bad times it is unlikely that this has caused them any serious 
hardship. In so far as their remission of profits and dividends to 
overseas owners has varied with export earnings the burden of 
adjustment on the balance of payments is reduced. An increase in 
repatriated profits is equivalent to an increase in imports and 
vice versa for a decrease. Adjustment in their profits and 
particularly in profits remitted overseas, acts as a shock absorber, 
softening the impact of external fluctuations upon the internal 
economy of Tanganyika. As sisal forms around 30 per cent of export 
earnings it would otherwise be a significant instigator of 
domestic instability.^
The other two important exports, coffee and cotton, are
*
mainly produced by peasant farmers, in conditions rather similar
to those discussed in the case of Uganda. Cash crop and subsistence
crops are usually grown by the same farmer. Often banana trees are
planted with the dual function of producing shade for coffee plants
and food for the family,Cotton farmers very often have livestock
and, indeed, tend to put cash income from cotton sales into purchase
11
of yet more livestock. Cash crops are in general sources of 
marginal income for the purchase of "luxuries" or the accumulation of 
wealth e.g. by purchasing cattle. Fluctuations in this income, while 
undesirable are unlikely to cause serious hardship unless a drop 
coincides with failure of the subsistence crops.
Only in the case of cotton was there any attempt at 
stabilization in this period. The Lint and Seed Marketing Board has
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fixed prices to producers for each season.
Effects of Unstable Prices on Consumers of Tanganyika's Exports
In the case of Tanganyika one important question is whether 
unstable prices for sisal are likely to damage long-run prospects for 
the product. In coffee and cotton such a question is of much less 
importance. First, because they are so much smaller in relation to 
the total economy and export earnings. Second, because the new 
International Coffee Agreement, if successful, may well reduce 
short-term instability in prices considerably. Third, in the case of 
cotton, the existence of large U.S. stocks of this type of cotton is 
likely to moderate fluctuations in Tanganyika's cotton export prices.
For sisal, however, the question may be vital. While the demand 
for hard fibres, sisal, hemp and henequen, is unlikely to be very 
sensitive to changes in prices in the short run, in the longer run 
several substitutes do exist. In the main uses to which hard fibres are 
put, agricultural and marine cordage, it would be difficult to find 
appropriate materials which are sufficiently cheap to substitute for 
hard fibres in general use. In the longer run many substitutes are 
available; steel hawsers, other fibres, such as jute, which can be 
used in garden twines, paper string and plastic tape in packaging, and 
synthetic fibres, such as nylon and terylene, can be used for the 
higher quality cordages e,g, in pleasure craft and climbing ropes. 
Studies of comparative costs of polythene trawling nets with manila 
nets have shown important operating cost advantages for the synthetic
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12material which offset the higher purchase price. Thus a real risk 
exists of encouraging substitution through the creation of uncertainty 
and through periods of high prices leading to the substitution of 
synthetics which are not abandoned when sisal prices fall. Sisal prices 
have fluctuated quite widely over the post-war era with an annual
average percentage variation of about 17.8 per cent between 1949 and
1959.(Tableô: 1 shows price movements of British East African No. i Sisal), 
This is rather higher than average for primary products in the post-war 
era. The danger exists that such price instability may result in the 
asymmetric substitution suggested above. Unfortunately the contribution 
of price instability in causing substitution cannot be assessed at 
present.
Causes of Instability in Tanganyika's Exports,
The most important factor here has been the behaviour of sisal.
Over this period, 1948-60, acreage, yields, output and exports of sisal 
have shown only very minor instability. The picture has been one of 
stable expansion as shown in Tables 2 and 3 below.
The average percentage year-to-year change in the quantity of 
exports over this period was only 7,0 per cent, while for total value 
over the same period the change amounted to some 19.6 per cent. Evidently 
fluctuations in the prices of sisal exports have been the main 
destabilising influence upon sisal export proceeds. The total value of 
exports is highly correlated with unitvalue^0,9 (significant at ,01 level), 
but not at all with quantity. Unit value and quantity have had low
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negative correlation, -0,3 (not significant at .05 level). Price 
instability which is much greater than fluctuations in quantity 
implies either extremely inelastic demand or large autonomous changes 
in demand. Since in almost every year changes in total value and in 
unit value have been in the same direction, changes in world demand 
for sisal seem to have been the main cause of short-term instability. 
Instability in prices of sisal has been largely due to fluctuations in 
world demand combined with a very inelastic or even perverse supply.
In fact, supply went on expanding in the face of a very sharp and 
sustained fall in prices between. .1952 and 1955.
For both cotton and coffee the price elasticity of demand for 
Tanganyika's exports must be very high as their contribution to world 
supply is marginal. The instability of export earnings must, therefore, 
be the result of changes in the quantity of exports at the going world 
price or changes in world demand. For both, and in particular coffee, 
fluctuations in price have been fairly large.
In the case of coffee, fluctuations in unit value and in quantity 
seem to have been roughly equally responsible for instability of the 
total value of coffee exports. Both were highly correlated with total 
value : quantity, r = 0.8 and unit value, r = 0.9, (both significant at 
the .01 level). Since the price elasticity of demand for Tanganyikan 
coffee is assumed to be high, (this is confirmed by a positive 
correlation of 0.6 [significant at the .05 level] between unit value 
and quantity), price changes must be due to global changes in demand. 
Demand and supply variation combined with inelastic supply seem to 
share equal responsibility for fluctuations in the total value of coffee
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exports from Tanganyika.
Quantity changes seem to dominate in the case of cotton.
Fluctuations in cotton tonnage exported are much greater than in price, 
as shown in Table 6:4. Moreover, the total value of cotton exports is 
highly correlated with quantities exported, 0.9 (significant at the .01 
level) and not at all with unit value.
For the main Tanganyikan export, sisal, fluctuations in foreign 
demand appear to have been the main de-stabilising influence; for coffee, 
responsibility is divided between changes in demand and changes in output; 
for cotton, quantity variations have been the main explanation of 
instability in export proceeds. On balance, it would appear that the main 
cause of Tanganyikan export instability has been fluctuations in external 
demand for her main exports.
Conclusions
Tanganyika's economy is a very open one, and throughout this 
period it has been subject to the rules of the Currency Board system 
which make adjustment to external imbalance very largely a question of 
induced changes in income and the money supply. Such an economy could 
well be expected to be very sensitive to external instability. Tanganyika's 
export earnings over this period, 1948-61, were very unstable, yet 
remarkably little impact from this can be found on domestic stability.
All of the internal economic variables: income, imports, investment, prices, 
employment and the government's budget reveal very little sensitivity to 
fluctuations in merchandise export earnings.
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Reasons for the lack of reflection in the internal economy of the 
instability of export earnings may lie in a large number of small 
offsetting factors induced by the changes in exports, in distributed 
lags which smooth out the peaks and troughs of internal responses to the 
initiating change, or in autonomous changes in other variables either in 
the balance of payments or in internal production and consumption which 
have tended to offset the effects of a rise or fall in exports. The first 
two groups may be regarded as factors which, if they exist, can be relied 
on to act as mitigating influences on transferred instability. The third 
groupp however, could only have mitigated the impact of external 
instability by chance and could equally coincide with and exacerbate 
export fluctuations.
One important example of the first group would be induced 
changes in the remitted profits of the sisal corporations. If these have 
fallen in years of poor export proceeds and risen in good years their 
movements would help to stabilise the overall balance of payments. 
Moreover, if the sisal firms do not allow short-term fluctuations in 
their export earnings to affect their purchases of goods and services 
from the rest of the economy, sisal instability will not be reflected in 
the internal economy. The relative stability of their labour force seems 
to indicate that this has been the case. As their investment is 
probably much more closely allied to long-run estimates of profitability 
(the sisal plant has a life of ten years) year-to-year and even cyclical 
swings in profits are unlikely to affect their expenditure on investment. 
It may well be that despite the great instability of the earnings of the 
sisal industry it is nevertheless a force for economic stability in
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Tanganyika's internal economy.
An example of the second group would be the connection between 
government revenues and variation in exports. When exports rise any income 
from export duties will increase immediately, but since income taxes and 
corporation taxes are assessed in arears and are liable to be subject 
to argument and bargaining between government and taxpayer quite long 
periods may elapse between incurring liability to tax and the actual 
payment. When these payments are actually made exports and incomes may 
well be far below the previous peak, but government revenue will be 
sustained by these delayed payments. This seems to have occurred in 
Tanganyika, It also works in the opposite direction. When export earnings 
fall, export duties and import duties are likely to show a swift decline, 
but income and corporation taxes may yield high revenues from previous 
years'* assessments. This may be regarded as a systematic factor which 
tends to smooth out government revenue’s response to export variability. 
Certain other sources of tax lead to very stable revenues -- e.g, the personal 
tax, and these help to stabilise total government revenues.
There are many possible autonomous factors whose random 
variations over the relevant period may have tended to offset fluctuations 
in merchandise exports. Changes in the capital account side of the balance 
of payments could have this effect. Either an increase in U.K. government 
or Colonial Development and Welfare Loans or in private capital flows to 
Tanganyika could mitigate a fall in merchandise exports. Equally a reduction 
in the foreign loans of Tanganyika could have this effect. The expatriate 
nature of the banking system may actually result in this being induced.
These banks tend to hold the greater part of their reserves in the U X
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Any increase in deposits with them is likely to lead to an increase in 
their sterling assets in U.K. Thus if an increase in export earnings 
results in a rise in bank deposits a good deal of this money will be 
reinvested in Britain by the banks. If a fall in exports leads residents 
in Tanganyika to draw upon their bank balances a certain amount of 
repatriation of these "foreign" investments will take place.
Within the internal economy random variations in harvests can 
have an impact on GDP, investment, employment, prices and imports.
These changes in a heavily agricultural economy are likely to have an 
enormous effect, sufficient at times to swamp the effects of changes 
in exports.
All in all, the results of this brief analysis of Tanganyika's 
economic instability throw doubt upon the importance of variations in 
export earnings to the stability of the domestic economy. Conclusions 
as to the effects on growth are not possible with the limited period and 
lack of standards for comparisons. Certainly the results of the analyses 
of data above and the many possible reasons, for the lack of relationship, 
which exist, provide good grounds for rejecting the simple foreign trade 
multiplier models which are implicit in most discussions of the effects 
of instability in exports on underdeveloped countries
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Chart 6 : I
Tanganyikan Exports and National Income, Total Economy 
and Money Economy 1962-60
Log. Scale
Total GDP70
GDP Money 
Economy
Exports
1948 49 50 51 52 53 34 55 56 57 58 59
Source: Table 6
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Chart 6 : II
Tanganyikan Exports, Imports and Investment
Log. Scale
60
50
Total Exports
40
Imports
30
^ ^  Total Fixed 
Investment
Money Economy 
Fixed Investment
20
10
Machinery 
and Vehicles 
Imported
9
8
7
6
5
5756 611948 49 50 51 53 6052 54 55 58 59
Sources Table 6 : 5
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Chart 6 : III
Tanganyikan Exports, Domestic Employment and Prices
Log, Scale
250
Cost of Living Index (Europeans)150
Retail Prices 
(African)100
90
80
60
Exports
Employment
30
16.3-
__ Employment on Sisal Estates
1948 49 50 51 52 53 54 5655 6057 58 59 61
Source: Tables 6 : 5 and 6 : 6
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Chart 6 ; IV
Tanganyika's Government Current Revenue, Expenditure,
Scale h Million
Total Surplus and Export Earnings 1948-62, h Millions,
Exports
Log. Seals L Million
—  Revenue 
 Expenditure
20 -
10 - -
9-
6 -
Arithmetic
+2
Total Budget
Surplus 4
Deficit -
53 55 57
Fiscal year, June '54 to 1st July '55 for Government data 
Calender year for exports.
Sources Tables 6 ; 5 and 6 : 6 .
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Table 6 : 1
Prices of B.E.A. No. 1, London, U.S. cents per lb.
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Price 11.4 12.5 17.5 28.7 19.8 11.7 10.8 10.1 9.8 8.9 9.1 11.2 12.8 11.3
Change % + 8.8 +28.6 +39.0 -31.0 -40,9 - 7.7 - 6.5 -2.9 -9.2 +2.2 +18.7 +12.5 -11,7
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Hard Fibres
Table 6 ; 2 
Sisal Area and Production.
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
'000 Hectares
Area 283 285 302 317 335 348 361 367 372 374 373 377 379 n.a,
'000 Metiic
Tons, Output 123 126 124 148 165 168 181 179 189 188 200 209 208 201
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Hard Fibres
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Table 6 : 3
Sisal Export Earnings, Quantities and Unit Values, 1948 - 60,
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
1 8,930 11,111 11,846 23,689 21,708 12,773 10,902 9,956 10,823 9,482 10,349 13,057 15,442
2 + 19,8 + 6,0 +50,2 “ 8.4 “41 » 1 “14,9 - 8.7 + 7.8 -12,2 +29.8 +21.4 +15.0
3 119 135 121 144 162 173 172 179 190 185 204 209 204
4 + 11.9 -10.7 +16.0 +11,5 + 6,4 - 0,8 + 4.0 + 5,8 - 2.7 + 9,3 + 2,4 - 2.7
5 75 82 99 164 134 74 63 56 57 53 51 64 75
6 + 8.5 +17,1 +39.5 -18.3 -45.0 “14.9 -11,1 + 1,8 - 7,0 - 3,8 +20,3 + 14,6
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit: Hard Fibres, 
Tanganyika, Statistical Abstract
Key ; 1 Total Value in thousands of fes
2 Percentage Change in 1, Average = - 19,6
3 Quantity in thousands of Metric Tons
4 Percentage Change in 3. Average - « 7.0
5 Unit Value in Ls per Metriç Ton,
6 Percentage Change in 5, Average = - 16.B
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Table 6 ; 4
Coffee and Cotton Exports: Quantity, Value and Unit Value
Average
1 1.2 1.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 5.8 10.0 6.9 9.2 7.1 7.6 5.8 7,3
2 1-25.0 +51.0 +22,2 +18.1 + 5.2 +42.0 "31,0 +25.0 -29. & + 6.6 -23.7 +20.5 - 21.3
3 12.7 12.1 15.0 16.5 18.6 15.3 19.4 18.5 21.6 18.5 22.3 19.7 25.1
4 - 4.7 +19.3 + 9.1 +11.3 “17,7 +21.1 - 4.6 +14,4 -14.4 +17.0 “11.7 +21.5 t 13.9
5 94 124 233 373 296 379 515 373 426 384 341 294 291
6 f24.2 +46.8 +14.6 +14.5 +21.9 +26.4 -27.6 +12.4 “ 9,9 -11.2 "13.8 “ 1.0 - 18.7
Cotton
1 1.5 2.1 1.4 2.8 4.7 4.8 3.4 5.5 7.5 6.6 7.2 6.7 8.8
2 f28.6 “33.0 +50.0 +40.4 + 2.1 "29.2 +38.2 +26.6 -12.0 + 8.3 - 6.9 +23.9 * 24.9
3 8.9 11.0 7.0 8.0 11.0 15.0 12,0 20.0 28.0 27,0 32.0 31.0 39.0
4 fl9.1 “36.4 +12.5 +27.2 +26.6 -20,0 +40.0 +28.6 - 3.6 +15.6 - 3.1 +20.5 - 21.1
5 169 191 200 350 427 320 283 275 268 244 225 216 226
6 HI. 5 + 4.5 +42.9 +18,0 “25,1 “11,6 - 2.8 - 3.2 - 8.9 - 7,8 “ 4.0 + 4.4 - 12.0
Source: Tanganyika, Statistical Abstract. 
Key : 1 Total Value in millions of fcs.
2 Percentage Change in 1,
3 Quantity in thousand tons.
4 Percentage Change in 3,
5 Unit Value in fcs.
6 Percentage Change in 5.
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Table 6 ; 5
Tanganyika Data 1948-61
(B Millions)
(Machinery Par es Salaam
ScVehicles) Gross Domestic
Merchan- Net Her- Capital Gross Product Index of Cost of Living
dise chandise Goods Fixed at Current Retail Prices of Index
Exports Imports Imports Investment Factor Cost African Purchases Europeans,
Money Money
1948
(Fob)
16.3
(Gif)
20.1 7.1
Total Econ. Total Econ,
Dec, - Dec. 88
1949 20.4 25.5 9.1 - - - - - -
1950 24.9 24.0 7.9
Dec.
100 (50 base)
1951 40.3 28.1 6.8 - - - -
Dec.
100 (51 base) 114
1952 47.4 37.5 9.9 - - 125.2 - 110 123
1953 35.6 28.4 7.4 - - 130.2 - 119 125
1954 37.8 32.0 7.4 26,0 21.8 135.7 79.1 114 128
1955 37.4 43.5 12.3 28.9 24.6 146.7 81.8 113 132
1956 46.3 35.9 10.4 27.6 23.3 152.4 89.3 111 135
1957 41.1 39.3 9.6 29.5 24.1 162.4 92.9 119 140
1958 43.8 33.6 8.6 27.4 22.7 167.1 97.9 125 143
1959 47,2 34.5 9.1 26.6 24.4 177.1 106.2 116 144
1960 56.6 37.8 10.9 29.4 186.9 113.8 127 145
.961 50.6 39.7 9.7 - » _ — 126 discontinued
lource: 1) East African Quaterlv Economic and Statistical Bulletin.various issues. 
2) UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics.
- not available
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Table 6 : 6
Tanganyika Data 1948-61 Continued
African Employment 'OOP's Government Budget (B Million)
Total
Recur­
rent
Recur­
rent Total
Total
Surplus
or
Total Sisal Revenue Revenue Expendit. Expenditure Deficit
1948 n. a. 122.5 1948 6,965 7,232 6,382 7,092 140
1949 474.1 134.7 1949 8,586 9,152 7,772 8,749 403
1950 n. a. 117.9 1950 10,397 11,490 10,123 11,565 - 75
1951 455.4 128.1 1951 11,931 13,105 12,305 14,638 - 1,533
1952 443.6 142.1 1952 16,430 17,500 15,878 18,323 - 823
1953 448.3 139.3 1953 14,728 15,589 14,724 18,045 - 2,456
1954 439.1 131.2 1954* 9,133 9,622 9,005 9,082 + 540
1955 413.1 129.9 1955’’ 19,277 20,015 17,700 19,806 + 209
1956 424.2 125.6 1956^ 18,680 22,764 19,532 23,616 - 852
1957 430.5 1957b 17,492 22,775 18,157 23,439 - 664
1958 430.5 1958^ 18,834 24,288 18,697 24,151 + 137
1959 430.5 1959b 19,412 24,571 19,527 24,686 - 115
1960 428.3
b
1960 22,066 26,005 21,154 25,093 912
1961 387.5
b
1961 21,355 27,027 21,267 26,880 + 147
1962b (20,505) 28,715 20,948 29,157 - 442
Sources: East African Economic & Statistical Review. September *62.
Quarterly Economic & Statistical Bulletin, various issues.
Employment in Sisal Industry - W. Guillebaud, Economic Survey of the Sisal 
Industry of Tanganyika. Table VII,
a
6 months to June *54.
Fiscal year, July to June.
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Footnotes to Chapter 6
1„ Only about 20,000 persons now work in manufacturing
establishments employing five or more persons (excluding service trades
and early processing of agricultural products)." IBRD, 1961: p.13
2. Guillebaud, 1958: pp. 92-96 and 108-9.
3. Economist Intelligence Unit, "Hard Fibres - 
a Quarterly Review."
4. H.W, Ord has suggested that there is an association 
between exports and imports lagged two years behind, but a scatter 
chart shows no evidence of this (communication to the author on an 
earlier draft).
5. IBRD, 1961: p. 43
6. IBRD, 1961: p. 326
7. IBRD, 1961: Table 78, presents figures for revenues from 
the main sources, including import duties and income tax. These were 
graphed against exports, but not reproduced here. Table 77 of the 
Bank's Report gives a very full breakdown of current revenues for 
1957/58 and 1958/59. Export duties were negligible, t 25,000,
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8. These figures should be regarded as tentative. The figures 
here taken from East African sources do not correspond, on the current 
expenditure side, with the figures given in IBRD, 1961: e.g. Table 76.
Up to 1957/58 their figures on current expenditure are lower than mine,
9. Cf. Reynolds, 1963 and Chapter 8 below for comparison 
with Chilean copper mines.
10. "The Wachagga and many people in other parts of Tanganyika 
grow coffee and bananas in mixed culture. Since the bananas are their 
staple food, they probably regard them as the more important crop,"
IBRD, 1961: p. 364.
11. IBRD, 1961: p. 367,
12. Tropical Products Institute, 1959: p.9,
13. Unfortunately there are no available figures on the money 
supply or the total balance of payments of Tanganyika, The IBRD Report 
makes an attempt at the money supply, but on the very arbitrary assumption 
of alloting one third of total East African Currency Board figures to 
Tanganyika. (IBRD, 1961: Table 40, p. 334)
14. See Chapter 3 above.
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Chapter Seven: Puerto Rico
In the literature of the economics of underdeveloped countries it 
is frequently asserted that many of their misfortunes stem from economic 
dependence upon the rich industrial nations. The close links which are 
forged between their economies and those of the rich countries, it is 
suggested, make them extremely susceptible to the cyclical instability of 
their industrial trading partners. Even fairly mild changes in activity 
in the rich industrial countries are supposed to have a greatly magnified 
effect upon the stability and growth of their dependent partners.
In the post World War II era, no country provides a irtore extreme 
example of economic dependence than does Puerto Rico in its relations 
with the Mainland of the United States. A study of the economic relations 
between these two countries should yield an interesting insight into the 
question of how serious are the i11-effects of the impact of fluctuations 
in an advanced country upon the economy of its dependent, underdeveloped 
trading partner.
Puerto Rico, however, has certain peculiar features which should 
be noted. With a per capita income of about a quarter of the US level, 
Puerto Rico is a relatively affluent underdeveloped country. Mpreover, 
in the post-war period there have been very sweeping changes in the 
composition of its production and exports. Agricultural exports have 
greatly declined in importance while manufacturés, particularly textile 
fibres and apparel, have grown with startling rapidity. While the ecpnomy 
has grown rapidly and become more diversified in its products Puerto 
Rico has become even more dependent on international trade in general and 
no less dependent on trade with the Mainland of the US, Exports form over 
50 per cent of Gross Commonwealth Product (GCP), imports 65 per cent. Of
-232-
those exports, over 95 per cent habitually go to the US and about 90 per 
cent of the imports come from there. Puerto Rico is clearly foreign trade 
oriented and her trade is regionally, highly concentrated. Her dependence 
is not limited to commodity trade, but extends over a broad field of 
activities including tourism, insurance. Federal government transfers, 
emigrants'remittances, long term capital flows and the flow of emigrants 
between Puerto Rico and the US. This last is an important outlet for an 
economy with the unfortunate combination of a %apid population growth 
with a less rapid growth in job opportunities.^
Fluctuations in the economy of the US can influence the internal 
economy of Puerto Rico through their effect on any of these variables.
Given all these channels of influence it would certainly not be surprising 
to find that the Puerto Rican economy was highly sensitive to fluctuations 
in the US. It is surprising to discover that when the figures for the 
post-war period are examined very little evidence of lany significant 
effect on the main variables: exports, product, employment or investment,
is revealed. The extreme dependence on the US did not lead to any serious 
instability in Puerto Rico. Indeed it requires most careful study of 
the data to establish any relationships with Mainland instability. This 
can be interpreted as tending to confirm the finding of thé cross-sectional 
studies in Chapter 2 that regional concentration in exports does not 
necessarily lead to economic instability. A preliminary conclusion of 
this sort is, however, subject to the objections that US recessions in 
this period were relatively mild and that Puerto Rico was subject to special 
factors which may have obscured the effects of US instability. These 
special factors were: rapid growth in general and, in particular*
growth in output, exports and employment of firms and branches newly set 
up in Puerto Rico by foreign investors
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Puerto Rico's exports, merchandise and total, have enjoyed relatively 
stable growth from year to year. This makes it rather less interesting 
from the viewpoint of a study which seeks to discover how much damage may 
be inflicted by unstable export proceeds. Its extreme economic dependence 
on.the US, however, invests its case with important interests of its o\m 
particularly in relation to the relative importance of the different 
channels through which the Mainland affects Puerto Rico's economy.
A recent study has concentrated on the impact pf the two recessions 
in the US during the 1950's upon the economy of Puerto Rico. Werner Baer 
(1962) first attempts to illustrate the impact of the 1953 to 1954 recession
by means of a general descriptive analysis, comparing US and Puerto Rican
variables such as exports, production and employment, both in the 
aggregate and by principal Puerto Rican industries. He concludes:
The effects of the 1953-54 Mainland recession on Puerto
Rico were very mild. The principal channel through which
it spread was a substantial decline in net emigration,
causing a rise in unemployment. Most manufacturing
industries which rely to a large extent on exports were
hardly affected by declines in exports which took place
with a lag of approximately nine months. (Baer, 1962; pp. 45-46)
The rise in Puerto Rican unemployment mentioned was, in fact, 
very slight. On the Mainland the unemployment peaks (seasonally unadjusted) 
were in the first three quarters of 1954, averaging around 5 per cent 
compared with the previous years 2.5 per cent. Whereas in Puerto Rico 
it was the last three quarters which may have shown the influence of 
the decline in US demand with an unemployment percentage of 14,4 to 
compare with the previous year's 12.7, Proportionally the rise in 
unemployment was very much less in Puerto Rico.^
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Baer argues that the effects on Puerto Rico were minimised by,
"the backlog of newly promoted firms which were opening their plants in 
1954 and thus contributing to total exports and general employment in 
the respective industries,"^ Because the decisions to invest had been 
taken several months before they would continue with construction after 
the recession had begun and many firms in Puerto Rico work under contracts 
which would guarantee the market for their output for some months,
Baer's final word on the 1953-54 recession is that, "The principal
effect was thus a mild decline in the rate of growth of the economy,
On the 1957-58 recession Baer concludes that while it "was more 
severe but shorter than the previous one, [it] had on the whole a relatively 
mild effect on Puerto Rico, The island gross product continued to grow, 
though at a rate smaller than projected without the recession (i.e., the
growth in current values of 6.8 instead of a potential 10%-13%)," (Baer,
1962: p, 58)
Unfortunately he gives no outline of how the projection for Puerto 
Rican growth was calculated. Since the average rate of growth over the 
period 1947-59 was between 6 and 7 per cent per annum the figure for 
1957-58 could not normally be regarded as an aberration.
Baer considers the banking system as a possible channel for the 
transfer of fluctuations to the economy of Puerto Rico, On this he 
concludes, "The banking system of Puerto Rico has hardly been affected 
by Mainland fluctuations since the beginning of the economic development 
program," (Baer, 1962: p. 72) The main explanation which he gives for
this is their very high liquidity. Since they have excess reserves a 
loss of some of their cash reserves does not force them to contract 
credit, nor is an expansion of their reserves necessary to any increase 
in the credit they extend. Once the banking system is mature this may 
no longer obtain.
-235-
Baer examines the composition of Puerto Rican exports and makes 
an attempt to estimate their relative sensitivity to changes in US 
production or income. He derives from this the interesting conclusion that 
Puerto Rico's export composition is altering in the direction of manufactures 
which are more sensitive to fluctuations in the US than were its preyious 
agricultural exports,^ This is one case where export diversification may 
actually increase the possibility of unstable export proceeds.
He also examined the sensitivity of new investments in Puerto 
Rico to fluctuations in: 1) US Industrial Production, 2) US New Plant
and Equipment, and 3) US Profits, with various time lags. The simple 
regressions yielded no result of any significance. Once trend was 
eliminated correlation coefficients were extremely low. There appears 
to be no cyclical relationship whatever between Puerto Rican new 
investment and these variables, (Baer, 1962: pp, 78-82)
A further section of Baer's book analyses sensitivity to Mainland 
fluctuations by firms classified by type of industry, ownership and 
market orientation. He finds it difficult on the basis of this analysis 
to make any policy recommendations on the types of firms which should be 
encouraged to develop in Puerto Rico, The evidence is not sufficiently 
clear. There is some suggestion, however, that the firms which declined 
most in recession were the firms which were also the most likely to grow 
rapidly. To discourage them would be to sacrifice some growth and on 
balance he thinks this would not be a profitable exchange, (Baer, 1962; 
p, 108)
The overall conclusions which follow from Werner Baer's study are 
that while there may be some evidence which suggests that, if the period 
of extremely rapid growth of new firms in Puerto Rico tends to come to an
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end, the Puerto Rican economy may become more sensitive to US fluctuations, 
At present its economy seems very resistant to the mild, shocks which it 
has received from Mainland instability.
The *rtfethod which Baer adopts of concentrating his analysis on the 
three year periods of the two recessions could be misleading. The 
possibility of coincidence cannot be ruled out when the sample is so 
small, particularly when the Puerto Rican variables which seem to have 
been Thost affected were different in the two periods studied, e.g. 
net migration in the first whereas investment and industrial production 
are emphasised in the second. Moreover, this method eliminates the 
possibility of observations of Puerto Rican variables perhaps moving 
independently of US in other periods. As a check on the conclusions based 
on Baer's results the data shown in Table 7:1 were collected and charts 
drawn for as long a period as available data permitted.
In Chart 7:1 annual values for Puerto Rican merchandise exports 
were plotted against US GNP in constant dollars, from 1947 to 1958.
It should be noted that the Puerto Rican data are all based on a fiscal 
year, so. that it is the value of goods exported between 1st July '47 and 
30th June '48 from Puerto Rico which are plotted against US GNP for the 
calendar year 1947. Consequently all the Puerto Rican data in Table 7:1 
except migration are lagged six months behind US GNP. Baer suggests 
a six to nine months' lag in his analysis for repercussions on the 
Puerto Rican economy.
The percentage fluctuations in both are relatively small. The 
chief interest of Chart 7:1 lies in the direction and timing of the 
changes in US GNP (values on left scale) and Puerto Rican exports (values 
on right scale). The US recessions, peak to trough, are indicated by the
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shaded blocks on the horizontal axis. Between 1948 and 1949 US GNP declined 
very slightly, but Puerto Rican exports rose more steeply than they had in 
the previous year. In 1951 Puerto Rican exports dropped well below trend 
while US GNP rose steadily, US GNP dropped from 369 billion dollars in 
1953 to 363.1 in 1954, Puerto Rican exports continued to rise, but at a 
rate slightly lower than the trend for 1947-58, Between 1957 and 1958 
US GNP fell from 408,3 billion dollars to 401,3, but Puerto Rican exports 
in 1958 . rose faster than the trend. It would be difficult to contend 
that these annual data support the hypothesis that fluctuations in US 
GNP are the most important single determinant of changes in the value 
of Puerto Rican merchandise exports.
In Chart 7:11 Puerto Rican income and fixed investment are plotted. 
They may be related visually to either US GNP or Puerto Rican exports.
With investment, US fortunes could determine Puerto Rican fixed 
investment either through the rate at which US firms and subsidiaries 
created new plants in Puerto Rico or through Puerto Rican exports.
If the latter declined this might deter investment in capital goods and 
affect public investment via reducing tax revenues available to finance 
it, Puerto Rican fixed investment seems to have fallen quite sharply 
in 1949, This might be attributed to the US recession, but on the other 
hand might easily be due to quite other factors. Exports went on 
increasing at that time and this was a very minor US recession, 'In 
1955 Puerto Rican investment may have risen very slightly less than the 
normal trend increase, but it is so slight as to be non-significant and 
it had increased rather rapidly in the previous year. Lack of data for 
1959 makes it impossible to test the reaction to the 1958 recession.
If any effect on investment is shown here the time lag involved is rather 
a long one. The graph already has the six month lag built in due to the
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fiscal year, and the reflection of the recession, if real, has been a 
further full year on. If quarterly data were available it would be 
possible to check this, but these figures are lacking. Comparison of 
the investment graph and Puerto Rican exports shows no evidence of 
relationship.
Comparison of the US GNP graph with Puerto Rican Gross Commonwealth 
Product and of Puerto Rican exports with Puerto Rican GCP provides no 
evidence of relationship in their movements from year to year.
In Chart 7:111 Puerto Rican annual emigration rate is compared with 
US average unemployment percentages. The unemployment graph is inverted.
The hypothesis underlying this relationship is that Puerto Rican net 
migration is related to the availability of jobs in the US. The expectation 
is that high US unemployment makes for a low level of Puerto Rican 
immigration to the US. This expectation is roughly upheld by the data 
as the graphs show. In each of the recessions the peaks of US unemployment 
coincided with troughs in Puerto Rican net emigration. Tlie proportionate 
size of the change varied enormously from one recession to the next and 
Puerto Rican emigration actually declined sharply in 1957 and in 1960 when 
US uræmployment had been approximately stationary. But this rather unique 
relationship between an underdeveloped and a rich country does seem to be 
established by these and Baer's results.^
Chart 7;IV sets out quarterly averages and the monthly average 
for each year for exports (expressed as monthly rates) from Puerto Rico 
for comparison with a chart of quarterly GNP values for the US. The 
quarterly data for Puerto Rico are unlagged and the monthly average for 
each year has been plotted against the second quarter point. The quarterly 
figures are linked with a free hand solid line. The monthly averages for 
each year are linked with a broken line. A trend line based on a 3 year
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moving average is drawn through the scattered points. The Puerto Rican 
quarterly data are uncorrected for seasonal variations. They are set 
out in Table 7:2.
It is clear that seasonal fluctuations and an upward trend have 
been quite strong in Puerto Rican exports. These have to be allowed for 
in analysing the relationships between Puerto Rican exports and US GNP. 
Puerto Rican exports seem to show some effect. In the second and third 
quarters of 1954 and the first quarter of 1955 they fell slightly below 
the values that could be expected from the regular seasonal movements and 
the upward trend in exports. But in the fourth quarter of 1954 they rose 
above what could be expected. Visual comparison of the graphs is 
diffinult and rather unreliable. They may, however, serve some purpose 
in checking the results of the multiple regression analysis which was 
attempted.
Quarterly figures for Puerto Rican merchandise exports 1953-61 
were treated as the dependent variable in regression equations with US 
seasonally-adjusted quarterly figures for GNP in constant 1954 dollars 
as the first independent variable. Seasonal factors and trend in Puerto 
Ricm e?q)orts were allowed for by "dummy" variables. The regression 
equations were computed with Puerto Rican exports in a current and one, 
two and three quarters lagged basis. The highest coefficient with 
respect to US GNP was found when Puerto Rican exports were lagged 2 
quarters behind the US data. It was, however, non-significant with the 
standard error almost as large as the coefficient. The results from 
this regression were:
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Puerto Rican Exports = -16,9062
+ 0,1066 US GNP of six months previous 
(,0783)
- 4,5153 1st quarter seasonal effect 
(2,0771)
+ 2,6930 2nd quarter seasonal effect 
(2,0800)
+ 3,4610 3rd quarter seasonal effect 
(2,0826)
+ 0,7182 General Trend 
(0,2200)
F Ratio 37,87 
R^  = 0.8752
The equation as a whole is quite highly significant (better than the 
,01 level) because of the highly correlated trends in Puerto Rican exports 
and US GNP over the period. These results do not support the hypothesis 
that short-term fluctuations in Puerto Rican exports are closely related 
to short-term changes in the general level of US activity. Any relationship 
which exists must be fairly weak or obscured by other factors.
Two possible reasons can readily be adduced in explanation of this 
lack of close relationship. The US economy is enormous and slight declines 
in its general level of activity are quite consistenet with fairly rapid 
expansion in some regions combined with steeper declines in other areas.
The effect on imports from an economy as small as that of Puerto Rico 
is likely to be heavily influenced by their regional distribution within 
the US,. It is quite feasible that they could have been concentrated in 
areas of the US which did not show the same pattern of changes in activity
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as the average for the US as a whole.? This is an interesting possibility, 
but one which would require fairly detailed and time consuming research to 
establish. Nor is it really necessary to the purposes of this study.
Another possibility is that the products which predominate in 
Puerto Rican exports have been insensitive to changes in consumers® 
incomes or to US industrial activity in this period. As was noted above 
Baer attempted to provide answers to this question, but was unable to
g
arrive at any very firmly established conclusions.
Study of Baer's findings, together with the supplementary evidence 
recorded above points to the general conclusion that the internal economy 
of Puerto Rico showed relatively low sensitivity to US general activity, 
Aparr from the unusual factor of migration the individual variables 
examined showed little or no relationship to the US economy. It seems 
unlikely that the Puerto Rican economy has suffered much hardship from 
external economic instability or that its instability can be related 
poweifully to general US instability. Yet this economy is extremely 
dependent on exports and has many close links with the US,
Because this finding contradicts spmë commonly accepted beliefs 
it ma> be worthwhile listing some of the factors which may have 
contributed to this result in the case of Puerto Rico. First, there 
is the factor of relatively rapid growth in general. This may have 
created a general atmosphere of buoyancy which could lead investors 
and potential investors to ignore temporary declines in demand in making 
investment decisions. This would tend to reduce accelerator effects of 
an initial decline in incsome. The liquid position of the banks would 
make credit reasonably easy to obtain provided expectations were geared 
to an upward trend. Also consumers may be inclined to dip into savings
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or make more use of consumer credit to maintain their standard of living 
if they have been conditioned to rising standards in a growing economy. 
Second, there is the factor, emphasized by Baer, of the rapid initial 
growth of newly set up industrial plants and investment in the construction 
of new plants on the basis of decisions made in advance of the US 
recessions and based in any case on longer«run criteria. Some of these 
were producing under pre-arranged contracts which could not be cut during 
the recessions. This Could have helped to sustain Puerto Rican output 
and exports in the face of a general decline in demand for these types 
of goods on the Mainland. Tliird, a decline in incomes on the Mainland 
may result in some substitution of cheaper products for higher quality, 
more expensive types. Such substitution may favour Puerto Rican exports 
such as textiles and apparel. Fourth, the import content of Puerto 
Rican exports is increasing, though not very high (about 19%), and 
reduction in exports would tend to reduce the need for certain imports.
On the invisible account of the balance of payments migrants presumably 
have some, if a rather small, effect on both the current and the capital 
account of the balance of payments. Their cost of transport and any sums 
they carry with them to the US will represent debit items on the balance 
of payments. A fall in net migration due to US recession would also 
reduce these.
These are some of the factors which could have acted as partial 
offsets to either changes in US activity or changes in Puerto Rican 
exports as determinants of Puerto Rican variables such as unemployment, 
income and investment. No doubt there are other possible explanations.
But the important points to note here are that even extreme economic 
dependence on an enormous, advanced, industrial partner does not by
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itself imply economic instability for the dependent and that neither does 
a very high ratio of foreign trade to national income imply this. Puerto 
Rico has enjoyed both stable and high rates of growth over the whole 
post-war period.
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Chart 7:1. US GNP and Puerto Rican Total Exports
Dollars
(1954)
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etc. Thus Puerto kican data are lagged six months behind US data.
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CShart 7:111* US Unemployment and Puerto Rican Net Migration 
1947-60 (Calendar Years)
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Chart 7:IV, Quarterly Index of US Gross National Product 
in constant 1954 dollars
Seasonally adjusted
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Table 7:1
Puerto Rico; General Economie Indicators, $ Million 
Fiscal Year July to Jtme
Gross
Total Net Migration 
Gross '000s
Merchandise
Exports
Total
Exports
Total
Imports
Commonwealth
Product
Fixed
Investment
Migration
(Calendar
1947-48 198.2 282,2 439,4 647,2 100,1 -24,5
1948-49 210,9 294.1 427,2 712,1 115.9 -32,8
1949-50 244.0 329,8 436,6 752,8 108,5 -25.7
1950-51 278,9 387,0 538,4 827,5 127.2 -34.7
1951-52 270,3 433,9 566.9 972.9 150.4 -52,9
1952-53 334,0 536,5 628,7 1052,6 158.9 -59.1
1953-54 362,4 551.5 675,2 1080,7 163.3 -69,1
1954-55 372,3 558,1 740,1 1116,1 195.6 -21,6
1955-56 432,2 613.2 818,4 1151,6 206,8 -45,5
1956-57 472,5 663,1 932.0 1198.0 221,3 -52,3
1957-58 487,0 681.1 962,2 1220.7 238,7 -37,7
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
530,1 744,2 1058.5 1319,8 257.8 -27,7
-30,0
-16.3
Sources: Puerto Rico Planning Board, Statistical Yearbooks, 1957-60,
Puerto Rico Planning Board, Net Income  ^Gross Product, 1947-55. 
Puerto Rico Planning Board, Current Business Statistics,1955 and 1961
“2 49 ■"
Table 7:2
Puerto Rico Exports Monthly 3 years
Monthly Rates $ Million Average Moving Average
Quarters 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1950 21
22.3
1951 22
25.0
1952 24
27.3
1953 23^ 29^ 31 a 27a 29
1954 25^ 29^ 28 32 29
29.6
32.0
1955 23 34 35 33 31
35.0
1956 33 34 39 40 36
37.6
1957 32 39 43 38 V. 38
41.6
1958 32 43 44 36 39
45,6
■ 1959 39 45 55 53 48
I960 47 49 57 47^ 50
52.3
1961 48 71 57 59 59
Sources : Puerto Rico Current Business Statistics,
^These figures are from Baer, 1962: p. 36, Table 12.
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Footnotes: Chapter Seven
< ,
1, Data calculated from Puerto Rico Planning Board, Statistical 
Yearbook,
2, But are these benefits to be regarded as mere accidents or 
are they themselves part and parcel with the situation of close economic 
ties. If they are factors associated with close economic ties which can 
be counted on to offset instability there can be no justificaion for 
treating them as exceptional circumstances which oilght to be dipcodnted.
3, Baer, 1962; Table 14 gives the data for these observations.
4, Baer, 1962: p. 46,
5, Baer, 1962: p, 78,
6, Jamaica and Trinidad may provide a parallel to this phenomenon,
«
7, Wolfgang Stolper suggests (in a private communication) that 
this may have been true of imports for the US as a whole. Because they 
are largely concentrated in the Eastern Regions of the US their movements 
have corresponded more closely to activity in the East while US growth 
has taken place mainly in the West, of the continent,
8, Baer, 1962: pp. 83-108, particularly conclusions 107-8,
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Chapter 8
Chile
Chile provides a very good example of the classic case of an export 
economy in which there is a relatively clear cut enclave dominated by 
expatriate enterprise. Exports of copper earn more than 50 per cent of 
Chile's foreign exchange and 8 per cent of its Gross Geographic Output,
The principal raining concerns, The Gran Minerla, are owned by U.S. 
companies who provide all the capital, all the administrative and 
technical expertise. Moreover most of the large copper mines are sited 
in remote parts of the country so that the labour force even lives in 
housing provided within the enclave by the industry and because of their 
isolation and poor transport facilities contacts between the export 
sector and the domestic economy are even less than might be expected 
a priori.
These particular circumstances are relevant to both the secular 
development prospects of such economies and to the impact upon their 
domestic economies of fluctuations In their main export. It is the 
latter question which is our main concern. Clearly in such economies 
the transference of instability from export fluctuations to the 
domestic economy is likely to be less rapid and less strong than in 
countries where exporting is closely integrated with the rest of the 
economy. One point which many writers have noted is that profits which 
can be assumed to be largely repatriated will absorb much of the 
fluctuations in export earnings. In this case the net foreign exchange 
made available to the domestic economy will fluctuate less than the 
total value of exports.
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Clark Reynolds coins the term "returned value" for the part of the 
total earnings of copper exports which is retained in the country. It 
includes all payments to local factors of production and, through taxation, 
to the government. More precisely he uses the name "net returned value" to 
cover all current payments to local factors--wages, domestic purchases for 
consumption and for stock, direct and indirect taxes paid to the government. 
When the export sector's local purchases of capital goods are added to this 
figure he uses the term "gross returned value."
Under the conditions which he assumes to hold for the Chilean 
Gran Mineria (the ex-patriate copper mines), the "gross returned value" is 
in fact just the same as the surplus on the total balance of payments on 
current and capital account to the copper sector (excluding local firms).
The balance of payments of this sector with overseas countries is the 
difference between its receipts from foreigners and its payments to them.
Bp = Bp - Pp where Bp = foreign balance,
Rp = value of copper exports and capital inflow, 
Pp - repatriated surpluses and payments for 
imports utilised in the sector.
Its net position with the domestic economy can be shown as:
= Rj - Pj where = domestic economy balance
R^ = copper companies' receipts for sale of 
copper locally,
Pjj = copper companies' payments for domestic 
factors, local purchases on current and 
capital account and government taxes.
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The overall balance of the copper sector is:
B = %  + %  - Pp - Pd-
Since surpluses must be held either in overseas countries or in the economy 
of Chile and deficits must be financed by foreign or domestic borrowing the 
copper sector itself can have no surplus or deficit on its overall balance 
so;
Rp + Ro - Pp - Pg = 0
/ . Bp — B d
The surplus with overseas equals the net payments to the domestic economy 
= "gross returned value".
2
If there were no sales of copper locally then Bp would equal 
That is, the overall surplus yielded by the sale of copper exports plus any 
transfers of funds from overseas to pay for capital imports over remitted funds 
and capital goods imported represents the net Injection of purchasing power 
into the domestic economy from the activities of the copper export sector.
In the main, all that Reynold's emphasis on "gross returned value" means 
is the point which has been made several times in earlier chapters of this 
study, that the value of exports is only one determinant (albeit the main one) 
of the contribution to national income and foreign exchange availabilities 
from foreign trade and payments. Changes in invisibles and in the capital 
account must also be considered before the effect on foreign exchange 
availabilities and on national income can be estimated.
However, Reynolds' formulation is perhaps more readily grasped and 
where company accounts are available gives a simple way of estimating the net 
contribution of the export sector to the domestic economy. Moreover, where
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data are available it enables some attention to be paid to the sectoral 
distribution of the export sector's expenditure in the domestic economy. In 
the case of Chile only the break-down between the Government, via taxation^ 
and the private sector, via payments to factors of production^is possible.
But even this may be fairly important for the effect on income and investment 
may differ substantially according to the proportions of the export sector's 
expenditures which accrue to the government or to private citizens.
The important question in relation to economic instability is whether 
changes in the "gross returned value" differ substantially in amplitude 
and/or in direction from changes in total export sales of copper.
Reynolds found that total copper sales for the Gran Mineria had an 
average annual fluctuation of 22.1 per cent (by the UN measure which 
was used for instaollity in uh, iyi>2. The chimges are calculated 
as percentages of the larger of each pair of years) over the period 1926 
to 1959. "Net returned value" had an annual fluctuation of 20.2 per cent, 
slightly less than total sales. Moreover, the direction of change was 
opposite to that of total sales in 6 out of 34 years. Two reasons are 
given for this: profits fluctuated more widely than any other component 
of total value and since they are remitted overseas are excluded from 
returned value; secondly, the inventory policy of the export industry 
tended to stabilise domestic factor returns so that they fluctuated only 
15,1 per cent and in 10 out of 34 years changed in the opposite direction 
from changes in the value of exports. (1963: pp. 95-96). The government's 
share of returned value, direct taxes plus import duties, however, 
fluctuated by 32.8 per cent per annum over the same period.(Reynolds' 
measure may exaggerate here as there was a strong upward trend in government
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revenues over the period, from 17 per cent (1925-31) of returned value to 
55 per cent (1956-59). Still even when allowance is made for this, tax 
revenues were very unstable). But, in 10 out of the 34 years they went 
in the opposite direction to changes in the value of copper exports.This 
was because of frequent changes in tax legislation and because of "an 
approximately one year lag between incidence and payment of taxation 
prior to 1946." (1963: pp. 96-97).
Government expenditure moved in the same direction as copper 
revenues in 20 out of the 31 years for which data can be obtained and 
in 8 out of the 11 remaining years it was simply a question of an 
increase in government expenditures while copper revenues declined* On 
this evidence and on the evidence that Chile's gross geographic product 
in U.S. dollars moved in the same direction on 26 out of 35 years as did 
copper revenues Reynolds concludes that instability in exports found its 
main path for communicating instability to the domestic economy via 
Government revenues and expenditure. His conclusion is not altered by 
consideration of the role of local capital purchases of the copper 
sector for the pattern and amplitude of fluctuations in "gross returned 
value" was very similar to "net returned value,"
Reynolds also discusses briefly the possibility that export 
instability may have deterred investment in the export sector. Lack of a 
period of sufficiently stable export proceeds for Chile prevents his 
making any statement on this. However, he points out that Chile's case 
is consistent with the "ratchet" theory, for, "The largest investments 
were commenced during periods of rising profits * , , (but) no major 
disinvestment occurred for any of the companies even during the severe
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depression of the 1930's,"(1963; p, 100) This is consistent with the 
finding, in Chapter 4 of our study, that the rate of capital accumulation 
and the degree of export instability appeared to be positively associated.
In his doctoral dissertation, Reynolds makes the further point that 
a "returned value" terms-of-trade index is a more accurate guide to the 
effects of fluctuations in prices on the domestic economy than is a total 
value terms-of-trade index. Me found that they differed, not only in 
magnitude, but also in 9 years out of 34 in direction of change* "During 
these years changes in the price of copper were completely offset (in 
terms of percentages) by changes in the index of returned value per pound 
of copper." (1962, p. 106),
His general conclusion is that the direction and magnitude of 
fluctuations in the value of copper exports are a poor guide to correct 
policy action intended to stabilise the domestic economy and its 
purchasing power over imports. In economies like Chile attention has to be 
shifted to the "returned value" of exports, (1963: pp. 100-102)* In
essence, as was argued above, this turns out to be the same as the
overall balance-of-payments surplus of the export sector with overseas 
countries.
Since Reynolds' analysis indicates fluctuations in government 
revenue resulting from fluctuations in the value of copper exports as 
the main line of communication between external and internal 
instability this relationship will be examined a little further below.
The simple UN measure for instability which Reynolds uses could be
misleading when there are strong trends present in the data. To test this
trends were calculated for the total government revenue from the
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Copper Mines and the total value of copper production by means of a 
five-year-moving average. Indices of instability were then computed 
as average percentage deviations from these trend lines for the 31 
available years,^ The results gave an index of 17.3 for the value of 
copper output and 31.3 for the government revenues from copper 
(approximately the same relationship as shown by Reynolds’ measures).
The deviations from trend were in the opposite direction for 10 out of 
the 31 years. But only on three or four occasions were the divergences 
in the opposite direction large. The correlation between these 
fluctuations in government copper revenues and the total value of 
copper was 0,55 which is significant at the .01 level. If only the 
post-war years are considered there is only one year, 1951, in the 
period 1945 to 1957 in which divergence for trend was in the opposite 
direction. Changes in the government revenues from copper can be 
regarded as very closely associated with movements in the total value 
of copper production, but only some 30 per cent of the variance is 
explained in this way. This is in fact surprisingly low. Explanations 
lie in changes in tax legislation which have altered the proportion of 
total income from copper accruing to the government, and time lags 
occurring in collection of taxes.
Any impact from fluctuations in government revenues from copper 
on the domestic economy depends on the expenditure response of the 
government. The greatest transfer of year-to-year export instability would 
occur where government expenditure increased and decreased in close 
sympathy with fluctuations in revenues from copper. The least transfer 
would occur where the government followed a positive policy of budget
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surpluses in good years and deficits in bad. This would tend to balance 
the fluctuations in Chilean private incomes derived directly or indirectly 
from the activities of the copper sector. In fact Chilean government 
expenditure appears to have moved in sympathy with copper revenues, 
but in a rather dampened and slightly uncertain manner. Table
8 ; 1 shows this in both absolute terms, in millions of constant (I960) 
dollars, and in percentage terms. The fluctuations in government 
expenditure have been much smaller than those in the government's 
revenues from copper; an average, $ 13,5 million as compared with 
$19,2 million. They diverged from trend in the same direction on
9 occasions out of a possible 13, The correlation between them was 
0,37 which is well below the ,05 significance level. The relationship 
between fluctuations in total government expenditure and revenues from 
copper seems rather weak. Earlier years, before the Second World War 
were deliberately omitted as revenues then were generally a very small 
proportion, much less than ten per cent, of government expenditure.
The degree of association between short-term fluctuations in 
government expenditure and fluctuations in the principal source of 
government revenue, the proceeds of exporting copper, is much lower than 
a priori reasoning or casual empiricism might suggest. The explanation 
for this lies in: (1) the possibility of divergence both in direction 
and magnitude of the "returned value" from the total value of copper;
(2) the fact of frequent changes in the fiscal system throughout the 
period; (3) the ability of the government to run surpluses and deficits 
on its overall budget. This last has been particularly important in 
Chile where long periods of "living with" inflation have alternated
•259-
with Sporadic attempts at fiscal and monetary severity. (Hirschman,
1963; Ch. 3),
It has been suggested that fluctuations in revenues from copper 
have been one cause of inflation in Chile through generating budget 
deficits when the value of copper exports has fallen below previous 
levels. An ECLA study (1957: p. 207) puts the argument as follows:
"The combination of rigid expenditure with irregular and 
inflexible tax revenue is sufficient in itself to lead to the automatic 
creation of deficits. As expenditure is inflexible, it is financed with 
a deficit. This is bound to produce a rise in internal prices."
Geoffrey Maynard, discussing Chile’s inflation in 1953 writes:
"A fall in copper sales produced a 26 per cent fall in government 
revenues from copper, and a 10 per cent fall in total government receipts. 
The exchange rate was devalued sharply, by more than 70 per cent, thereby 
reducing import subsidies, but even so the budget deficit rose to 20 per 
cent of total expenditure. This of course was inflationary in itself." 
(Maynard, 1962: p. 271),
Both of these sources make it clear that other factors were much 
more important causes of inflation, but they do both identify a budget 
deficit originating from a cut in copper revenues as one factor in the 
inflationary process* But there is an important difference between 
a deficit which arises from a cut in taxes on residents and one which 
stems from a fall in taxes levied on foreigners. In the first case 
residents gain an increase in purchasing power which allows them to 
compete with the government for domestic resources and imports. In the 
second case the residents’ disposable income is unaltered and only the
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government's income is cut* If government expenditure remains at the previous 
high level no extra demand for goods and services is generated in the economy 
by the simple existence of the budget deficit*
Depending on how the government finances the deficit there may, of 
course, be varying amounts of inflationary pressure generated through 
increases in the liquidity of the nation’s banking system. But this is an 
indirect, not a direct, effect of the deficit*
Conclusions
This brief account of the relationships between several strategic 
variables and fluctuations in the value of Chile's copper exports suggests 
the following findings; (1) study of fluctuations in the value of copper 
exports may be a misleading guide to the direction and magnitude of changes 
in the actual quantity of foreign exchange made available to Chile by the 
operations of the copper industry; (2) in general the copper companies 
appear to have operated inventory policies which tended to offset fluctuations 
in copper exports and the upward and downward adjustments of their remitted 
profits also seem to have mitigated the domestic impact of the export 
instability; (3) the suggestion that a decline in export proceeds through 
cutting government revenues and generating budget deficits is inflationary 
has been shown to be logically incorrect. The extreme instability which 
copper exports have experienced may well have had harmful effects on the 
Chilean economy, but there is little doubt that they have been exaggerated.
It seems evident that other and more deep-rooted factors have been the 
causes of Chile's serious problems of stagnation combined with one of the
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most consistently rapid inflations in Latin America,^
It seems very probable that these conclusions will apply in whole 
or in part to many of those underdeveloped countries in which expatriate 
enterprise plays an important part in the export industries, e.g. Northern 
Rhodesia, Malaya, Katanga, and several of the oil countries.
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Table 8 ; 1
Fluctuations in Copper Revenues and 
Total Expenditure of Government of Chile
(Deviations from a five-year-moving-average trend) 1944-56*
1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1955 1954 1955 1956 Average
Revenue
(1960) -0.2 - 3.1 -14.0 +11.8 +16.7 - 9.3 -15.9 - 3.6 +36.7 -18.7 -37.3 +58.6 +23.7 19.2
Revenue
% Deviation-1.0 -10.7 -39.8 +30.9 +41.9 -19*6 -26*9 - 5.6 +52,0 -19,2 -33.3 +55,3 +23,3 27,2
Expenditure
4.$ (1960) -4.0 +11*0 -13.0 -13.0 +27.0 - 9.0 - 2.0 -23.0 +10,0 +24,0 - 9*0 +16*0 -14,0 13,5
Expenditure
fe Deviation-2.9 + 6.0 - 6.2 - 5.7 +10.0 - 3*3 - 0.6 - 7.0 + 2.8 + 6.2 - 2.2 + 3.7 - 3,2 4.6
Source: Calculated from Reynolds, 1962: Appendix, Columns 112 and 117.
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Footnotes to Chapter 8
1* This section leans heavily on work done by Clark Reynolds, 
"Development Problems of an Export Economy; The Historical and Developmental 
Relationship of the Copper Industry to the Economy of Chile," Doctoral 
Thesis, University of California at Berkely, 1962, and, "Domestic 
Consequences of Export Instability," Paper and Proceedings, AER, May 1963.
2, Reynolds seems to assume this. In fact local sales of 
copper were generally less than 10 per cent of total even in recent 
years so this may be a reasonable simplification,
3, Reynolds, 1962; Statistical Appendix, Columns 117 and 83 
give the data used in U.S. constant dollars (1960),
4, Hirschman, 1963; Chapter 3; Maynard, 1962; pp. 266 et seq,; 
Schott, 1959; Felix, 1960.
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Chapter 9 
Pakistan
Pakistan, in contrast to our previous examples, is a large and 
important economy* It has a population of about 100 million most of whom 
live at a standard near the bottom of the scale, even for underdeveloped 
countries* Average per capita income is around $ 63* The economy is 
predominantly agricultural with 75 per cent of labor employed in cultivation 
and approximately 55 per cent of gross national product generated in 
agriculture* A great deal of the output of the farms is consumed directly 
by the producers and their families and is never sold in any market.
While export proceeds for Pakistan tend to be very unstable they 
form only a small proportion, 7 per cent, of the total national income and 
of the incomes of either of the two regions. West and East Pakistan* 
Consequently the impact of export fluctuation on national income is, nrima 
facie * unlikely to be great. However, for other reasons it might be expected 
that export fluctuations could inflict quite serious damage on the economy. 
Pakistan has embarked on ambitious programs of economic development, with 
a good deal of emphasis on expansion of industry. These plans necessitate 
heavy expenditure of foreign exchange on imported capital goods and raw 
materials, If fluctuations in export proceeds should affect the economy's 
ability to obtain these imports fluctuations in investment and production 
might result* If this should prove to be so other consequences would follow. 
Price levels of goods in the cash economy might fluctuate, development 
projects might be held up or be forced to use less efficient and more
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cost ly methods or materials.
Apart from these more general effects it is also possible that 
instability in Pakistan’s export markets may inflict severe hardship upon 
the producers of the main export crops, jute, and cotton. The degree of 
instability in the prices which they receive for these cash crops may 
also deter the peasant farmers from too great an investment in the cash 
economy. The uncertainty which attaches to production for sale may greatly 
reduce the attractions of other incentives to specialization such as the 
expectation of a higher average real income from the same inputs.
Export Fluctuations
As was noted in chapter 2 the degree of instability experienced by 
Pakistan’s export proceeds ranks it with the twelve most unstable countries. 
Exports from each of the two regions were even more unstable than the 
aggregate for the economy as a whole. Over the period 1948-49 to 1961-62, 
the average annual percentage changes in exports from East Pakistan and 
West Pakistan were 23,8 and 23.9 respectively compared with 15.1 for 
exports from the whole Pakistan economy. Table 9:1 shows the absolute 
values and the percentage changes for exports from the nation and the two 
regions for each year during the period studied. Export earnings and the 
other major variables for the nation and the regions are sketched in 
Chart 9:1.
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National and Regional Incomes
The expectation that national and regional incomes should be little 
affected by fluctuations in exports is upheld by examination of the available 
data. Incomes have been relatively stable with average annual percentage 
changes of 3.0 for the nation, 3.5 and 4.0 for West and East Pakistan. 
Examination of Chart 9:1 shows little or no relationship between fluctuations 
in exports and incomes. In Chart 9:11 the percentage changes in exports and 
income for the nation and both regions are sketched on a natural scale, It 
is clear that no close relationship exists. Calculations of the rank 
correlation coefficients between annual percentage changes in exports and 
income on a current or one-year-lagged basis yield no support for any 
relationship. Similar calculations for deviations from a five-year-moving- 
average trend for both exports and income show no significant correlations. 
The calculated coefficients are set out in Table 9:2. None reaches the 
,05 level of significance.
Imports
Fluctuations in imports, however, appear to be highly correlated 
with fluctuations in the previous year's exports. As shown in Table 9:3 
national and regional imports are significantly correlated with fluctuations 
in exports whether measured as annual percentage changes or as deviations 
from trend. Inspection of Chart 9:1 verifies the tendency for imports to 
follow exports with a one year lag.
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Investment
Given the high level of association between exports and imports, and 
the expected importance of imports to domestic capital formation some influence 
of exports on investment could reasonably be anticipated. Table 9:1 and 
Chart 9:1 set out the available data on fixed capital formation* Neither 
visual inspection nor correlation analysis provides evidence of a close 
association between fixed investment and exports. Coefficients of rank 
correlation between exports and investment are recorded in Table 9:4, None 
reaches the ,05 level of significance.
It could be argued that the lack of correlation between fluctuations 
in exports and domestic fixed-capital formation stems from the intervention 
of other factors such as foreign economic aid and the use of reserves of 
foreign exchange to support imports, A rough attempt to test for this can 
be made with the aid of figures on gross domestic savings compiled by 
Mahbub ul Haq^* Gross domestic savings are defined as gross investment 
minus foreign aid and loans, plus the change in Pakistan's foreign exchange 
reserves, All of the values are measured in 1959-60 prices. When the figures 
in Table 9:5 are compared with exports in Table 9:1 it is evident that no 
close relationship exists. The rank correlation coefficient between annual 
changes in exports and in gross domestic savings is +0,26 which is non-significant. 
The introduction of a one year lag does not improve the correlation. In fact 
it makes it worse. Nor is the correlation any better between annual 
deviations from trend for exports and savings. The paradox remains that while 
fluctuations in exports and imports seem fairly highly correlated and 
capital goods imports are a major part of both total imports and of domestic
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fixed capital, fluctuations in investment and exports seem to be unrelated 
A possible explanation lies in the ability of both government and firms 
to stockpile capital goods. Through this means capital can be purchased 
when foreign exchange is available and used later. Such a policy would 
break the connection between the current unavailability of foreign 
exchange and domestic investment. If this is an explanation, or partial 
explanation of the paradox, the question remains as to what costs are 
imposed on the economy by stock piling capital goods. This would depend 
on the average time for which they were held, the interest cost involved 
in financing the stocks and the cost of storage.
The foreign exchange component of Pakistan's gross investment 
is a little over 30 per cent. In 1959-60 this amounted to approximately 
1,000 million rupees. Year-to-year changes in total imports have averaged 
21 per cent from 1948-49 to 1961-62. For a slightly shorter period annual 
changes in gross—fixed-capital formation have been around 12 1/2 per cent, 
A stock of capital goods imports of about one fifth of the average annual 
total would probably be sufficient to avoid temporary shortages of 
capital goods from preventing the fulfillment of investment plans. The 
annual interest cost of carrying such a stock would amount to about 
12 million rupees, assuming a six per cent rate of interest. Assuming 
that the other costs amounted to a further 8 million rupees the total 
annual cost would be 20 million rupees. This could amount to a very tiny 
fraction of Pakistan's gross domestic product of approximately 28,960 
million rupees in 1959-60, It can hardly be maintained that an annual 
cost of ,07 per cent of national income is a serious infliction.
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Jute and Cotton Farmers
From the foregoing discussion it seems that the more general 
macro-economic effects of fluctuations in exports are very difficult to 
establish and may very well be minor. However, the impact of unstable 
markets for jute and cotton upon the peasant farmers of East and West 
Pakistan may be severe. Fluctuations in their incomes can inflict serious 
hardships and at the same time create uncertainties which may deter 
specialization in these cash crops even though the average real returns 
may exceed those from subsistence farming.
Farmers in East and West Pakistan live very close to the famine 
margin. Their situation is made still more precarious by the severe 
fluctuations in prices which recur in jute and cotton. They depend on 
the staple crops they grow or purchase with the proceeds of sales of 
cash crops to maintain themselves and their families. If East Pakistan 
farmers choose to sacrifice a rice crop for the sake of expected higher 
returns from a jute crop grown on the same land they run grave risks of 
reducing their already low food supply. They run a double hazard if they 
opt to grow jute, for jute prices may fall and rice prices rise before 
harvest time is reached. If they are unfortunate their only resort is 
the charity of relatives and friends or expensive borrowing from local 
moneylenders. While there are no published empirical studies of the 
effects of fluctuations of jute or cotton prices upon the welfare of the 
farmers it seems probable that these effects are serious.
Apart from the effect upon their current welfare there is also 
the possibility that the existence of a high degree of uncertainty
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actual ly deters farmers from growing more jute or cotton. This case has
been argued for cotton by Walter Falcon in the paper cited  ^and at more
length in his Harvard University PhD thesis. The argument is intuitively
appealing, but the evidence is not convincing. The only empirical evidence
in support of the view that price uncertainty deters cash cropping is an
apparent tendency for the elasticity of substitution between cotton crops,
such as sugar cane, to be higher than between cotton and crops mainly grown
for consumption on the farm, such as maize and rice. However, the
possibility of substitution is subject to other constraints such as the
level of the water table, the degree of salinity of the soil, other soil
characteristics and traditional attitudes of the farmers. Moreover, the
statistical problem of multicollinearity seriously lowers the confidence
which can be placed on the statistical analysis as Falcon himself points 
3out. Compared with the risks of crop failure the risks involved in price 
uncertainty are probably minor. In any case, in East Pakistan the acreage 
response to changes in the relationship between jute and rice prices is 
relatively high - around 0,6, Production elasticities for jute are about 
+0,4 with respect to jute prices, -0,4 with respect to the staple food 
crop, rice,^ Similarly, Falcon finds cotton acreage fairly responsive to 
the ratio of cotton price to a price index for possible substitute crops,
5
+0,41, These short-run elasticities are high by normal agricultural 
standards,^ Consequently it is difficult to argue that the price 
instability to which jute and cotton are subject has been a serious brake 
on willingness on the part of the farmers to respond to price and profit 
incentives, at least so far as short-run, year-to-year adjustments are 
concerned. It may be true that more jute or more cotton would be grown
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in the long-run if the problem of price uncertainty were removed, but there 
is no evidence one way or the other on this possibility.
Cost of Living
It can be argued that fluctuations in export proceeds should be 
expected to have some impact on the cost of living. In such regions as 
East and West Pakistan the cost of Living is heavily weighted by the 
prices of staple foods which tend to be inelastic in supply. If the 
incomes of producers of jute and cotton exports fluctuate severely this 
could be expected to cause sympathetic fluctuations in food prices.
Table 9:6 shows figures for the cost of living in West and East 
Pakistan. For West Pakistan the coefficient of rank correlation between 
the annual changes in exports and prices is 0.5 which is non-significant 
at the 5 per cent level. For East Pakistan the correlation is zero.
It would appear that there is little or no relationship between 
exports and domestic price levels in Pakistan, Nor is this altogether 
surprising. Since the cost of living is so heavily influenced by the 
prices of the staple food crops and demand for them is very inelastic 
fluctuations in the harvest yields of rice and wheat will cause large 
variations in food prices and are probably the main determinant of 
changes in the cost of living index.
Causes of Export Instability in Pakistan
As shown in Table 9:7 jute and cotton form over 70 per cent of 
Pakistan's exports and explanations of fluctuations in Pakistan's export 
proceeds must be sought mainly in the causes of jute and cotton instability, 
The fluctuations of each have tended to offset more often than to reinforce 
the fluctuations of the other. Fluctuations in the total value of jute and 
cotton exports together are rather lower than of either separately. The 
total values, unit values and export quantities for jute and cotton are 
shown in Table 9:8. The market position of Pakistan in these two exports 
is very different, Pakistan dominates the market for raw jute, exporting 
over 90 per cent of the world total. In cotton Pakistan's share of total 
world exports is relatively small. The differences are modified a little 
by the existence of various substitutes for jute ranging from kenaf and 
other fibers to paper bags which increase the price elasticity of demand 
a little more than would be expected for a country with such a near 
monopoly of a raw material. The grade of cotton produced by Pakistan 
is not a perfect substitute for American or Egyptian cotton and the price 
elasticity of demand for it is probably rather less than infinity. However, 
the difference between the economic situations of the two exports would 
seem likely to be considerable. But on analysis the differences turn out 
to be much less marked than expected. Table 9:9 sets out estimates of the 
relationships between fluctuations in total values, prices and quantities 
for raw jute and cotton exports from Pakistan.
For jute, fluctuations in total value appear to be slightly more 
closely associated with fluctuations in the quantity exported than with
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fluctuations in price. Fluctuations in price and quantity appear to be 
unrelated. A simple counting of the number of times which these three 
variables moved in the same or the opposite direction as shown by the 
fluctuations recorded in Table 9:8 confirms the results of the correlation 
analyses in Table 9:9. Moreover, the degree of instability, measured by the 
average percentage deviations from trend, is larger at 12,1 for quantity 
than for unit value at 8.8 (Table 9:8).
Can we deduce from this evidence that fluctuations in supply
rather than in demand were the main cause of instability in raw jute
proceeds? Unfortunately the matter is not so simple. From a priori
reasoning and the results of other empirical studies it is clear that
the short-run price elasticity of demand for raw jute from Pakistan is
7
fairly low, around -0,4. Given this relatively low demand elasticity 
and a stable demand, fluctuations in export quantities could have led 
to an inverse relationship between, not only jute quantity and price, 
but between quantity and proceeds. Since this did not occur one can 
only conclude that fluctuations in demand were an independent and 
almost equally important cause of fluctuations in jute earnings.
It might appear that this can be carried further and the 
responsibiltiy for fluctuations placed more firmly on the side of 
demand. It might be argued that fluctuations in current jute exports 
are the consequence of producers* decisions based on prices established 
in previous seasons. These in turn may have been the result of a shift 
in demand. But several studies have shown that jute output responds 
as much to the previous year's rice prices as to jute prices. Moreover, 
between them jute and rice prices explain only about 50 per cent of
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variations in jute output. Random factors, such as planting, harvest and
8
flooding conditions are almost equally responsible for changes in output. 
Autonomous changes in production were probably the main factor in short-term 
fluctuations in jute proceeds over the period studied here.
In the case of cotton, fluctuations in total value appear to be 
quite closely related to fluctuations in price, but very little to 
quantity. Price and quantity are not significantly correlated. Since the 
price of cotton is likely to be determined in international markets in 
which Pakistan's supply is a small fraction it would seem that 
fluctuations in world demand and supply have been the major cause of 
Pakistan's cotton export instability. Fluctuations in export quantity 
were considerably less than in unit value over the period 1949-58. Since 
the correlation between price and quantity was negative though too low 
to be significant some tendency for quantity changes to have actually 
offset price changes is present. Price and quantity moved in the same 
direction on only three occasions out of ten. Given the probability of a 
fairly high price elasticity of demand for Pakistan's exports of cotton 
it is less likely that autonomous changes in quantity produced opposite 
changes in the price, but this may also have happened.
Since the mid-1950's the capacity for processing jute and cotton 
into cloth, yarn and clothing has increased sharply. One result of this 
is to make the quantities of raw material available for export a residual. 
This may increase the elasticity of supply through the activities of 
local producers in responding to raw material prices. However, throughout 
most of this period export duties upon both jute and cotton have varied 
frequently and tended to break the relationship between the domestic and
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international price for both materials. These changes in export duties, 
which are in effect also subsidies to domestic producers at least in the 
case of jute, may have had some impact on short-term changes in the 
quantities exported. But until recently the domestic jute and cotton-goods 
producers were probably not large enough to cause serious disturbances in 
the quantity of raw jute and cotton exported.
Explanations of fluctuations in cotton output in terras of prices 
are not very satisfactory. Falcon and others have shown acreage response 
to the ratio of cotton prices to various production substitutes to be of 
the order of 0.4 supply elasticity. But actual output seems to be so 
heavily influenced by natural hazards that price factors are obscured.
In the case of cotton, fluctuations in foreign demand were 
probably the major factor in instability, with changes in output due to 
natural factors such as weather a secondary cause.
Effect of Price Instability on Long-Term Demand
From time-series analysis of a relatively short period of a 
country’s history it is well nigh impossible to reach conclusions about 
the effects of fluctuations on economic growth. We have touched upon the 
matter in discussing the effects of price uncertainty upon jute and 
cotton farmers. Price uncertainty can also affect the industries which 
purchase jute and cotton. Both of these commodities are ones in which 
alleged asymmetric response of consumers to price fluctuations has 
reinforced longer-run tendencies to substitute synthetics for them in 
various uses.
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There is no good evidence on this question of instability 
stimulating a secular trend away from jute or cotton, but the arguments in 
its favor are appealing. Other things being equal, manufacturers will almost 
certainly prefer raw materials and intermediate goods with stable to those 
with unstable prices. The main uses of jute are in packaging. This accounts 
for over three-quarters of all mill-manufactured jute. Subordinate uses 
are in the backing of floor coverings, roofing felts, automobile insulation, 
upholstery, string, rope and electric cables. In almost all uses there are 
good substitutes available: latex can be used as carpet backing and 
underfelts, other fibers such as sisal, in its cheaper grades, are close 
substitutes in most uses, paper thread can be used in carpet backing.
But most important of all, in the main packaging uses multi-walled paper 
bags and bulk-handling represent a serious threat to jute sacking. In 
these uses the probability is that decisions to switch to paper sacks or 
to bulk-handling are irreversible, A high jute price may be the final 
incentive required to induce the manufacturer to invest in the equipment 
required to handle either bulk-deliveries or paper packaging. This change 
may mean a substantial investment which commits the manufacturer to the 
new technique even if jute prices subsequently fall sharply. According 
to an FAO study, "During the period of relatively high hessian cost 
(1948-51) the turning over to paper involved technical adjustment and 
possibly capital expenditure which militated against reversal; certain 
sectors of the market were lost to hessian, more or less permanently."^
In addition to the effects of unstable prices on world demand 
there are probably effects on the supply side* High jute prices may 
stimulate new entrants to the field of production of jute or close 
substitutes such as mesta fibers. While these are mainly annual crops
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it is unlikely that all of the new producers will withdraw when prices 
subsequently fall.
If world demand and competing supplies are affected in the ways
outlined the long-run demand for Pakistan’s exports of raw jute must
shrink or at least its rate of increase must be slowed by the effects
of short-term fluctuations in jute prices. Potentially this could mean
a serious loss of importing capacity and a possible retardation of
economic development. But the role of short-term price instability in
causing a shift in demand away from jute materials may be quite small.
The shift towards paper packaging depends on many other factors -
improvements in technology, changes in methods of marketing, the
superiority of paper for carrying advertising for example. Moreover,
the longer-run relationship between jute and paper prices is probably
10
a much more important factor than short-term fluctuations. Manufacturers 
would be behaving irrationally if they made decisions, which may bind them 
for several years, on the basis of current prices of a highly price-unstable 
product.
The same arguments can be presented in the case of cotton. Here 
the substitutes are mainly synthetic fibers and the possibility of 
irreversible decisions is present here too. But, as with jute, the 
difficulty of deciding how much substitution of synthetic for natural 
fibers is due to price instability and how much to price trends, changes 
in tastes and changes in technology would involve a major study.
In short, price instability probably has some adverse effect on 
trends in demand for jute and cotton. The importance of the price 
fluctuations as compared with other factors affecting trend is
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probably minor, but evidence on this is lacking and the possibility that it 
is major remains.
Conclusions
The macro-economic effects of fluctuations in Pakistan's exports 
appear to be slight. Income, investment and domestic prices; all seem 
relatively unaffected. Imports do appear to fluctuate in sympathy with 
exports, but this does not seem to have had any major impact on 
investment. Explanations for this may lie in greater flexibility in the 
import content of investment or in the ratio of capital goods imports to 
total imports than is normally expected in underdeveloped countries, 
or in stockpiling of capital goods by entrepreneurs or government in 
anticipation of shortages of foreign exchange. Such activities would 
involve some costs, but they seem to be minor.
More important are the likely effects on the welfare of producers. 
People as poor as Pakistan’s farmers are may suffer severely if price 
fluctuations rob them in some years of a large part of their cash income.
Possible long-term effect are: (1) that price uncertainty may deter 
peasant producers from specializing in the production of jute or cotton 
and so reduce Pakistan's long-run supply of these, (2) price instability 
may lose Pakistan customers for its raw jute, (3) price instability may 
attract rival producers when prices are high. This last point seems 
inconsistent with the first, but both points are often made in statements 
of the ill-effects of instability. These long-term effects are potentially 
important, but evidence on them is lacking.
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In sum, the very high d e g r e e  of short-term instability which
Pakistan's exports experience is probably a bad thing. The major effects are,
however, probably directly connected with the production and export of jute
and, less importantly, cotton. National measures of the buffer stocks or
11
funds nature could probably solve these problems relatively cheaply.
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It is fairly clear from this chart that export fluctuations and national or 
regional income changes are not closely related.
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Table 9;1-A 
Pakistan Data (million rupees)
(Trade year July-June, Fiscal year 1 April to 31 March)
Exports(a) T , (»)Imports
Percentage
Income
Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation
Percentage  (a) Percentage (b) Percentage
National Change National Change National Change National Change
(Prices of Average) (Current Prices) 
1949/50-1952/53
48-49 958 - - 1459 - - - - - - - - - -
49-50 1194 19.8 1297 -11.1 17542 - - 840 — —
50-51 2553 53.2 1620 19.9 18575 5.5 880 4.5
51-52 2008 -21.3 2237 27.5 18522 -0.2 1220 34.4
52-53 1510 -24.8 1384 -38.1 18761 1.2 1380 11.5
53-54 1286 -14.8 1118 -19.2 19727 4,8 1520 9.2
54-55 1223 - 4.8 1103 - 1.3 20064 1.7 1530 0.6
55-56 1784 31.4 1325 16.7 19586 -2.4 1740 12.0
56-57 1608 - 9.8 2335 43.2 20882 6.2 1820 4.3
57-58 1422 -13.0 2050 -12.2 21011 0.6 2390 23.8
58-59 1325 - 6.8 1578 -23.0 20850 -0.7 2340 - 2.0
59-60 1842 39.0 2461 35.8 21683 3.8 3060 23.5
60-61 1799 - 2.3 3188 22.8 22943 5.5 - - - -
61-62 1843 2.3 3109 - 2.4
(c)
23802 3.6 - - - -
Average
Percentage
Changes -15.1 -21.0
+
-3.0 -12.6
Sources: (a)
(b)
(c)
CSC, Statistical Bulletin.Karachi. Sept. 1962, Table I for Trade Data,
Table 24, National Income at Constant Prices (Average 1949/50-^1952/53), 
Mahbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning (A Case Study of Pakistan), 
Pakistan Branch, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963, Appendix B,
Tables B-1, B-2, B-3 (Income in Constant Prices : average 1949/50 - 1952/53 
Figures are provisional.
Table 9;1-B
West Pakistan Data (million rupees)
(Trade year July-June, Fiscal year 1 April to 31 March)
Exports(a) Imports(a) Income
Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation
Percentage 
West Change
Percentage 
West Change
(b) Percentage (b) Percentage 
West Change West Change
(Prices of Average)(Current Prices) 
1949/50-1952/53
48-49 529 - - 1177
49-50 565 6.4 912 -22.5 8460 - - 620 -  -
50-51 1342 57.9 1167 21.8 8860 4.5 640 3.1
51-52 921 -31.3 1474 20.8 8670 -2.1 850 24.7
52-53 867 - 5.8 1017 -31.0 8880 2.3 940 9.5
53-54 641 -26.1 824 -18.9 9850 9.2 1060 11.3
54-55 491 -23.4 783 - 4.9 10110 2.5 1150 7.8
55-56 742 33.8 964 18.7 10400 2.7 1310 12.2
56-57 698 - 5.9 1516 36.4 10640 2.2 1280 - 2.2
57-58 434 -37.8 1314 -13.3 11080 3.9 1620 20.9
58-59 444 2.2 1025 -21.9 11290 1.8 1670 2.9
59-60 763 41.8 1806 43.2 11750 3.9 2080 19.7
60-61 540 -29.2 2173 12,2
61-62 543
Average
Percentage
Changes
0.5
-23.8
2236 2.8
-20.6 -3.5 -11.4
Sources: as for Table 9:1-A
Table 9;1-C 
East Pakistan Data (million rupees)
(Trade year July-June, Fiscal year 1 April to 31 March)
Exports (a) Imports(a) Income
Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation
East
Percentage
Change East
Percentage
Change
(b)
East
Percentage
Change
(b)
East
Percent
Change
48-49 429 -  - 282 -  - - - -  - - - - -
49-50 629 31.8 385 26.7 8580 - - 220 " “
50-51 1211 48.1 453 15.0 8920 3.2 240 8.3
51-52 1087 -10.2 763 40.6 9110 2.0 370 8,1
52-53 642 -40.9 366 -52.0 9620 5.3 440 15.9
53-54 645 0.5 294 -16.9 9840 2.2 460 4.3
54-55 732 11.8 320 8.1 10000 1.6 380 -17.3
55-56 1041 29.7 361 11,3 9570 -4.0 430 11.6
56-57 909 -12.6 819 68.1 10570 9.4 540 20.3
57-58 988 7.9 736 -10.1 10170 -3.7 770 29.8
58-59 881 -10.8 554 -24.7 10050 -1.1 670 -12.9
59-60 1080 18,4 655 15.4 10880 7.6 980 31.6
60-61 1259 14.2 1014 35.4 - - - - - - - -
61-62 1301 3.2 873 -13.9 - - - " - - - -
Average
Percentage
Changes -23.9 -26.0
+
-4.0 -16.0
Sources: as for Table 9:1-A
Table 9:2
Rank Correlation Coefficients Between Exports and Income 
1949-50 to 1961-62 (1949-50 to 1959-60 in the Case of the Regions)
Yearly Percentage Annual Deviations
Changes________  Sample From Trend  Sample
National R = 0*15 12 R « -0,49 9
West R =-0.003 10 R = -0,48 7
East R =-0,296 10 R = -0,52 7
National 
(one year
lag) R = 0.04 11 R «  0.17
Source; calculated from Table 9:1
Table 9:3
Rank Correlation Coefficients Between Imports and the 
Proceeding Year's Exports, 1948-49 to 1961-62
Yearly Percentage Annual Deviations
Changes Sample From Trend  Sample
National R = 0.77 12 R = .83 8
West R = 0.71 12 R = .86 8
East R = 0.63 12 R = .76 8
Source; calculated from Table 9:1
Table 9:4
Rank Correlation Coefficients Between Investment and Exports 
1948-59 to 1959-60; (1) Current (2) Investment Lagged One Year
National
West
West
National
West
East
(1)
(2)
Yearly Percentage 
Changes
R = -0.16
R = 0.31
R = 0.24 
R « -0.19
Sample
10
10
10
10
Annual Deviations 
From Trend
R = -0.15 
R = -0,64
R = 0.1
R = -0.53
Sample
Source: calculated from Table 9:1.
Gross Domestic Savings 
(M.rupees,1959-60 Prices)
Table 9:5
Fluctuations in Gross Domestic Savings 
Percentage Change
1949-50 570 - -
1950-51 2210 74.2
1951-52 810 -63.3
1952-53 1010 19,8
1953-54 1440 29.8
1954-55 2480 41,9
1955-56 2170 -12.5
1956-57 1050 -51.6
1957-58 1330 21.0
1958-59 1670 20.3
1959-60 1750 4.5
Source: Mahbub ul Haq, op. cit.. Table A-12, p.232.
Table 9 : 6
Export Proceeds and Regional Prices Indexes
1951-52 52-53 53-54 54-55 55-56 56-57 57-58 58-59 59-60
Price Indexes For
(1) West Pakistan
(2) East Pakistan
Annual Percentage 
Change in (1)
Annual Percentage 
Change in (2)
100
100
114
96
99
76
82
59
93
S3
112 109 113 120
118 113 118 124
14 -13.2 -17.2 11.8 17.0 - 2.8 3.5 5 * 8
- 4 -20.8 -22.3 28.9 29.7 - 4.2 4.2 4.8
- 5.8 -26.1 -23.4 33.8 - 5.9 -37.8 2.2 41.8
-40.9 0.5 11.8 29.7 -12.6 7*9 -10*8 18.4
Export Proceeds (1)
Export Proceeds (2)
Source; (1) and (2) Cost of living indexes: Ul Haq, 1963: Table 23, p. 109
Table 9 : 7
Total Foreign Exchange Earnings 1955-60 (million rupees)
Percent
Raw Jute 4,215 44.1 )
Jute Manufacturers 685 7.2 )
Raw Cotton 1,509 15.8 )
Cotton Manufacturers 429 4.5 )
Hides and Skins 251 2.6
Wool 417 4.4
Tea 155 1.6
Miscellaneous 795 8.3
Invisible Receipts 1,098 11.5
Ï65.5
71.6
Source; Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan, 
June 1960, p. 83
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Table 9 : 8 - A (JUTE)
Jute and Cotton Exports From Pakistan, 1947-60
Total Value
Percentage 
Million Deviations
U.S. $ From Trend
Unit Value
$ Per 
Metric Ton
Percentage 
Deviations 
From Trend
Quantity
Thousand 
Metric Tons
Percentage 
Deviations 
From Trend
1947 22,48 -  - 303.9 - - 74.0 - -
1948 106,82 - - 316.5 - - 337.5 - -
1949 154.03 -10.9 287,9 - 2.7 535.0 - 9.8
1950 228.88 8.7 243.0 -19.0 941.9 18.6
1951 352.44 57,5 327,0 16,5 1077.8 16.7
1952 210.35 - 6.8 250.3 5,9 840.4 -15*5
1953 172.65 -20.5 175,9 -21,8 981.5 -22.0
1954 164.88 - 7.5 184.9 - 5,6 891.7 - 6.9
1955 185,58 9.8 188,9 0 982,4 9.1
1956 157.72 - 7,1 183,7 - 4,7 858,6 - 2.9
1957 164.44 - 0.8 209,5 9,9 784,9 - 9.6
1958 176.34 8.8 194,7 - 1.5 905.7 10,1
1959 142,85 — — 176,5 - - 809,4 - "
1960 169,33 — — 223,6 -  - 757.3 - -
Average
Percentage
Deviations 13.9 8.8 12.1
Source: Economic Analysis Division, FAO, Rome,
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9 ; 8 - B
Jute and Cotton Exports from Pakistan, 1947-60
Total Value
Percentage 
Million Deviations 
U.S. $ From Trend
Unit Value
$ Per 
Metric Ton
Percentage 
Deviations 
From Trend
Quantity
Thousand 
Metric Tons
Percentage 
Deviations 
From Trend
1947 64.09 - - 568,2 - - 112.8 - -
1948 107.42 - — 657.8 - - 163,3 — -
1949 127.94 -14.7 755,7 - 7.5 169.3 - 3,4
1950 157.33 “16,9 728.7 -20,4 215.9 7,5
1951 291.48 41,7 1376,2 49.6 211,8 - 5.8
1952 261.14 29.9 1061,1 15.7 246.1 11,8
1953 190,68 0 676,4 -24,7 281.9 34.3
1954 105.40 -29 « 1 742.8 0,7 141,9 -26,8
1955 106.24 - 3.6 632,0 - 2.5 168.1 0
1956 76.40 - 7,3 579.7 - 5.8 131,8 0,8
1957 69,66 6.1 607,3 8.2 114.7 1,8
1958 50,50 - 3.8 518,5 - 3.0 79.4 0
1959 25.35 - - 467,8 - - 54.2 - -
1960 44.33 - - 500,9 - - 88.5 — "
Average
Percentage
Deviations 15.3 13.8 9,2
Source: Economic Analysis Division, FAO, Rome
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Table 9 ; 9
Statistical Analyses of Jute and Cotton Export Fluctuations
CD Total Value and Unit Value
*
Log total value = 0 , 0 7  + 0 , 9 3  log unit value
( 0 , 3 9 )  F - ratio 5 , 6 9 = 0 . 4 2
Correlation, r = 0 , 6 4 *
(2) Total Value and Quantity
*
Log total value = 0 , 00 2  + 0 , 9 4  log quantity
( 0 , 3 2 )  F - ratio 8 . 75 = 0 , 52
*
Correlation, r = 0 , 7 2
(3) Unit Value and Quantity
Correlation, r = - , 0 6
CD Total Value and Unit Value
*
Log total value = 0 , 0 5  + 0 , 7 0  log unit value
( 0 , 2 5 )  F - ratio 7 , 64 r2 = 0*49
*
Correlation, r = 0 , 7 0
C2) Total Value and Quantity
Log total value = 0 , 0 4  + 0 , 5 0  log quantity
( 0 , 4 2 )  F - ratio 1 , 39 = 0 . 1 5
Correlation, r = 0 . 3 8
C3) Unit Value and Quantity
Correlation, r = - 0 . 3 9
(a) Data were transformed into logarithms and then deviations from a five-
year-moving -average of the logarithms centered on the mid year calculated
as indicators of trend-corrected short-term fluctuations. Since the 
regression equations are in logarithm form the B coefficients measure the 
percentage response of total value to a given change in quantity or unit 
value,
*
Statistics marked with the asterisk are significant at the 5 per cent level
Source: annual values given in Table 8 from 1947-1960,
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1. 1963, Table A-12, p. 232,
2. See Falcon, 1964 and Falcon 1962*
3. Falcon, 1962: pp. 73-75
4. See MacBean, 1962: pp. 254-56, and other works cited there*
In all cases price data are for the previous season.
5. Falcon, 1964: passim and 1962: p. 75,
6. See M.J. Brennan, ’’Changes in Cotton Acreage in the Southeast 
Implication for Supply Functions,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol XL, pp.835-44, 
cited by Falcon, 1964,
7. MacBean, 1962: p. 258; Maizels, 1960 and 1961; Chatterjee and 
Sinha, 1941.
8. MacBean, 1962: pp. 254-56; FAO, 1957; Clark, 1957.
9. FAG, 1957: p. 14
10. Maizels, 1960 and 1961
11. See MacBean 1962: pp. 260-66.
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Chapter 10 
National Stabilization Policies
One of the main problems of policy is to decide on what should 
be the object of stabilization* This may be export prices or producer 
prices, the terms of trade, the money Income or real income of exporters 
or producers, the national income of the country, the available foreign 
exchange or development expenditures. Any policy designed to affect any 
one of these variables may cause instability in others and run counter 
to other national policy objectives such as maximum foreign-exchange 
earnings or long-run growth. Policies can only be devised when the 
priorities for the particular country have been established* These qan 
only be decided after careful study of the particular problems facing 
individual countries and can only be judged in terms of the long-run 
economic welfare of each country,
The government of one country may consider that it is important 
to stabilize the price which the domestic producer receives for his crop. 
Such an objective would be appropriate where they regarded prices as being 
Siii important determinant of output or where they regarded a highly unstable 
price as a cause of severe hardships to individual producers or as a 
deterrent to specialization in the production of cash crops for export.
In other countries, however, the important problem might seem to the 
government to be not the impact on the individual producer, but the 
impact on the economy as a whole* Here the problem of the government would 
be to devise some scheme which stabilizes national income and this might
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take the form of fiscal or monetary policy rather than of particular schemes 
which aim at breaking the connection between export prices and prices 
received by producers; the more traditional national policy for dealing 
with fluctuations in exports.
In another country the main concern might be the impact on the 
rate of growth of the economy. If export instability were expected to 
bedevil private and government investment programs the objective of 
stabilization policy would be to attempt to stabilize development 
expenditures. This could be achieved by ensuring that the country could 
always pay for imports of investment goods required for development and 
also by encouraging stable private investment in the economy. The point 
emphasized here is that there is a wide variety of experience and a wide 
variety of problems in underdeveloped countries; hence no single type of 
policy is likely to be suitable for all.
Not only is there a wide range of problems facing underdeveloped 
countries, but also the importance of these problems is likely to vary 
considerably from country to country* From our analysis in the previous 
chapters of this study it does not appear that fluctuations in export 
earnings are very urgent problems for most underdeveloped countries. This 
is to some extent borne out by the lack of serious attempts by underdeveloped 
countries to moderate internal fluctuations originating in short-term export 
instability. It is probable that other policy objectives haye received, and 
probably deserved, more attention than the instability generated by export 
fluctuations. This is particularly true in view of the perils involved in 
operating any stabilization scheme. The difficulties are both of the 
conceptual kind suggested above and practical difficulties of obtaining
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administrators who will operate the schemes honestly and efficiently. Many 
schemes in the past have in fact varied their aims from stabilization and 
become mere tax-gathering institutions. In a few cases they have become 
instruments of corruption and abuse of power. However, despite these doubts, 
or perhaps because of them, national stabilization policies remain a 
worthwhile subject of discussion. For some countries the problem of export 
instability must be serious enough to warrant strenuous efforts to reduce 
repercussions on the internal economy. Particularly where export 
fluctuations seem to inhibit economic development. However, before a 
scheme stabilization is recommended it should be clear that the device 
itself should not inhibit economic development more than its absence.
National Stabilization Devices
The objective of moderating fluctuations in producer prices, in 
incomes or in national income caused by fluctuations in exports can be 
attained, in principle, by many devices; marketing boards, stabilization 
funds, variable export duties and subsidies, and variable exchange rates 
among others. Very few countries are in a position to do any more than 
attempt to ameliorate the internal impact of external instability. This 
is because they normally supply only a small part of the total market for 
any of the commodities which they export. Consequently the price elasticity 
of demand facing their exports is usually very high and alterations in 
their volume have little or no impact on world prices, Pakistan, Ghana 
and Brazil are probably the most important exceptions to this rule. The 
proportions of the world trade in jute, cocoa and coffee, respectively
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exported by these three countries are sufficiently large to enable them 
to affect world prices significantly by their export policies. For them tp 
use this power in attempts to raise the long-term average prices received for 
these would however be foolish (as Brazil has recently found to her cost), 
even if the elasticity of demand were less than unity. It would stimulate 
too much substitution, and production of exact and near substitutes to allow 
the price to remain high for long. However, such countries could, if they 
considered it worthwhile, reduce fluctuations in export prices by a 
sensibly operated buffer stock policy. For Pakistan, as we have suggested 
elsewhere such a policy might well be a useful aid, not only to internal 
stability, but to long-term export earnings and economic growth (MacBean, 
1962).
But for most countries such policies are out of the question without 
international co-operation. In this chapter we can therefore confine 
discussion to policies aimed merely at reducing the internal effects of 
fluctuations in export proceeds. This still leaves the field fairly wide 
and to narrow it further, discussion of general income stabilization policies 
such as fiscal and monetary policies of the central government are postponed 
to the following chapter. In this chapter we concentrate on the principles 
and practice of the four devices; marketing boards, stabilization funds, 
export duties and variable exchange rates.
These, in particular marketing boards and stabilization funds, are 
the most widely known schemes adopted by individual nations for stabilizing 
the prices and incomes received by producers for their exported crops.
Insofar as stabilization, as we have defined it, is their aim they have a 
great deal in common with one another and with variable or progressive
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export duties/subsidies and variable differential exchange rates. ^ The 
principle upon which they all hinge is the need to break the connection 
between the price paid in world markets for exports and the prices and 
incomes received by the producers.
Marketing boards usually achieve this aim by acting as monopolies 
which buy all the output of the producers at prices fixed by the board 
and sell the product on world markets for what it will fetch. By this 
means they can, in general, hold producers' prices constant within the 
season and probably also moderate their movements between seasons. When 
world prices are higher than average the boards can make 'profits' which 
form a reserve fund which can be used to support prices to producers 
when export prices fall below trend. The marketing board has been the 
device used most widely for this purpose in 'British Africa.' The State 
Agricultural Marketing Board (SAME) of Burma forms another important 
example of this genre.
In 'French Africa' the caisses de stabilisation des prix or price 
stabilization funds achieve similar objectives without monopolizing either 
the purchase or sale of the products. They rely mainly on the fixing of 
minimum producer prices and their legal enforcement. They have controls 
over private sales contracts and use a system of levies and premia on 
exports which allows them to accumulate funds in good years to support 
producers' prices in years of low export prices.
A system of export taxes and subsidies can also be used so as to 
reduce, either automatically or at the discretion of the governmentj, 
variations in producers' incomes from exporting specified commodities.
For example, a tax can be designed so that when the export price of, say.
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rubber rises 10 per cent above trend 50 per cent of the excess over the 
trend value will be taxed away, when it rises by 20 per cent, 70 par cent 
of the excess is taxed away. Conversely, when the price falls below trend 
an automatic subsidy can come into effect so that over a reasonable period 
of time the producers as a body receive the same income as they would have 
without the scheme, but spread more smoothly over time.
Finally, special rates of exchange can be used for specific 
commodity exports and varied in such a way as to moderate fluctuations in 
the net price or income received by the producers. When world prices rise the 
government can lower the value of domestic currency which the exporter 
receives in exchange for the foreign currency earned by his sales to 
foreigners by devaluing the exchange rate applicable to these transactions. 
The government acquires and may put to reserve the difference between the 
sum the exporter receives at the new rate and what he would have received 
at the old rate of exchange with the new high export prices. When export 
prices subsequently fall below trend, the exchange rate can be raised so 
as to compensate the producer for the fall in world prices. As with all 
of these schemes the authority running the scheme makes 'profits' in years 
of supra-Bormal export prices and 'losses'in years of sub-normal prices.
It is not uncommon for variations of these schemes to operate 
simultaneously in the one country. Marketing boards, for example, have 
frequently co-existed with export duties on the same products and the 
stabilization function may to some extent be shared between them.
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Prices or Incomes
In fact all past or existing schemes have had stabilization of 
producers' prices as their immediate objective. Some question remains as 
to whether producers' prices or incomes form the more appropriate and 
important target for stabilization policy. It should be clear that even 
absolute stabilization of the price received by producers will not 
completely stabilize the income of producers, even as a body, quite 
apart from as individuals. Variations in the quantity of commodities 
exported have been at leat as important causes of the instability of 
export proceeds as variations in world prices. This is clear from our 
analyses of the causes of instability.  ^Not only may stabilization of 
producer prices fail to produce stable incomes, it may de-stabilize them. 
Wherever variations in the volume of exports would normally cause a 
compensatory change in price, a fixed price will increase instability 
unless it in turn reduces fluctuations in supply. For example, if the 
volume of the exported commodity this year were 10 million tons and the 
price were $ 10 per ton, income received would be $ 100 million. If next 
year the crop were a bad one and exports fell to 8 million tons price 
.could rise to, say $ 11 a ton, giving an income of $ 88 million. But if 
the price had been fixed by policy at $ 10.50 per ton the incomes received 
would have been $ 105 million and $ 84 million in each year. In the first 
case the percentage change is 12.0 and in the second 20.0 showing greater 
instability of income with the stable price.. The lower the price 
elasticity of demand for the commodity and the more important autonomous 
fluctuations in output are the more relevant and significant is this point.
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For many, perhaps most, countries destabilization of income is uplikely to 
be caused by a fixed price since a relatively highly elastic demand for one 
country's output of one commodity is normal and price variations are more 
often the consequence of fluctuations in demand. But in a country like 
Ghana a fixed price could destabilize incomes. Between 1948 and 1961 the 
year-to-year instability of cocoa producers' prices paid by the Cocoa 
Marketing Board averaged 16.6 per cent per annum while the export price 
was more unstable with an annual average fluctuation of 26,7 per cent. 
Producers' incomes however fluctuated 27,8 per cent compared to
q
fluctuations in the Board's sales of only 18,1 per cent.
In any case, it is clear that stabilization of producer prices may 
destabilize incomes and in very few cases will it do more than remove part 
of the instability of incomes. Why then pick on only the one component of 
income for stabilization and ignore the other? Historically, the reason 
for this bias may stem from a tendency to blame the foreigner for instability 
and ignore fluctuations in export proceeds which result from changes in 
the volume of exports. However, if variations in income do cause serious 
hardship to producers the argument for compensating fluctuations in output 
iô just about as strong as for smoothing prices. Fluctuations in the crop 
are often just as much out of the control of the producer as prices and 
can cause him as much, in some cases, more hardship.^ Practically all the 
111-effects attributed to fluctuations in prices can also result from 
fluctuations in outputs inflationary or deflationary impacL ih_
prices of food and imported consumer goods, instability of government 
revenues and fluctuations in the international balance of payments. Finallyg 
in many underdeveloped countries where the extended family system is commoRg
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windfall increases in income may bring with them unwanted social obligations 
which remove most of the benefits from the farmer and which may tend to remain 
after the boom has passed. ^
It may be argued that the emphasis on price stabilization is 
justified on the grounds that it is price which determines the amount of lapd 
and other resources which will be devoted to production of the export crop. 
Hence an unstable price will produce unstable outputs in current or 
subsequent seasons, depending on the time taken from planting to commercial 
cropping. In fact, in many regions this is at best only partly true. Often 
the price paid for other crops may be just as important as the price of 
the exported cash crop. This can be true of food crops which the farmer 
consumes for his own use and for other crops which he can grow for cash 
on the same land as the export crop. In any case, the expectation of a 
relatively stable cash income from growing the export crop should be at 
least as powerful an influence over his decision as a relatively stable 
price.
From a welfarepoint of view it would seem cigar that instability 
in the real income of the producers, in the absence of the exercise of 
thrift and foresight on their part is the most important factor. This is 
likely to be the main cause of individual hardship. The prevention of 
fluctuations in the prices of consumption goods is likely to be the 
subject of other more general government policies so that in discussing 
producer income stabilization the problem of stabilizing real (as opposed 
to cash) income is best set aside. In many, if not most countries, there 
would"be a very serious problem of constructing an acceptable index of 
the producers' cost of living. It would seem to be unduly complicated to
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attempt to incorporate this aim into such a scheme and more sensible to 
leave it to other policies of the government to ensure reasonable stability 
in the cost of living.
From the viewpoint of the economic efficiency or overall economic 
welfare of many countries the question of price versus income stabilization 
may be decided in favour of price. Simplicity or the existence of more 
vital objectives than producers' welfare could determine a choice of price 
rather than income stabilization. For example, in East Pakistan the 
intelligent operation of a buffer stock for jute would probably serve the 
purposes of reducing fluctuations in both the world price and the 
producers' price of raw jute. This combination of objectives would seem 
to be more important for Pakistan than stabilization of producers' income, 
which objective would in any case be assisted by this policy (MacBean, 1962),
Smoothing Producer-Incomes
It seems probable that schemes of one sort or another can be devised 
which would smooth out fluctuations in the total income received by 
producers (wherever the word income is mentioned in this section price 
may be substituted in general without altering the sense). A "Bauer^Paish 
formula"  ^or a simple moving average of the previous three years' incomes 
can ensure that fluctuations can be modified without serious loss of 
contract with the general trend in the market for the product. There are 
several arguments in support of such operations for smoothing producers' 
incomes around their trend values
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lo If it is true that peasant producers cannot operate their own 
reserve policy by personal saving in good times to support their consumption 
in years of poor harvests or low prices then a scheme which to a 
considerable extent simply institutionalises such a practice should improve 
the producers' lot.
2, Success in smoothing income would remove some of the uncertainties 
of economic life which are supposed to deter peasant producers from entering 
the cash economy. This should encourage the production of cash crops, bring 
subsistence farmers into contact with the market and open out possibilities 
for entrepreneurial behaviour. Such breaking of former social attitudes, 
increase of opportunities and development of new attitudes to prices, 
profits, consumption and general economic behaviour can be argued to be
the most fundamental change required to produce general economic growth 
in underdeveloped countries.
3. It has been argued that in the conditions which prevail in many 
underdeveloped countries, and particularly in Africa, the producer may 
lose most of the benefits of a period of exceptionally high income through 
being forced to accept "onerous social obligations" to members of his 
extensive family.? If this is common and is asymmetrical, in that it brings 
no benefits to the producer in years of abnormally low income, the net 
benefits derived from growing cash crops for the market would be lowered 
over time. This could deter the rational farmer from entering too far into 
the cash economy. Given all these provisos, the smoothing of producers' 
incomes might lead to their receiving a higher net income over time which 
should encourage the production of cash crops.
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4. Another argument involves the assumption that many underdeveloped 
countries have already evolved the 'ratchet economy.' We have discussed some
of the implications of this already in the section of Chapter 4 which dgals with 
export instability and inflation. The suggestion is that a boom in income from 
exports results in an increase in domestic prices and costs which later 
prove to be resistant to downward pressures in subsequent periods of 
normal or sub-normal incomes. The price increases in the boom can be 
attributed to a low elasticity of supply of domestically produced food and 
consumption goods and to low short-run elasticities of supply of imports —  
perhaps due to time lags, low domestically-held stocks or import controls.
These price increases force up the cost of living and generate increases in 
the cost of labour and other agricultural and industrial inputs, Giyen 
some degree of money illusion in labor or active trade unions any 
subsequent fall in the value of total output will not be accompanied by 
a commensurate fall in wage costs and other prices. This may result in 
some unemployment or force governments, in order to avoid unemployment^ 
to adopt deficit-finance measures which may tend to sustain the inflation,®
If the booms and slumps in producers’ incomes were smoothed out by a 
producerst income stabilization policy these harmful consequences of 
export instability could be avoided.
5. Unstable export proceeds cause windfall profits and losses to 
producers and to dealers in both the exported good and in some imports,
Besides causing difficulties for the individuals directly affected, some 
strain on social and political relationships in communities can arise in 
these circumstances. This is particularly likely where most commerce is 
in the hands of non-indigenous groups. In Africa and much of Asia this is
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often the case. Thus economic instability may exacerbate existing 
racial ill-feeling.
60 Finally, a scheme which automatically moderates the range of 
fluctuations in income helps to make ad hoc government interventions 
unnecessary. That this is likely to be an advantage casts no aspersions 
upon the abilities of the governments of underdeveloped countries. Those 
of rich industrial countries have had equal lack of success in reacting 
to short-term instability. Discretionary reactions are apt to be too 
slow and necessarily based on inadequate information and very uncertain 
projections. In consequence, fiscal or monetary measures often only 
begin to take effect after the emergency is over and on occasion add 
to the risks of too great a swing in the other direction.
These arguments for income-smoothing schemes might be summarised 
as; lo reduction of personal hardship, 2. reduction of uncertainty,
3. reduction of other disincentives to increased output (via parasitic 
tendencies of relatives), 4. avoidance of inflationary 'ratchet' effects,
5. reduction of haphazard and socially disturbing effects on income 
distribution, and 6. avoidance of arbitrary government intervention.
They are all, at least prima facie. tenable even if not, perhaps, entirely 
convincing arguments. Some further analysis and criticism of each may be 
justified before moving on to consider possible disadvantages of smoothing 
producers' incomes around their trend value.
Two questions arise in connection with the first of these 
arguments; are the hardships caused by instability serious and secondly, if 
so are there any indirect costs involved in reducing these hardships? There 
is a serious lack of information on the first of these questions and until
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studies are made of the experience of peasant cultivators through periods 
of economic instability such as has existed in the post-war era, 
generalizations on this subject should be regarded with extreme caution.
But it does seem to be true that most peasant cultivators, certainly in 
Africa, do produce sufficient food to meet the normal requirements of 
themselves and their families. Their cash crops are a net addition to this.
In the case of the rice cultivators of Southeast Asia the rice crop is both 
for subsistence and for sale, but only the surplus is actually sold. If 
these statements are generally valid it is unlikely that acute hardship 
will result from fluctuations in the value of the cash crop in most 
underdeveloped countries. But of course there may be many exceptions 
to this. In some countries peasant producers may be highly specialised 
and hence a sharp fall in the value of their cash crops may bring real 
misery. Where this is so the plight of the producer may be a compelling 
argument for an income-smoothing scheme. On the other hand, unless these 
people's average standard of living is so close to basic that even mild 
downward fluctuations cut into necessities there may be a stronger case 
for treating each occasion as a disaster situation justifying emergency 
relief rather than as a proper subject for a smoothing scheme. Much 
depends on the frequency of recurrence of the trouble.
It has also been suggested, by M, Friedman among others,® that 
creation of a compulsory income smoothing scheme which forces producers 
to save for "the. rainy day" is over-paternalistic and may tend to thwart 
the abilities of these farmers to develop habits of saving and self-reliance. 
This looks a little like the classic 'liberal* case against any sort of 
government interference which smacks of welfare state tendencies. It is
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an argument which most farmers in rich countries have found lacking in 
appeal. Few of them have been at all unwilling to surrender a little of 
their indepence for the sake of assured incomes from state intervention 
in agriculture. Unfortunately neither this nor social welfare schemes are 
precise parallels since both involve some element of income support or 
redistributions of income from other elements in the community in addition 
to pure income stabilization.
The crux of the issue seems to be the empirical question of how 
serious are the personal hardships inflicted upon the farming community 
by the fluctuations. If they are at all severe humanitarian considerations 
should clearly dominate and if the frequency of depressions is high an 
income-smoothing scheme could well be an appropriate solution. On the 
other hand if the hardship is relatively minor by the general standards 
of the area the overriding importance of development might lend some 
support to merely encouraging farmers to use post-office savings banks 
or other savings institutions as a means of enabling them to keep up 
their consumption in bad years out of savings from previous good seasons. 
Improvement of facilities for borrowing by farmers would be another 
possibility in some regions of the underdeveloped world.
Against the second argument (of uncertainty) may be placed the 
equally plausible assertions of P.T. Bauer and of Sir Sydney Caine 
They both suggest that investment in new capacity may be faster with 
unstable prices and incomes. Bauer cites Kola nuts in Nigeria and the 
growth of the small-holder rubber industry in Sumatra and Borneo as cases 
in point. Caine says.
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"Some of the widest fluctuations have taken place in tropical ' 
agricultural products such as rubber, cocoa, coffee, tea, sisal.
In all of these any investor has to take quite a long view, ... 
because no yield whatever can be expected from, say, a rubber 
tree or a cocoa tree for five years or more, and its true 
economic worth can only be calculated over a period of 20 
OÏ' 30 years of continuous yield thereafter. In practice over 
the period of fluctuation covered by the recent United Nations 
study (Instability in Export Markets of Underdeveloped Countries), 
there has been continuous investment in these long-term crops 
both by capitalist plantation organisations and by peasants 
and small-holderso"
In the statistical analyses in Chapter 4 it appeared that investment and 
export instability were positively associated and some discussion of 
possible reasons for this were given. In any case it would seem that 
sufficient doubt is cast upon the view that fluctuation in the income from 
export crops is an important deterrent to production of such cash crops 
that it can hardly form a sound argument for smoothing schemes. Indeed, 
it is quite possible that smoothing out of exceptionally high incomes 
would reduce both the incentives and the financial means'for expansion 
of areas under tree crops.
The suggestion that peak incomes attract burdensome social 
obligations which disperse the fruits of the farmer's efforts among 
parasitic relatives probably involves an exaggerated and possibly 
misconceived picture of the role of the extended-family system.
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For example, it presupposes the objective of individual financial gain ,as
the motive for increased efforts. But characteristically in most extended-
family systems power and prestige depend on status within the society and
status depends not on control over material wealth but in claims against
persons. "The actions of the group are dictated by the requirements of 
12the community." There is no scarcity of good land in most of Africa, 
hence no one within the productive age groups is without the means to 
produce food for himself and his immediate family. A windfall profit may 
draw more kin closer around the successful farmer, but this may enable 
the group to expand its farming activities. The cash may not be dissipated 
in wanton consumption, but rather forms the working capital for the group 
which allows extension of its economic activities. If this is so it is 
not at all clear that smoothing producer incomes will contribute to the 
average prosperity of the farmers or to economic development, possibly 
the reverse.
The suggestion that producer-income instability tends to cause 
secular inflation through the "ratchet effect" is very plausible, but that 
this is at present a serious cause of inflation in most underdeveloped 
countries is very unlikely. In many countries where peasant production 
is important wide fluctuations have taken place without any secular 
inflationary tendencies being revealed. This has been true of almost all 
African territories between 1948 and 1959. Only the Belgian Congo stands 
out as an example of rapid inflation in Africa and that is sufficiently 
explained by the political and military crises of the last few years. While 
the close financial connection between most members of the dependent 
Sterling Area of the United Kingdom, and the French Franc Area and
'311.
metropolitan France are partial explanations of the stable price levels 
of many underdeveloped countries, this also suggests that inflation is 
no necessary concomitant of export instability. It also suggests that the 
"ratchet effect" was not in evidence in most of these territories since 
neither inflation nor noticeable unemployment followed the peak export 
years of the post-war era. It has been mainly in Latin America and to a 
minor extent in the British West Indies that export instability and either 
inflation or unemployment consistent with the ratchet hypothesis have 
coincided. Few of these have been the peasant farming economies for 
which income-smoothing schemes have generally been recommended. For the 
most part they have been mineral exporters like Chile or plantation 
economies like Brazil. Moreover, there have generally been other more 
powerful demand or structuralist explanations for the more spectacular 
inflations of the post-war world.
The question of windfall profits and the social strains they 
impose probably belongs mainly to the early post-war period and the 
immediate aftermath of the Korean War boom in commodity exports. On both 
occasions there were extreme shortages of the consumer goods which the 
enriched farmers wanted to buy. These shortages were due to the economic 
dislocation caused by the Second World War exacerbated by the rearmament 
drive for Korea. This led to excess demand for imported goods and for 
domestically produced food and consumption goods whose short-run supply 
was extremely inelastic. Such emergency situations demand emergency 
treatment rather than the creation of permanent stabilizing schemes. In 
more normal circumstances the supply of imports is very elastic unless the 
government chooses to impose controls on them. Should the government do
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so it may be able to ensure that any windfall gains accrue to its revenues 
by imposing high tariffs, auctioning import licences or imposing special 
levies on importing firms.
The final advantage attributed to these schemes, that of avoiding 
arbitrary government intervention, is in general a telling one. However, 
its force depends on the seriousness and frequency of the fluctuations.
If they are fairly regular then the smoothing scheme- possesses many 
advantages over government intervention, but if the trouble is from 
occasional wide swings in cash income such as are likely in a crop subject 
to natural hazards, the smoothing scheme may have insufficient reserve 
funds to meet the situations and more drastic government remedies will 
be required in any case.
Positive Objections
In addition to these doubts about the alleged advantages of 
producer income stabilization some positive arguments against such schemes 
exist. Probably the most important objection to the principle of producer 
ithCome s t a b i l i z a t i o n  was put forward by Ragnar Nurkse (1958).He argues that 
to introduce a buffer between the world market price and the price received 
by the producer is to reduce or eliminate the possibility of a supply response 
to higher or lower world prices. This will reduce their total earnings from 
exports over time. Moreover, since he assumes that "The 'established* 
comparative advantage of underdeveloped countries in certain primary 
commodities is generally high" this means that they will also have sacrificed 
real income.
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The argument is most neatly and clearly presented in a diagram. 
(Figure 10si)
The dotted lines are curves of unit elasticity of demand 
otherwise known as equal revenue curves. The supply curve OS is drawn 
through the origin and therefore is assumed to have unit elasticity, 
but this is not an essential assumption. As long as it has elasticity 
greater than zero and less than infinity Nurkse*s logic shows that by 
allowing supply to accommodate to changes in demand, total revenue from 
export sales will be higher for either an increase or a decrease in 
demand than if supply were held fixed.
For a shift in demand from DD to D*D* supply expands from 
M to N and total foreign exchange earnings can be shown by a rectangle 
bounded by sides of length ON and NP^. If supply were held fixed price 
would rise to P^ and total exchange earned would be a rectangle DM,
MP^, but since P^ falls below the equal revenue curve on which P^  is 
situated, OM-MP^ must be smaller than ON-NP^ hence a fixed supply leads 
to a smaller gain from this rise in demand and price. Analogously a 
fêill in demand shown by a shift from D'D* to DD leads to exchange 
earnings OM»MP while if supply were
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fixed at N earnings would be ON-NP^ which falls below the equal revenue 
curve through P and hence is smaller.
The crucial assumptions for Nurkse*s conclusion are : 1) demand
must be elastic above the point of the intersection of the D curve with 
the supply schedule and inelastic below it g 2) fluctuations must be the 
result, at least mainly, of changes in demand; 3) relatively short-run 
elasticities of supply must be at least greater than zero and preferably 
rather high; 4) lagged responses of supply must not exist or must be 
amenable to controls.
The necessity for the first assumption can be easily verified from 
the diagram. If demand elasticity is less than unity above Pg the D’D' 
curve will lie above the equal curve so that holding supply constant 
when demand increases will actually result in the greater earnings. Equally 
if demand should be elastic below the point P the DD curve will lie above 
the equal revenue curve through P and if demand declines a constant supply 
will again yield the higher earnings.
Nurkse defends this assumption by arguing that no rational country 
would charge a price for its exports which would lead to its operation on 
tha inelastic portion of the demand schedule for it can gain by simply 
reducing exports and raising prices. He says, "A country would almost 
certainly not operate to the right of PM, since in that region the DD 
schedule has an elasticity of less than one, so that the country could 
increase its export income by reducing the quantity over that range of the 
demand schedule." (p. 248). However, this, at most, only takes care of 
inelasticity. It does not rule out the possibility that the DD schedule 
may be elastic in all of the range relevant to the problem. For many countries
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the demand facing their commodity exports is almost certain to be highly 
elastic simply because they supply such a small share of a relatively 
homogeneous market. But if demand is elastic a downward or leftward 
shift of the D“D® curve to DD would yield higher foreign exchange earnings
to a policy which fixed supply at N than one which allowed supply to
adjust back to M.
There are many other complicating features of this assumption. The 
policy makers have to know what the relevant demand elasticities are which 
face their commodity exports, but these are to a considerable extent functions 
of the export policies of their competitors as well as of the taste and 
habits of the consumers in industrial nations. If all react in the same way 
to increases and decreases in world demand the effect is to lower considerably 
the relevant demand elasticity facing each country. Since the price elasticity 
of demand for the total world market for the exports of most commodities is 
likely to be less than unity in the relatively short-run (1 to 3 years) 
many underdeveloped countries could find themselves facing relatively 
inelastic demand schedules. In this case they would benefit at least in the 
short-run from holding exports constant rather than encouraging 
;.ccomodsting supply responses to short-term increases in world demand.
On the other hand it would pay them to adjust along their supply curves to
decreases in demand if the relevant portion of the demand curve were
inelastic.
The situation is much too complex for simple generalisations on 
even the limited question of which policy will bring in the greater earnings 
of foreign exchange, in the relatively short period. Probably the balance of 
the argument is more in favour of doing nothing to discourage supply
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adjustment to changes in demand the longer the time period considered.
The more rigid is world sujiply in face of fluctuations in demand the 
more extreme will be the variations in world prices. If this leads to 
asymmetric increases in entry into production and in synthetic 
substitution or other technical innovations which cut demand for the 
natural products anything which keeps world prices steadier should aid 
foreign exchange earning prospects of present commodity-exporting nations. 
Given the extremely diverse character of underdeveloped countries’ 
economies and of their principal exports most generalisations are 
likely to be contradicted at least as often as they are confirmed. Almost 
all market situations from near monopoly to atomistic competition can be 
found among them. Hence the range of price elasticities of demand facing 
these exports is likely to be far too wide to be sensibly represented 
by an average.
The second assumption, that changes in demand are mainly responsible 
for fluctuations in underdeveloped countries' export incomes, is fairly 
dubious. On the available evidence presented in Chapter 2 a roughly 
even division of responsibility between demand and supply changes is 
■ robabl}^  the most reasonable general assumption. Once again, much depends 
upon the type of products raw materials, foods or minerals which are
exported and the markets in which they are sold. However, our evidence 
indicates that supply changes have been probably at least as frequent 
causes of export instability. Wherever this is so the Nurkse problem does 
not arise. Nurkse states that a relatively elastic supply of exports is 
crucial to his thesis. "The answer depends largely on whether in fact 
the export supply of primary products is elastic or inelastic with respect
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to price," He maintains, "In actual fact the supply of primary
products exported is generally though perhaps not invariably --
18rather elastic," The time period relevant to this supply response is
not explicitly stated, but it seems clear from the subsequent discussion
that Nurkse had in mind a relatively short period, at most 2 to 2-1/2
years* He says, "Let us consider,,,a policy under which the domestic price
is left free to follow the world market, at least from year to year, if
19not from day to day," and he discusses, "cyclical shifts of effort and
resources into and away from export production in response to external 
20changes," as a possible objection to his suggestion of leaving prices 
and incomes free to respond to world market forces.
It is clear that if Nurkse’s criticism of buffer funds is to have 
force it is essential that the response of exports to an increase or 
decrease in prices must be positive and significantly different from zero. 
The higher the price elasticity of supply (short of infinity) of exports, 
given his other assumptions, the greater the loss involved in a buffer 
fund which eliminates or reduces incentives to expand or contract the 
supply of exportable commodities in response to world market prices.
The price elasticity of supply of exports is a function of:
1) the elasticity of response of stocks of exportable commodities held 
within the exporting nation’s boundaries, 2) the response of current home 
demand for the exportables, 3) the response of imports which can be 
re-exported, 4) the response of output of the commodities. The first of 
these, the response of stocks, can be almost immediate, but for most 
commodities apart from coffee the stocks held in underdeveloped countries 
in the post-war world have generally been rather small. Many, probably most,
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of the commodities exported by underdeveloped countries are 
intrinsically expensive and difficult to store. It is unlikely that the 
total elasticity of supply of exports is significantly affected by this 
factor in many countries. As for the second, this too is unimportant 
for most countries and most commodities apart from rice and perhaps 
groundnuts. In general the amounts of export products consumed in 
underdeveloped countries are small and probably rather insensitive to 
price because they are staple foods. The third may be important for 
Malaya and perhaps in African territories whose neighbours have fixed 
prices for cash crops and where smuggling is easy and profitable. Even all 
three of these together probably add up to a very small element of 
elasticity for the typical underdeveloped country. For most the only 
significant response possible is a change in output.
We are concerned here with agricultural products almost entirely 
since the income-smoothing schemes which Nurkse criticises are aimed at 
peasant farmers. In the case of tree crops and certain other products, 
such as hard fibres (sisal, hemp, etc,) capacity to produce cannot be 
increased in the relevant period, i,e,, the new plants require five or 
riôre years to start giving a commercial yield and take still longer to 
reach maturity. If prices are exceptionally high it may be possible to 
increase the rate of tapping rubber trees or of stripping the leaves from 
the sisal plant, but these activities damage the plants and decrease yields. 
If there are some wild rubber or cocoa trees high prices may increase the 
search for their products, but as a percentage of the total crops these are 
likely to be very small and percentage changes in the total yield due to 
these activities infinitesimal, Nurkse relied here on evidence from the
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Bauer-Paish articles which is in fact very weak and at best supports only 
the case for some positive elasticity, but certainly cannot in the case of
21tree crops be regarded as demonstrating their supply to be "rather elastic,"
It seems very unlikely that even after due allowance is made for all these
possibilities that the relevant elasticity of supply of exports of products
such as tree crops or hard fibres can be significantly greater than zero.
New planting may well respond to price incentives, but this brings the
serious danger of excess supplies in 5 or 7 years time, a threat which
Nurkse says must be avoided by the imposition of controls. In view of the
22chequered history of agricultural controls this has its dangers too.
With annual and semi-annual crops such as grains, cotton,
groundnuts, and oil seeds, output is likely to be flexible over a 2 to 2-1/2
year period. Several studies have shown a positive producer response to
price incentives, particularly to changes in the relationship between
23the prices of different crops which compete for the same lapd* However, 
although positive, these producer responses have generally been lagged one 
year, related to price ratios between substitute crops, and even so have 
invariably indicated considerably less than unit elasticity of supply.
If, for example, demand for such crops were to rise in year one, the 
producers’ reaction would not result in any marketable increase in output 
till the following year. Whether demand would still be high then is largely 
a matter of luck. It depends on the probability that can be attributed to 
the expectation that an increase in demand and prices this year will 
continue in the subsequent year. We have very little evidence on which to 
assess this possibility. One scrap of evidence can be found in a table 
constructed by Michael Michaely, This presents the results of calculations
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of Von Neuman Ratios for a group of countries’ export prices and terms
24of trade. If the ratio approximates to 0, it indicates the existence 
of a strong trend; year-to-year changes are seldom if ever reserved. If 
it approximates to 4 the direction of change will have been altered every 
alternate year throughout this period. At or around 2 indicates a roughly 
equal chance that the direction of change in each following year will be 
the same or opposite to the previous year's. Sixteen of the countries 
listed are underdeveloped countries which export mainly primary products.
The average ratio for them was 1,2 for both export prices and the terms 
of trade. This indicates a slight preponderance of probability that the 
following year's direction of change will more often than not be in the 
same direction as the current year. Where this happens and the exports of 
the crop from the country do show positive elasticity the country may 
gain some increase in foreign-exchange earnings.
The fourth assumption that lagged responses are not important or 
can be controlled has been partly covered in the above discussion. For 
many products there are serious risks that unusually high prices will 
produce exaggerated responses in the form of increased capacity which 
leads to marketable output long after the surge in demand has passed.
The outstanding example of this among commodity exports has been coffee 
where peak prices in the early 1950's led to new plantings whose fruits 
subsequently seriously depressed world prices forcing the carriage of 
enormous stocks by producer countries, in particular Brazil, This 
sequence of events led to the formation of the new World Coffee Agreement 
to prevent further price declines, Nurkse argued that this kind of lagged
25response could be prevented by taxes on new plantings or physical controls.
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but as we noted earlier such schemes in the past have proved very difficult 
to enforce and relatively easy to circumvent.
The Nurkse point concerning the possible risks of sacrificing long-run 
export earnings for the possibly lesser gain of producer income stability 
is potentially important for some countries, Rpr the typical underdeveloped 
country it is probably a relatively minor matter. Probably the most useful 
recommendation which would follow from this discussion is that for some 
countries, where storage of stocks is feasible and inexpensive (e.g. coffee, 
rubber and most textile fibres) there is a good :ase for using stock 
adjustments as a means of reducing both domestic producer income fluctuations 
and of export price instability while avoiding the risk of sacrificing 
foreign exchange earnings.
Fiscal and Monetary Effects
As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter income smoothing 
involves increasing and decreasing a reserve fund. If this is treated by 
the government as revenue it may have destabilizing effects on government 
expenditure. A sophisticated government whicli wished to maintain domestic 
income and price stability would maintain stable expenditure while allowing 
its overall budget to go into surplus in years of export boom and into 
deficit in years of export declines. Assuming that all instability in the 
domestic economy is the result of export instability such a policy would 
maintain domestic income stability. In very few underdeveloped countries 
have such stabilising budgetary policies been deliberately adopted.In 
many, available revenue has been the determining factor in development
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expenditures,^^ When revenues have risen more projects have been financed 
and when revenues have fallen either development expenditures have been cut 
or deficit finance utilised without the necessary reserves of foreign 
exchange to maintain imports. In the latter case inflation due to excess 
demand plus import controls has been the all--too-frequent result. This has 
certainly been a contributing factor in many of the Latin American 
inflations.
Whether total national income would be more or less stable with 
such government reactions contrasted with a situation where producers' 
incomes absorbed the fluctuations in exports depends on the relative 
marginal propensities to spend of farmers and government. This is an 
empirical question on which we have no evidence. All that can be said 
is that if governments allow their expenditures to vary with their 
revenues the stabilising effect of the smoothing schemes on national 
income would be impaired.
Another problem arises from the possible effects on the banking
system. Suppose the stabilising agency deposits its surplus from a good
year with either the central bank or with commercial bapks what effect
will this have on the availability of credit and the money supply? In the
absence of offsetting action by a central bank the cash base of the
banking system is increased and the commercial banks' ability to create
new demand deposits through loans and advances to customers is enhanced.
Central banks in most underdeveloped countries find it difficult to carry
out such action. (See Chapter 11), If there are a sufficient number of credif
worthy borrowers the effect may be to increase the money supply and
28Stimulate demand for imports and domestic resources. Either prices will 
rise or imports increase or both. In the absence of controls the probability
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is that the foreign exchange accumulated for use when exports fall off may 
be dissipated making subsequent income support difficult or even impossible.
Once again a relevant consideration is what would have happened if the 
cash had simply gone to consumers. Possibly it would still have accrued to 
the banks and the net effects would have been much the same.
This discussion of possible fiscal and monetary byproducts of the 
smoothing scheme emphasises the fact that the contribution to national income 
stability made by export taxation or other income smoothing policies is only 
potential, and is contingent upon the overall fiscal and monetary policies 
of the government remaining consistent with this objective.
Another, possibly minor, qualification to income-smoothing schemes is
that without various adaptions they do not guarantee a smoothed income to
the individual producer, only to the group. This only matters where the
fortunes of an individual are at variance with those of the group. If his
crop is poor when everyone else has a good harvest the price adjustment
needed to smooth the income of the others will depress his. This is however
the kind of situation in which relatives and friends can assist, where,
indeed, the extended-family system can most easily fulfil its social
i^surancs function since the average farmer will be reasonably prosperous.
The schemes can, in fact, be adapted to provide individual-income-smoothing 
29facilities, but this probably involves an uneconomic amount of 
administration and calculation for the smoothing authority.
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Conclusions on Income Smoothing Schemes
The only sensible economic criterion by which national buffer-fund 
schemes can be judged is the overall economic welfare of the nation* For 
most countries and products the impact on the welfare of the rest of the 
world is certain to be negligible at worst a slight increase in the 
instability of the prices of a few imported raw materials, food and 
beverage products, in general a tiny proportion of their total imports*
The national economic welfare is a composite of current output, income 
distribution and growth considerations. Of these, in most of the countries 
we are considering, the last is probably the most important given their 
rates of growth of population and their expectations of higher living 
standards* The main benefits claimed from the schemes are reduction of 
hardship, encouragement of investment in export crops and increasing spread 
of the cash economy in underdeveloped countries. On the available, albeit 
limited evidence, it is not clear that the hardships are in general serious 
nor that income smoothing would necessarily increase investment or social 
and economic change*- This, naturally, does not exclude the likelihood that 
producer income-smoothing schemes could be very beneficial for some countries, 
ror maximum benefits the following main conditions should hold for the 
country: producers should be small-scale peasants unwilling or unable to 
accumulate reserves against bad seasons and unable to borrow on reasonable 
terms, but who are nevertheless fully specialised on a single cash crop, Their 
ability to vary output in the relevant time period of under 2-1/2 years should 
be slight* There should be a large number of subsistence farmers who are 
enamored of a cash income provided it is stable and will enter the export 
market for this* Producers should be a substantial part of the population ane3
325
politically sensitiveoThe government should be capable of accumulating budget 
surpluses without allowing this to lead to increased expenditure and
should be able to tolerate deficits in years of poor returns from the
export crop.
With some or all of these conditions absent national economic 
welfare might be better served by directing government energies to more 
directly developmental activities. Only if the real costs of t)ie scheme 
were very small would it be justified.
On the assumption, which we have held throughout this section, 
that the automatic smoothing scheme would be honestly and efficiently 
operated, neither the case for nor the case against is very strong. The 
schemes, in principle, might do a little good and probably would do very 
little harm* In the next section the respective merits and demerits of the 
various mechanisms for producer income stabilisation are discussed along 
with some illustrations of their past performance in practice.
Mechanisms for Stabilization of Producer Incomes
W e r e  it not for the fallibility of human nature and human 
institutions there would be little to discuss in this section. Given 
clearly defined objectives, honest management and an automatic formula 
to build income smoothing, without risk of wide departure from trend, into 
the schemes, there would be little to choose between say marketing boards 
and export taxation as methods of operating the policy. Costs of operation 
and administrative convenience would be the main points of distinction. 
Unfortunately institutions have a way of altering their own functions and
'326'
objectives and of presenting different stimuli and temptations to the 
people who run them. This can readily be illustrated from the history of 
the West African marketing boards.
It would, however, be unfair to suggest that undesirable developments 
which occurred in their history were entirely due to the nature of the 
institution. Probably the main source of the difficulties of the marketing 
boards in Africa and in Burma was the lack of a clear definition of their 
aims. According to Bauer,
"The marketing boards were not warned of the fundamental
difficulties they were likely to encounter, and they were
certainly not given a mandate sufficiently specific to serve
as a guide to policy. While it is difficult to reconcile the
policies actually pursued with any reasonable interpretation
of the idea of price stabilization, it is nevertheless
necessary to state, in fairness to the boards, that they
were never provided with any useful directive; indeed, the
documents announcing their establishment served only to
30obscure the difficulties of the problem."
It is clear from the Cocoa White Papers that prevention of short-term
fluctuations in producers’ prices was a main objective of government policy,
31They talk of, "the avoidance of short-term fluctuations," of "stabilization 
of seasonal prices to the West African cocoa producer" and argue that,
"the remedy for many of the evils afflicting the West African cocoa industry 
lies in imposing a buffer between the producer and the international market 
which will protect him from short-term fluctuations of world prices and
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32allow him a greater stability of income," It is clear that they intended
this to be carried out by revolving funds which would make ’profits' in
good years to subsidise by 'losses* the incomes of producers in bad years,
"Thus on the average of a period of years, it is to be expected that the
average price paid in West Africa will be substantially equal to the
average net price realised on world markets and that the Boards' buying
32and selling transactions will therefore approximately balance," 
Unfortunately, no precise period over which this balance should come 
about or over which average producer prices would equal average net 
export prices was defined, but clearly long-period accumulation of 
surpluses was not intended. But without any defined balancing period 
latent tendencies to play for safety by accumulating surpluses may go 
unchecked. The higher prices climb the greater the funds required to 
check their fall. Moreover, the lower the producer price, relative to 
the export price, the easier it is to keep it stable. The objectives 
mentioned in the White Papers could be consistent with board policies 
which were far from the intentions of the authors of the papers.
Although it is clear from the White Papers and from the discussion 
Parliament that smoothing of short-term fluctuations was a main objective 
it was not mentioned in the ordinances setting up the boards, For example, 
the functions of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board were defined as being: 
"to secure the most favourable arrangements for the purchase^ grading, 
export and selling of Gold Coast Cocoa, and to assist in the development
by all possible means of the cocoa industry of the Gold Coast for the
33benefit and prosperity of the producers," This is typical. The charters 
of the boards gave them the sole right to purchase and export the crops
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and all processed products derived from the crops which were under their 
control. This enabled them to define grades of quality of the crops to 
fix prices to be paid to producers for these grades. They can also bar 
the export of crops which fall below their standards,Most of these 
powers are unnecessary to the purpose of stabilization, but may have 
been intended to serve other purposes e.g. regulation of marketing and 
prevention of excess profits to middlemen. The White Paper of 1946 
paraphrases the pre-war report of the Nowell Commission as showing;
"How the producer* through the practices of the trade 
and particularly the activities of middlemen in West Africa, 
failed to obtain a fair price for his crop while at the same 
time the trade in general became unremunerative to buying
35firms and a conservative marketing policy was made impossible,"
These conclusions are dubious and a good part of Bauer’s book is devoted 
to demonstrating their falsity. However, our concern with the marketing 
boards is with their function as an income-smoothing scheme and we merely 
note in passing that they had other objectives which may have influenced 
their ability and willingness to stabilize producer incomes.
It is difficult to suggest any advantages which they could possess 
in thi? sphere over the other schemes. It has been suggested that as 
monopolies they have greater powers of control over the internal marketing 
of the crops. This might give them the power to eliminate or greatly 
circumscribe the operations of the middlemen. However, this could only 
be relevant to stabilization policy if the gross profit margins of the 
middlemen fluctuated so that the prices actually received by the farmers
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failed to reflect the changes in the prices paid to the middlemen* Then 
stabilising action such as the operation of sliding-scale export taxes 
which stabilised the incomes of the middlemen or exporters might have 
little or no effect on the incomes of the actual producers* However, quite 
apart from the questions of whether this really occurs or not there are no 
good grounds for suggesting that only a marketing board can get around the 
difficulty* In fact the French caisses de stabilisation have controlled 
prices received by producers, export prices and dealers' profit margins 
without the need for monopoly control*
"The Caisses aim primarily at establishing and maintaining 
conditions of orderly marketing of the commodities at stable 
producers’ prices without eliminating private trading. Private 
trade is controlled by the Caisses through licensing, or 
approval of contracts for certain market operations* Fines, 
in some case very heavy ones* may be imposed on private traders 
who violate regulations* The essential functions of the private 
traders, however, are continued, both on domestic and export 
markets
In fact the caisses have successfully carried out all the operation which 
the marketing boards have, including quality control of crop exports, 
assistance to farmers in the control of disease and occasional stock piling
of crops in addition to stabilising producer prices via controls and export
37premia and levies*
Given neutrality in ideology there would seem to be few grounds for 
choosing one system rather than the other* But it has been argued that one
■ 330'
important benefit of international trade for underdeveloped countries is 
that it exposes their population to contacts with businessmen from the 
economically more advanced nations. Such exposure may assist in the
38development of attitudes and techniques which will aid economic growth.
This.leads Bauer to condemn statutory export monopolies on the grounds 
that their establishment
"greatly reduces the external contacts of the local 
population. Local producers and traders are prevented 
from seeking external buyers and foreign merchants are 
discouraged or prevented from establishing themselves 
locally. This is apt materially to retard economic 
progress by restricting the transmission of new ideas, 
methods, crops and wants, which in turn are potent 
factors in breaking down traditional custpms and
attitudes, including those most detrimental to economic
39
progress,"
This is a gross oversimplification of the situation in most 
underdeveloped countries. Peasant producers from rice farmers in Asia to 
cocoa farmers in Ghana have seldom dealt with foreign buyers in the sense 
of European or American businessmen. All this business has been transacted 
with dealers of their own race or more commonly with people of another race 
but nevertheless part of the resident population e.g. Chinese in Thailand 
and Burma, Indians and Lebanese in Africa. Under the boards they generally 
continue to deal with these same men who become licensed buyers for the 
boards. The only people whose commercial relationship with foreign buyers
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is likely to be altered are the traders who formerly sold directly to the 
foreign purchasing firms. Under a marketing board system these transactions 
are handled directly by the boards. It would seem very unlikely that this 
should be a serious limitation on the transmission of western "know-how,"
The Chinese, Indian, Lebanese and West African traders probably need no 
lessons in commercial transactions from westerners. This particular 
criticism of the marketing board seems trivial,
A more serious reason for regarding the boards as potentially 
dangerous lies in their power to amass reserves and to dispense patronage.
If they were strictly governed by the necessity to follow a formula for 
stabilizing producer incomes they would seldom, if ever, amass very large 
reserves nor could they easily divert them to other purposes. They would 
be. M)ore accountable. However, as independent statutory monopolies they 
are inherently more likely to follow courses of their own without adequate 
government supervision than would be the case where stabilization is left 
to the operations of a sliding-scale-export tax. Whether this is necessarily 
so or not it has in fact proved to be so in the recent history of the boards 
in West Africa, The findings of the "Coker Commission" in Nigeria show 
clearly that-,the substantial reserves of the Western Region Marketing Board 
were misused for political and commercial purposes,
"A substantial loan of L 6,710,000 was made by the Western 
Region Marketing Board to the National Investment and 
Properties Co, Ltd,,,,the company is now insolvent.
(paragraphs 2 and 3), Abundant evidence has been produced 
before us to prove that the National Investment and Properties
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Co. Ltd. belongs to the Action Group...(para. 7).
We are satisfied that the present financial plight of 
the National Investment Property Co, Ltd. has been brought 
about by the substantial amounts of monies (described by 
the Company in their books as loans to the Action Group, 
but in the books of the Action Group as Special Donations) 
being paid out of its funds to the Action Group, (para,8)"^^
The repeated refusals by other West African governments to allow independent 
inquiries into their activities lends credence to charges of widespread 
abuses. Given that stabilization objectives can be attained just as 
easily through systems less liable to such abuse, this forms a substantial 
argument for preferring them. In theory there are no valid reasons for 
supposing that one method should be superior to another in achieving stable 
producer incomes. However, in practice it might be argued that the marketing 
boards have historically become more engrossed with their other activities 
than* say, the caisses and perhaps less successful in stabilization, (They 
are not directly comparable because of French marketing arrangements for 
Franc Area Commodities which give substantial stability and support to prices 
of cotton, groundnuts and coffee.)
On the other hand, it can be argued that there may be advantages 
(e.g. economies of scale) in having one institution handle a variety of 
tasks. Most of the marketing boards in ex-British territories have undertaken 
a range of tasks; 1) stabilization of producers* incomes and thus indirectly 
of national income and prices, 2) tax gathering, 3) provision of advice 
and assistance in crop management and pest control, 4) development finance
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for the export crop sector e.g. for agricultural improvements and transport. 
The question remains does this make for overall efficiency or would it 
be preferable to separate these functions and have them performed by 
different bodies or devices?
It seems probable that the concentration of several tasks of this 
sort in one semi-autonomous institution is dangerous. For one thing, the 
objectives may clash e.g. the achievement of short-term stability may run 
counter to the achievement of large reserves which can be used for general 
government finance or for special development policies. Secondly, taxation 
and developmental activities are more properly handled by the central 
government. Both should be subordinate to the general economic planning of 
the government and this is likely to be best achieved when they are directly 
ruled by the government and remain subject to the tre#gury and planning 
departments of the central administration. On grounds of an equitable 
distribution of the tax burden all taxation is best handled by the central 
authorities where it remains subject to parliamentary scrutiny and is not 
obscured by the other activities of a statutory corporation. Finally, 
since changes in the level of the boards' reserves and pricing policies 
htfve fiscal m d  monetary effects on the whole economy it is best that they 
should be clearly circumscribed. Otherwise they may run counter to the 
general policies of the government.
If* for any of the possible reasons and combination of reasons 
which were discussed above, it is decided by the government of an 
underdeveloped country that an income-smoothing policy for producers would 
be beneficial the balance of argument is against the marketing board system. 
As between the others the choice may be largely a question of taste. Our
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preference is for the simplest* This is probably a sliding^scale export 
duty and subsidy* Export taxation in many or most underdeveloped countries 
is already a major source of government revenue* Where this is so a reduction 
in the tax which would normally have been paid is equivalent to a subsidy*
All that may be required of the government may be no more than the 
regulation of the sales receipts of the exporters* If all payments by 
foreign firms to the exporters have to be made through a special account 
in the central bank it would be a simple matter to block a proportion of 
these payments and allow only a percentage e.g* 60 per cent to be cashed 
immediately by the exporters*^^ The proportion distributed can be larger 
the more stable are normal receipts and vice versa. The remainder could be 
held.until the end of the crop export sales season when the total value 
of current exports of the commodity can be ascertained* The next step is 
for the central bank to calculate a norm or target figure for exporters* 
receipts* An unweighted average of this year plus the preceding two years 
would yield a figure which should effect some smoothing without loss of 
contact with the trend* The difference between this year's current 
receipts and the norm gives the amount of the tax or subsidy which the 
ydres to pay to the exporters. This can be added to or
subtracted from the blocked account which is then paid to the dealers in 
proportion to their s a l e s I f  a formula of this type had been applied to 
cocoa producers’ income smoothing in Ghana the average annual fluctuation 
from 1950-51 season to 1960-61 would have been 10 per cent instead of the 
actual 21 per cent for that period achieved by the Board*
The minimum effect achieved should be stabilization or smoothing 
of dealers’ receipts and reduction of destabilizing injections into
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national income from fluctuations in receipts from sales of the commodity.
If there exists a reasonably competitive marketing system the benefits 
of a more stable income should be passed backward to the producers. If there 
should be a poor crop, dealers, knowing that their total receipts will not 
fluctuate very much from year to year know that the unit price they will 
receive will be high. They therefore have a strong incentive to bid up their 
buying prices to get hold of as much of the crop as they can handle in order 
to raise their profits. They have an incentive to go on buying until the 
price paid for the last units they buy, plus the marginal cost of handling 
them is equal to the expected unit value they receive from the central bank 
which is the expected total receipt divided by the quantity sold. If the 
crop is large they know that the price they receive from the bank is likely
to be low and they cannot afford to pay high prices to the producers.
Consequently the producer price which satisfies their demand schedules 
and producers* supply schedules and clears the market will be low. Thus 
variations in the size of the harvest and in the quantities sold are 
compensated by changes in prices. Both intermediaries and producers as 
groups should have more stable incomes than they would have in the absence 
of the scheme. The possibilities of individual gain from manipulation of
output are slender and generally too risky for producers to undertake such
a policy. Bargaining processes and contacts are maintained between buyers 
and sellers at all levels so the scheme involves minimal interference with 
the market. If dealers should find themselves short of money at any time 
before the final settlement it should be possible to make arrangements for 
them to borrow up to a certain percentage of their blocked payments against 
the security of these sums. To ensure equity the central bank could pay
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interest on its blocked accounts.
If the assumptions of competitive behaviour and free entry into the 
market do not hold this policy of minimum government intervention will, 
probably be insufficient. If the industry were controlled by a single 
monopoly or if the market were rigged by a few firms the fluctuations, which 
would occur in producers' incomes in the absence of the scheme would still 
probably be reduced. The buying prices of the monopolised trading firms 
would still move in the opposite direction to changes in the quantity of 
the crop harvested and offered for sale. Assuming absolute rather than 
relative stabilisation of export receipts passed on to the dealing firms 
the demand curve facing the monopoly is of unit elasticity. Assuming absolute 
barriers to entry into the distribution industry the monopoly can maximise 
its profits by equating marginal revenue and marginal cost which it does 
at.sales of OM given average unit costs shown by AC (fig. 10:2). The major 
element of these is the price paid to the producer. The only limit on the 
monopoly's ability to squeeze the producer is that he be left sufficient 
inducement to continue to produce the cash crop. Supposing weather conditions 
are beneficial and in year 2 shown in figure 10:3 the crop is larger than 
in figiir® 10:2» This means that unless harvesting costs are much increased 
the price to the producer can be substantially cut, for as long as his net 
income equals or exceeds the income from alternative pursuits he will stay 
in business. He has at least to be able to buy new seed and pay his other 
costs. If harvesting costs were constant price could be cut so that his 
gross income is held constant, but if costs have risen his gross income 
has to be allowed to rise a little above the previous year. The reduction 
in price per unit paid to producers lowers the average unit cost (AC curve)
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and enables the monopoly to handle the larger volume of sales without 
reducing profits* At any price above or equal to the marginal cost of 
harvesting it pays the producer to sell* At any buying price which lowers 
his MC below MR the monopolist will continue to buy* Only sharply rising 
handling costs to the dealer or a relatively high marginal cost of 
harvesting would prevent the market from being cleared.
However, in this situation the power of the monopsonist is likely 
to be intolerable because of lack of alternatives for the producers, so 
that quite apart from stabilization policy the government should regard 
this as a situation for policy action to get rid of the monopsony or to 
control its effects* A situation of oligopoly or monopolistic competition 
of the Chamberlin type among the dealers would probably also require 
government intervention because of the extra uncertainties they import 
into the market relationships*
If the government is forced to intervene, probably the most useful 
method would be to declare government controlled minimum and maximum 
producer prices* These could be derived from a Bauer-Paish formula and 
enforced by a combination of legal sanctions, wide advertisement of their 
Gxistence and if necessary some government agents who stand willing to buy 
or sell at the minimum and maximum prices*^^ Given the background of 
illeteracy, ignorance and political weakness of most of the peasant 
population in underdeveloped countries many abuses would continue, but it is 
difficult to think of any scheme which would avoid these and remain practical
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General Conclusions
In almost all of the above discussions of the pros and cons of 
national policies to stabilize producer incomes we have assumed the 
operation of systems which prevent wide departures from the trend values 
of the exports as determined by world markets. But loss of contact with 
the trend is probably the most serious risk for such schemes. If prices 
are allowed to get too far out of line with world market evaluations the 
country concerned is likely to be sacrificing real income through under 
or over-production unless other controls which have their own costs 
are used to correct this. Moreover, if domestic prices and incomes have 
been supported above world levels a painful readjustment is likely to be 
necessary in the fairly immediate future. Few underdeveloped countries are 
in a position to support prices of major export crops for long. These are 
very obvious points which are not worth laboring. The main point which has 
been made in this chapter is that even on the most favorable assumptions 
regarding objectives and governmental understanding of fiscal and monetary 
effects income stabilization of producers as a group is no easy m a t t e r . 46 
Unless it is clear that instability of producer incomes is producing real 
hardships and/or serious damage to the economy in general, specific 
measures to smooth incomes according to formulae are probably not worth 
the effort. If exports are regarded as a suitable object for taxation on 
other counts the adoption of an ad valorem ta^ will help to dampen 
fluctuations. If taxes on imports are also important sources of revenue 
the operation of these fiscal devices is already a built-in stabilizer which 
should assist in the control of the general level of income and even
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provide some stabilization for producer incomes. We shall return to 
these aspects in the following chapter.
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Footnotes to Chapter 10
1. Marketing Boards and indeed all of these devices have very 
mixed objectives regulation of marketing, ensuring fair prices to 
producers, improving the quality of crops, disposing of the crop in 
world markets, etc. See UN, FAO, "The Role of Marketing Boards for Export 
Crops in Developing Countries," mimeograph paper, Rome 1962, In this study 
we are directly concerned only with their stabilization functions.
2. See above, particularly Chapter 2,
3. Calculated from UN, 1962 a: Table 2.
4. In small scale peasant farming where perfect competition
is approximated there would be no possibility of manipulation of output by 
individuals to bring benefits from the scheme.
5. Most of these points have been made by Bauer, 1962, and
6, Bauer and Paish, 1952 and 1954.
7, Bauer, 1962: p. 17, Bauer seems to accept this line of 
reasoning. To me it seems to involve a very debatable conception of the 
role of the extended family system in underdeveloped countries.
>342*
8, The significant correlation which we found between export 
instability and domestic price increase is at least consistent with this 
view. See above, Chapter 4.
9c Friedman, 1954: pp, 698-703 and Bauer, 1962: p. 15,
10c Bauer, 1962: p, 16, and Caine, 1958: pp, 188-9,
11, Caine, 1958: p. 188.
12, Yudelman, 1963: p. 10; Schapera and Goodwin, 1937;
Colson, 1955, Questions put to Mr, David Muffett (a senior British 
Civil Servant in Nigeria for 17 years and author of several studies
on African history and politics), Dr, Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill (ex-Senior 
Lecturer in Law at the University of Ghana and author of studies on
African land law) and Dr, Eliezer Ayal (Expert on Southeast Asia and
author of ’’Value System and Economic Development in Japan and Thailand”) 
elicited the views expressed in this paragraph.
13, The theories of the ’’structuralists” include export
instability as one among many so-called ’’structural” causes of inflation,
14, Nurkse, 1958: p, 247, footnote 4.
15, Nurkse, 1958: p. 249, The argument is presented first on
pp. 149-151 and then restated more precisely on pp. 247-250.
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16, Kitamura and Yang, 1959: pp, 319-21, present a similar 
critique of this point in Nurkse*s thesis,
17, Nurkse, 1958: p, 148,
18, 1958, p. 149.
19, 1958, p. 150,
20, 1958, p. 151,
21, "The short-period elasticity of supply of certain tree crops 
is much greater than that of others as the rate of capacity working can be 
subject to wider variation. Thus rubber production from a given area depends 
on the rate of tapping, while cocoa production is not subject to this kind 
of variation," (1952, p. 768). In the case of cocoa they say "...even in the 
short-run, supply cannot be wholly unaffected by price," They cite a Nigerian 
Survey as "evidence that even the short-period supply (of cocoa) is not
inelastic," (1954, p, 708),
22, Cf. jute controls in Pakistan and acreage restriction in 
most rich countries.
23, Stem, 1959: pp, 375-84. His study shows that the area 
devoted to cotton as a ratio of the area sown to other crops showed a 
positive response to changes in the previous year’s price of cotton
'344.
deflated by the prices of the competing crops. MacBean, 1962 and other 
studies cited there show jute acreage and output response to ratio of 
the previous year's jute prices to rice prices to be positive. Falcon,
1964, has similar findings for cotton and maize in West Pakistan.
Krishna, 1963.
24. Michaely, 1962: Table 15. His results are for the total 
commodity exports from each country, not for each country's exports of
a single commodity. The Von-Neuman ratios are defined as the ratios of 
the mean square successive differences of a series to the variance pf 
the series (p. 93).
25. 1958, p. 246.
26. Chapters 5 to 9, case studies on underdeveloped countries,
27. Cf. Dosser, 1958.
28. In many underdeveloped countries the commercial banks are 
branches of ex-patriate banking firms and may pay little attention to their 
cash reserves within any one territory. How much they allow local liquidity 
ratios to affect their local lending policies is an unsettled question. We 
return to this point in the following chapter.
29. Bauer and Paish, 1952: p. 770; Friedman, 1954: pp. 598-9. 
Niculescu, 1954: pp. 730-43, shows variations in output of cocoa in Ghana
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between regions are large and the likelihood that they are much more 
diverse for individual producers is very high.
30o Bauer, 1954: p. 275. "The difficulties" are discussed 
by Bauer on pp. 271-274 and in the Bauer and Paish articles of 1952 and 
1954. Most of them have been covered in our discussions on the principles 
of stabilization and of smoothing schemes above.
31. Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa 1939-43 and
Statement on Future Policy,ÇCmd 6554, 1944), Quoted in Bauer, 1954: p. 268,
32. Statement on Future Marketing of West African Cocoa,
(Cmdo 6950, 1946). Quoted in Bauer, 1954: pp. 268-9.
33. Gold Coast Ordinance No. 16 of 1947, Quoted by Bauer,
1954; p. 276.
34. Cf. Extracts from Gold Coast Marketing Ordinance
(No, 1,6 of 1947) Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Ordinance (No, 33 of 1947) and
Nigeria Groundnut Marketing Ordinance (No. 11 of 1949) reproduced in 
Bauer, 1954: Note to Chapter 21, pp. 280-82.
35. Cmd, 6950, 1946. Quoted by Bauer, 1954: p. 206.
36. FAQ, 1962: p. 14.
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37. PAO, 1962s p. 14.
38, Caimcross, 1962: p. 215.
39. Bauer, 1962: pp, 12-13.
40. Coker Commission of Inquiry (into the affairs of Certain 
Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria), (Ministry of Information, Lagos,
1962) Vol. IV.
41, It may stimulate smuggling, but probably less so than most 
other stabilization schemes.
42, Formula T = - 1/3ÎX^ + X^_^ + X^^g where T » tax or subsidy,
X a export receipts for the crop and subscripts t, t-1 etc. indipate this year, 
previous year, etc. Where the government normally imposes a revenue tax on 
exports of average 20% the formula can be modified to
T = - 4/5IX, + X^.i + X;_2 _
43, UN, 1962 a, Table 1.gives the data for this calculation,
44. This section is based entirely on the assumption of free entry 
and exit from the trade and highly competitive behaviour. We deal later with 
other possible assumptions.
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450 The formula;
Qt
where = producer price, P = market price, P = expected market price,
Q  « volume of crop, Q  = expected volume, 1/X = fraction of the expected 
proceeds of the current year actually paid out, n = number of years over 
which proceeds are averaged for smoothing fluctuations. See Bauer apd Paish, 
1952, p. 771.
46. Since finishing this draft a manuscript by Harrison Wehner, 
"The Cocoa Marketing Board and Stabilization in Ghaii a ; A Case Study" was 
sent to me by the author. He also finds that producers* incomes were 
probably destabilized by the Board's activities. For Ghana, however, he 
inclines more favourably to the Nurkse proposal than I.
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Chapter 11 
Fiscal and Monetary Policies
The object of this chapter is to evaluate the usefulness of general 
fiscal and monetary weapons in combating export-induced instability in 
underdeveloped countries. We discuss, first, the principles of such 
policies and the expected advantages, particularly vis-a-vis the more 
specific remedies discussed in the previous chapter. Secondly, the problems 
involved in designing and operating general economic policies with 
sufficiently sure and swift reactions to offset fluctuations are discussed» 
Finally, we consider the difficulties of reconciling these policies for the 
maintenance of internal income stability with the maintenance of the 
country’s ability to pay for imports, at least essential imports, without 
incurring serious depletion of reserves.
Principles
In abstracto there are no discernible differences between the 
general methods of fiscal and monetary policy in advanced and in 
underdeveloped countries. In the case of fiscal policy, or functional 
finance, the object is to use the government’s budget as a counterpoise 
to changes in aggregate demand in the private sector. When aggregate 
demand becomes too great to be met by aggregate output at stable prices 
without excess imports the government has to take action to reduce 
overall demand by increasing tax revenues and/or decreasing its own
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expenditures. These actions by the government, if they are carried out 
sufficiently promptly and in correct strength, should maintain an 
aggregate demand for the whole economy which roughly equals aggregate 
supply. The surplus revenues which now accrue to the government can be 
sterilised in the form of cash reserves or by redemption of foreign 
debt. If the policy is successful prices should remain stable and 
imports should not rise above levels which can be paid for out of 
normal income derived from foreigners by sale of exports and ordinary 
capital inflow.
In the opposite case, where export earnings decline temporarily, 
causing a tendency for the purchases of the private sector to decline, 
the government may have to decrease its revenues apd possibly increase 
expenditures to prevent a slump in national income.
With monetary policy, the central bank would attempt to lower 
interest rates and increase the availability of credit in the face of an 
export slump and raise rates and decrease the liquidity of the economy 
in times of export booms. The object being to influence private savings 
and investment so as to offset the expansionary and contractionary effects 
of the export fluctuations.
The techniques by which these policies ape put into effect may 
differ very considerably between advanced industrial countries and 
underdeveloped countries and between various underdeveloped countries 
themselves, but discussion of these differences is postponed to a later 
section of this chapter. Our main concern here is with the expected 
advantages of such policies over the more specific policies of producer 
income smoothing.
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In the Kyklos discussion Nurkse (1958) advocated general fiscal 
policies as an alternative to policies confined in their direct effects 
to the export sector. His reason for this was that general tax measures 
would interfere less with the operations of the price mechanism in 
producing supply responses which would tend in his view to benefit 
long-run earnings and assist the growth of national income. An additional 
reason is that on grounds of equity too much of the tax burden should not 
be borne by a section of the community which is not necessarily the most 
affluent. We have discussed the first point at length in the previous 
chapter and found it very dubious.
The second point, the question of equity can bear a little further 
analysis. If a producer-income-smoothing scheme is in use as a device for 
a) stabilising producer incomes about the trend and b) by so doing reducing 
repercussions on national income then, as long as it functions as planned, 
it should be neutral in its effects on tax incidence as between sectors.
It merely collects a proportion of income in good years from the producers 
as a group and return?it to them in subsequent years. Strictly speaking 
it leaves income unaltered for producers as a group (apart from minor 
interest and discount rate problems). All that is affected is the time 
pattern of their cash receipts so that windfall gains and losses are 
reduced, but income, properly defined (Hicks, 1939: pp. 172-81) is 
scarcely altered at all,^ There is no extra tax burden imposed by the 
scheme. Of course the government may make use of the scheme as a convenient 
method of raising revenue through generating surpluses and transferring them 
to general use, but this is a separate issue. It is not normally necessary 
to have a stabilization scheme in order to tax exporters (though it may be
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politically convenient to disguise a revenue tax as a stabilisation 
scheme). We have already made clear in the previous chapter our objections 
to mixing up different policy objectives in these schemes. Howevei\ it is 
evident that one cannot blame an export-oriented tax/subsidy scheme qua 
stabilisation policy for shifting the incidence of tax onto exporters or 
producers of exports, for if it is run properly it cannot do that. The 
burden on producers should be minimal because the tax payments are made 
when they are at their most affluent as a group and the subsidies ai*e 
received when they are at their least affluent. With general tax measures 
this is much less likely to be the case, particularly if the tax rates 
are changed by administrative action rather than revenues rising and 
falling appropriately because of built-in-flexibility (tax revenues 
highly elastic with respect to income).
This is one disadvantage of general fiscal action. Where different 
sectors of the economy have differing periods of affluence and penury 
little will be done to stabilize their incomes and such action as is 
taken where one group’s income is large may actually destabilize the 
incomes of smaller groups. This could easily happen in a country like 
Uganda where there is no guarantee that cotton and coffee export proceeds 
will move together. Indeed they most often do not (Chapter 5). If a 
substantial rise in the price of coffee were to cause national income 
to rise, even though cotton exports fetched less that year, any attempt 
to moderate the rise in national income by general weapons could depress 
cotton export producers’ incomes still further. A separate income smoothing 
scheme for each of the main export crops would avoid this problem.
If the Nurkse policy is to result in increased earnings it requires.
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as we pointed out in Chapter 10, significantly positive elasticity of supply 
of exports and in most cases the adjustment has to take place in output. 
Where this requires reallocation of labor, land and capital from one use
to another certain costs of adaptation may be imposed which are not directly
borne by the export industry and hence are not reflected in the opportunity
costs of producing more of the export. For example it may raise the level
of frictional unemployment, reduce the level of skill of workers acquired 
through specialization in a smaller range of activities and increase social 
costs such as frustration and readjustment of attitudes imposed on labor 
and their families when changing jobs. These costs even if measurable are 
probably very small, but then the benefits in terms of the marginal 
differences in comparative advantage between different occupations for the 
same factors of production which result from the cyclical changes in 
relative prices and the lagged responses of supply are also likely to be 
very small.
All of these points are relevant to the merits and demerits of 
specific versus general^income-stabilization policies. But perhaps the 
most important argument relates to the questions of whether stabilization 
as such is a sufficiently important objective. If it should prove that an 
unstable national income were more conducive to growth than a smoothed 
income this would be a telling argument against either general or 
specific policies aimed at reducing fluctuations in national income. On 
this question we have no concrete evidence. General opinion among economists 
is probably against it, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that an 
export boom may trigger off many developments in the economy since it 
provides the finance and the optimism at the same time and may lead
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Individuals and companies to take risks which they would not undertake in 
the absence of these booms. Subsequent slumps may largely weed out the less 
efficient and less tough as well as the unlucky and thus allovy still more 
progress in the next boom. Our finding of a significantly positivq 
association between export instability and investment is at least consistent 
with this view of progress. At present it remains an open question. But, 
even though there is no readily available answer policy makers would be 
wise to Aote the possibility of conflict between the objectives of 
stability and growth. In specific countries there may be qualitative 
evidence on this point which could enable a reasonable assessment of the 
probabilities that national income smoothing should aid or retard growth.
Even if it were true that a relatively stable path of national income 
was conducive to activities which would lead to growth the possibility that 
the means adopted to achieve the smoothing process would themselves inhibit 
development remains as a highly disturbing question. It is certainly 
possible that either fiscal or monetary mechanisms used by governments to 
achieve a smoothed national income path would have disincentive impacts on 
work and saving in the private sector, might distort allocation of 
resources between different activities and might discourage entry into 
the market nexus. These possibilities have to be examined before any 
stabilization policy can be given a "clean bill of health." In the 
following sections we take up these points in discussing the fiscal and 
monetary techniques normally available to underdeveloped countries for 
countering fluctuations in national income. Fiscal and monetary policies, 
both from necessity and choice are normally operated togehter, but in 
our discussion we follow normal practice in splitting up the various
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techniques and considering them separately under the two broad headings.
Where necessary we shall point out the monetary corollaries of a fiscal 
maneuver and vice versa.
Fiscal Policy
The definition of fiscal policy implicit in our discussion includes 
the use of variations in government expenditure as well as in tax revenues, 
as means of combatting fluctuations. Indeed, some debate does focus on which 
of these alternative methods of producing budget surpluses anddeficits is 
likely to be the more effective in the context of underdeveloped countries' 
economies. We shall consider first the possibilities for gaining flexibility 
in the revenues of the government.
Assuming government expenditure to be held relatively constant around 
its trend values surpluses and deficits in the budget will be achieved by 
variations in revenue. In order to moderate fluctuations in national income 
it is necessary that revenues should change in the same direction as changes 
in gross national product, and preferably more than proportionally to them. 
This can be achieved either through changes in the rates of taxation or 
through the basic design of the tax system. Such design requires that the 
taxes yield revenues which are elastic with respect to changes in national 
income.
It may be possible to change tax rates simply by administrative fiat, 
but in many countries legislative enactment is a necessary requirement for 
tax changes. Even if it is only a decision by government officials which 
is required there is a strong likelihood of delay. The statistical information
required to make the decisions is inadequate, subject to serious time lags 
and large margins of error even in advanced countries with large statistical 
departments with great experience in collection and analysis of statistical 
data (cf, Morgenstern* 1963); how much more so in underdeveloped countries!
If the approval of the legislature is required before tax changes 
can be put into effect still more delay is involved. Even after the changes 
are made in the tax schedules there are normally considerable time lags 
before any appreciable change in tax revenues occurs. Given a chain of 
delays there are serious risks that the policies of the government, far 
from stabilizing the economy may exacerbate its tendencies to fluctuate.
Like a clumsy crewman in a sailing dinghy whose slow reactions to changes 
in the thrust of the wind rock the boat violently or even capsize it so 
may lagged shifts in the budget unbalance the economy.
To avoid these practical obstacles to a smoothly adjusting policy 
a government may seek to devise automatic mechanisms whereby a rise in 
national income automatically increases tax revenues and a slump 
automatically lowers them. This requires a tax structure whose returns are 
elastic with respect to changes in national income. It is generally 
supposed that this is most readily achieved by a tax system which leans 
more heavily upon taxation of private and corporate income and less 
heavily upon taxes on wealth, e,g,, land and property, or on poll taxes. 
Taxes on goods and services will respond, but normally the marginal 
increase in revenue from them is expected to be much less than the 
increase in income derived from their sale. The general recommendation 
for a tax system which would be highly sensitive to upward or downward 
changes in GNP is to have highly progressive income taxes on corporations
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and individuals^to emphasise, within the field of indirect taxation, high 
rates of tax on goods which are in elastic demand with respect to changes 
in income and reduce emphasis on fixed taxes such as poll taxes, land taxes 
and property taxes, for they respond little to changes in income.
There are serious objections to such a tax structure; (1) if it 
works it is liable to violate other important cannons of a good tax 
system in underdeveloped countries; (2) the probability of success simply 
as a stabilization device in the context of underdeveloped countries is low 
even if it is possible to set up the system; (3) the lack of good 
administrators, the low levels of income and the high level of illiteracy 
would rule out such a tax system in many underdeveloped countries. These 
objections overlap, but there may be different degrees of emphasis op them 
in different underdeveloped countries.
As we have stated repeatedly in this stud)^  for most underdeveloped 
countries the most important objective of economic policy is growth, A 
highly progressive tax system may militate against this objective. Consider 
first taxes on firms' profits. These firms may be expatriate or indigenous.
In most underdeveloped countries the largest of them will generally be 
foreign owned. Foreign firms' profits will normally be divided between 
repatriated moneys; dividends, interest, funds for reserve and purchases from 
abroad; and local investment expenditures. Highly progressive taxation of 
these foreign firms (at least once it has past the level of taxation in 
their home countries and ceases to be deductible under double-tax agreements, 
where these apply) is liable to discourage new firms from settling in the 
underdeveloped country and to discourage further investment by the existing 
firms. Given most underdeveloped countries' need for capital and the
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technical and administrative techniques which often accompany foreign direct 
investment it would be a serious obstacle to growth if direct taxation were 
allowed to rise to a level which deterred foreign investment. Of course^tax 
holidays^and other discriminatory incentives may be given for new investment 
while taxing heavily the profits on existing investments. This however will 
do little to stabilize the internal economy. All it does is reduce the 
peak flows of remitted profits. This helps conserve foreign exchange in 
peak years, but makes no difference to the general level of demand within 
the economy. Indeed if it encourages foreign firms to switch profits into 
local investment in fixed capital or inventories in boom years to avoid 
incurring maximum tax liability it may increase internal instability by 
stabilizing the flow of repatriated income at the expense of destabilized 
expenditure within the underdeveloped country.
An increased tax burden on local firms would be liable to discourage 
new entrants into manufacturing or divert energies into tax avoidance and 
evasion with serious risks of corruption among tax officials. Evidence on 
the effects of income taxes on willingness to work, save and undertake 
risks even in rich industrial countries is inconclusive. However, it seems 
probable that it makes risk-taking less attractive since progressive taxes 
tend to bear more heavily on high profits without equal compensation for 
losses. Effects on willingness to work depend on the taxed persons's 
ability to substitute non-taxed activities for taxed ones. For most 
salaried employees this is usually not possible, but for many small 
businessmen and farmers subsistence farming and bartering activities may 
enable increased retained real income. For these people an increased 
reliance by the government upon income taxes may mean a reduction in
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production and a distortion of resources towards activities which yield lower 
social returns. It is also generally believed that income and profits taxes 
discriminate against saving though this is debatable.
Another aspect of income taxes is that they tend to be relatively 
expensive taxes to collect. They require more bookkeeping and more 
administration then do most other taxes* so tliat it costs the economy more 
in terms of real resources for each dollar collected via income taxes than 
alternative systems of taxation. Moreover, there are greater time lags 
involved in their collection than for most other taxes. Normally they 
are paid in arrears and as we saw in our case studies more than a year can 
often elapse between incurring liability and actual payment of taxes.
In the area of taxation on goods and services it is possible to 
select those goods which tend to be sensitive to changes in income as 
the best subjects for taxes designed to stabilize GNP, However* just 
because they are goods for which demand is highly income elastic these 
are generally the main incentive goods in the economy. If taxation makes 
them too expensive for large groups of people the goods lose their role 
as targets which can be attained by a fair amount of hard work anc) thrift. 
Such an effect could form a serious brake on economic growth.
Depending on the nature of the products and the situation of the 
country high sales taxes on these "luxury" goods may lead to increases in 
smuggling (already a serious problem in many underdeveloped countries) with 
consequent loss of foreign exchange and tax revenues.
Many of these goods will in any case be imports. If the government 
taxes them too highly this can have allocational effects and inflationary 
effects. High customs duties form a protective barrier behind which local
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firms may operate to produce substitutes which would be high cost and 
represent a distortion of the comparative cost structure of the economy.
In so far as imports are reduced by high taxes demand from increased 
incomes will be directed to home produce-d goods. Unless the price 
elasticity of supply of these is high there is a strong likelihood of 
inflationary price increases in domestically produced food and other 
consumption goods. In general the expectation is that the elasticities 
of supply over the relevant time period will be fairly low. Consequently 
the risk that higli taxes which deter imports should tend to have 
inflationary effects is quite high in many, if not most, underdeveloped 
countries.
From the viewpoint of allocative efficiency and rapid economic 
growth probably the least harmful taxes are those levied on land or 
property and poll taxes. They are more likely to increase effort because 
reduction of effort does not reduce liability to pay the tax and if a 
person is accustomed to a particular standard of living an unavoidable 
increase in tax may induce extra efforts to increase income in order to 
maintain living standards. Poll taxes can also force people who live 
on the fringes of the cash economy to earn cash to pay the taxes.
Not only are tax systems which place more stress on direct taxes 
of personal income and profits likely to violate the growth and 
efficiency criteria for tax policies but they are also likely to fail in 
their objective of producing a tax structure with a high income elasticity. 
Even in a country such as India which has very high standards of 
administration compared with most underdeveloped countries tax avoidance 
and evasion have been on such a scale that revenues derived from the
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personal income tax have shown only a very low elasticity. Sahota (1961,pp. 42-51) 
estimates that the revenue from income tax at constant rates should have 
increased 1.8 times faster than national income over the period 1952-58 
which he studied. In fact he estimates that it did not increase at all* but 
probably declined. This decline occured even though there were small increases 
in the tax rates and income rose. He says that this cannot be accounted for 
by redistribution of income. Clearly the quality of tax administration and 
the dishonesty of the taxpayers have been the major causes of this.
Particularly interesting in our context are his findings on yields from 
income tax during price fluctuations. When prices fell the yield fell just 
as much* but when prices rose it did not recover proportionately, Sahota 
estimates that tax evasion rose during that period so that the yield of the 
tax fell by nearly one-third. He has similar conclusions on corporate taxes. 
Corporate profits tax* net of rate changes, increased by only one per cent 
per year while over the same period industrial profits grew by 7,9 per cent* 
value added from manufacturing 6.6 per cent* and income in the urban sector 
by 3,3 per cent. Development rebates* depreciation and exemptions no doubt 
explain part of the discrepancy, but Sahota regards evasion as the main 
cause, T h s  moral of his study seems to be that built-in-elasticity in the 
case of income and corporation taxes is likely to fail to work in most 
underdeveloped countries because increases in income and profits will 
simply not be reported by the majority of tax payers and the administrative 
machine is unlikely to be capable of enforcement. If we accept this as 
suggestive for the economies of most underdeveloped countries it would 
seem that built-in-stabilizers in the general body of the tax structure 
are a chimera not worthy of pursuit until many other changes and
361
and developments have occurred in their political and economic situations.
We have already covered most of the points relevant to our third 
major argument against the feasibility of built-in-elasticity in discussing 
the first two. However* in some countries it may be immediately apparent 
that little or no tax can be collected via income taxes on the clear 
evidence of illiteracy in the tax payers and lack of trained personnel in 
the revenue departments.
There are many other difficulties which face attempts by governments 
to use the general tax system as a balancing force in the economy. There 
may for example be strong political opposition to budget deficits from 
proponents of pre-Keynesian orthodoxy. This occurs in even the best educated 
circles and it does also occur in several underdeveloped countries. Perhaps 
a more general obstacle in underdeveloped countries however is the 
difficulty of achieving a budget surplus in the face of widespread demands 
for increased government expenditure. Many of these demands may be 
perfectly genuine* for extremely worthwhile social and economic projects, 
and may be argued forcefully by powerful ministers within the government.
The finance minister may easily find himself in a position where it is 
extremely difficult for him to convince his colleagues of the risks that 
the country’s present prosperity will probably be reversed in the near 
future. His position is likely to be impossible where an election is in 
the offing and any provident behaviour by the current government may 
result in substantial sums falling into the hands of a rival party who 
will gain the benefits and popularity of spending it. Only a very strong 
finance minister* backed by the head of the government or a few powerful 
colleagues is likely to be able to resist such pressures,
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If surpluses cannot be created in good years it is highly probable 
that stabilization policy will be at best difficult and at worst impossible. 
Without the budget surpluses in good years to restrict home demand and 
cut down imports the deficits in bad years will set up a serious drain on 
foreign exchange reserves which is likely to become intolerable. When this 
occurs only a barrage of controls upon the use of foreign exchange can 
allow income support to continue at all. But these controls bring with them 
many problems. They demand administrative machinery which is often lacking. 
They create a market for illicitly obtained foreign goods or currencies.
They distort patterns of demand and supply away from those most conducive 
to efficiency. They block up one safety valve .t'0|.^ nflationary domestic 
price increases.
Without government reserves deficit finance may only be possible 
through printing money or borrowing from the central bank. Unless the 
credit of the government is good other private sources are liable to be 
unavailable. This may present difficulties in some underdeveloped countries 
where legal barriers to either of these policies exist. However, nowadays 
this is not a widespread difficulty,
A final question relevant to general tax policies is that even if 
they succeeded in maintaining national income in rough balance they could 
fail to alleviate the difficulties of the export sector. For example, a good 
harvest for food crops consumed internally would raise GNP, but the value 
of the export crop might be low for reasons external to the economy or for 
factors specific to its production. Then GNP might remain fairly stable 
while export producers' standard of living dropped sharply. For some 
countries the main reason for any stabilization policy may well be the
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question of personal hardship for producers. Where this is the case 
evidently a more specific policy is appropriate.
These points sum up roughly the main pros and cons of general tax 
policy in dealing with instability. We should also discuss the parallel 
questions relating to government expenditures. It has been argued by 
some economists that expenditure policy can be more flexible* certain 
and rapid in its effects on the economy as a whole than can tax policy. 
(Higgins* 1959; pp. 564-68).
Expenditure Policy
Expenditure flexibility would scern to be subject to at least the 
same doubts as were posed in tlie case of tax flexibility* either through 
rate changes or built-in-elasticity. If decisions to change government 
expenditure are required from either the executive or the legislative or 
both^ similar delays in putting the policies into effect are to be expected. 
It may be true that once the cuts or increases in government expenditure 
are made the effect on the general level of demand in the economy should 
b& much more rapid than in the case of tax cuts where delay is imposed by 
the normal time lags which exist for many taxes between incurring liability 
to pay and actual payment. But just as great or even greater time lags may 
occur between the decision to increase or cut government expenditure and 
the actual change in it. In the best possible circumstances the government 
has a list of relatively small-scale projects which can be put into 
operation and which roach completion at fairly frequent intervals. However, 
unless the economy has a permanent reserve of unemployed labour it is
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difficult to see where the labour will be drawn from to undertake the projects,
A decline in the value of exports does not necessarily release labour. One
can conceive of circumstances where in fact the producers of the exported
commodities may even work harder in their own sector either because their
supply of effort is backward sloping or because they have to grow more of
their own food to compensate for the reduction in their cash income. To find
the right kind of labour at the right time requires a mobility of labour
2
which is unlikely to exist in most underdeveloped countries. In addition 
it requires a corps of lower management and technical staff -- foremen, 
supervisors, surveyors, architects, engineers, etc. —  which exists in few 
underdeveloped countries and would be very expensive to maintain as a 
matter of policy. If the supervisory staff does not exist the series of 
development projects are liable to be very inefficient and very costly.
Since cyclical unemployment is seldom an important feature of fluctuations 
in underdeveloped countries, ’make-work* projects have little justification.
The cost in terms of sacrificed efficiency and growth would be too important 
for the possible benefits of increased stability.
In most cases it would probably yield greater benefits to underdeveloped 
countries to maintain a steady trend in government expenditure, particularly 
that part of expenditure which is on development projects. This should aid 
planning, increase confidence and lower costs. In construction projects in 
general, delays and difficulties in co-ordination are frequently the major 
reasons for final costs greatly exceeding planned costs. In our view 
anticyclical timing of public developmental expenditure is seldom likely to 
be a worthwhile objective of underdeveloped country government planning.
In very few underdeveloped countries have government transfers of
-365'
the social insurance* family allowance* pensions* unemployment benefits etc, 
type become important. Given the prevailing levels of per-capita income and 
the agricultural nature of their employment in most of Asia, Africa and the 
Near East, the vast majority of the citizens of underdeveloped countries are 
unlikely to live in countries which have any prospects of establishing such 
measures save in the distant future. Given these limiting factors there 
seem to be few possibilities for governments to attempt anticyclical 
variations in either current or capital expenditures with any hopes of 
worthwhile benefits to the stability and growth of the economy.
Monetary Policy
This is an area of economic policy in underdeveloped countries which 
has been very thcCtoughly discussed in the course of the 1950*s. The staff 
of the IMF in particular have been prolific writers on the subject of 
central banking techniques in use in underdeveloped countries. The object 
of this section is to summarize the main points which emerge from these 
discussions and to consider the usefulness of monetary policy in 
combatting the effects of export instability.
The orthodox weapons of monetary policy are the discount rate and 
open-market operations. Changes in the first are intended to affect the 
cost of commercial bank borrowing from the central bank and through this 
the terms at which they are able to lend to their customers. The purchase 
or sale of government securities in open-market operations of the central 
bank are intended to lead to withdrawals from or additions to the cash 
reserves of the commercial banks and thus enforce reductions in their
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liabilities or enable increases in their liabilities. Changes in the 
commercial banks* liabilities involve changes in the supply of money since 
the deposit liabilities of the commercial banks are the major component of 
the supply of money in the countries for which orthodox monetary policies 
were designed. There are certain essential preconditions for successful 
use of these devices. They include a commercial banking system which is 
in the habit of rediscounting bills at the central bank* a reasonably wide 
market for government securities including non-official buyers, banks which 
operate at or close to fairly rigid reserve requirements and without 
possibilities of resort to external sources of extra cash, and finally a 
substantial amount of local investment and consumption should be financed 
by commercial bank credit. In reality* the money markets of few 
underdeveloped countries meet all* or even any, of these requirements,
"Commercial banks in the majority of underdeveloped countries do not 
discount at oi' borrow from the central bank to any great extent or on 
a frequent and regular basis," (Exceptions to this rule aie:S, Korea»
Chile* Colombia* Paraguay* Guatemala* Costa Rica and Nicaragua),^ a, Bloomfield 
goes on to say that in underdeveloped countries, "The evidence at hand does 
net suggest that (changes in discount rates) had any pronounced effects in 
the majority of cases upon the volume of commercial bank rediscounts and 
borrowings at the central bank* upon commercial bank loan rates or other 
market rates or upon the volume of commercial bank loans to their own 
customers. Even less does the unorganized sector of the money market 
appear to have been influenced by changes in central bank discount rates." 
(1956* p, 253),
As for the other prerequisites* in most underdeveloped countries
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the market for government securities is'so small that any sales sufficient 
to absorb bank liquidity would send security prices plunging down, inflict 
serious damage on investors* confidence and probably postpone prospects of 
creating a capital market for local funds indefinitely. Moreover, the 
banks in any case are very often in possession of considerable "free" 
reserves, i,e, reserves in excess of the legal conventional minimum 
requirements, which make it impossible for a central bank, limited to 
orthodox weapons, to enforce a contraction of credit. In many cases it 
would be possible for the banks to call upon head offices overseas or 
upon correspondent banks for cash reserves should they need them. This 
is true of the major banks in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and even in 
many Latin American countries. Finally, activities financed by commercial 
bank credit in many underdeveloped countries form a small proportion 
of GDPo Large sectors of agriculture for instance are often quite 
outside the money nexus. Even where money is in use credit seldom comes 
from the commercial banks. In most Asia and Africa most credit used in 
agricultural production conies from traders, money lenders, or cooperatives. 
These conditions, which exist in all but a few of the better-off Latin 
American countries, rule out orthodox central banking policy as a method 
of influencing the level of demand in these economies. The question remains 
whether unorthodox techniques can fare much better. The most general and 
most widely used of these is variation in the required reserves of the 
commercial banks.
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Variable Reserve Requirements ^
The existence of a fixed reserve requirement sets a limit to the 
secondary expansion of the money supply consequent upon a change in the cash 
base, or primary expansion, The latter, in the case which particularly 
interests us here, would stem from a balance of payments surplus which 
forces the central bank to pay out local currency for foreign exchange 
surrendered to it by exporters* An increase in the total reserve requirements 
of the banks can be made to absorb all of the secondary expansion and even, 
if sufficiently great, the primary expansion can potentially be offset by 
forcing a contraction in deposit money equal to the increases in currency*
In the opposite case, a balance of payments deficit causes a reduction in 
the currency base as importers buy foreign exchange from the central bank 
with local currency* Then available reserve requirements can be lowered 
so as to prevent the banks from being forced to reduce their deposits when 
their cash reserves fall* But unless the banks are willing to expand 
loans at this time a reduction in reserve requirements can never offset 
the primary effect of the balance of payments deficit on the money supply* 
Variable reserve requirements possess certain advantages over the 
orthodox controls* Their use avoids the need for close normal discounting 
and borrowing relationships between commercial and central banks* The 
technique circumvents the need for an operational security market* It is 
in principle quicker and more certain in its effects than open-market 
operations* Moreover, the measure can to some extent be made 
discriminatory* "A high reserve requirement means that, within the limits 
of any specified monetary expansion, the central bank can increase its
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assets more, and commercial banks can increase their loans and investments 
less, than would be possible with a lower reserve requirement* In most 
countries, this will tend to divert credit from the private sector 
to the government sector since the central bankas domestic assets usually 
include a large proportion of loans to the government and government 
securities." (Goode and Thorne, 1959: p. 14). If the initiating force 
is a balance of payments surplus a high reserve ratio, by forcing the 
commercial banks to increase their deposits with the central bank enables 
it to increase its holdings of foreign securities which can subsequently 
be sold to help cover a balance of payments deficit. Finally, if required 
reserves can be met by prescribed assets other than cash, e.g. government 
securities or certain approved investments, the reserve requirement can be 
made discriminatory. The commercial banks are likely to take advantage 
of such means of making up their reserves as they yield some return 
compared with cash deposits at the central bank. The ability to 
discriminate not only allows the bank to influence the allocation of 
credit, but enables more severe general restriction without damaging 
priority investment. Variable reserve requirements can also be used to 
supplement as well as to replace orthodox measures. If the commercial 
banks possess excessive reserves and have no need to rediscount at the 
central bank a large increase in the requirement can force them 
"into the bank." They may have to rediscount some of their assets to 
obtain the cash to deposit with the central bank. Similarly, raising reserve 
requirements makes open-market operations more feasible since excess 
reserves can be eliminated by the more direct measure.
Naturally, as is the case with any policy measure, there are many
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possible objections. It is a direct control and thus carries with it an 
element of arbitrariness which is more apparent, and to some, distasteful, 
than the more subtle control involved in the use of discount rate and 
open-market operations which work at least partly through the price 
mechanism* In the case of underdeveloped countries this is very readily 
answered* If control of the money supply is an important objective and 
orthodox techniques are useless then the only question is whether there 
are better techniques than this one. In fact most of the others involve 
much more direct intervention and more severe limits on the freedom of 
the banks to operate their business as they wish than does this measure. 
Moreover, if additional argument is required it can, as suggested above, 
be combined with the more flexible orthodox measures.
Another objection encountered is unfair discrimination. An increase 
in reserve requirements can involve several elements of discrimination. 
Firstly, it discriminates between commercial banks which because of the 
nature of their business or the timing of the measure have different 
liquidity ratios. These with lower than average ratios of reserves to 
assets will be more affected by the measure than are others. Secondly, 
nou-bank and special bank sources of credit* if they are not included, 
are left free when the commercial banks' activities are restricted. 
Normally, savings banks, specialized banks such as development banks, 
agricultural banks, cooperative credit organizations, mortgage associations 
and hire-purchase concerns are not subjected to variations in reserve 
requirements. In a period of credit restriction they may gain customers 
whom the banks are forced to turn away. They may also weaken the effects 
of restrictive credit policies. A third form of discrimination is between
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the private and public sector* It may be argued that use of high 
reserve requirements allows the public sector an unduly large share 
of credit at the expense of the private sector.
Discrimination between banks also applies to the effects of 
open-market operations. Either measure affects equally only banks 
which have the same liquidity position. Both measures, if they work at 
all, inflict more hardship on banks which are operating with lower cash 
ratios than most. These may be the very banks one would wish to 
encourage as being more active forces for development* However, the 
central bank can alleviate any serious inequities by rediscounting at
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a fair price assets of any banks which seem to have been hard hit by 
the measures to restrict credit* The second form of discrimination, between 
the banks and other credit sources, seems to be particularly resented when 
some commercial banks, small ones or the private banking section of the 
central bank, escape the need for the increased reserve ratio* This is 
easily remedied by extending the measure to cover all commercial banking 
institutions if this is administratively feasible* Opinions differ as to 
how much advantage would be gained by the other financial intermediaries 
during a credit squeeze and how far increased activities by them, 
especially mortgage and hire purchase concerns, would weaken the effects 
of restrictions on the commercial banks. But, on the whole, these questions 
are more relevant in the industrial countries than in underdeveloped 
countries at present, and even in the advanced countries a recent serious 
study concludes, "The tendency for non»bank intermediaries to usurp some 
of the payments functions of the commercial bank may reduce this latter's 
importance (but) it is not a significant factor from the angle of
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short»period contra-cyclical policy." ^
It is true that raising reserve requirements may help to transfer 
resources from the private to the public sector, but would lack of this 
facility prevent the public sector from acquiring the resources? The 
probability is that if the government wants the resources it will obtain 
them anyway either tolerating the inflation which results or using other 
means to restrict private demand.
Possibly the most general answer to the criticism of discrimination 
is that while variable reserve requirements may indeed discriminate more 
than do orthodox monetary weapons, nevertheless they involve much less 
direct discrimination than say^ detailed restrictions on bank lending which 
are the likely alternatives.
It is claimed that the use of marginal reserve requirements  ^
against increases in commercial bank deposits avoids discrimination 
between banks. However, unless the controls are adjusted to the 
specific circumstances of individual banks they tend to discriminate 
against new, growing banks.
A further objection frequently raised is that increasing reserve 
requirements reduces the banks' profits. It generally means they have to 
cut down on their earning assets to make non-interest-bearing cash 
deposits at the central bank. Some central banks alleviate this by 
allowing them to hold interest-bearing government or central bank securities 
for some of their reserves. When reserve requirements are lowered the 
banks can increase their holdings of interest earning assets. Provided that 
the average level of the reserve requirements over booms and slumps is no 
higher than the banks would have held anyway in the interests of financial
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prudence they should suffer little hardship.
There are, no doubt, some administrative problems as compared with 
the use of discount rate and open-markct operations, but the viable 
alternatives almost certainly involve more detailed regulation of 
commercial bank activities and would involve more administrative problems 
than do variations in reserve requirements.
Effectiveness of Reserve Requirements
Most of these objections are fairly trivial. What really matters is 
whether variations in reserve requirements can in the real world of politics 
and business be made to influence the supply of money and whether this in 
turn can exert significant influence on the general level of demand in 
the economies of underdeveloped countries. Bloomfield comments, "Experience 
with these devices, especially in Mexico and Colombia which have made most 
use of them, has indicated their considerable potentialities as control 
instrumentsj,although in some cases their effectiveness has been hampered 
by the tendency of the banks to hold large excess reserves." (1956, p.256) 
There is a delicious hint of musical comedy in the concluding sentence 
of a recent IMF article, "It is convenient to have all banks report on the 
same day to prevent the shifting of reserves from bank to bank as a means 
of circumventing reserve requirements." (Goode and Thorne, 1959, p. 43).
Several factors in the situation of underdeveloped countries weaken 
the effectiveness of variable reserve requirements. Many, indeed most, of 
the banks have very high ratios of reserves to assets. This is particularly 
true of the large expatriate banks. Moreover, they have immense resources
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abroad. I£ they particularly wished to expand loans and advances at a time 
of high reserve requirements they could bring in extra cash to do so. Some 
indigenous banks may be less strong hence an overall increase in reserve 
requirements would probably discriminate against the very institutions most 
nationalist governments wish to foster* But to favour them might lead to 
friction with the powerful foreign banks. The existence of "free reserves," 
particularly where this free reserve ratio is unstable as it characteristically 
is in underdeveloped countries (Ahrensdorf and Kanesathasan, 1960:p.126-49), 
and unwillingness to antagonise the commercial banks set severe limits on 
the usefulness of the technique. In many countries the powers to vary reserve 
requirements have been on the statute book for years without the central 
bank making use of them* A. K* Cairncross comments, "It has proved easier 
to reduce reserve requirements, in peace time at least, than to increase 
them; an increase may present difficulties either because it shatters the 
bond market or because of evident unfairness to particular banks."
(1962, p. 164) Thus, while variable reserve requirements are probably 
the most powerful general instrument for control over the money supply in 
underdeveloped countries there are many limitations on its usefulness* This 
probably makes it desirable in many underdeveloped countries to supplement 
this measure with more direct controls on banking.
Advance Deposits on Imports
Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan and several Latin American 
countries have made use of a technique forcing intending purchasers of 
imports to make a prior deposit of cash with the central bank before
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receiving a licence to import the desired goods. This measure has certain 
attractions as a short-term expedient in an inflationary situation. To the 
extent that it deters potential importers, either because of the difficulty 
or cost of obtaining the cash for the deposit, it saves foreign exchange, 
but at some cost in terms of further increases in domestic prices. If 
importers are not to be put off the deposit requirement drains some cash 
out of circulation and reduces bank reserves by the amounts deposited 
with the central bank. This is a fairly temporary, once for all time, 
benefit merely pushing forward in time the cash drain which would in 
any case occur when the imports were paid for.
I. G. Patel (1954: pp. 81=82) argues that the effect will be felt 
more on the general money supply than on the demand for imports. He 
thinks that the additional interest cost involved in borrowing for this 
purpose is likely to be a minor deterrent in an inflationary situation. 
Although the banks have an incentive to avoid lending for prior deposit 
on imports they are not able to determine precisely the purposes to which 
their loans are put. As they lend for prior deposits their reserves will 
be depleted checking their ability to expand credit, always provided 
that they do not have sufficient excess reserves to render the whole 
measure impotent.
In the context of inflationary pressure produced by an upsurge in 
the value of exports and a balance of payments surplus the most beneficial 
effect would be achieved if the measure's effects were general. If it 
served merely to reduce imports this would add to internal instability by 
increasing the pressure of demand for local goods which are generally in 
inelastic supply. This would tend to push up domestic prices. Assuming
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that the reserve position of the commercial banks is sensitive the 
likelihood that the effect will be general or specifically on imports 
depends mainly on the ability of the commercial banks to discriminate 
between loans for import financing and loans for other purposes* However, 
if the desired effect is general credit restriction this measure has no 
evident advantage over variable reserve requirements, contains some of 
the same elements of discrimination, in addition interferes with banks' 
choice of assets and inflicts more hardship on those banks which 
normally have greater dealings with importers* B* Higgins claims that in 
Indonesia the system of advance payments for foreign exchange and for 
import surcharges withdrew large rupiah sums from the money supply* But 
he acknowledges that these may have been met from idle deposits and he
7gives no evidence that this measure effectively reduced monetary demand*'
Jo Ahrensdorf is skeptical* He says:
" In Indonesia, Nicaragua and Paraguay, the central bank 
attempted to counteract increases in monetary liabilities 
by imposing or raising advance deposit requirements for 
importers**o The restrictive effects of these requirements 
were, however, only temporary, as might be expected in 
view of the limitations of this device, which by its 
nature can scarcely be more than a stopgap*" (1959,p*283)
If it does succeed in reducing imports this measure has further 
definite limitations for it may react adversely in output and employment in 
industries which are dependent on imported raw materials and capital 
equipment* For such reasons the central banks in all three of these
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countries relaxed these measures shortly after their imposition *
(Ahrensdorf, 1959: p. 283)*
The main occasion, relevant to our purposes, for which advance 
deposit requirements might be a useful ancillary measure is where a country, 
faced by a decline in exports and unsure of its ability to finance a 
balance of payments deficit from reserves or foreign borrowing, seeks 
to combine income support with restrictions on imports. Here the instrument 
probably possesses certain advantages over import quotas or increased tariffs 
since it can be put into effect at very short notice if it is provided in 
the statutory powers of the central bank. Such general credit restriction 
effect as it might have here could be offset by easy rediscounting by the 
central bank and reductions in reserve requirements.
Credit Ceilings
If the methods, enumerated so far, which operate on the reserves of 
the banks cannot be made effective, attempts to limit the total assets or 
particular assets of the banks may be a possible way to reduce the supply 
of money. However, ceilings on total bank assets are generally felt to be 
too restrictive and as yet have not figured in any stabilization program.
But in a number of countries ceilings have been set on credits to specific 
activities in the economy. ("Moral suasion" may be regarded as a special 
case of credit ceilings.) If effective, this would usually restrain credit 
to the private sector. If there were an expansion in the money base from 
a balance of payments surplus a ceiling on claims against the private sector 
should prevent a secondary expansion of the money supply.
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Within private sector loans it may be felt desirable to limit loans 
for particular purposes* In an inflationary context investment in stocks 
and in construction become attractive, but in a sense antisocial since they 
increase demand without making any contribution in the current period to 
increased output* Consequently they tend to add to price inflation* For 
these reasons, or because some investments are contrary to the government's 
views of correct investment allocation, selective credit ceilings may be 
used* TTiey can prevent some of the undesired effects of the inflation and, 
to the extent that the investments deterred are particularly inflationary, 
they help dampen the inflationary pressure* Eduardo Laso (1958: pp*436-7) 
claims some success for such controls in Costa Rica in the early nineteen 
fifties, but another International Monetary Fund study, by G*S* Dorrance 
and W* II. White (1962, p* 326) is severely critical of these instruments* 
They say:
"Insofar as they are not associated with other restrictions 
on monetary expansion, they may be expected to have little 
effect on the total volume of credit, and hence on the general 
pressure toward inflation* The basic reason for this 
ineffectiveness is that even in countries that are not 
highly developed, 'there is an underlying unity in the market 
for loanable funds' If one type of lending is cut back, lenders 
will turn to other borrowers* If one source of borrowing is 
restricted, borrowers will obtain the funds they desire from 
other sources, or will change the stated purpose of their 
borrowing*" ^
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Where entrepreneurs typically engage in a variety of activities the 
difficulty of selective credit control is immensely increased* A 
general objection raised by Dorrance and White is the interference 
with competition. They maintain that ceilings would have to be imposed 
on each banking institution and that this would tend to maintain the 
status quo.<encouraging rigidity rather than flexibility in the economy. 
However, if the restrictions are only as a short-term measure this 
objection loses much of its force. The general conclusion of Dorrance 
and White is that credit ceilings are for emergency use only.
Clearly the more specific controls are, the more administration is 
required. But in underdeveloped countries administrative talent is a very 
scarce resource. This implies that the more reliance is placed on selective 
controls the more costly in terms of skilled personnel an effective policy 
will be. If the administrative talent is not devoted to the policy the 
more costly it will be in terms of wrong selection of objects for control 
and ineffective enforcement. Secondly, if inflation is persistent these 
specific measures will in general be insufficient. More loopholes will be 
found in the regulations and some, such as prior deposit requirements on 
imports are merely of a once-for-all nature. General measures to reduce the 
liquidity position of the banks will be necessary. But thirdly, within limits 
selective credit controls can, in principle at least, and in many countries 
probably also in practice, achieve desired objectives such as temporarily 
limiting imports and inventory accumulation.
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Political and Institutional Limitations
One hard reality which has to be faced by central banks is that if 
they are to be effective agencies for the control of the supply of money 
they are likely to be very unpopular. This political fact of life is 
probably the major reason for the relative ineffectiveness of central 
banking policies in most underdeveloped countries, particularly in 
Latin America. In many cases they are relatively new institutions. They 
have yet to build up the respect necessary for acceptance of their views 
on credit and the state of the economy. They are particularly vunerable 
in underdeveloped countries to criticism which claims that their attempts 
to restrain demand stifle economic progress by preventing "productive" 
investments, or that restrictions will hurt mainly national but not 
foreign banks and businesses. Few central banks have proved willing to 
jeopardize their status and prestige by taking a tough line in these 
situations.
In addition there may be actual legal barriers to certain types of 
credit restriction. For example, in Nicaragua there is a legal requirement 
to provide unlimited credit to agricultural borrowers as long as they have 
acceptable collateral. Central banks have to combat widespread belief 
(which they sometimes appear to hold themselves) in the "needs of trade" 
doctrine of finance. Particularly in Indonesia accepted theory seems to hold 
that "productive" investment is not inflationary. There is apparently no 
recognition of the implications of the time lag between the increase in 
demand due to the investment and the eventual increase in supply of output 
which it subsequently facilitates.lt is obviously very hard in countries
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which are struggling to increase the rate of growth to adopt policies 
which may cause some loss of output. Even if they might make growth 
faster in the long run this is not generally recognized or the future 
is heavily discounted*^
Conclusions on Monetary Policy
Central banks in underdeveloped countries are now, in general, 
equipped with a full arsenal of weapons for dealing with short-term 
cyclical instability. That these weapons are potentially powerful is clear 
from their successful operation in an advanced dependent economy such as 
Australia. David Rowan (1954) shows that the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia played an important part in stabilizing the Australian economy 
in the face of the wool export boom and subsequent slump of 1948-52. But 
several factors place serious limitations on the usefulness of central 
bank action in the environment offered by the great majority of 
underdeveloped countries* These factors may be summarised as the small 
size of bank finance in the total economy, the possession of "excess" 
reserves and access to overseas funds on the part of many of the largest 
commercial banks, shortage of administrative talent and the relative 
weakness of the new central banks in a rather hostile setting where they 
dare not take upopular actions for fear they lose whatever influence they 
may at present possess*
From their study of British Colonial Africa, W. Newlyn and D. Rowan 
(1954, p* 271) conclude, "In territories which are highly economically 
dependent and financially underdeveloped, the view that a central bank can
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promote economic stability by monetary management is to put matters tersely 
nothing but an illusion." Their view is largely confirmed by a more detailed 
study of East Africa by D. C. Mead (1963, pp. 92-97) who finds that 
interrelationships between monetary variables and expenditures flows 
"are not of great importance in the East African context," and that: the 
prospects for effective central bank action to stabilize the internal 
economy are poor*
A revealing comparison with Rowan's description of the success of 
Australia's monetary policies is the experience of Ceylon over roughly the 
same period, H, A„ de S, Gunasekera (1954, p. 156) concludes an analysis 
of the role of the Central Bank of Ceylon in the boom and slump in exports 
1950-53 with these remarks:
"No doubt the Central Bank can within limits prevent an 
excessive contraction or expansion of credit. It can prevent 
a 'non-essential or speculative expansion of credit’ and the 
financing of mushroom adventures. It can contribute towards 
healthy banking practices by bank supervision. It can advise 
the government on financial and economic matters. In all these 
fields it can achieve a lot. But in the major tasks of central 
banking the stabilisation of incomes, prices and money 
supply —  it fares very badly. This is the lesson of recent 
experience»" (italics mine)
,383.
Internal and External Stability
The preceding discussion has concentrated upon the advantages and 
disadvantages of various stabilisation techniques which fall within the 
general headings of fiscal and monetary policy* Some political and 
institutional factors which are characteristic of many underdeveloped 
countries have been described as limitations upon effective general 
policies for stabilisation* Now we discuss a little more fully a 
question we have touched on earlier the question of reconciling 
policies for internal stability with the maintenance of balance of 
payments stability.
Most economists seem to agree that the marginal propensity to 
import, in the absence of restrictions, tends on the average to be 
higher in underdeveloped countries than in rich industrial countries.
If this is so, and if the initiating cause of instability is a change 
in exports then this high marginal propensity to import forms a 
powerful stabiliser acting on both the balance of payments and on the 
level of demand in the economy, (See Chapter 3) It reduces the 
secondary effects on both incomes and the money supply of the change 
in exports* Unfortunately, however, there are at least two possible 
defects* The change in imports may be lagged by too long a period to be 
tolerated and it may not be symmetrical for increases and decreases in 
national income. If there is a long lapse of time, nine months or a 
year, between the response of imports and the initiating change in 
exports there will be an increase or decrease in domestic incomes and an 
addition to or subtraction from the reserves of the banking system.* At the
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same time there will be a surplus or deficit on the balance of payments 
(assuming no change in other sectors of the balance of payments)* A 
balance of payments surplus is not particularly worrying in an 
underdeveloped country context unless it gives rise to internal inflation*
As long as the supply of imports is elastic this danger is slight, A 
deficit may cause problems if the country has insufficient foreign 
exchange reserves or cannot find willing foreign lenders of short-term 
finance to pay for the excess imports and to avoid crises of confidence 
in the stability of the exchange rate which could cause capital flight*
The deficit, will cause a reduction of bank reserves as customers draw 
down their deposits to purchase foreign exchange to pay for imports 
ordered previously* Whether this will cause secondary contractions of the 
money supply depends on the policies of the commercial banks and of the 
central bank^ if it can intervene effectively*
The dilemma which arises from the viewpoint of economic policy is 
that an attempt to offset any internal contraction of demand will tend to 
delay the adjustment of imports to the new export level and thus maintain 
the decline in foreign-exchange reserves* In theory there are many possible 
solutions* One is simply to let the exchange rate fluctuate. This will 
increase the returns to exporters in domestic currency, but because of 
inelastic supplies of exports is unlikely to increase earnings of foreign 
exchange significantly* Depreciation of the exchange rate also raises the 
cost of imports and increases the attractions of import substitution* Here 
there should be some effect, but it is unlikely to be very substantial in 
the short run* Import orders may have already been placed and may be 
difficult to cancel and the short-run price elasticity of demand for imports
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may be very low* Moreover the fall in exporters' incomes is partially 
offset by the depreciation of the exchange rate since it raises their 
money income in terms of local currency and this may support their 
demand for imports* Production of import replacements is likely to be 
very inelastic in the short-run and would normally require imports of 
capital goods and new materials in any case* Consequently, the 
likelihood of devaluation correcting the balance of payments deficit 
arising from a fluctuation in exports is low, at least until sufficient 
time has elapsed for adjustments to take place in the supply of 
exportables and import-competing products* On the other hand, the 
devaluation assists in the maintenance of exporters' incomes in money 
terms and in real terms in so far as they buy locally produced goods, 
unless the prices of these goods increase by as much as the increase in 
exporters' money incomes*
Another possible policy for combining internal income support with 
measures to reduce the deficit is to impose controls or raise taxes on 
imports* The imposition of controls on imports suffers from many defects, 
particularly in underdeveloped countries* First, it requires diagnosis of 
the problem and then probably legislative or at least administrative 
approval* This involves delay* Once in force import controls tend to 
cause serious discrimination, inequities and a powerful inducement to 
corruption* Those firms which succeed in obtaining imports can make 
large profits since imports are made scarce in relation to domestic 
demand* If the restricted imports are raw materials or capital goods they 
form a subsidy to those firms which obtain licenses for them* There is no 
reason to suppose that they will be the most efficient firms* They may
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simply be the luckiest or the ones with the ear of a minister or civil 
servant* It is possible to avoid some of these difficulties by such 
devices as auctioning import licenses or quantities of foreign exchange 
to the highest bidder, but few countries have made use of them* There are 
risks in these too for if the market for foreign exchange is small and the 
number of firms in it few they may form a buying ring, hold down the 
price of foreign exchange and make monopoly profits on the sale of the 
scarce imports*
Increasing import taxation is probably subject to the same delays, 
but avoids the rationing problems involved in import controls* However, 
increasing either controls or taxes on imports creates risks of smuggling 
and tends to raise domestic prices and to stimulate uncompetitive import 
replacement industries which will later prevent reduction of the import 
duties or involve straight subsidies* The alternative of allowing them to 
die tends to be politically very unattractive to most governments*
Even if a country is relatively short of reserves it should in 
general be possible to adopt a policy of domestic income support with 
the aid of short-term finance from the International Monetary Fund* In 
recent years it has frequently allowed stand-by credits and use of quotas 
for this purpose* In recent publications it has made clear that requests 
for drawings within the "gold tranche" and first credit tranche will be 
treated very liberally when required for financing a balance of payments 
deficit due to a decline in export proceeds* Further sums can be made 
available after discussions of remedial policies and approval by the 
Fund of the policy intentions of the government *^^  This method has the 
defect of involving some interference from foreign experts. But the only
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likely cause of a difference on policy here would be a different view on 
the probable trend in exports, e.g., if the Fund thought the current drop 
indicated the future course of the country's exports rather than a 
temporary aberration, but it seems improbable that the Fund experts 
would take such a view without good evidence*
Such a policy of foreign borrowing in deficit years would involve 
repayment in the following years with larger repayments in years of 
surplus over trend so that this might be regarded as a stabilisation 
policy on the installment credit system* It is probably rather easier 
for a government than the puritan system of saving foreign exchange in 
surplus years to support imports in deficit years* The policy of 
requiring prior deposits against imports may be a useful auxiliary 
measure since it can be brought into operation quickly and operates in 
advance rather than in arrears as is often the case with tax policies*
If it is effective it may reduce the balance of payments deficit a 
little and in the best possible case the general credit restriction 
effected by the withdrawal of cash from the bank reserves will more than 
offset the effect of diverting demand towards import substitutes.
General Conclusions
As we have pointed out repeatedly the circumstances of underdeveloped 
countries vary enormously* Few would expect policies suitable for a country 
like Brazil to fit the context of a country like Uganda* However, we are 
at least considering a limited problem methods for dealing with the 
internal effects of export instability* For most underdeveloped countries
388-
our inquiry indicates that these effects are relatively minor* Since 
other objectives, such as more rapid growth of per-capita income are 
paramount great care has to be taken to ensure that policy measures 
designed to alleviate the lesser problem do not handicap the economy 
in attaining the more important goal* For this reason after examining 
the arguments of Nurkse and the feasible general fiscal and monetary 
weapons available our view is that most underdeveloped countries would 
be well advised to avoid ambitious stabilization policies* The existence
11of a high marginal propensity to import and of a large internal cash drain 
which are typical phenomena in underdeveloped countries greatly reduces 
the second stage expansionary or contractionary effects of balance of 
payments surpluses and deficits* The addition to these natural built-in- 
stabilizers of designed stabilizers in the form of ad valorem taxes on 
exports (if necessary on a sliding scale basis) and imports should be 
sufficient to smooth out most export fluctuations*^^ If the general trend 
of exports is upwards such policies are fairly easy to operate and the 
country can amass sufficient reserves to carry it over temporary 
balance of payments deficits* If the trend is down the government has 
to be more prudent and will have less leeway for errors* The vital point 
for these measures is that government expenditure should be determined 
only by the trend in revenues, not by the current revenues of the 
government*
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Footnotes to Chapter 11
1, If the diminishing marginal utility of income is a real 
phenomenon to producers then smoothing out the bumps may actually increase 
the utility of the income stream*
2* Migrant labour in Africa may give this flexibility in some 
agricultural activities* (Berg, 1963)
3* Arthur Bloomfield, 1956: p, 241*
4* Most of the information in this section is drawn from 
Goode and Thorne, 1959*
5c Clayton, 1962: p* 886, Ibe question is not quite irrelevant 
to underdeveloped countries, "At least three underdeveloped countries 
Chile, Peru and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland have introduced 
controls over instalment credit terms," Cairncross, 1962: p, 166,
6, Marginal reserve requirements have been used in Mexico, Peru 
and India among others, Australia relies solely on a very similar system.
It may be regarded as the ultimate in discrimination since the Australian 
"special accounts" involve a separate reserve ratio for each bank,
7, Bo Higgins* 1959: pp, 562-3, Actually the largest of the banks 
in Indonesia were expatriate concerns with access to large reserves abroad
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which makes it likely that the banks' compliance with the government's 
wishes could not be forced by this measure though they may have complied 
for other reasons such as maintenance of goodwill,
8, The internal quotation is from Committee on the Working 
of the Monetary System* (Radcliffe Report) Cmnd. 827, London 1959, p„ 108*
9o For a more detailed discussion of reasons for the lack of 
firm action by central banks in underdeveloped countries see Ahrensdorf*
19^9: pp, 295-99,
10, IMF, 1963; pp, 10-11, This assumes the decline is due to a 
decline in world prices or a bad harvest and is not due to domestic inflation 
or stockpiling of exportable goods. The Fund's policies will be discussed 
more fully in Chapter 3, "International Compensatory Finance."
11, Many residents prefer cash to bank deposits hence the
expansionary effect of a primary increase in the money supply is greatly
reduced,
12, Many countries did succeed in reducing the impact of even
the Korean Boom in their exports by means of export taxation.
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Chapter 12 
International Commodity Agreements
Current interest in International Commodity Agreements (ICA's) is 
very high. Two main causes of the recent heightened interest lie in the 
decline in the prices of the commodity exports of underdeveloped countries 
over the last ten years and in the problems arising from economic 
integration in Europe, Both of these give rise mainly to schemes for price 
support or market rationalisation rather than for the moderation of 
short-term fluctuations which is our main concern. In fact most recent 
discussions of ICA's seem to view their main role as that of supporting 
commodity prices at levels higher than they would receive in an open world 
market,1 They thus become a form of economic aid which transfers resources 
via higher prices from consumers to producers. We postpone discussion of 
this form of ICA to the second section of this chapter,
ICA*s Combat Short-Term Instability
Most ICA*s have as one important aim moderation of fluctuations in 
commodity prices* Some also attempt to influence export incomes « Our main 
concern is with possible damage which export instability may inflict on 
underdeveloped economies. Consequently* it is important to have some idea 
of how far policies which limit fluctuations in commodity prices are likely 
to reduce fluctuations in the export incomes of commodity exporting 
underdeveloped countries* both individually and collectively. The latter
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represents one motive for the industrial nations* concern with ICA's*
Although underdeveloped country export instability is often regarded as 
largely a function of fluctuations in the rich industrial countries there 
could be feedback effects through sympathetic fluctuations in underdeveloped 
countries* demand for imports from industrial nations*
Most ICA*s make price stabilization their direct aim« However,, the 
methods adopted usually also involve some stabilization of the quantities 
exported^ e„g«junder quota provisions or contracts for specified purchases 
and sales* They should thus exert a stabilising influence upon underdeveloped 
country proceeds through stabilising both prices and quantities* International 
buffer stocks schemes* on the other hand* may destabilize export proceeds by 
holding price movements within relatively narrow limits when fluctuations 
in quantities exported cause the instability* Whether such an effect is 
likely depends on the relative price elasticities of supply and demand*^ 
However* even where conditions are such that short-term fluctuations in 
total value are increased* price stabilization might pay off in the longer 
run in terms of modified quantity fluctuations* For example* if current 
outputs are influenced by prices attained several years earlier* production 
intentions would gradually be stabilized by reductions in price fluctuations » 
Stabilization of prices should also remove most of the incentives for 
speculative stock adjustments and thus modify one source of instability In 
commodity markets* Moreover* if fluctuations stem from changes in demand a 
stabilized price will limit the fall or increase in earnings to an amount 
proportionate to the fall in the quantity demanded* If price were left free 
to fluctuate its effects on earnings would be additional to the changes in 
quantity (assuming an inelastic demand and supply which seems realistic in
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the relevant short-term time period)* Consequently* it appears reasonable to 
suppose that while price stabilization will not remove all earnings® 
instability it will probably remove more than appeared likely from our 
statistical evidence on the causes of export instability (Chapter 2)«
Moderation of fluctuations in price alone should reduce fluctuations 
in the total value of world exports of the commodities involved* Fluctuations 
in the value of any one country®s exports should also be moderated whether 
the quantity of the commodities they export varies in line with the world 
totals or not* Naturally* since the probabilities are that quantity 
variations will be proportionately greater for any individual country than 
for the world as a whole, export proceeds from individual underdeveloped 
countries will be stabilized less than the value of world sales of the 
commodity*
Given that ICA*s can reduce instability in world prices and total 
proceeds of commodities^ the significance of their effect on underdeveloped 
countries depends on the number and importance in underdeveloped countries* 
exports of the commodities wich are subject to their control* At present 
these are very few: tin* wheat* sugar and coffee* Out of these wheat is 
almost entirely exported by the rich countries* the Sugar Agreement has 
been disrupted by the Castro take over in Cuba, the Tin Agreement has run 
out of stocks or funds twice and the Coffee Agreement is a new venture 
and as yet untried*
It is not without significance that* despite all the advocacy of 
ICA®s in UN and other offical writings* up to date only these four 
agreements have been formed in the post-World War II era*^ (The Olive Oil 
Agreement does not affect prices or quantities*) There are probably many
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reasons for this: some political* some technical* To assess the difficulties 
which have stood in their way and to give criteria for judging schemes
which have existed* are operating or proposed* it may be worthwhile
considering some principles or guidelines for ICA^s* Numerous groups of 
experts and individual scholars have already set out lengthy lists of such 
principles* However* if moderation of fluctuations in exporting countries® 
earnings from commodity exports without causing serious divergence between 
long-run demand and supply is treated as their sole objective many of 
their statements become superfluous* With this limited objective the
following fairly simple set of rules and preconditions probably covers most
contingencies*
Guidelines for ICA"s
be represented in the negotiations and operation of the agreement* There are 
at least three reasons for this: (a) to avoid bias against either producing 
or consuming countries the rights of both can best be protected by including 
them in the ICAg (b) to facilitate enforcement of the rules upon producing 
countries through obtaining the co-operation of the importing countries^
(c) to prevent exploitation of the agreement by non-member nations*
2o Products selected should be more unstable than average, form 
a significant part of world trade or be very important in the trade of 
particular countries and be technically feasible objects of an ÎCA* The latter 
point involves thorough study* for the problems of regulation are often very 
complex and the potential side effects difficult to foresee* The most 
commonly discussed commodity markets are much more intricate than is
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usually recognized. The Director of the Stanford University Food Research 
Institute has said* "What we call simply wheat, coffee, tin, wool or cotton 
is not a homogeneous commodity but a complex of commodities differing 
greatly in value; what is called the ®world price* is not a point but a 
range; and the ®geographical structure® of prices is fluid* not static.^  even 
in the absence of important governmental interventions,’* (Davis* 1947: p*32) 
Accurate statistical information and the best possible estimates of future 
demands and supplies are essential to the success of XCA®s* Without such 
guidance schemes tend to make serious errors whose costs may be very 
inadequately measured by the direct financial losses involved. To ensure 
constant maintenance of close contact with underlying trends in supply and 
demand requires frequent revision of quotas* stock policies and contracts*
3, The national policies of the members must be consistent with 
the operations of the schemes* If export quotas are exceeded by production 
it must be clear that this is not because of direct or indirect government 
subsidies to producers*
4o The agreements should not frustrate increases in productivity* 
bar new entrants or prevent expansion and contraction of efficient and
^ ° ^ ^ ‘ J ^ *^ ^ .niCw a TMgrrBniffiT3:*rTyaiTrTiti\T f.^M ^TatTja«xg J a3agei3naf7rT irin .w ^uiitai5!C==iSa : :. i !'-T
inefficient producers* This involves frequent revision of quotas or 
contracts* It may be advisable to utilize some mechanism which would partly 
insulate such revisions from the area of political controversy*
5, An additional safeguard against abuse of ICA®s is representation 
of some of the relevant international organizations: FAQ, GAIT or IMF*
They can fulfill some of the functions of independent arbitrators in the 
bargaining situation which inevitably tends to arise in determining 
policies*
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The Main Features and Modes of Operation of ICA*5 
Buffer Stocks
Probably the most widely advocated measure for stabilizing commodity 
markets is the International Buffer StockSuch a scheme involves fixing 
a price range within which commodity prices are left free to vary* and 
which is maintained by the stock agency®s purchases and sales. When price 
falls to the lower limit the agency stands ready to buy the excess supplies 
at the floor price* Provided the agency has sufficient funds price can be 
held at the lower limit by purchases for stock. If the price rises above 
the upper limit the agency sells the commodity from its stocks at the 
ceiling price and so long as its stocks last the price can be held at or 
below the ceiling* The effectiveness of the scheme in reducing fluctuations 
in exporting countries® export prices depends on the relative size of the 
gap between the ceiling and the floor price and the ability of the agency 
to defend these* This latter in turn depends on the resources of the scheme 
in the form of stocks of the desired types and qualities of the commodity 
and cash* Contact with long-run trends in demand and supply can theoretically 
be maintained either through periodic re-negotiation of floor and ceiling 
prices or through initial agreement on some formula for automatic 
adjustment of these prices*
In principle such a scheme possesses great merits. It interferes as 
little as possible with the free workings of the price mechanism as an 
allocative influence on producers and consumers, Moreover,, when it does 
interfere it does so minimally^ avoiding such distateful if not tragic 
features of some agreements^ as destruction of crops or restriction of
output* It allows free entry and exit to and from the industry* thus
enabling the more efficient producers to grow and the less efficient
to decline* These features make it as nearly possible a neutral influence
on the efficiency of the industry and in most cases this is likely to be
optimal
There are certain important disadvantages attached to international 
buffer stocks. All ICA®s are likely to involve lengthy and difficult 
discussions both in setting them up and in subsequent renegotiations of 
the terms* Certain features of buffer stocks however may make negotiations 
of this type of agreement peculiarly difficult* The main one is the cost 
involved. If the scheme is to make a significant reduction in price 
instability the range of price movements must be kept fairly narrow* But 
if stabilization within these limits is to be maintained by purchases and 
sales of the commodity by the agency it must be given a very large initial 
fund or stock* For natural rubber alone a relatively modest stock of 
200^000 metric tons would represent an investment of around $ 100«,000g000 
at current prices. Admittedly the true cost in terms of world resources 
may be substantially less sine© privately held stocks may b© reduced as 
their role is partly usurped by the international stocky but someone still 
has to put up the money and the United States traditionally looks askance 
at international buffer-stock policies. The question of who should provide 
the substantial sums involved is likely to be vexed*
Further difficulties arise from the need to confine the scheme to 
commodities which can be stored without serious deterioration and at 
relatively low cost* This eliminates most fruits because of their 
perishability and petroleum because of its bulk*
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The lack of homogeneity which in fact characterizes most primary 
commodities forms another technical problem. There are in general several 
different markets and many grades for each commodity* This would seldom be 
very important if the price differentials between them remained fairly 
constant and if the geographically separated markets moved in close harmony^ 
Unfortunately neither of these possibilities is supported by the facts* 
According to Davis (1957* p, 32)  ^ "The experience of the Canadian Wheat 
Board and the Federal Farm Board and Commodity Credit Corporation in the 
United States has shown that price differentials for type^ quality* and 
location normally vary considerably* and that fixed differentials often 
lead to unexpected and undesirable results," With some goods the diversity 
of experience of the grades may be so great that for practical purposes the
different grades should be treated as separate commodities®
A further technical difficulty lies in the possibility that instead
of eliminating speculation the scheme stimulates it by providing a
one-way-option which presents the speculator with the possibility of great 
gains and negligible risk of loss. This is analogous to the debate on free 
versus pegged exchange rates,^ If* for example* the speculator suspects the 
ability of the scheme to hold the price of the commodity at the ceiling 
because of suspicion that the stock is too small the speculator will buy 
as much of the commodity as he can obtain at the ceiling price. If the 
forward market is also controlled he can buy there on relatively small 
margins* These activities actually make the buffer stockas position worse 
and may generate a cumulative pressure as more and more speculators and 
ordinary businessmen* anxious to secure their raw materials at the lowest 
prices* become convinced that the agency®s stock will be exhausted. If the
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agency has to stop sales because of its depleted stocks the prices will 
shoot up and the speculators can then unload quickly at a large profit.
Even if the speculators have guessed wrongly the most they can lose is 
the full amount of the gap between the agency®s buying and selling prices 
and this would be exceptional. Equally* speculators can take a "bearish" 
attitude if they consider the funds of the agency insufficient to absorb 
an excess supply of the commodity®
These risks of speculation make it essential that the management 
of the agency have large resources and be left a fair amount of discretion 
as to stock operations. If they are free to buy and sell within fairly wide 
limits and have sufficient resources they can inflict losses on speculators 
and greatly increase the risks involved in such antisocial acitivity* but 
this makes for additional complications in buffer-stock policies. To avoid 
error in judgment of long-run trends is made even more difficult if the 
management has to conceal its policies from the public and constantly 
change the floor and ceiling prices which it is prepared to defend. But the 
difficulty should not be exaggerated. After all* exchange equalization 
accounts have had a fair amount of experience in such activities. However* 
it does mean that a buffer-stock policy requires a heavy initial investment 
at a time when underdeveloped countries are crying out for capital for 
long-term investments within their economies, Moreover^ there is a strong 
element of risk. The future is so uncertain that even the most expert 
management can make costly errors of judgment resulting in accumulation of 
stocks at what turn out to be relatively high prices and the subsequent 
unloading of the commodities at a loss,
Boris Swerling comments on these risks*"’Secular changes* in supply
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or demand of particular commodities have long-run effects* but can take 
place with shocking rapidity...Shifts between different producing regions 
may be equally spectacular and disturbing. Operation by a buffer-stock 
agency may not merely impede adjustment; there is also a serious risk 
that the agency will in the course of time find itself saddled with 
obsolescent commodities or obsolete grades," ^
Another point made by Swerling concerns the possible effect of the 
policy on the trend in supply. He suggests that elimination of short-term 
instability may reduce desirable short-term supply responses from existing 
capacity, but tends to cause a secular increase in capacity, (1953*pp,781-82) 
This must be based on the assumption that producers will tend on the average 
to increase capacity more with relatively stable prices than with more widely 
fluctuating prices. We have discussed this point before*^
There seems to be no clear evidence on producers* reactions to such policies* 
and no convincing reasons for expecting increased rather than stable or 
decreased capacity to be the result of more stable prices.
Strategic considerations may affect the choice of location of stocks 
and may conflict with economic criteria. This may increase the range of 
bargaining discussions and result either in inefficient location or costly 
duplication of the international stock by national stocks felt to be 
essential for strategic reasons.
Most of the points which we have listed may be regarded as technical, 
but in fact ICA®s belong in the field of political economy not technical 
economics and in the real world it is seldom likely that the basic price 
targets for a buffer stock would approximate closely to the technical 
optimum for they are the result of bargaining and only by chance would they
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coincide. But if the basic price range does not balance long-run supply and 
demand* the buffer policy will inevitably run into difficulties, rhen either 
the agreement must be abandoned and price allowed to find its equilibrium 
level or the principles abandoned and direct controls introduced to limit 
supply,or demand. If the latter* inefficiency and increased social costs are 
perpetuated* if the former* dramatic changes in prices are likely to follow. 
Davis (1947* p, 35) remarks on this* "Experience under national commodity 
controls has shown that the most depressed prices have followed eventual 
abandonment of a policy involving heavy accumulations of commodity stocks,"
In short* while international buffer stocks are prima facie the most 
appealing method of moderating commodity price fluctuations they are beset 
with difficulties. Of these cost and risk are probably crucial. Without 
enthusiastic support from the US and Western Europe the enormous sums 
required to finance a significant number of buffer stocks would not be 
forthcomingo The prospects of creating international money to buy them do 
not seem hopeful,^ Other forms of control agreements have rather less 
evident virtues in relation to the chosen objective of moderating 
fluctuations without disturbing long-run equilibrium for they interfere 
more directly with supply and demand.
International Quota Agreements
Regulation of export quantities by adoption of quotas forms another 
method of moderating fluctuations in commodity prices. The overall permitted 
quantity of exports is determined at a level which will satisfy current and 
expected demand at prices approximating to informed estimates of long-run
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equilibrium price. Individual country quotas are usually determined on the 
basis of historical market shares. Ideally* however* they should take into 
account differences in cost structures in the exporting countries and should 
allow frequent adaption to alterations in productivity increasing the 
quotas.of the more efficient and decreasing those of the less efficient.
Given the solution of these problems of adaption quota schemes could achieve 
the same aims as international buffer stocks without the high initial capital 
outlay and the risks of financial loss involved in buffer stocks schemes and 
with less need for storeability on the part of the controlled commodities. 
Despite these apparent advantages this type of scheme attracts more 
professional disapproval than any other proposed solution for commodity 
instability.^^
The principal charges are misallocation of resources* protection 
of inefficient producers and restriction of production. It should be 
evident from our outline that these are not logically necessary attributes 
of such schemes. As usual the charges stem less from the mechanism than from 
past experience and expectations about the way the mechanism is likely to be 
handled. Historically quotas have generally been used as a means of 
restricting over-all supply which raises prices above equilibrium levels 
and protects inefficient high-cost producers. There is a pre-supposition 
in the minds of most commentators that price support rather than 
stabilization is the objective of quota agreements. This gains credence 
from the historical record. If true* the schemes will lead to misallocation 
and restriction and may in the long run be self-defeating as outside 
competition from non-member producers and from synthetics is stimulated 
by the high prices maintained.
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The two major criticims are: (1) quota schemes are inherently 
liable to breakdown* (2) if they do not break down they lead to 
inefficiencies in world production and marketing which will involve greater 
costs to the world than any benefits due to moderation of short-term 
instability.
Arguments in support of the charge of inherent instability stem from 
the difficulty of obtaining initial agreement on size of quotas and 
subsequent adjustments. Each member country has motives for desiring a 
low overall export quantity while obtaining as large a quota for its own 
exports as possible. While the optimum arrangement would see the overall 
quota just correctly balanced with overall demand at equilibrium prices* 
few independent experts* let alone interested parties are likely to agree 
on the long-run equilibrium price. This is no more, nor any less* difficult 
than in the case of any other form of ICA, The real extra difficulty arises 
in the matter of allocation of the country quotas. The optimum here should 
reflect differences in cost and potential growth, but this is difficult to 
estimate and the most likely arrangement is historical shares in a given 
year. This has been the case in both the Sugar and Coffee Agreements, It 
is probably not too serious a defect as long as some method for allowing 
market shares to be reallocated over time makes possible adaptation to 
changes in relative efficiencies and trading patterns. If no such method, 
either through formulae or re-negotiation* exists, the expanding low cost 
producers will have powerful incentives to break the agreement.
Apart from this refined point, for agricultural products the sheer 
existence of quotas may become intolerable becausF of output fluctuations. 
The 1933 Wheat Agreement broke down for this reason. According to Davis*
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(1942; p, 26) Argentina "faced with an unexpectedly large harvest 
for which adequate storage was lacking, exceeded her quota," This 
particular difficulty of lack of short-run flexibility can be met by 
combining national or international buffer stocks or funds with the quota 
scheme. They need not be very large since quota adjustments can take care 
of major shifts in production or demands. These quota adjustments, however, 
will produce clashes of interest between the expanding efficient producers 
who want larger quotas and are prepared to take lower prices and the less 
efficient countries whose interests may be felt to lie in preserving market 
shares and maintaining high prices. Agreements are liable to break down 
under the pressure of such conflicts. If the agreement survives these 
hazards, but maintains prices above long-run equilibrium importing countries 
will seek substitutes either from suppliers outside the agreement or through 
the efforts of their own industries to produce synthetics.
If the agreement continues despite all these possibilities over 
several years then, unless it happens to be in a product which, because of 
fewness of exporting countries and lack of substitutes is ideally suited 
to monopoly control, the probability is that the scheme is not guilty of 
serious misallocation. None so far have survived.
One of the difficulties is to devise criteria for changing the 
pattern of distribution of the export quotas. One suggestion, put forward 
by Nicholas Kaldor, contains some of the necessary ingredients. The 
suggestion is that member countries have limits fixed upon the level of 
stocks which they are permitted to hold. They should then use tax 
disincentives levied on producers to reduce output whenever their stocks 
grow too largeo The tax levied per unit in any underdeveloped country
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would then serve as a measure of the relative efficiency of that country*s 
producers of the commodity. At periodic re-negotiations of quotas the size 
of the tax would serve as a guide for their reallocation. The countries with 
the highest production tax would have a claim for increased quotas. The main 
problem involved in this ingenious suggestion is that production is 
manipulable. A Government may impose a tax on output, but at the same time 
subsidize inputs so that the tax no longer serves as a measure of 
profitability. There are many ways in which an ingenious government could 
induce a balance between the tax and concealed incentives to increase 
output.
Given a serious interest in the moderation of short-term instability 
quota agreements might serve a useful purpose, but the difficulties of 
initial negotiation of quotas, of re-negotiation of quotas, the temptations 
to monopoly practices and the inherent tendency for efficient producers to 
break away make success unlikely.
Multilateral Long-Term Contract
The third major form of ICA is the multilateral long-term contract. 
This is a form of mutual insurance between importing and exporting nations. 
When prices fall below an agreed floor importing countries undertake to 
purchase pre-arranged quantities of the commodity at the floor price. If 
prices rise to an agreed ceiling exporters agree to supply pre-arranged 
quantities at the ceiling price. Between these contract prices trade is 
allowed to remain free. Trade may also continue outside the contract 
agreement at free market prices.
Certain advantages may be claimed for this form of ICA. It assures
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exporters at least a minimum income from exports of the commodity and 
also assures importers that they can obtain a minimum of their needs 
at moderate prices. The scheme thus moderates fluctuations in income of 
both exporting and importing countries. At the same time, since part of 
world trade is left free, the prices which obtain outside the quantities 
controlled by the agreement can serve as a guide for re-negotiation of the 
agreement floor and ceiling prices. In principle the scheme appears to 
achieve moderation of income fluctuations while preserving the allocative 
function of a free price. Since there are no quotas imposed it has less 
rigidity and allows of easier entry and exit of producers and producing 
countries than does a quota agreement. The degree of stabilization of 
world trade in the commodity depends on the price range* the amount of 
trade covered and any repercussions on the free market outside the 
contracts.
Naturally, it has its own drawbacks. It requires a relatively 
homogeneous product or one with grades for which differentials remain 
fairly constant. This limits the number of commodities for which it is 
suitable. As with all ICA’s the scheme cannot ensure long-run equilibrium 
unless national production policies or consumption policies are consistent 
with the policies of the scheme. The movements in prices must be sufficient 
to induce rational adjustments of production to trends in world demand.
To do this they must be allowed to have an impact on producers" decisions. 
There may also be a need for some regulation of traders in consuming 
countries since they may make excess profits by buying at contract ceiling 
prices and selling at the higher free market prices.
A technical drawback stems from the risk that the residual free
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market may be made much more unstable as a result of the controlled share
of the market. H. G. Johnson argues that "...in the absence of other
national or international intervention, an agreement which fixes maximum 
and minimum prices for a part only of the total volume of a commodity traded 
is likely to give rise to more violent fluctuations than would otherwise 
occur. Consequently, the advantage of guaranteed maximum buying prices or 
minimum selling prices on that part of the transactions covered by the 
agreement will to a greater or lesser extent be offset by higher buying or 
lower selling prices on those transactions which fall outside the agreement." 
(Johnson* 1950; p. 626) This criticism applies equally to any control form of 
ICA which does not cover all of the traded commodity. Its theoretical 
validity is unchallengeable,^^ but its empirical significance is probably 
minor as long as the area under the agreement is much larger than the part 
of the market left free. The weighted average of the controlled price 
and the free price will then almost certainly show greater stability than 
prices would have been in the absence of the agreement.
The probability of inherent instability suggested in the case of
quota agreements exists also for long-term contracts. The existence of 
a free market constantly gives an incentive to countries to leave the 
agreement whenever free market prices are substantially above or below the 
agreement price range.
Commodity Reserve Currency Proposal
These represent the three types of international commodity agreement 
of which we have historical and current examples. Before turning to consideration
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of how they have worked in practice it may be worthwhile considering one
further suggested ICA which has a certain dramatic appeal as holding out
a much broader solution than any of these discussed so far. This is the
13proposal for a Commodity Reserve Currency Scheme. It has two aspects 
which are not necessarily connected. One is the idea of setting up 
buffer stocks for a large number of commodities with a view to 
stabilizing the composite-commodity-price index rather than the individual 
prices of particular commodities. The other aspect is related more to 
questions of international liquidity than to commodity control. It is the 
suggestion that these stocks should be paid for by a newly created 
currency issued against the backing of the commodities. In this section the 
first aspect interests us more than the second.
Stabilization of a Commodity Index
The object of such a scheme is to reduce fluctuations in the 
purchasing power of commodity exporters in general. It is thus directed 
much more against general problems of world recessions and inflations than 
against the specific difficulties of individual countries confronted with 
the problem of living with a highly unstable export. The ideas were evolved 
in the 1930®s and it may well be a legitimate criticism that this scheme 
represents a prime example of attempting to fight the last war all over 
again when the problems have changed radically.
The main claimed advantage is that it stabilizes the price of the 
composite unit while leaving the individual commodity prices free to vary 
and perform their normal allocative function. The degree of stabilizing
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force exerted on the individual prices depends on the number of commodities 
included, the weights assigned to them and the price range for the index.
For commodities which are assigned a heavy weight price instability may be 
significantly moderated. For commodities which have a low weight purchases 
or sales of the commodity block may yield little stabilizing influence or 
may even destabilize. For a country which happens to be highly specialized 
on the export of a good of relatively minor importance in world trade, 
insult may be added to injury if, when its export prices decline, purchases 
of the commodity block actually raise the prices of some of its imports 
by much more than the export. Since many underdeveloped countries specialize 
in one or two commodity exports this is a real possibility. Moreover, 
fluctuations on the supply side which are the major proximate cause of 
instability in underdeveloped countries' export proceeds would be largely 
unaffected, or even made worse. In cases where export quantity fluctuations 
would normally lead to partially compensating price adjustments the stock 
policy may tend to check these somewhat and so destabilize export proceeds 
still further. Such a scheme promises little relief for the instability 
problems of individual underdeveloped countries.
Another weakness of the scheme is that it. may distort the allocation 
of resources between goods within the composite unit and goods outside it,
This may occur either through the cyclical ups and downs of the non-stabilized 
goods vis-a-vis the composite-block commodities or through a secular preference 
by producers for more or less stability. Such misallocation would be undesirable 
but quantitatively it seems unlikely that it would be significant.
In common with other ICA's the problem of reconciling stabilization 
with maintainance of contact with the long-run trends in demand and supply
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remains. This would be a very complex problem for a large group of 
commodities. It involves re-weighting the index and altering the price range.
The UN study group, of which the main proponent^ Jan Goudriaan^ was 
himself a member, concluded that, "The difficulties of operating such group 
stabilization schemes are considerable and, along with their beneficial effects, 
they are likely to have some distorting consequences. The schemes as here 
described are in any case relatively unattractive because of the difficulty 
of financing them." (1953, para. 188).
One claimed advantage is political. It is suggested that a 
multi-commodity agreement may be easier to negotiate than a single commodity 
one. The underlying belief here is that it avoids the direct producer-consumer 
confrontation, since most countries both export and import primary commodities. 
This in turn enables quid pro quo bargaining which is the kind that normally 
produces results. Against this view stand the complexity and costliness of 
the scheme besides the fact that because of its generality it may do very 
little for individual underdeveloped countries. Almost all the evidence 
which we have examined on underdeveloped country export instability in the 
post Second World War era suggests that it is due to very specific factors, 
usually peculiar to the individual country and often mainly on the supply 
side,,^  ^A scheme which merely aims at moderating fluctuations in a 
composite-commodity price index, made of 10 to 30 strategically chosen goods 
is likely to be unhelpful even if successful in its direct objective. However, 
the most recent advocates. Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen point out that the 
scheme is not incompatible with the concurrent operation of orthodox 
single-commodity ICA's,
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ICA's in Practice
Pre-War Experience
The very severe instability experienced in world trade in the
inter-war period gave rise to much discussion and some action in the field
of commodity agreements. Most of the agreements were national, or international
only in the sense that several producing nations were involved. In very few
cases did they confine their activities to reduction of short-term instability.
In general their objective was to raise prices and support the incomes of
producers at the cost of reducing the quantities of the controlled commodities
15which were exported.
A League of Nations' committee commented on inter-war ICA's as follows:
"...while it would not wish to state that all regulation 
schemes in the past have been well conceived or beneficial to 
all the interests concerned [the Committee] considers that the 
governmental regulation schemes relating to raw materials now 
in operating have, generally speaking, been an imporatant factor 
in the improvement in economic conditions experienced in 
producing countries during the depression as well as in the
1 /Tj
development of international trade."
A decidedly less favorable viewpoint is expressed by Davis (1946, p. 220);
"Pre-war and wartime experience with ICA's brings out the 
great difficulties and delays incident to reaching and
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rationally revising agreements and their vulnerability to 
break down, especially when numerous countries have important 
conflicting interests. It reflects tendencies to rely unduly 
on a favorite restrictive device, export quotas; to be 
timid in the face of strongly backed nationalistic commodity 
policies; and to avoid grappling with problems of fundamental 
economic readjustment."
Part of the difference is explicable in terms of the criteria being applied, 
The League study focusses on the benefits to producers while Davis is 
concerned with the repercussions of restrictive policies on consumers 
and on the allocative efficiency in the longer run. However, the total 
volume of world trade which came under the influence of ICA's was never 
large :
"At their widest extent in 1937-39, ICA-regulated commodities 
comprised tin, tea, rubber, sugar, beef, lumber, fur seals, 
north Pacific halibut* whaling, and narcotic drugs. Almost 
none of these was universal in scope; and ICA controls over 
sugar* lumber* and whaling were, in fact, expecially far from 
complete. The only ICAAs that have effectually operated for 
as long as five years were thoæ for tin* tea, rubber, fur seals, 
halibut and drugs. (Davis, 1946: p. 219).
The tea* tin and rubber ICA's used export and production controls mainly 
for price maintenance and achieved little success in maintaining price 
stability. They failed to adjust capacity to world requirements and they
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tended to shelter high-cost producers and producing countries. Only in 
wheat and sugar were numerous exporting and importing countries represented 
and even there the results of the agreements were very disappointing,^^
Tlie inter-war experience with ICA's was scarcely happy. The relevance 
of that period's difficulties to the problems of the present world may be 
relatively slight, but the unhappy experiences have perhaps heavily 
influenced the views of consuming nations about the merits and demerits of 
ICA's, Moreover, the inter-war experience does point up the political 
difficulties of obtaining agreements even when the problems of 
international economic instability are obvious and serious.
Recent Experience
Each of the main types of ICA discussed above can be illustrated 
from the working out of the post-war agreements on tin, sugar and wheat. 
Apart from these, an agreement on olive oil exists but exerts no control 
on either prices or quantities and is thus irrelevant to our main interest, 
and a new Coffee Agreement has been set up, but has scarcely come into 
operation. After several years of negotiation an attempt was made to form 
a quota agreement for cocoa, but this broke down at the last moment because 
of failure to obtain agreement between producing and consuming nations on 
prices.
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The International Tin Agreement (Buffer Stock plus Quotas)
As we have noted above a Tin Agreement did exist before the 1939-45 
War, However it was not until 1953 that a new ICA for tin was signed. Further 
years of delay elapsed between the signing and the implementation of the 
agreement and it was only in the latter half of 1956 that the buffer stock 
came into being.
The mode of operation is the nearest approximation to a buffer stock 
scheme in existence, but in fact the agreement also relies on quota 
restrictions to meet serious declines in world tin prices. These quotas 
are allocated among the producing countries on a quarterly basis by 
decisions of a majority of the producing and consuming-nation members. The 
1956-61 agreement covered over 90 per cent of non-Communist tin output.
The producer members were Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaya, the Congo, Nigeria 
and Thailand. The United States, Western Germany and the Soviet Bloc did 
not join. While potentially a serious threat the absence of the US did not 
seriously hamper the scheme as the US government took care that the 
operations of its large strategic stock pile of tin were not destabilizing. 
The absence of the Soviet bloc did however represent something of a threat 
and was partly responsible for the collapse of buffer stock support of the 
market in 1958 and the consequent decline in price in September 1958,
How successful was the scheme in moderating fluctuations in tin 
markets? The direct objective of the Tin Agreement was to stabilize prices 
within a range of h 640 to k 880 on the London spot market. At prices 
between L 720 and L 800 the manager of the stockpile was not allowed to 
intervene,, Between L 640 and L 720 or between L 800 and k 880 he had
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discretionary power to respectively buy and sell tin. At the extreme limits 
of k 640 and k 880 he was obliged to buy in the former case and sell in the 
latter case, unconditionally. In March 1957 these limits were adjusted so 
that the floor was raised to k 730 and the new band widths became k 730 to 
k 780* k 780 to k 830 and k 830 to k 880„ In the last quarter of 1956 the 
price in fact rose above the point which obliged sales, k 800, but the 
manager had no stocks of tin and therefore could not intervene in the 
market. From the peak price of November 1956 price fell steadily until it 
reached the revised floor where it was supported by purchases for the stock 
until the buffer fund became exhausted. Support was withdrawn in September 
1958 and the price dropped below the floor to L 642, In addition to the 
purchases for stock the scheme adjusted quotas in a drastically restrictive 
manner. During 1958 quarterly quotas were: first quarter, 71 1/2 per cent; 
second and third quarters, 60 per cent; and fourth quarter, 52 per cent of 
the average quarterly quotas for the previous year. This drastic cut in 
supply combined with restrictions imposed by the UK and the 
Netherlands on imports of Soviet tin soon restored price levels, but at a 
very severe cost in terms of reduced output,
The effects on average annual prices, volume and value of exports 
in the two main exporting countries are shown below (Table 12:1). In each 
case figures for another main export are shown for comparison. It is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to say whether these countries" exports of 
tin were more or less stable under the Agreement than they would have been 
in its absence. Probably tin export prices were made more stable, but the 
volume of exports was decidedly less stable because of the effect of the 
sharp cut in quotas on exports in 1958, Because of this it seems likely
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that little if any moderation in the fluctuations in annual values of 
tin exports for the two major tin exporting countries can be attributed 
to the performance of the 1956-61 International Tin Agreement, The period 
is,however, too short to establish this more than tentatively. Moderation 
in monthly and yearly average prices for tin was almost certainly achieved. 
Fluctuations in tin prices on the London market from July 1956 to the end 
of 1959 were much smaller than for copper, lead or zinc, (Robertson,
I960: p, 312, Chart I). But that this is a significant contribution to 
world economic welfare is, to say the least doubtful.
The other major question concerns the effects of the Agreement on 
efficiency in the production and consumption of tin. The pre-war agreement 
came under heavy attack for holding the average price too high which 
preserved high cost, inefficient producers discouraged tin consumption 
and encouraged substitutes. The 1956 Agreement may be subject to the same 
charges. Tin consumption has not increased since the late 1920*s, while 
growth in consumption of other non-ferrous metals has been fairly rapid.
It is widely believed that this is not unrelated to the relative price of 
tin to other metals. Aluminum in particular has become relatively much 
cheaper than tin in the post-war era and is being substituted for tin 
in many uses. In one major use of tin, in solder, the ratio of lead to tin 
has increased. These substitutions are no doubt partly technological changes 
but price probably also played a part. There seems to be a wide range of 
costs and of profits among companies within the tin industry (Robertson, 
1960: pp. 328-29) Reduction of the price would almost certainly eliminate 
the less efficient and allow expansion of the efficient to take place.
Producers attempt to justify a relatively high price by arguing that
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lower prices would result in closures of marginal mines which still have 
large deposits of ore and cause exploitation of the richer deposits first 
leading to higher cost later, Robertson’s comment (1960, pp.329-30) on 
this appears sound: "The scope for substitution and economy in use appears 
to be so great that it does not look as if future generations would be 
penalised by some mild profligacy of the present generation"
If the object of the scheme is to maximize producers’ incomes their 
policy may be rational. The short-run price elasticity of demand may be 
fairly low allowing monopoly profits for some time. In the long run 
technical change may be so great a risk to tin use in the industrially 
advanced countries that long-run profits may, quite sensibly, be heavily 
discounted. The industry may rationally prefer to "snatch" quick profits 
than to "stick" in the terminology of Micks (1954: pp.41-54), But this 
would be not stabilization, but exploitation of the tin market. As far as 
the world is concerned such price stability as may be achieved by the 
scheme may in fact be bought dearly in terms of high average tin prices 
and misallocation through substitution of other metals where real costs 
of production are actually higher than tin and inefficient allocation of 
productive activity between the producing countries and between producers 
within the countries.
The scheme goes some way to meet the problem of misallocation as 
between countries. The basic quotas which were determined by market shares 
are supposed to be revised according to estimates of production costs, but 
modified to avoid the possibility of causing hardship in particular countries.
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According to Robertson:
"There is some evidence of flexibility in the quota system, 
as operated by the Council, A comparison of the basic quotas, 
which are related to the 1953 voting power, with the export 
quotas for the third quarter of 1959, shows that the Bolivian 
and Indonesian shares were cut by about 10 per cent, the 
Nigerian and Thailand shares were increased by about 15 and 
40 per cent, and the Malayan by a negligible amount « How far 
this process of changing quotas has been determined by 
strict economic criteria is uncertain, how far it could go 
without the additional pressure of lower prices on high-cost 
producers is equally uncertain," (1960, p, 352),
At least in theory, a combination of consuming nations' votes with low-cost 
producing countries' votes could lead to lower prices and larger quotas. 
Unfortunately even the low-cost producers may reckon to do better under 
the existing arrangements than if the scheme broke up or major producers 
left it. Since, in any case the producing member countries all fall into 
the category of underdeveloped countries, transfers of income to them 
via exploitation of monopoly powers may not be altogether undesirable. 
Questions on whether this is the most efficient way of giving aid however 
arise, but these will be discussed in a more general framework below.
In sum, the International Tin Agreement, at least in intention, 
fits with many of the criteria we suggested for ICA's, It has equal 
representation of consuming and producing countries. It is supposed to be 
concerned with moderation of short-term fluctuations and not with price
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support « It has mechanism for frequent adjustment of the quotas* which 
regretably seem to be required* and these quotas are supposed to be 
modified so as to improve productive efficiency. However* its buffer 
stock/fund* while larger than pre-war has proved inadequate to meet 
fluctuations in 1956 and 1958 and while it is true that prices for tin 
have been fairly stable during the course of its operation the part played 
by the Agreement here may have been small. One commentator, Boris Swerling* 
(1963* po 68) claims, "The current ceiling on tin prices is governed not so 
much by the price range specified in the Agreement itself as by the terms 
on which the US disposes of tin in excess of the present needs of the 
strategic stockpile," In any case the contribution this has made to 
moderating fluctuations in underdeveloped countries* export earnings from 
tin seems small. While having modest achievements on the stabilization front 
it has almost certainly helped to continue a high price relationship vis-a-vis 
other metals* probably preserved high-cost producers and may have damaged 
the long-term interests of tin producing countries by stimulating the hunt 
for substitutes.
The International Wheat Agreement, 1949 (Multilateral Long-Term Contracts)
This is probably the most important ICA of the post-war era. It 
represented an innovation in technique since it neither imposed quotas nor 
held stocks. Exporters and importers simply entered into contracts by which 
they agreed to buy or sell specified quantities at specified prices. These 
contracts deliberately did not cover all the trade in wheat, even of the 
participants. Thus neither production nor exports were controlled and a
420-
'♦free'* market remained whose prices could indicate long-run tendencies 
in supply and demand for wheat.
In common with all ICA/s it took some time to get started. The fifth 
International Wheat Conference in March 1947 introduced the scheme* but 
2 1/2 years elapsed before it. commenced operation in August 1949. Wheat 
is almost entirely exported by rich countries: USA* Canada, and Australia, 
Argentina is the only significant underdeveloped country exporter. The 
contribution to the solution of fluctuations in the exports of underdeveloped 
countries® exports could therefore only be negligible even if the scheme 
were highly successful. Thus its main interest is in illustrating the 
method of the multilateral contract agreement with a view to its extension 
to underdeveloped country exports.
The first question concerns the effect of the Agreement on the 
stability of wheat prices. The relevant price here has to be a weighted 
average for the prices at which trade took place under the Agreement and 
the "free market" prices over the same period. Over the period of operation 
of the first Agreement* 1949-53* this index shows a remarkable degree of 
stability when compared either with wheat prices in previous years or 
with prices of other commodities over the same period, (Harbury* 1954: 
pp. 83-88), In later years the difference is less striking. However it is 
still true that wheat prices remained relatively stable, A serious problem 
of separating the influence of the Agreement from the effects of the 
stock policies of the US and Canada on wheat prices remains. It is quite 
clear that both these countries were able to affect prices by their policies. 
Despite a falling market in the short period preceding the outbreak of the 
Korean War the ICA ceiling seems to have been regarded also as the floor by
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the exporting countries. Later when "free" prices rose in 1950-52 the 
operation of the Agreement stimulated consumption by enabling importers 
to satisfy much of their requirements at the Agreement ceiling and may have 
discouraged production during this period of severe shortage. Although 
wheat harvests in 1952 and 1953 were "bumper"* the Canadian Wheat Board 
deliberately kept its "free" export price high as a bargaining maneuver 
for the 1953 renegotiation of the Agreement. Thebelief that a new 
agreement would be at higher prices led importers to build up their 
stocks at the 1949 Agreement prices,Given the market dominance of the 
major exporting countries and the nature of government control of 
marketing in them over this period it would not be surprising if a great 
deal of price stability could be ascribed to them rather then the Agreement, 
After 1953 joint action by the Canadian and American wheat marketing 
agencies prevented wheat prices from ever reaching the 1953 Agreement 
floor price.
The UK* the major importing country* accounting for a third of 
wheat imports under the Agreement* refused to join the 1953 Agreement.
The grounds for this were too high a price and probably disagreement with 
the methods of adjustment. In a sense the UK was proved correct for the 
price trend afterwards was down and led to an enormous increase in world 
wheat stocks held by the exporting countries despite US surplus disposal 
on special concessionary terms. Only non-Agreement purchases in recent 
years by mainland China and by Russia have done anything to reduce these 
stocks by significant amounts.
The Inteniational Wheat Agreement seems to have only slender claims 
to have reduced instability in wheat prices and has co-existed with serious
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imbalance between supply and demand for a long period of time. These long 
run disequilibria are due to the internal policies of the national governments 
of exporting members, Tlie Wheat Agreements have not helped to get rid of these 
policies. Whether they would actually have been better or worse in its absence 
is not clear. What is fairly clear is that the Wheat Agreements have done 
little to solve the problems of wheat surpluses and their role in the 
achievement of relatively stable prices may well have been minor*
It may be that the experience of operation of these Wheat Agreements 
provides little information relevant to the possible uses of multilateral 
contracts for underdeveloped country exports. The characteristics of wheat 
coupled with the dominance of USA and Canada in its exportation may make 
it unique. Any lessons learnt may be incapable of generalization to other 
products and other countries. For what it is worth the experiences of the 
IWA are not a strong recommendation for extension of the system.
The International Sugar Agreement* 1953 (Export-Quotas)
The International Sugar Agreement took the traditional export-quota 
form which has been so widely criticized in the past. It did however have 
equal voting power allotted to the exporting and the importing countries.
But this balance of opposing interests was more apparent than real. The 
United States imported all her sugar requirements under preferential 
terms and consequently had little direct interest in a low free market 
price. The UK also obtained most of its imports* under the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement* at prices generally above those of the free market.
Moreover* Britaip had already entered into a very favourable contract for
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Cuban Sugar at relatively low prices and held large stocks of sugar in 1953* 
preparatory to ending rationing. Reductions in the free price would have 
involved the UK Treasury in embarrassing book-keeping losses in the values 
of these inventories. For both of these major sugar-importing countries 
political and economic ties with exporting countries within their respective 
spheres of influence made relatively high free market prices at least 
acceptable if not actually preferable. On the other hand* one major 
exporting country* Cuba* might well have been willing to see lower prices 
if this would have enabled her to sell the larger volumes of sugar which 
she could easily produce, The attitudes of the US and the UK governments 
illustrate an important practical feature of ICA's, This is the tendency 
for political considerations to overrule questions of efficiency and 
consumer interests.
The Agreement signed in 1953 ran for five years and a second 
Agreement was signed in October of 1958, This came to an end in 1961 
due to failure to reach agreement on quotas for Cuban sugar exports. The 
Sugar Council has remained in being and certain minor features of the 
agreement have continued.
The 1953 Agreement is a rather strange phenomenon. Price 
stabilization was a declared objective and quota provisions adjustable 
in accordance with current prices were introduced as a means of enforcing 
floor and ceiling prices for "free market" sugar, A more important objective 
however was a rescue operation for those sugar producing countries who were 
so unfortunate as to be outside the two preferential systems: the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement and the US import quotas for sugar, "Shelter for Sugar*s 
Cinderellas" was the title of an article on it in the Economist (1953:pp,583-5)
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It was an attempt to solve the problems of many of the relatively efficient 
tropical cane sugar producers. These problems were the result of the growing 
production of heavily protected beet sugar in the US and Western Europe* 
where consumption was increasing very slowly* and of the preferential 
trade relationships which the US and Britain had with important sugar 
exporting countries* particularly Cuba and the British West Indies* 'Ihe 
International Sugar Agreement of 1953 however did little to correct these 
distortions of existing production and trade in sugar. It did not even 
attempt to restrict increases in protected production as the 1937 Agreement 
had. The basic quotas when finally allotted showed little concern for 
efficiency. Indeed Peru which probably was one of the lowest cost producers 
in the world was given a relatively small quota and withdrew from the 
agreement insisting that * "Neither the United Nations nor the present 
Conference could press an efficient producer to become an inefficient one". 
(Quoted in Timoshenko and Swerling* 1957: p„ 338),
Effects on Instability
FAO and UN diagnoses of the reasons for instability of sugar markets 
are traditional ones of low short-run supply and demand e l a s t i c i t i e s . 1^ 
However* in a world wide free market these would not be sufficient 
explanations. Sugar production is geographically very widely dispersed so 
that annual average fluctuations in world production due to natural causes 
are unlikely to be very large. Income elasticities of demand for sugar are 
low hence cyclical fluctuations in consumption are likely to be very small. 
These conditions are consistent with some but not major instability in the
42
price of sugar. Moreover since the cause would normally be changes on the 
supply side* price changes would normally be compensating so that total 
proceeds in a ti’uly free market would be much more stable than prices a
The real reasons for instability in the "free market" price of 
sugar lie mainly in the narrowness of the market* its residual nature# in 
perverse reactions in the protective tariffs of importing nations and in 
the double market standard which faces producers and encourages dumping 
on the "free market," The International Sugar Agreement made no attempt 
to deal with these political and institutional causes of instability and
of surplus capacity in sugar production. Instead it concentrated on
palliatives for the residual "free market."
The price stabilization features included variable export quotas 
and production limits in quota countries. Export quotas were to be 
adjusted in accordance with estimates of market requirements and in the 
event of disagreement on the necessary adjustment export quotas would be 
automatically reduced by at least five per cent within ten days after the 
"world" price had stood below the 3*25 cents floor price for 15 consecutive 
market days, (Timoshenko and Swerling* 1957: p* 345), This is a very feeble 
weapon of control and once cuts have reached 20 per cent of basic export 
tonnages no further reduction is permitted. The price floor and ceiling of 
3o25 to 4o35 cents per pound (Cuban f.a.s. no, 4 sugar) were changed in
1956 to 3,15 to 4,0 cents. When the price went above the ceiling all quotas
were to be removed and exporters could be called upon to make their stocks 
available. Exporters were required to hold stocks equal to 10 per cent* 
later raised to 12 1/2 per cent of their basic quotas.
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The Executive Director of the Sugar Council claimed considerable 
success for the operation of the agreement,
"It can be fairly concluded from the course of free market 
prices since the coming into force of the 1953 Agreement 
that with the exception of the period from the end of 1956 
to the middle of 1957* when a combination of unusually 
unfavourable circumstances was encountered* the International 
Sugar Agreement has had a moderating effect on price 
fluctuations." (UN, 1958 a: p, 33),
The actual course of prices before and after the 1953 Agreement is sketched 
in Chart 12:1 along with a general index of food prices. The reader may 
judge for himself whether the Director's conclusion is particularly 
meaningful.
The floor price under the agreement was In danger in the initial 
period and it was largely because of Cubans willingness to restrict its 
crop severely that the price did not drop below it for any length of time. 
When the outbreak of the Suez Crisis coincided with a poor beet sugar crop 
in Europe exporters® stocks of cane sugar proved quite inadequate to meet 
the increased demand for "free market" sugar and prices rose higher in a 
shorter period than even in the Ko re mi War boom in commodities..
Given the political difficulties of the sugar market it is unfai r to 
criticize the inadequacies of the scheme.,, The m&joi troubles oi this market 
stem from the protectionist attitudes of the governments of the US and 
Western Europe... 1hese cause both structural Imbalance in. sugar oroduction 
and consumption sind force short-term instability on to the small "free 
m a r k e t I t  is small wonder that the scheme should have little success
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in this environment. Its performance emphasises the difficulties which ICA*s 
run into when the attempt is made to transfer them from the drawing board 
to the real world. The contribution, if any, which the International Sugar 
Agreement has made to stability in developing countries' exports seems no-libible
The International Coffee Agreement* 1962 (Quota)
The latest ICA is the Coffee Agreement & signed* after two years 
of negotiations* in September 1962 and operating at the present time. This 
is the only ICA which covers most of the market for a commodity of real 
significance to the economic well-being of many underdeveloped countries.
The main benefits go to Latin America* particularly the major producers*
Brazil and Colombia^ but several African territories are also much affected 
by the fortunes of coffee.
In terms of degree of short-term instability coffee ranks as a fairly 
stable commodity. The total value of coffee exports was relatively stable 
over the period 1948-57* fluctuations in coffee prices were about the 
average for commodities (UN^  1958: Table 13* p« 40). So that although the 
agreement talks of "excessive fluctuations in the prices of coffee" this 
is clearly not its main concern^ The chief worry of the producing nations 
has been the enormous surpluses* amounting in 1962 to around 2 years world 
shipments* and the steady decline in coffee prices from the peaks achieved 
in 1954-56.
Growth in consumption of coffee is in general very slow and very 
stable. The main cause of the slump in coffee prices was the surge in 
tree plantings which occurred as a result of the very high prices achieved
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in the early 1950*s« These in turn may have been due to restrictions on 
coffee production in Brazil which prevented rapid adjustments of output to 
the rising world demand as rationing restrictions were removed and the 
Korean War caused increased demand for stocks in importing countries. In 
any case since coffee trees have a gestation period of 4 or 5 years the 
increased supplies did not reach the market until after the pace of demand 
had slowed to more normal levels with the result that prices continued 
to fall under the pressure of the growing supplies from both Latin 
America and Africa, Several producers* agreements on a yearly basis started 
in 1957 designed to limit exports. At first they covered only Latin American 
countries but they were joined by French and Portuguese African dependencies 
in 1959 and by UK associated territories in 1960, They were merely agreements 
between producing nations and as such under grave risks of desertion by 
memberso The International Agreement of 1962 brought in importing countries 
which greatly improves the possibilities of enforcement of the quota 
restrictions.
The main stated objectives of the Agreement are: "(1) to achieve a 
reasonable balance between supply and demand on a basis which will assure 
adequate supplies of coffee to consumers and markets for coffee to producers 
at equitable prices# and which will bring about long-term equilibrium 
between production and consumption; (2) to assist in increasing the 
purchasing power of coffee-exporting countries by keeping prices at equitable 
levels and by increasing consumption," (UN# 1962 b: p» 7)
These make it clear that price support* not stabilization* as we have 
defined it* is the objective. If further confirmation is required Article 27 
gives it:
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"[The members] agree on the desirability of operating the 
Agreement in a manner such that the real inqome derived from 
the export of coffee could be progressively increased so as 
to make it consonant with their needs for foreign exchange 
to support their programmes for social and economic progress,"
(UN* 1962 b: Po 25),
Export regulation is by annual quotas which will be altered by the 
same percentage for all members of their basic export quotas in accordance 
with estimates of world demand and non-member exports. Quotas are also fixed 
on a quarterly basis to reduce seasonal fluctuations (Articles 30 and 31), 
Exports in excess of quotas may be made to areas where consumption is at 
present low* mostly underdeveloped countries and Eastern Europe, Importing 
countries agree to regulate imports from non-members to the average of the 
preceding three years. Revision of the basic export quotas is possible by 
two-thirds majority vote (Article 28),
For its evident purposes the Coffee Agreement seems well designed.
Its period of operation however is much too short for assessment of 
performance. At the present time (January 1964) coffee prices are very 
high* around 46 cents a pound compared with about 37 cents for the same 
grade (Brazil Santos 4) in 1960-61* and the Agreement is under attack from 
coffee buyers who are demanding that the quota restrictions be raised. The 
reasons for the present increase are bad harvests caused by weather damage 
to coffee trees. Coffee futures are at premia of 2-3 cents per pound 
indicating market expectations of insufficient supplies. The indications 
are that while the Coffee Agreement will probably do little to moderate 
fluctuations in export earnings around the trend levels it may succeed in
holding export earnings higher than they would otherwise be,
Con cl us ;i
This brief survey of the theory and recent history of ICA's suggests 
that unless there are radical changes in attitudes to such agreements the 
prospects that extensive adoption of ICA's will substantially reduce 
underdeveloped country export fluctuations are slights The reasons lie 
partly in technical difficulties* but even more in human fallibility and 
the trials and tribulations of achieving political accord
International Commodity Agreements and Economic Aid
In recent years growing concern over the decline in commodity prices
since the 1950'’s has led various individuals and organizations to suggest
the setting up of ICA's to restrict exports and raise prices to "fair"
72levels. Til© 1963 Coffee Agreement contains provisions for doing just this 
(1,6, prices are to be supported at 1962 levels as a minimum).. The purpose 
of this section is to evaluate these suggestions for using ICA®s as a means 
for transferring financial resources from rich to poor countries* Such use 
makes ICA's media for long-term economic aid in addition to devices for 
moderating price instability.
The suggested method is to set up ICA's with both producing and 
consuming country members to control trade in primary commodities* Target 
prices would be chosen* in accordance with certain criteria* which would 
be above long-run equilibrium prices and would yield monopoly profits to
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producing countries. In effect consumers in importing countries would pay 
a tax in the form of higher prices and the yield from this tax would accrue
to underdeveloped countries through raised export prices.
Growth of interest in and increased popularity of such a scheme 
arises from several factors* some of which have been mentioned above. 
Probably the most important reason is the decline in commodity prices from 
1950-51 to 1962, The fact that commodity prices have risen substantially in 
1963 and stand fairly high at present (January 1964) is felt to be a 
temporary improvement only* The fears that the true secular trend in the
terms of trade of underdeveloped countries is downward have not been allayed
by this recent increase in their export prices* These views gain support 
from such studies as FAO's Agricultural Commodities Projections for 1970 
(Rome* 1962) which indicates very slow rates of growth in demand for most 
agricultural exports of underdeveloped countries and from the theoretical 
analyses of such writers as Raul Prebisch* Hans Singer# Gunnar Myrdal# end 
Ragnar Nurkse,
This is reinforced by some disillusionment with the results of 
industrialization and of foreign economic aid, (Hirschman# 1963 a). The 
amount of foreign exchange saved by import replacement has probably been 
very small for most countries. Often the capital investment# raw material 
and professional skill inputs have cost as much or more than the saving,v 
particularly where the choice of industry has been at fault and continued 
high tariffs have been required to preserve an inefficient operation, Tlie 
small amounts of foreign exchange gained frommnufactured exports# 
invisibles# private foreign investment and economic aid emphasize the 
dependence of underdeveloped countries on their commodity exports for
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foreign-exchange resources for a long time to come * At present over 70 
per cent is earned by primary products, (UN* 1962: Table 1-6* p« 6)«
In addition to disappointment with the quantities of foreign aid 
and the prospects for increases in it# underdeveloped countries* leaders 
have often been resentful of the strings# both political and economic# 
which are tied to public capital. Financial resources which come via 
increased commodity prices# at least at first blush# seem to carry no 
comparable loss of sovereignty.
At the same time some well-wishers within the industrial countries 
feel that this is one way of increasing the flow of resources to 
underdeveloped countries at a time when opposition to aid programs is 
mounting in the US and Western Europe# particularly in the US Congress. 
Experience in the past seems to show that it is easier to help producers 
through distorting prices than by financial transfers,, It is easier to 
conceal the financial and real costs involved by using controls and price 
support policies in most countries. For other groups in the industrial 
countries such policies have the merit of distracting attention from 
their own high cost operations carried on behind a protective wall of 
tariffs and quotas# e.g,^ beet sugar producers and many textile producers.
For all these reasons pressure has been building up for demands for 
the setting up of ICA's which will support the prices of primary products. 
Three major questions arise: are such schemes technically and politically 
feasible? what contribution could they make to underdeveloped countries® 
foreign-exchange receipts? what would be the net benefits and costs involved?
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Technical Feasibility
In o r d e r  t o  t r a n s f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  s u m s  t o  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  
t h e  I C A ' s  h a v e  to b e  a b l e  t o  r a i s e  c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  w i t h o u t  
c a u s i n g  s u c h  a  s h a r p  fai l in t h e  v o l u m e  o f  s a l e s  t h a t  t o t a l  e a r n i n g s  a r e  
r e d u c e d .  T h i s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  c o m m o d i t i e s  b e  c h o s e n  f o r  w h i c h  t h e r e  a r e  f e w  
s u b s t i t u t e s #  e v e n  i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l o n g  r u n #  a n d  w h i c h  f o r m  a  v e r y  s m a l l 
p a r t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  o f  c o n s u m e r s  i n  t h e  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s .
C o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  m a k e  f o r  a  l o w  l o n g - r u n  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  d e m a n d  s h o u l d  
p r e v a i l .
T h e  c o m m o d i t i e s  c o n t r o l l e d  r e q u i r e  t o  b e  m a j o r  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  t h e  
e x p o r t s  o f  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  o f  m i n o r  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  
u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r y  import; e x p e n d i t u r e .  F u r t h e r *  t h e y  s h o u l d  p r e f e r a b l y  
n o t  b e  e x p o r t e d  o r  e v e n  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s .  If l a r g e  a m o u n t s  
o f  a c o m m o d i t y  h a p p e n  t o  b e  e x p o r t e d  b y  s o m e  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s  as is t h e  
c a s e  f o r  g r a i n s #  w o o l #  c o t t o n  a n d  v a r i o u s  m i n e r a l s  a m o n g  o t h e r s ,  p r i c e  
s u p p o r t  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  t r a n s f e r s  a m o n g  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  w h i c h  w o u l d  
p r o b a b l y  b e  u n a c c e p t a b l e  to c o n s u m i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  I f  t h e  g o o d s  a r e  p r o d u c e d  
w i t h i n  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s #  b u t  n o t  e x p o r t e d #  t h e  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  d e m a n d  
f o r  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r y  e x p o r t s  o f  t h e s e  c o m m o d i t i e s  w o u l d  b e  r a i s e d #  
p e r h a p s  t o  s u c h  an e x t e n t  t h a t  n o  i n c r e a s e  in p r i c e  c o u l d  b e  m a d e  w i t h o u t  
r e d u c i n g  e x p o r t  p r o c e e d s *
A n o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n  w h i c h  is e s s e n t i a l  to a n y  I C A  is r e l a t i v e l y  
h o m o g e n e o u s  c o m m o d i t i e s »  I f  t h e r e  a r e  m a n y  g r a d e s  a n d  q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  
p r o d u c t s  a n d  i f  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  t e n d  t o  v a r y #  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  
p r i c e s  b e c o m e  i m m e n s e l y  complic ated, .
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These might be described as necessary conditions. Certain others 
are at least desirable for the setting up and continued operation of such 
ICA's* The commodities selected probably should be ones for which prices 
have been tending downward. This establishes a better claim for sympathetic 
treatment and the memory of higher prices in the recent past may modify 
consumer resentment of increased prices* A relatively static distribution 
of production probably gives better prospects for continued success than 
would exist with an industry where rates of increase and relative 
efficiencies differed widely between producing countries -= particularly 
where high cost and stagnation exist in the largest producing nation. Smaller 
countries take less heed of the effect of increase in their own output upon 
world prices and are therefore difficult to bring under the discipline and 
restraints of an ICA* Finally# producing countries have to be willing and 
able to control production. Otherwise stocks will pile up and form a 
constant threat to the scheme*
The Choice of Commodities
These conditions# outlined above# place rather severe limits on 
the choice of commodities for ICA's for this purpose* The vast majority 
of commodities have to be excluded for one or more of these reasons.
Products such as cotton# sisal# jute and rubber face relatively close 
competition from synthetics and from technical changes# e.g.# use of 
bulk*handling instead of jute bags or changes in agricultural techniques 
which reduce demand for twine made from sisal* Other commodities compete 
with domestic production in the advanced countries: vegetable oils and
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oil seeds* non-ferrous metals# citrus fruits* tobacco and even sugar. The 
market for vegetable oils is in any case so complex that price and 
quantity regulation would be frightfully difficult. The same is largely 
true of non-ferrous metals where competition is not only close between 
each* but also with reclaimed scrap metal* Tobacco# citrus fruits# cotton^ 
wheat0 and feed-grains* meats and wool are produced and exported by rich 
industrial countries as much as by underdeveloped countries. Some of them* 
Cage* wheat and grains are substantial imports of some underdeveloped 
countries. This is even more true of rice where the largest part of world 
trade is among underdeveloped countries themselves and income transfers 
here would be pointless* Petroleum is exported by both rich and poor# but 
mainly by poor countries* It competes with domestically produced fuels in 
most industrial countries# e,g«* domestic petroleum# natural gas* coal* 
hydro-electric power* and% in a small way# nuclear power. But the price 
elasticity of demand is quite low and consumption is probably correlated 
highly with income. Transfers through increased petroleum prices should 
thus be technically possible and fairly equitable in the incidence of 
the extra cost on consumers® On the other hand petroleum has not suffered 
in the general decline in commodity prices and the oil countries have been 
very fortunate compared with other underdeveloped countries, However* if 
a UN agency were allowed to tax oil revenues and distribute the income 
among underdeveloped countries as economic aid the incidence of the tax 
would be borne mainly by the rich® Oil producing underdeveloped countries 
could be compensated for any losses they incurred. Petroleum is so 
enormously important in world trade that a small increase in price should 
yield a large sum of money*
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Apart from the discussion of petroleum all of these points have 
been made by Pincus, He selects five crops as possessing the attributes 
required for this type of ICA, These are coffee* tea^ cocoa, sugar and 
bananas (pp* 232-35), Between them they provided about 4,6 billion dollars 
of underdeveloped country exports in 1960, Pincus suggests that properly 
designed schemes for these products could increase the flow of financial 
resources to underdeveloped countries by some $ 700 millions rising to 
$ 900 millions per annum over the next six years allowing for projected 
increases in world demand. These estimates* from Pincus (1964, p. 236) 
are based on target prices as compared with average prices during 1961 
shown below:
E a r n injgs
Average 1961 Price Target Price Distr^utl^n of Increase
Coffee 30,7 48,0 55
Cocoa 21 ,8 29*0 10
Tea 48*5 64*0 13
Sugar 3*9 5*0 17
Bananas 3*8 4*7 5
Ihe expected increase in earnings results from assumed demand and projected 
growth in demand over the period* The distribution of the increase between 
commodities reflects their relative weights in international trade and the 
degree to which their prices can be raised without stimulating too much 
substitution [based on FAO (1962) calculations of price elasticities of 
demand]
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Distribution of Gains and Burdens
As can be seen from the third column of the table the main benefits 
would accrue to coffee producers* Because of this the distribution of the 
increased export income if allowed to go directly to producing countries 
would be about 67 per cent to Latin America^ 23 per cent to African 
countries and 10 per cent to Asia* Brazil alone would gain 40 per cent 
of the increase® About 26 underdeveloped countries altogether would gain 
something but foi* most the gains would be very small®
The burden of the transfers would be shared between the US, Western 
Europe* and the rest of the developed world in the proportions 40 per cent,, 
40 per cent* and ten per cent. (Pincus* 1964: p, 238). Within Europe the 
UK would carry a heavier burden because of relatively high imports of tea* 
sugar and cocoa compared with the rest of Western E u r o p e . ^3 Soviet bloc 
countries import very little of these commodities at present and 
consequently would contribute little to the costs of the scheme unless 
they alter internal policies toward consumption®
Are Such Schemes a Practical Possibility?
In principle there is little doubt that schemes confined to 
commodities such as the five discussed above could be made to transfer 
resources to underdeveloped countries. Private international cartels 
have been able to do this in the past* in petroleum for example, without 
any disatrous consequences, Pincus points out (1964, p* 233) that, 
"Producers of some commodities have benefited from high fixed prices for
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many years* and in certain cases* have also been able to enjoy a steady 
growth of markets." Clearly there is no necessary contradiction between 
monopolistic prices and growth in demand because demand depends not only 
on price but also on income* population expansion* changes in taste or 
technology and the prices of substitutes among other less important 
determinants. However* it so happens that the products which seem 
suitable* on other counts* for control do not face relatively auspicious 
prospects for growth even at constant prices. (FAO* 1962)* Raising their 
prices will mean a fall in sales volume and perhaps in the long run in 
the total value of exports.
A legitimate question arises as to the time period over which 
underdeveloped countries would wish to maximize their export earnings.
It may be that increased earnings over the next five years would mean 
lower earnings over a 20 year period because of the increased stimulation 
to substitution® In this case the optimum policy for say coffee exporters 
would depend on the degree to which long-term returns were discounted®
Since knowledge of each one of the determinants of demand is uncertain 
the question of which policy will maximize export proceeds over the 
longer run* say 20 years is an extremely difficult one to answer. Even 
the price elasticities of demand are highly uncertain* Elasticity 
estimates simply measure changes in quantities demanded which appear 
historically related to changes in prices® Even assuming them to be 
accurate for the past there is doubt as to their applicability in the 
future* particularly when the situation has been radically changed by 
the introduction of an ICA® The companies which import and process products 
like coffee and cocoa are now faced by a situation where* if the ICA is
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successful,, p r i c e s  w i l l  b e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p r i c e s *  T h i s  is q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  a K o r e a n  o r  S u e z  p e a k  i n  p r i c e s .  It 
m a y  m e a n  a g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  s t i m u l u s  to r e s e a r c h  f o r  s y n t h e t i c  s u b s t i t u t e s .  
I f  t h i s  s h o u l d  b e  so t h e  l o n g - r u n  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  d e m a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e  
to I C A  p o l i c y  c o u l d  b e  m u c h  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  r e g r e s s i o n  
a n a l y s i s  o n  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a ®
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  it m a y  b e  t h a t  t h e  b r e a k - t h r o u g h  t o  a " s y n t h e t i c
c o f f e e  e s s e n c e "  w i l l  c o m e  anyway, w h a t e v e r  t h e  p r i c e .  In t h a t  c a s e  coffee
p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  c o u l d  v e r y  r a t i o n a l l y  a i m  f o r  m a x i m u m  p r o f i t s  in t h e  
s h o r t  run, f o r  t h i s  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  m a x i m i z e  p r o f i t s  i n  t h e  l o n g  r u n  as 
w e l l .  As w a s  r e m a r k e d  i n  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g  s e c t i o n  t h i s  is a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  b y  H i c k s  ( 1 9 54: pp. 4 1 - 5 4 )  in r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  f i r m s  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o m p e t i t i o n ®  G i v e n  t h e  h i g h  r i s k  
o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a n g e s  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t i n g  d e m a n d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  
u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  m a y  b e  p e r f e c t l y  j u s t i f i e d  i n  w e i g h t i n g  present 
e a r n i n g s  m u c h  m o r e  h e a v i l y  t h a n  f u t u r e .  I f  t h e y  d o  t h i s #  t h e y  w o u l d  w i s h
in t h e i r  o w n  i n t e r e s t  to r e s t r i c t  e x p o r t  q u o t a s  s e v e r e l y  s o  as to r a i s e
p r i c e s  t o  v e r y  h i g h  levels a n d  use t h e  p r o c e e d s  to f i n a n c e  d i s v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
B u t #  as t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  of i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  is r e q u i r e d  f o r  e n f o r c e m e n t  
o f  ICA's,, in r e a l i t y  s o m e  c o m p r o m i s e  p r i c e  w i l l  b e  w o r k e d  o u t *  n o t  t h e  
p r i c e  w h i c h  m a x i m i z e s  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r y  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .
T h e r e  are m a n y  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w h i c h  c o n f r o n t  t h e  operation 
o f  s u c h  ICA''s. T h e  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  t o  b e  p r e p a r e d  to a c c e p t  a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  a m o u n t  o f  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  self-restraint,.. T h e y  m u s t  agree* 
n o t  o n l y  t o  l i m i t  t h e s e  e x p o r t s  t o  a m o u n t s  f i x e d  b y  m a j o r i t y  v o t e s  o f  t h e  
members,, b u t  a l s o  to l i m i t  s t o c k s  a n d  production,. T h i s  is l i k e l y  to b e
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very difficult for countries where production is scattered* administration 
weak and ill-informed and facilities for holding stocks inadequate. Many 
of the Central American coffee producing countries conform to this 
description® It is likely also to be true of several of the newly independent 
African coffee producing areas® Moreover* because they are small and often 
low-cost producers the motivation for restriction Is less clear® For one 
of these countries a doubling of exports would not lower prices one iota. 
Thei*e is thus a persistent tendency for such small nations to break the 
agreement ®
Such break aways are particularly likely to occur when a country has 
an exceptionally good harvest and has inadequate storage for the surplus.
As was noted above this happened with Argentina in the 1933 Wheat Agreement, 
Faced with a bumper harvest the temptations proved too great. If we agree 
that a heavy discounting of the future and heavy weighting of the short r u n  
are likely to make underdeveloped countries act restrictively in concert we 
should note that it may also make them succumb to the temptation of a 
high return from a bumper harvest® The farmers may be so powerful that t h e  
government could not risk restrictive measures* particularly crop d e s t r u c t i o n  
in these circumstances® In Pakistan acreage restrictions cm jute c u l t i v a t i o n  
proved unenforceable® (MacBean# 1962: p® 254)®
Apart from these difficulties of enforcement upon producing countries 
there is the question of obtaining the cooperation of the importing countries 
The Coffee Agreement of 1963 was made possible by a change of heart by the 
USe This was largely due to political considerations® The complaints of the 
Latin American nations about low coffee prices were very bitter and may have 
been felt to be a threat to the Alliance for Progress and relations with
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Latin America in general® Moreover* prices were low# by recent historical 
standards® Subsequently* however# opposition grew "A sharp rise in coffee 
prices is threatening a break down in the year-old international coffee 
agreement®e® The Administration is reluctant to push legislation for 
implementing the coffee agreement,®* In its absence# the agreement may lapse 
after next April, (New York Times^ January 22nd# 1964)® In fact# quotas 
were subsequently eased and prices held at or below 48 cents a lb for 
Brazil Santos 4« The Agreement has since been implemented.
However# it is not legitimate to infer from the Coffee Agreement or 
the past acceptance of domestic policies of agricultural price support 
that similar policies can be easily instituted to effect income transfers 
to underdeveloped countries® The agricultural sectors have generally been 
well organized and for historical reasons usually over represented in the 
legislatures of most western democracies® This has enabled them to obtain 
concessions which foreigners could scarcely expect®
On the other hand* some industrial countries may approve of this type 
of arrangements M, Couve de Murville* Foreign Minister of France is reported 
in the j^june^ s (January 23rd# 1964) as having said, "The solution of an 
increase in world price levels would remove the reason for subsidies, 
establish a balance between producer and consumer costs and help the 
underdeveloped countries," Actually# these remarks were made in a defence 
of the system of levies on agricultural imports adopted by the European 
Economic Community (EEC), If world prices were raised the levies would 
disappear ot* become very small® But these levies are likely to be 
imposed mainly upon temperate zone exports which compete with EEC 
agricultui'© and ICA's on these would give little help to underdeveloped
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countries* 'Oie extension of similar policies to underdeveloped count: 
exports might be expected to reduce some of France®s present burdens 
to her support price policy for several Franc Area exports (coffee* 
groundnuts* cotton and bananas) to France*
For the US* Britain and Western European countries other than France 
enthusiasm for ICA*s is likely to be very cool* Since it is they who 
would pay the price it is their cooperation which is vital* They have 
had a long and fairly disillusioning experience of the working of ICA^s 
both between the Wars and recently* On the other hand^ they may reckon 
that the cost is not really very great and under pressure from the 
Afro-Asian countries may give way to the demand for some form of ICA®s.
The question then arises of what effect this would have upon their 
normal forms of economic aid* Would not this lend another weapon to 
the opponents of financial aid to underdeveloped countries? Would it 
perhaps also draw attention away from the system of tariffs* internal 
taxes and quota restrictions which at present reduce underdeveloped 
country exports to the industrial nations? Only the most speculative 
answers can be given to these questions*
Pincus points out (p„ 233) that "If we accept the thesis that it will 
be difficult to achieve further increases in foreign aid^ then the 
alternative [to ICA*s] is not genuine*" But* need this be accepted as 
ruling out increases in foreign aid or preventing improvements which will 
increase the benefits from roughly the same amounts of money? If the 
climate of opinion were set against straight economic aid is it really 
likely to be any more favourable to ICA*s with their many unattractive 
features?
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ICA*s are both inefficient and an inequitable means of raising and 
allocating economic aid* Allocation of the increased revenues would be 
simply on the basis of which commodities underdeveloped countries 
happened to export and what degree of price support had been negotiated 
between producing and consuming countries. They would thus discriminate^ 
on the basis of the Pincus suggestions^ in favour of relatively rich 
Latin American countries and would give little or no aid to extremely 
poor countries such as Pakistan and India* Since allocation would be 
arbitrary there is no reason to suppose that aid would accrue either 
to those with the greatest need or those best prepared to make use of 
it* While it may well be true that foreign aid in the past has not 
conformed closely to either of these criteria it is also true that 
there has been a considerable increase in awareness of the flaws* 
Improvements in planning and supervising techniques which should lead 
to higher productivity in aid have taken place as a result of 
experience gained in running this entirely novel program*
lCA*s are also inequitable in the means used to raise the funds & 
They tax countries on the basis of their imports of ICA controlled 
commodities* These may not be closely related to national or 
per-capita incomes among industrial countries* Within each country the 
method corresponds to a regressive tax since it raises prices equally 
to rich and poor^ nor are these commodities ones which are consumed 
proportionally more by the well-to-do* Admittedly fiscal adjustments can 
be made to correct this^ but whether they would is another question,
A further question arises on the receipt of the increased revenues* 
These may accrue either to private citizens^ exporting firms^ traders or
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producers* or the government may tax away the increase probably through 
export taxes and use it for its own purposes* If it is allowed to pass 
back to producers it may encourage further production which will be 
difficult to control and threatens the continuance of the scheme. If it 
accrues to the government it may be used for current expenditures or for 
developmental purposes* The donor countries would have much less*, if any 
control over the use of the funds* They would suspect^ possibly with 
justification^ that they would disapprove of some uses of this aid,.
The suggestion that. îCA®s would be more easily obtained than 
equivalent increases in financial aid seems very dubious,. It seems very 
unlikely that the US Congress would wish to see aid transfers made by 
a system which would reduce their control over allocation between 
countries and the purposes to which it is put* The riders added by both 
House and Senate to recent Foreign Aid Bills restricting the discretion 
of the Administration in both of th^se aspects point clearly to 
Congressional desire to retain fairly tight control over aid funds* There 
is little reason to suppose that administrations or legislatures in the 
other industrial countries apart from Franco* would differ significantly 
over this issue.
The prospects for obtaining ICA's wh.ich could significantly increase 
the flow of resources to underdeveloped are very noor. liven if
they could be achieved there are grave risks that fhe costs would outweigh 
the benefits. These costs may be summed up as:- allocative inefficiency.^”’^ 
inequitable distribution and collection of funds,* increased risks of 
synthetic substitution and inefficient use of development funds, i'hty
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are admittedly speculative conclusions and we have noted arguments tending 
the other way, but in our view the balance of probabilities lies against 
their acceptance»
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Chart 12 :T
World Sugar Prices [Free Market) 1948-60 and 
Index of Prices of Food Exports from Underdeveloped Countries
" a
Food
6--
50 53 54 57 58
Logarithmic scale on vertical axis. Sugar Agreement started January 1954,
Sources: Sugar prices: annual average based on New York Coffee and Suoar
Exchange daily spot quotations; FAO, Commodity Review J962 (Pomc^ 19^ 2) 
Table 18, "..... .............
Pood price Index: UNj, World Economic Survey, 1962 (New York, 1962;
Table 2-6,
A chart of monthly sugar prices 1948-58 in UN, Sugar Co^f^ i'encc^  1958 
(Ceneva, 1958) p, 36, shows a very similar picture.
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Tnfrlo 12 •; ]
I ndex Numbers for Pid.ce, Volume and Hutput,
Tin and Rubber 1953 to 1960 in Malaya,
Tin and Lead 1952 to 1960 .in Bolivia
Pro-Tin Agreement Post"Tin Agreement
Malaya 1952 1955 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Index Tin Price 100 97 101 106 102 101 109 108
Index Rubber Price ' " 100 100 169 143 132 119 150 160
Index Tin Volume 100 108 109 110 100 66 64 99
Index Rubber Volume 100 100 109 106 108 111 127 121
Index Tin Value 100 103 107 116 101 64 70 107
Index Rubber Value
-
100 99 175 150 143 129 187 194
Bolivia
Index Tin Price 127 100 100 98 106 99 98 106 106
Index Lead Price 123 100 104 111 118 109 88 76 76
Index Tin Volume 92 100 87 89 86 87 58 67 58
Index Lead Volume 126 100 77 80 91 110 96 93 90
Index Tin Value 116 100 83 79 82 79 50 7.3 59
Index Lead Value 155 100 79 89 107 118 83 70 68
.Source, , International I'inaneial Statistics (^ larcli 1962) country iniqes 
for Malaya and Bolivia,
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Footnotes to Chapter 12
1, OECD, 1963; Pincus, 1964.
2, WiC; .. completely inelastic supply a price elasticity of 
demand above a critical level of -0,5 will ensure that total proceeds will 
remain more stable if price is allowed to fluctuate freely in response to 
changes in the quantity supplied rather than if price is hold fixed. If 
the reader bears in mind that, with a unit price elasticity of demand a 
small change in quantity supplied will be completely offset by an equal 
percentage change in price in the opposite direction, this point will
be intuitively evident and is susceptible to a s.iirplo algebraic proof.
If price is held constant a small increase ir quantity will result tn
an increase in proceeds ~ P,dq, T" price is allowed to more freely T h e
same change in quantity will cause a fall in price and, i F elasticity of
demand is less than unitv, n decline in pi'oceeds ■= -f.dp ■ (dnf - dq, dp),
but dq,dp-^0 for very small changes 
. . If F dq - -Qdp - dqP
then 2dqP = -Qdp
/  * d c f 1
' (f - 2
3, ICi's are define ’ bi this stuc-y us whic! h; ve both
producer and con .turner membership .h].’., In lin.t roujidy C'ntrur' to the
princip;o^ of the lîevajia. C v.r? er \ ’• i ch h id on 1 v n . ■ • icm'-nrrs
have been g) n oul> pa.^'s in- ;\ ■ - r-t ■ i:.. ' i I ' • • > •
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conform to optimal criteria than TCA's* Tea and coffee are the only important 
post-war agreements which involved only producers.
4. By almost all the international agencies concerned with this 
field and an impressive list of professional economists, among tliem:
Colin Clark, Condliffe, J, K„ Galbraith, E, 8, Mason, IMa Myint,
W. W, Riefler, J, M, Keynes and Sir Roy Harrod, See Swcrling, 1963: p,778,
5. We recognize that where there are other serious distortions 
of the market, due perhaps to national policies in either producing or 
consuming countries. Certain types of distorting effects produced by an 
ICA might lead to a "second best optimum" and thus a net Increase in 
economic welfare, but it is very difficult to think of examples where
a corrective distortion would be politically feasible and reconcilable 
with our declared objective of price stabilization without interference 
with trend* We shall take this point up again in considering ICA’s 
as instruments for long-term aid*
6. A good brief summary of this debate can be found in 
Scammell, 1954, and MacDougall, 1954.
7* Swerling, 1953: pp, 780-81* (The recent slii ft in consumer 
demands to instant coffee may have had some effect in this direction on 
Brazil's stocks of coffee).
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8„ See above Chapters 4 and 10 which give some discussion of 
the relative effects on capacity of fixed versus stable prices in the 
content of jute and cotton,
9, The sums involved would be enormous in comparison with say 
the resources of the World Bank or the annual flow of international aid. 
Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen (1964) have revived the idea of creating 
international currency units, "bancor", to pay for commodities to bo held 
in stocks under IMF control. Their ambitious and stimulating proposals 
aim at the solution of three problems at one blow': shortage of international 
liquidity, prevention of declining terms of trade for commodities and 
moderation of short-term fluctuations in commodity exports* For reasons 
given below in the section "Stabilization of a Commodity Index", my view 
is that their scheme would do little towards the moderation of export 
fluctuations of underdeveloped countries,
10, UN, 1951: para, 71; UN, 1953 ; paras*142 -47; and Mason,
1946: pp* 225-27.
11. Bilateral contract agreements can be regarded as a special 
case of the more general type of scheme*
12* If demand and supply reach equilibrium above the ceiling 
price of the agreement consumers satisfy a large part of their demand at 
the ceiling price. As opposed to buying at the equilibrium price this 
represents a saving of real income equal to the quota times the difference
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between the equilibrium price and the ceiling price. Depending on consumers' 
income elasticity of demand for the commodity their residual demand may be 
increased thus pushing the residual free market price above the overall 
market equilibrium price. If the commodity were by any chance an "inferior 
good" this income effect would actually be stabilizing. Since the proportion 
of income spent on one commodity in the main consuming countries is 
generally very small and the income elasticity of demand very low the 
total effect on demand is likely to be negligible. An analogous argument 
exists for sales at the floor price and also for effects on supply 
elasticities,
13, Advocates include Goudriafin( 1932) and other books and 
articles; Graham (1937), and elsewhere; Bennet (1949) discussed it at 
some length and a more recent enthusiastic advocate is Harmon (1959); 
finally a memorandum on the subject, Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen (1964) 
was presented to the UN, Conference on Trade and Development.
14, See Chapter 2 above,
15, Accounts of agreements in this period can be found in
ILO, 1943; Davis 1946; Yates, 1943,
16, Leagweof Nations, 1937: quoted in UN, 1953: pp, 29-30
17, Davis, 1946: p, 220; Knorr, 1945, and Bauer, 1948,
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concur with Davis on rubber regulation. Similar views on tin are expressed 
by Knorr, 1945 a«
18, See Swerlingj 1963: pp„ 66-67* and Farnsworth* 1956: pp,227-28
19« UN* 1958: p., 121 „ "The testing of the Agreement floor price 
has thus far been avoided* since Canada and the United States have preferred 
to accumulate large stocks rather than unload them in the free market,"
20„ Cuba actually voted for a relatively high volume and low 
price during the discussions on the Sugar Agreement, Tiiiioshenko and 
Swerlingj 1957: p„ 336.
21, FAQ* 1953: p, 70; UN, 1953 a; UN, 1958 a; Annex 1, p, 31,
22, The idea has been put forward in the name of the European 
Economic Community (rather than accept the obligation to eliminate barriers 
to underdeveloped country exports to community members) and a well reasoned 
exposition of its possibilities has been made by Pincus, 1964: pp. 227-41.
1 am grateful to Mr, Pincus for stimulating discussions with him on this 
subject, OECD, 1953: pp, 31-34* also suggests them as a supplement to 
financial aid,
23, FAQ* 1962 a: Part I* p, 23* gives data for this statement.
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24, The 1963 Coffee Agreement permits dumping in special areas 
of low consumption* i.e., Soviet bloc and underdeveloped countries. But 
likely sales would be small and the price reduction severe. It is hardly 
likely to be a very efficient safety valve,
25, In the case of sugar there might actually be some 
improvement if an overall international scheme superceded the present 
preferential bloc arrangements. In the other cases existing discriminatory 
treatment is minor.
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Chapter 13 
International Compensatory Finance
Disatisfaction with the risks and frustrations of commodity agreements 
and increasing realization of the difficulties of negotiating them in 
sufficient numbers to make a significant impact upon underdeveloped 
countries' export instability has led to a search for other ways of 
tackling the problem. This has given rise to a series of widely 
discussed proposals which can be embraced under the name of international 
compensatory finance schemes.
Probably the first systematic proposal of this type was F.G. Olano's 
"Mutual Insurance Scheme" outlined in an appendix of UN, 1953; pp. 97-102.
In recent years several varieties have been discussed widely in meetings and 
official documents of the UN, the IMF and the Organization of American States 
(GAS) and several academic publications,^
All of these schemes have certain features in common. They make no 
attempt to influence either the prices or quantities of commodities exported. 
All seek to compensate underdeveloped countries at least for some part 
of a decline in their export prices or proceeds below a previously defined 
"normal" trend. All involve the provision of a fund out of which compensation 
is to be paid. The permutations and combinations of other features of the 
schemes, however, present an awe-inspiring variety and complexity. These 
stem from their different answers to the following questions on how such 
schemes should operate. Should they be bilateral, regional or global? Should 
the scheme be based on insurance principles with premia payments and outright 
grants of compensation or on a revolving fund basis with loans and repayment?
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Should rich countries participate as recipients of compensation as well 
as contributors of finance? Should the schemes be related to a single 
commodity, selected commodity exports, all merchandise exports, total 
export earnings or the net balance of payments position? Should the schemes 
lead to long-term transfers of economic aid from industrial to underdeveloped 
countries? Should this become their ;najor feature?
In this study we can only attempt to outline and discuss those 
features which seem to have gained the widest support in the official 
documents or which have some special interest. It would take too long 
and involve too much repetition to cover all of the many detailed 
proposals. In the exposition below we shall follow mainly the outline 
scheme suggested by the group of experts appointed in 1961 by the UN to
2
consider compensatory financing and a variant suggested by OAS experts.
Proposals of UN and OAS Experts
Both sets of proposals are for general, not single commodity schemes 
and aim at regional or worldwide membership rather than bilateral schemes. 
Both suggest the prescription of an automatic formula for the determination 
of the norm for merchandise exports for each member country. Both choose 
a moving average of the values of exports for the preceding three years 
for this practical norm, A shortfall in export proceeds is thus measured 
by the difference between the current year's export proceeds and the 
unweighted average for the preceding three years' exports. Compensation 
for a shortfall is only partial. In the OAS version compensation takes 
the form of stabilization credits which are granted to a country for 
two thirds of the amount by which its official export receipts for any 
year fall short of its average export receipts for the preceding three years, 
with a limitation that the total credits received by the country may not
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exceed twenty per cent of its average export receipts for the preceding 
three years. These credits have to be fully repaid. In the years 
following the credit the country must apply two thirds of any surplus 
of export receipts over the average for the preceding three years to 
repayment. If at the end of three years it has not been fully repaid the 
outstanding debt must be converted into a "deferred credit" which must 
be repaid in two years, one half in each year. Interest is also charged 
on all credits so the OAS scheme involves no long-term aid and confines 
its aims to moderation of short-term fluctuations in foreign exchange 
availabilities for individual underdeveloped countries. The initial 
fund is to be of the order of $1 . 8 billion, $1. 2 billion from the rich 
countries and $. 6 billion from the underdeveloped countries. Only 
underdeveloped countries are eligible for credits.
The schemes suggested by the UN, on the other hand, partake of 
the nature of social insurance and aim at income redistribution from 
industrial countries to low-income underdeveloped countries as well as 
moderating fluctuations in foreign-exchange availabilities. The UN group 
of experts suggest two general types of scheme. The first involves 
payment of premia and outright grants for shortfalls in exports. Premia 
would be based on export proceeds for underdeveloped countries and on 
national income for rich countries. This would ensure that benefits to 
underdeveloped countries would exceed costs while for richer countries 
the opposite would hold. In addition they suggest that shorfalls of 
less than, for example, 10 per cent, 5 per cent, or 2,5 per cent should not 
qualify for grants from the insurance fund. Since the tendency is for 
the richer nations to have more stable export earnings (though as Chapter 
2 above shows the difference is less than the UN experts imply) they should
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have fewer claims on the fund than most underdeveloped countries. Between 
them these features should ensure secular transfers from rich countries to 
poor countries in the normal course of operations of the scheme.
The second general type proposed would give countries drawing rights 
on a credit fund. These would have to be repaid only if the fortunes of 
the country permitted. If its exports in subsequent years exceeded the 
average for the preceding three years the country would make repayments 
from some fixed proportion of these surpluses. At the end of a stated 
period (three to five years) any outstanding debt would be turned into a 
grant. This type lies somewhere between the first UN plan and the OAS 
scheme.
More recently Raül Prebisch has suggested a form of compensatory 
scheme designed to compensate declining trends in underdeveloped countries' 
terms of trade (UN, 1964). This would represent the extreme opposite to 
the OAS type of scheme and becomes a proposal for long-term economic aid. 
Conforming to our usual schema we shall defer discussion of the use of 
compensatory finance as economic aid and concentrate first on evaluation 
of the potential usefulness of the technique for dealing with fluctuations.
In the following section we assume the operation of a scheme with a revolving 
fund and no net long-term transfers.
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A Critique of Proposals for Automatic Compensatory Finance (CF) Schemes
Of the international schemes which we have so far outlined 
compensatory financing has probably the most appeal to the general economist.
It involves the least interference with the allocation functions of the 
price mechanism, but is compatible with more specific measures to deal 
with special problems. A CF scheme can form a framework within which 
ICA's can operate and national governments can make their own internal 
arrangements to combat national or sectoral effects of export fluctuations 
wihtout risk of balance of payments crises.
If it is true that the main fear of underdeveloped countries 
concerning fluctuations in their export proceeds is the general internal 
instability created and the effects on ability to maintain steady 
investment and rapid growth the target of moderating fluctuations in the 
foreign exchange available from sales of commodity exports seems the correct 
one. In any case if a national government should feel greater concern for 
the impact on a region or a particular section of the population moderation 
of fluctuations in total foreign-exchange receipts would be of assistance.
It would make it easier to provide specific help to such regions or groups.
For example, deficit financing for subsidies to such people would be easier 
when the effect of this on the balance of payments is partially compensated 
by a credit from the fund. The international obligation to repay in 
subsequent years should assist underdeveloped countries' governments in 
carrying out the necessary but unpopular fiscal adjustments to absorb 
surplus foreign exchange proceeds in years of high export proceeds. This 
ordering of events is probably more feasible for most underdeveloped countries' 
governments than the more puritan policy of saving first to accumulate 
reserves to be used later to support income and imports in the lean years.
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Another advantage possessed by CF schemes over ICA's is that they 
promise greater continuity of operation. As we have argued above* ICA's 
are under almost constant threat of breakdown. This uneasy state stems 
from the frequent temptation to some producer nations and some consumer 
nations to desert the scheme for the possibility of selling or buying 
unrestricted quantities of the commodity at favourable prices, A single 
unusually large harvest in a country with poor storage facilities may 
be sufficient to end an ICA. No similar danger exists in a revolving fund 
type of CF scheme. It is true that there may be some risk of individual 
nations defaulting on the repayment of a credit. This could occur either 
where a country's exports suffer a serious decline over several years or 
where the government acts irresponsibly. In either case under the OAS 
proposals the sum involved could not exceed 20 per cent of the average of 
the three preceding years' exports. If the trouble were a disastrous 
decline in the value of exports for which the country itself could not 
be held responsible the probability is that other aid from the IMF or 
national governments would be made available to assist recovery* provided 
the nation was doing its best to solve its economic problems* by cutting 
down imports and checking consumption. There would then be no need 
for the country to leave the scheme. Indeed willingness to remain in it 
and co-operate in paying off its debts would undoubtedly assist a debtor 
country to obtain other help. Equally a country which has acted 
irresponsibly or has defaulted deliberately might well find it extremely 
difficult to obtain credit elsewhere in the future. It is doubtful 
whether the short-term gain of a maximum credit of 20 per cent of the 
average value of the previous three years' exports would be worth the risks 
involved in defaulting. In any case defaulting by individual nations need
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not do permanent damage to a scheme which should include large numbers of 
countries. It would merely increase the costs by a relatively minor 
amount.
The main attraction of CF schemes to underdeveloped countries' 
governments probably lies in the automatic nature of the credits. There 
are no "strings" of a political or economic policy nature attached to CF 
loans. The only obligation is repayment. There is a history of friction 
and resentment in the dealings between several Latin American governments 
and the IMF. Generally the Fund has insisted on evidence of the government's 
willingness to undertake measures to restore balance of payments 
equilibrium before agreeing to provide foreign exchange to help finance 
balance of payments' deficits. Evidences required by the Fund have often 
involved politically sensitive issues such as control of domestic 
inflation through attempts to balance the government's budget, to raise the 
cost of borrowing and to refuse wage increases to powerful groups of organized 
labor. Many underdeveloped governments have felt that their political 
and economic problems were not fully appreciated by the outside experts 
of such institutions as the Fund and the US Export-Import Bank.
Consequently any measure which brings financial assistance automatically 
when exports decline while leaving the national government free to follow 
its own policies is very welcome to them. Other members of the scheme 
may, of course, view such countries' satisfaction with some alarm. Their 
participation may substantially increase the risks of default on 
repayment of credits and so raise the costs of the scheme.
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But there may be political gains for the rich countries in 
automaticity. At present they alone bear the odium for demanding fiscal 
and monetary responsibility from borrowers. In a CF scheme all members 
have the motive of keeping costs to a minimum and preserving the 
continued operation of the scheme (i.e., if it does help to reduce the 
damage which it is claimed export instability inflicts on underdeveloped 
countries). Consequently potential defaulters risk the censure of 
other underdeveloped countries as well as of the chief creditor nations. 
Any warnings or advice would come from the administrators of the 
institution rather than from the US or Western European countries. This 
could help in a small way to reduce tensions between rich and poor nations 
which may well become an increasing threat to world peace in the immediate 
future 0
It is at least arguable that new governments may learn more from 
their own mistakes than from resentfully following the advice of 
outside experts, hence as long as the discipline of the need to repay 
credits is maintained there may be a strong case for complete freedom of 
action for the recipient government to do as it wishes with the sums of 
money credited to it by the ÇF scheme.
Most of the arguments for international compensatory finance are 
premissed upon the view that underdeveloped countries' balance of payments 
problems are mainly due to export instability and that this in turn is 
due to circumstances beyond the control of their governments (UN, 1961; 
pp. 3-15). Neither of these assumptions is entirely valid. According to 
an IMF Report (1963, p. 17) "fluctuations in other items are, indeed* more 
important than export shortfalls in the causation of payments deficits." 
Fluctuations in imports are, according to the Fund Report, the most
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notable cause of deficits. In 29 underdeveloped countries out of 56,
3imports proved to be more unstable than exports in the period 1946-58 
which at least confirms the possibility that they could be a more important 
generator of deficits than exports.
The other assumption, implying that countries which have experienced 
high export instability have done so because of natural disasters or 
because of fluctuations in rich countries' demands, is clearly false 
for several of the countries which have experienced the greatest degree of 
export instability. In Iran, Iraq, Argentina, Bolivia and Indonesia, 
government policies of nationalization or particular commercial policies 
have been major causes of fluctuations in export proceeds (Chapter 2 above). 
Boris Swerling (1963; p 69) comments, "Primary producing countries have 
also by their own actions set in motion serious commodity disturbances.
One need recall only Castro's actions in expropriating sugar properties, 
the Iranian oil episode, nationalization of Bolivia's tin mines, or the 
bearing of political crises in the Congo and the Rhodesias on copper 
supplies 0"
Even if it were true that many export shortfalls were the result 
of their own governments' policies would this constitute a strong argument 
against automatic compensatory credits for two thirds of the export 
shortfall? This ceases to be an economic question and becomes one of 
morals and politics in which this writer claims no particular competence 
to judge. However, there are some economic aspects of the problem. The 
shortfall may be the deliberate result of the government's policies, e.g., 
they may have placed an embargo on certain exports or imposed high taxes 
on production or export or have subsidized consumption of the commodities 
at home. Alternatively the shortfall may be the unintentional and unforeseen 
result of other policies of the government, e.g., they might not 
anticipate difficulties in nationalizing and operating industries formerly
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run by expatriate concerns. The first is a chosen position and it may be 
legitimately argued that no government can justifiably claim compensation 
for a deliberate self-inflicted injury. The second is not a chosen 
position, but the result of a miscalculation. Given the high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding most economic decisions there may be a good case 
for providing compensation here.
In practice it could often be extremely difficult to distinguish 
between such cases. Probably, as long as the CF scheme is of the revolving 
fund type, with only partial compensation and near commercial rates of 
interest on borrowed money, the question becomes relatively unimportant.
The incentives to manipulate exports in a deliberate attempt to obtain a 
credit would be too small to tempt any rational government. Consequently, 
the fact that export instability is often the fault of the sufferers 
themselves may not constitute a particularly serious attack on the 
principle of automatic compensation. There are other more powerful 
objections.
* Prospects for Moderating Fluctuations by CF Schemes
The assumption that changes in export earnings form the major 
determinant of changes in the foreign exchange available to the economy 
and in domestic stability is more crucial. If it should be wrong the 
possibility arises that a policy of tying compensatory payments to 
fluctuations in merchandise export proceeds may actually destabilize the 
total foreign-exhcange receipts of the economy and perhaps increase the 
danger of domestic instability. In economies where expatriate concerns 
dominate the export sector there may be a considerable difference in
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magnitude and even direction of change between export proceeds and the f o r e i g n  
exchange which actually becomes available to residents of the country. (See 
Chapters 3 and 8 above). Changes in capital flows and invisibles are not 
always in the same direction as changes in merchandise exports. Clearly 
between these effects there is a distinct possibility for some countries that 
fluctuations in the net foreign exchange available to residents ( including 
the government) may be made greater rather than less by the operation o f  an 
automatic formula geared to merchandise export proceeds alone.
On top of this there is the probability that* even without these 
complicating features* the mere operation of a scheme of automatic credits 
and repayments geared to a formula such as the unweighted average of t h e  
preceding three years exports may do little to stabilize the gross foreign 
exchange receipts and in some variants may even destabilize them. The 
evidence for these statements lies in a lengthy series of statistical 
exercises carried out by IMF officials. (Fleming* Rhomberg and Boissonneault* 
1963) These consisted of comparisons between the relative a p p r o x i m a t i o n s  
to a norm* representing an "ideal" degree of smoothing out of export 
fluctuations* of actual exports 1951-59 and of the "foreign exchange 
availabilities" (merchandise exports plus credits and/or minus repayments) 
under variants of the OAS proposals. The chosen "ideal" norm was a 
five-year-moving-average centred on the middle year. But since some 
automatic adjustments of imports to exnort change is normal and since most 
CF scheme aim only at partial compensation the norm or target level for 
comparison of CF schemes was set at a level which* "lies between the actual 
exports and the ideal norm in such a way as to diverge from actual exports 
by two thirds and from the ideal norm by one third." (1963* p. 127)
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The criteria of performance were; (1) "the ratio of the standard 
percentage deviation of availabilities from the target level for all years and 
all countries to the standard percentage deviation of actual exports from the 
same target*" (p. 126) and (2) a subordinate auxiliary criteria of a "smoothness 
ratio" which compares the available exchange receipts under the scheme relative 
to a five-year-moving-average of these same receipts (corrected for the deviation 
of target availabilites from the ideal norm) to the actual exports relative to 
their five-year-moving^average* the ideal norm (similarly corrected) (p. 128)* 
For both ratios closeness to zero is the aim* over unity means a worsening of
Their conclusion was that straightforward versions of the 0A3 s< 
and the several variants with which they experimented would achieve only very 
partial success in apprcximating to these targets.
"The extent to which any of the schemes bring export availabilities 
closer to the target is limited. . . Some of the variants examined have 
deviation ratios in excess of unity* showing that availabilities under 
these schemes deviate from the target more than do actual exports* i.Co 
more than availabilities in the absence of any scheme whatsoever,» The 
deviation ratio of the O.A.So scheme as drafted is as high as 0.92* and 
the lowest deviation ratio for any scheme is no lower than 0.77." (1963* 
pp. 132-3)
On the second criterion they fared a little better. All of the schemes 
improved the smoothness of available receipts somewhat (between 0.66 and 0.87).
It comes as something of a surprise to discover the very slight 
improvement in stability of even gross receipts which automatic schemes of the 
OAS type make„ Nor does this slender benefit come entirely without costs for 
the credits do bear interest and countries do have to meet interest obligations 
at close to market rates on their outstanding debts to the scheme.
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It may be supposed that the system of repayment which involves 
repayment of "deferred credits" over the 4th and 5th years may be responsible 
for the trouble* e.g. these obligations might fall Oïï years of relatively 
poor export proceeds. However this explanation accounts for little of the 
discrepancy. Even when the terms of the scheme are varied so as to make all 
repayments contingent upon surplus exports the degree of stabilization is 
scarcely improved in the historical examples. (1963* Table 5* Scheme No. Ill)
The greatest degree of stabilization of gross receipts is achieved 
when several features of the OAS scheme are varied. Instead of using the 
unweighted average of the three prec ding years' receipts as the practical 
norm the current and two preceding years are used and given weights of 0.5 
for the current year and .25 for the other two. Instead of the 20 percent 
of average receipts limit on debt* no limit is applied. Instead of the 
repayment system prescribed by the OAS scheme* repayments are all made 
contingent upon exports exceeding the norm in subsequent years. With these 
features a deviation ratio of .772 and a smoothness ratio of .706 are 
achieved* compared with results of .921 and .830 for the OAS proposals. 
However* these benefits are achieved at a higher cost in terms of 
indebtedness; 1.46 billion dollars at the end of 1958 compared with 1.29 
billion under the OAS scheme. (1963, Table 5* Schemes nos. 132 and 3) This 
does not seem a very great cost if the improvement in stability is regarded 
as significant.
These results suggest that the faults in the OAS proposals lie in;
The chosen practical norm which fails to approximats sufficiently the "ideal" 
norms ; the fairly low limit on total indebtedness, 20 percent of average 
export receipts over the last three years; and the system of repayment
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which together with the debt limit is likely to force some repayments in 
of export shortfalls» These results* of course assume that all countries 
take all the credits they are entitled to and make all the repayments requirec 
by the rules of the scheme. But perhaps few governments could resist t h e  
temptation to borrow sums to wiich they are given an automatic entitlements 
T h e y  would almost always be subject to some internal political pressure to 
accept» Accordingly the assumption may be fairly realistiCe
Assuming an interest cost of 4 percent per annum for outstanding 
credits these schemes* once under operation* would impose an interest b u r d e n  
of from around 25 to 108 million dollars per annum on the recipient
4
underdeveloped countries depending on the rules of the scheme. (Fleming*
Rhomberg and Boissonneault* 1963: Table 5) Would the very modest improvement 
in the stability of gross export receipts be worth this cost? When the f a c t  
that it is net export receipts which really matter and that theiî path need 
not follow closely that of exports is also weighed* it becomes yet more 
dubious» When we add that the case for believing that severe damage is 
inflicted in underdeveloped countries by export instability is not proven 
the case for automatic CF schemes falls to the ground. Should underdeveloped 
countries pay these relatively high and certain costs for what are at best 
very dubious benefits? The whole basis of the argument for C F  is that it 
should assist the maintenance of domestic stability and economic growth»
But the ability of all the variants of automatic schemes* analyzed by the 
Fund experts* to moderate fluctuations in even their proximate target of 
gross export receipts was extremely poor» Given that this proximate target 
is by no means uniquely correlated with the more important target of net 
foreign exchange available from merchandise exports and all other sources 
to government and residents* and that relationships between this and domestic
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income stability and growth are also complex* varied and incompletely 
understood* it is clearly possible and even likely that automatic CF schemes 
may do more harm than good»
Another possible objection to CF schemes is that they do little for 
the particular groups hit by export instability. This is true^ An effective 
ICA would deal directly with the cause of the problem and help the producers 
and all connected with the damaged industry. However* as previously explained 
CF schemes do not rule out ICA®s and they enable the national government to 
take internal remedial action should it wish to do so. The OAS scheme actually 
contains a provision for making assistance available to a country where a 
fluctuation hits one major export industry severely while because of offsetting 
changes in other exports the total export receipts may not qualify for aid» 
(1962 po 9) This particular objection is not an important criticism of the 
CF idea»
Easily the most damaging criticism of CF schemes is the likelihood of 
poor performance of attainment of their main objective* moderation of 
fluctuations in the foreign exchange available to individual underdeveloped 
countries» This together with the interest cost must greatly reduce their 
attractions to underdeveloped countries'* governments. Nevertheless* the 
fact that they interfere so little with market incentives makes them on 
the whole much less undesirable than ïCA®s. The question remains as to 
whether automatic CF schemes have any contribution to make which could not 
be achieved by use of their own reserves and of the arrangements of the IMF 
as described in their recent publication on Compensatory Financing of Export 
Fluctuations. (1963)
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The IMF Alternative
This report takes issue with the Crawford Report's calculations which 
purport to show the inadequacy of the Fund's arrangements for meeting the 
problem of export fluctuations. The Crawford Committee accepted the Fund's 
view that its financial resources were ample to meet any reasonable demands 
for assistance from primary producing countries. (UN* 1961 p. 27) However# 
the Committee's calculations appeared to show that on a basis of full use 
of 125 percent of their IMF quotas either seven (1948-59) or eleven (1948-58)
countries out of 31 underdeveloped countries would have been unable to meet
cumulative shortfalls in exports without dipping into their own reserves to 
an intolerable extent.^ (Ibid.* Table 4 and pp. 24-25 of text. A reduction 
of 30 percent of reserves was taken as the critical amount.) Assuming only 
SO percent of quota available the numbers would have increased to 16 countries 
out of 46 for shortfalls from average export proceeds of the previous three 
years in the period 1953°59o^(UN* 1961: Table 6 and p. 25 of text. Similar 
opinions are expressed in UN* 1965: pp. 55-56* Table 10 and p. 49.) Tlie 
Committee also felt that access to Fund quotas was too uncertain and could 
not give underdeveloped countries sufficient assurance of the continued 
availability of foreign exchange to enable planning for steady economic 
development. They concluded. (1961* p. 21)
'"The fact remains that the decision rests with the Fund;
in preparing a long-term development programme a country can­
not count with certainty on its ability to draw on the Fund's 
resources in the event of need/'
Because of their disatisfaction with the quantitative adequacy and certainty 
of Fund arrangements for dealing with underdeveloped countries' export problems 
the Crawford Report urged the case for CF schemes. One of the UN experts*
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MoLv Qureshi set out in Appendix II of the Report suggestions for improving 
the Fund arrangements in this respect. He suggested (1961* p« 81) that*
"to offset fluctuations in the export proceeds of primary 
producing countries* compensatory drawings and repayments 
should be determined automatically by a formula. The 
fluctuations should be measured as a deviation from a trend 
which can be estimated on the basis of a moving average of 
three preceding years. A shortfall in export proceeds in 
any year should entitle the country concerned to draw from 
the Fund automatically up tOg say* . . . 125 percent of its 
quota. 0 0 Subsequently* when export proceeds are above the 
trend* the excess earnings should be used automatically to 
repay the earlier drawings.
The Fund has discussed these two problems of automaticity and adequacy
in three studies which have been referred to several times in this book. The
7most recent sums up their present position. (Fleming and Lovasy* 1960; Fleming* 
Rhomberg and Boissonneault* 1963 and IMF* 1963) This Report emphasizes the 
arbitrary nature of the assumptions which necessarily underly any statistical 
analyses of such a complex concept as the quantitative adequacy of 
international liquidity. Fund facilities are intended to supplement rather 
than replace national reserves and other sources of finance. International 
liquidity is required to deal with deficits arising from all causes not 
merely export fluctuations. Indeed other items in the balance of payments 
are more important causes of deficits. However* it is unlikely that the 
separate causes should coincide on any one occasion. The Report recalls that 
the three year moving average norm chosen by the UN experts is a very fallible
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predictor of trend (and hence likely to exaggerate shortfalls and the 
compensation required)» In the view of the Fund no automatic formula can 
give us good a prediction of export trend for any country as can expert 
analysis of the historical data and the underlying causal relationships.
If a formula must be used then it should be based on the values of current 
exports and the two preceding years with weights of 50 percent to the current 
and 25 percent to the other years» Using this formula and several different 
measures of available international liquidity the Report gives its own 
analyses of reserve adequacy and reaches more optimistic conclusions than 
those of the UN» (IMF* 1963: pp. 15-22 and Table I)
The Fund concludes:
"The quotas of many primary producing countries* taken 
in conjunction with a reasonable use of their own reserves* are 
at present adequate for dealing with export fluctuations such as 
have occurred during the past decade» In those instances* however* 
where adjustment of the quotas of certain primary exporting 
countries* and in particular of countries with relatively small 
quotas* would be appropriate to make them more adequate in the 
light of fluctuations in export proceeds and other relevsvant 
criteria* the Fund is willing to give sympathetic consideration
g
to requests for such adjustment»" (IMF* 1963: pp. 23-24. Ethiopia* 
Jordan* Libya. Malaya* Peru* Tunisia and Viet Nam have or will soon have 
increased quotas (p. 19)»
The Report also points out (pp. 24-25) that:
"Under the present policies and practices on the use of the 
Fund resources* any member is given the overwhelming benefit
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of the doubt in relation to requests for transactions within 
the gold tranche* and the Fund's attitude to requests for 
transactions within the first credit tranche is a liberal one 
provided the member itself is making reasonable efforts to 
solve its problems/’
The Report adds that the Fund has often given much greater assistance than 
this in the higher credit tranches and through stand-by credit arrangements» 
Moreover* assisted members often find that Fund help leads to aid for both 
short and long-term purposes from other public and private sources» In 
future the Fund has decided that members with export shortfalls "can expect 
that their requests for drawings will be met where the Fund is satisfied 
that
(a) the shortfall is of a short-term character and is largely 
attributable to circumstances beyond the control of the member; and
(b) the member will co-operate with the Fund in an effort to find* 
where required* appropriate solutions for its balance of payments 
difficulties." Such assistance would normally be limited to 25 percent of 
quota. To carry this out the Fund is prepared to waive the limit on 200 
percent holdings of the member's currency. (IMF* 1963: pp. 24-25)
The Fund continues to reject both aspects of automaticity: both the 
formula for judgment of shortfalls and the granting of credits without any 
consideration of the overall balance of payments position, current indebtedness* 
economic policies of the country or causes of the shortfall. (1963: pp. 9-14)
At the eleventh session of the UN* Commission on International Commodity 
Trade in May 1963 this IMF Report and a Report by a UN Technical Working group 
on CF schemes (UN* 1963) were considered. The conclusions of this Commission 
were that* by and large* the new action by the Fund would meet most of the
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requirements of primary-producing underdeveloped countries for a greater
measure of certainty on the availability of compensatory finance for short
term export fluctuations. "While not excluding the possibility that other
steps might have to be considered* the Commission decided to keep under
review the implementation of new IMF policies leaving their effectiveness
9to be tested by experience." (This is a quotation from the World Economic 
Survey* 1962* Vol. I » p„ 57* which was actually published near the end of 
1963 and so included a report of the CICT Conference.)
Given our view that the importance of the difficulties created by 
short-term Instability has not been established and that the proposed CF 
schemes might well do more damage than good* this compromise position and 
"wait and see" attitude* seems quite the most appropriate in the current 
state of knowledge»
Compensatory Finance and Economic Aid
As was noted above* CF schemes may be designed which have the further 
objective of effecting transfers of resources from the richer countries to 
the less developed primary-exporting countries» If devised in the form of 
an insurance system the annual premia required from the members can be 
adjusted so that most of the costs are borne by the richer nations and most 
of the direct benefits received by the underdeveloped country members» 
Similarly if the scheme is in the form of a fund from which countries may 
borrow to finance export shortfalls repayable only if adequate surpluses are 
generated within the next three years the fund will require annual 
contributions to keep it solvent» These may be drawn mainly from the 
industrial nations» Under either method if there is a minimum shortfall to 
be exceeded* e»g» 5 percent of average exports before any compensation will
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be paid* underdeveloped countries should tend to be favoured because of their 
greater tendencies to export instability» These were the suggestions of the 
Crawford Report (UN* 1961) and repeated in all the subsequent UN publications 
dealing with CF schemes.
The Crawford Report noted (para. 126) that because of this net 
transference of resources from industrial to underdeveloped countries it was 
particularly important* "or even essential* that the countries receiving 
assistance from compensatory schemes should make the best use of such assistance 
But* the experts go on to give their opinion that they do not "consider that 
it is either practicable or desirable to trace whether compensation has been 
specifically used for particular objects of expenditure^ or that it is desirable 
otherwise to impose detailed conditions on the use to be made of compensatory 
payments. It must be primarily the responsibility of the receiving country 
to make effective use of the assistance made available to it." (UN* 1961; 
para» 131)
Such longer-term aid as results from these arrangements is thus 
transferred automatically in accordance with the value of a country's exports* 
their degree of fluctuation and the particular time pattern of shortfalls and 
surpluses over average export receipts» Its expenditure is under no formal 
external control» Within the overall group of underdeveloped countries this 
type of aid would not necessarily flow either to those most in need of it or 
those best able to make use of it. Such a method of distributing resources 
is therefore open to much the same objections as were raised against ICA's 
for long-term aid» However* CF systems of the L/pvs described would probably 
have little or no distorting effect on the normal production and distribution 
of commodities and would tend to distribue aid over a wider group of countries 
than ICA's. Table 13.1 sets out the net amounts which would have been received
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by members of a hypothetical scheme if it had operated from 1953 1961 and 
had had no effect on the flow of trade. On an area basis South and South 
East Asia would have recieved most* 47 percent of the total# Latin American 
countries* 31 percent* Africa and the Middle East would each have received 
around 9 percent» Greece and Spain would have shared the remainder. The 
individual countries which would have received the major benefits are: 
Pakistan* 16 percent; Indonesia* 14 percent; the Federation of Malaya#
10 percent; Colombia* 9 percent; and Brazil* 7 percent. Many underdeveloped 
countries would receive nothing.
This scheme was in fact the one most approved by the UN Technical 
Working Group. "Among the schemes providing compensation fully in the form 
of loans examined by the Group it was felt that Scheme No^ 5 in Table 1 was 
the most worthy of further consideration by governments/' (UN* 1963% p. 25)
The rules governing it were: (1) the norm was the arithmetic average of
the three preceding years; (2) a minimum deduction of 2.5 percent of average 
exports before any fluctuation becomes eligible for compensation;
(3) compensation and repayment on a basis of 75 percent of any shortfalls or 
surpluses over the norm; (4) repayments required within the three subsequent 
years if exports exceed the norm. Amounts then outstanding became grants,
(UN* 1963: Table I p. 23) The overall cost of the transfers would have been 
about $2 billion over the period or an average of $220 millions par annum, 
(Table 13.1 total)
As shown in Table 13.1* the distribution of aid under this scheme 
would be wider and more equitable than under the ICA schemes described in the 
previous chapter. Since it is geared to all merchandise exports while ICA's 
are only feasible for a small group of commodities this is always likely to 
be true. However* relatively small changes in the rules or in the time period
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covered can result in sharp changes in the pattern of aid\^  (UN, 1965: Annex 3# 
Table I* schemes 3 and 15 illustrate this point») It remains true that aid of 
this kind is unrelated to the more rational criteria of need and ability to 
make use of it» Moreover it is completely free of supervision* hence the donor 
countries have no guarantee against its misuse»
These attributes of arbitrariness and lack of control over use are
11
features which are likely to prow objectionable to the industrial nations. 
Attempts at the 1964 UN Conference on Aid, Trade and Development to obtain some 
longer-term compensatory finance were opposed by industrial countries^ but 
a compromise proposal to pass the idea to the International Development 
Association for further consideration was passed* "The measure calls for the 
IBRD to study the “feasibility' of an arrangement to provide longer-term aid 
to help the poorer countries avoid disruption of their development programs," 
(New York Times* May 28th* 1964)
While economically superior to ICA's the transfers are more explicit and 
perhaps because of that less easily approved by governments of industrial 
countries»
A further objection is that a scheme of the type described could present 
some temptation to debtor countries to arrange their exports so as to minimize 
their repayments* Table 13:2 illustrates this possibility* In year 4 the 
country's exports fall to $130 million which enables it^ after a 2 1/2 percent 
deduction* to borrow 75 percent of the shortfall from the norm^ This makes 
a compensatory receipt of approximately $18 million» In year 5 its exports 
equal the norm so no repayment is made» In year 6 exports exceed the norm by 
$13 million which enables a repayment of $7 million* In year 7 exports 
continue thfir rising trend reaching $170 million which would enable the
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country to repay the whole debt* But by merely delaying some of its exports 
for a month or two so that they fall within calendar year 8 the country could 
reduce its export proceeds in year 7 and avoid repayment of all or part of the 
outstanding debt* As shown in the alternate 7, all that is required is to 
stock pile or delay payment on exports worth $16 million to avoid repayment 
of the outstanding $11 million entirely*
With risks of manipulation* arbitrariness in methods of distribution 
of aid and no controls against waste or abuse of the funds such schemes offer 
only a very inefficient method of giving aid to underdeveloped countries.
That they offer a better method than ICA's is their sole recommendation. It 
is also true that from the burden sharing point of view they can be made more 
equitable* e.g* if contributions to the fund from industrially developed 
nations are based on national incomes adjusted for differences in per capita 
incomes» But on almost all counts it seems undesirable that longer-term aid 
should be geared to such arbitrary criteria,
Compensation for Declining Terns of Trade or Import Capacity
One UN study (1963: pp. 44-49) considers briefly some suggestions for 
aiding countries which have been hit by a secular decline in their real export 
proceeds relative to other nations* Such schemes would be concerned with 
trends* not short-term fluctuations* The choice of a base period and of the 
correct variable to insure are not easy questions to answer. Possible variables 
are: export prices# export proceeds or the terms of exchange between 
underdeveloped countries' exports and their imports^ among others. Export 
proceeds and in some cases prices are easily manipulated through government 
policy so care would have to be taken to keep compensation low enough to avoid
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attracting countries’ governments to such actions. If export or import prices 
are to be used serious difficulties arise regarding the base year for indices 
and the methods of weighting the various prices over time when the proportions 
of different commodities in total exports and imports keep changing. "The 
pricing of a basket of goods over time* when the composition of the basket 
and the quality of the goods are both subject to material change# is a 
notoriously difficult matter." (UN* 1963% p. 47) Any particular year chosen 
as a base would always favour some countries over others and it would be 
extremely difficult to obtain agreement on this question.
The UN Group found that its members could not agree on whether there 
was any point in pursuing long-term compensatory finance ideas any further.
Some felt that enough had already been said to demonstrate the "impracticability 
and inappropriateness of" adapting CF schemes to this purpose. Others felt 
it should be kept open for further discussion, (pp. 48-49)
Any scheme which geared the raising and distributing of funds to 
long-term changes in the terms of trade would be subject to the same objections 
of arbitrariness and risks of inequity and inefficiency.. Given the scarcity 
of long-term aid to underdeveloped countries any wastewould be deplorable. 
Nevertheless a CF scheme to compensate developing countries for declining terms 
of trade is warmly recommended by Raul Prebisch in his Report to the UN 
Conference on Aid* Tradeand Development, He says g "developing countries 
experiencing a deterioration in their terms of trade should have easy access 
to additional international resources in order to achieve the objective of 
maintaining their purchasing power," (Piebisch# 1964s p, 99) It can readily 
be appreciated that there is some moral justification for compensating a 
country for a misfortune which lies beyond its control for much the same
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reasons as lead most rich countries to provide unemployment benefits and 
public assistance to their citizens in times of misfortune» If it could be 
shown that a country's development program was in danger as a result of an 
unforseen and unavoidable decline in proceeds from exports long-term 'soft" 
loans might be made availablOo Indeed such a scheme seems to be what the 
UNCTAD had in mind when it passed a resolution instructing the IBRD to 
consider the “feasibility* of longer-tem aid in such situations. If the 
details can be worked out such a scheme would seem much more satisfactory than 
ICA's as media for long-term aid. In principle it comes closer to gearing 
aid to the over-all situation of a country and its economic plans than to the 
sole criterion of export performance. This seems to be a much more sensible 
approach than automatic CF schemes or ICA*s.
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Table 13:1
Beneficiaries under UN Scheme 5. (1953-61)
Area Net Benefits $m** Area Net Benefi
Latin America 615 Middle East 185
Argentina 34 Cyprus 5
Bolivia 69 Syria 58
Brazil 138 Turkey 43
Chile 2 UaAaR* 79
Colombia 178
Dominican Republic 2
Ecuador 7 South South East Asia 936
Haiti 21 Burma 38
Mexi CO 21 Cambodia 3
Nicaragua 5 Ceylon 8
Paraguay 4 Federation of Malaya 194
Uruguay 134 India 78
Indonesia 269
Africa 175
Korea 15
Algeria 120
Pakistan 320
Central African
Republic 2 Philippines 11
Congo (Leopoldvilje) 25
Greece 8
Ivory Coast 2
Spain 81
Niger 8
Iganda 16
Upper Volta
Total Aid $2,000 million
'Compensatory Payments less contingent repayments adjusted fo assumed 
repayment to same extent of loans still outstanding.
Source: UN. 1963% Annex 3% Table 1
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Table 13:2 Scheme 5
Year 1 2 3
Exports 150 160 160
Norm* 3 year moving average 
Payments of Compensation
Contingent Repayments
4 5 6 7
Alternate
(7)
130 150 160 170 (154)
157 150 147 150 ISO
18
0 7 11 (0)
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Footnotes to Chapter 13
I» See UN, 1953; UN^ 1D61; UN, 1962: Vol. 1; UN, AU6: c; 1962 6^
UN g 1963; UN* 1963 a; IMF* 1963; ÜAS, 1962; Fleming and Lovasy^ I960; Fleming,
RJiomberg and Boissonneault* 1963; iiazlewood* 1959; Morgan,, 1962; Posthmna,, 
1961; Stem* 1963„
2» UN^ 1961 and OAS, 1962,
3, CoppodCg 1962: Appendix* Table A-2 gives the data for this
statement 0
4,. Calculated froin Fleming* Rhomberg and Boissoneault » 1963%
Table 5» The suggested interest cost for the OAS scheme is 1/2 percent 
above a U,S. three month Treasury Bill, (OAS, p,. 15.,)
5, Ibidfg Table 4 and pp» 24-25 of text, A reduction of 30 
percent of reserves was taken as the critical amount.
6» UN g 1961: Table 6 and p» 25 of text. Similar opinions Fie
expressed in UN^ , 1963: pp. 55-56% Table 10 and p., 49,
7. Fleming and Lovasy^ 1960; Fleming,., Rhomberg and Boissonneault*
1963 and IMF, 1963.
8. IMFg 1963: pp. 23-24, Ethiopia,, Jordan* Libya# Malaya^ Peru, 
Tunisia and VietNam have or will soon have increased quotas (p.. 19).
9» Tbis is a quotation from the World Economic Survey^ 1962% Vol.
p, 57g which was actually published near the end of 1963 and so included a
report of the CICT Conference.
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10« UN, 1963: Annex 3, Table I, schemes 3 and 15 illustrate thi;
point
11» Attempts at the 1964 UN Conference on Aid# Trade and Development 
to obtain some longer-term compensatory finance were opposed by industrial 
countries# but a compromise proposal to pass the idea to the International 
Development Association for further consideration was passed. " T h e  m e a s u r e  
calls for the IBRD to study tne 'feasibility; of an arrangement to provide 
longer-term aid to help the poorer countries avoid disruption of their 
development programs(New York Times# May 28th# 1964)
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Chapter 14 
The Role of the Industrial Countries
The role of the industrial countries as the main generator of the 
export instability which afflicts underdeveloped countries has often been 
emphasized in the literature. Because of this it is frequently recommended 
that they assist in smoothing out such instability by maintaining stable 
growth at home and providing assistance to underdeveloped countries. Since 
it is clear that all the advanced industrial countries wish to maintain 
stable growth for their own sakes the first part of this seems a rather 
superfluous recommendation. However, it may not even be particularly 
relevant. It is by no means clear that fluctuations in the production of 
the industrial countries have been the main, or even a major, cause of 
fluctuations in the export earnings of underdeveloped countries. But
there are other aspects of their economies which may exacerbate fluctuations
in the export of underdeveloped countries. The object of this chapter is 
to evaluate various ways in which existing policies of industrial countries 
may make it more difficult for underdeveloped countries to achieve stable 
export earnings and to consider what improvements could be made.
Fluctuations in Industrial Countries and Commodity Imports
Several studies argue that fluctuations in the national product of 
the industrial countries are responsible for instability in underdeveloped 
countries' export earnings, Ragnar Nurkse claimed that evidence from a 
U,No study (UN, 1952: Tables 1  ^2) of "The parallel movement of export
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prices and export quantities reflects unmistakably the dominant role of 
demand conditions. It furnishes conclusive proof— if proof were needed-- 
that the export fluctuations of primary producing countries originate in 
the world's industrial centers," (Nurkse# 1958: p, 14) The most recent 
UN World Economic Survey contains this passage:
"A major source of such instability lies in the cyclical variations 
that continue to characterize income and output in the industrially advanced 
countries/'^
Again the role of the industrial economies is emphasized.
In the major recessions of the inter-war period it is quite probable 
that fluctuations in the industrial countries were the main factor in 
commodity instability. However# the available evidence does not support 
such a conclusion for the contemporary world.
The United States and the United Kingdom are the two industrial 
countries with the greatest influence on world trade. Countries whose 
exports are geographically concentrated are usually partnered to one or 
other of these countries»' If fluctuations in the export proceeds of 
underdeveloped countries are heavily influenced by changes in the income 
or industrial production of the richer countries it seems likely that these 
two countries are mainly responsible. But when countries are ranked by 
the degree of instability of their imports both the US and the UK emerge 
as relatively stable importers. Indeed out of 83 countries listed the US 
ranks 80th and the UK 59th, (Coppock: 1962# Figure 4-7# p, 63)
This is partly because both countries have maintained relatively 
stable levels of economic activity since the war. There may also have 
been some change in the relationship between changes in economic activity 
and imports in these countries. Before the war it appears that a fall of
4 per cent in American consumption was accompanied by a 25 per cent decline 
in the volume of imports. During the 1948-9# 1953-4 and 1957-8 recessions 
in the US imports fell off by only 5# 2,5 and 1,5 per cent respectively 
(Benham# 1961: p, 45), Our brief examination in Chapter 7 of the Puerto 
Rican economy revealed very little impact of the US recessions on Puerto 
Rican exports# almost all of which go to the US, Indeed for most countries 
it appears that the higher the proportion of their exports directed to the
3
US the more stable their export proceeds tend to be,
A recent careful analysis of UK imports gives estimates of production 
elasticities of demand of between 0,6 and 1,3# with a "best guess" of 1,0 for 
imported raw materials (Scott, 1963: pp 137 and 145), This indicates that
a one per cent change in UK industrial production will cause an approximately 
one per cent change in UK demand for raw materials. Within the overall group 
estimates are given for metals (1,05), textiles (0,82) and other raw
4
materials (1,13), Since industrial production has been remarkably steady 
in the post-war economy of the UK it is hardly likely that severe swings 
in UK demand for raw materials could arise given these moderate production 
elasticities of demand,
Scott also finds a very low income elasticity of demand for imported 
food in the UK# indeed# close to zero (1963# pp 18-33),
The various causal factors, national income, industrial production 
and import prices apparently account for only very minor variations in UK 
commodity imports. Food and raw materials make up respectively 37 per cent 
and 30 per cent of UK imports. The only other significant amount of 
primary commodity imports is fuel at 12 per cent. As far as underdeveloped 
country exports are concerned this means petroleum. But petroleum has 
been a remarkably stable commodity in world trade and variations in
=487'
underdeveloped country export earnings from it can be largely attributed to 
political events (See above# Chapter 3),
It would seem that the cyclical fluctuations in the economies of the 
two industrial countries which weigh most heavily in the exports of underdeveloped 
countries can explain only a minor part of the short-term instability of 
export earnings from underdeveloped countries.
These findings# based on the two principal importing countries# are 
largely borne out by other more general studies. The UN World Economic Survey 
for 1958 (p. 48) comments:
"In only a minority of primary commodities# particularly 
the mineral raw materials# have cyclical variations in 
demand within the industrial countries dominated the 
pattern of short-period fluctuations in both volume and 
price. The behaviour of prices and volume of trade of 
most foodstuffs# and of prices— though not of volume of 
trade--of textile fibres# has been heavily influenced by 
the instability of supply conditions and has not conformed 
to any systematic cyclical pattern, "
A,Jo Brown has analyzed the relationship of manufacturing
production to short-term changes in prices for cereals# tea# coffee and
cocoa# vegetable oils# textile fibres# non-ferrous metals# petroleum# coal,
wood pulp and natural rubber. For only cereals, surprisingly, was there
a statistically significant correlation , For vegetable oils# textile
fibres and rubber, correlation coefficients were apparently positive and#
although not significant# sufficiently high to be regarded by Brown as
5
suggesting a systematic connection. He concludes that "changes in
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industrial activity do not provide more than a part of the explanation of 
short-term changes in the real prices of primary commodities/’ (1960; p, 33) 
When changes in volume are included in the analyses Brown says that imports 
of foodstuffs are not closely linked to short-term variations in demand, but 
that industrial raw materials show some correlations. For the US, he claims 
that a change in industrial production tends to produce an equal percentage 
or less than equal percentage change in imports of raw materials. For Japan 
and Western Europe the response seems greater. He also points out that they 
import about three times the quantity imported by the US,^
The general tenor of the evidence which has been presented here is 
that for most primary commodities it is very difficult to establish any 
close connection between fluctuations in industrial activity and fluctuations 
in their values. Only for mineral raw materials and for the prices of 
textile raw materials do any of the studies claim an established connection. 
These conclusions are for world trade or industrial country imports of these 
commodities# not for individual underdeveloped countries’ exports. As we 
argued in Chapter 2^ variations in supply become even more important when 
attention is focused on the individual country’s exports, as random variations 
in weather, pests, politics and war all affect the supply from the individual 
country much more drastically than the world supply. Clearly, the evidence 
does not support the view that fluctuations in the industrial countries’ 
economies are the main or even a major cause of instability in the exports 
of most underdeveloped countries. Only those countries which specialize 
in exporting particular products such as some of the metals or nâtufal 
rubber could claim that most of their export instability stems from 
fluctuations in the industrial centers.
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Stocks of Imported Goods
Changes in the size of stocks of imported commodities could have a 
seriously destabilizing effect on underdeveloped countries' exports# 
particularly if changes in stocks were synchronized with changes in 
industrial countries’ consumption of these goods. But in fact,
“ No simple conclusion can be drawn about the influence of 
changes in commercial stocks on the volume of trade. While 
the behaviour of stocks has certainly magnified the 
fluctuations in volume of trade in some years# in other 
years changes in stocks may have served to moderate the 
impact of changes in cohsumption on trade,"(UN, 1958: p, 52)
Scott’s study of UK imports (1963: pp 52-3) finds no systematic 
relationship between stocks of mainly imported goods and either all stocks 
or the level of industrial activity or the prices of imports, Scott also 
says (1963: p, 53) that "fluctuations in manufacturing production in the 
United States and in the rest of the world appear to have been greater than 
fluctuations in their apparent consumption of materials# which suggests 
that $tocks of these materials are biiilt up in a recession and run down 
in a boom," This seems fairly plausible. When demand within the importing 
country rises above current production the immediate response is probably 
to use up existing stocks and place orders for purchases to replenish 
stocks. But normal delays and time lags# given the distances separating 
export producers and importers# will generally hold up deliveries in the 
importing country until the boom has passed its peak so that stocks are in
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fact replenished in the recession part of the fluctuation. If this happens 
more often than not# changes in stocks of imported goods would tend to 
stabilize the demand for raw materials.
Instability In Import Competing Domestic Production
Another likely cause of fluctuations in the demand for commodity 
imports is unstable domestic output of competing commodities within 
the industrial countries. Where domestic output provides a substantial 
part of the domestic market a relatively small change in domestic supply 
can produce a proportionately much larger fluctuation in the demand for 
imports. For example# Western Europe meets some 75 per cent of domestic 
sugar requirements from European beet sugar production. The output of 
beet sugar# however# tends to be relatively unstable because of the usual 
hazards of agricultural production; more so on the average# than cane 
sugar. The result is that while domestic consumption remains very stable 
the demand for imports of sugar can vary quite widely. Supposing domestic 
production equalled 100 and normal imports 20 then a 10 per cent fall in 
domestic output would cause a 50 per cent change in demand for imports. 
However# the main cane-sugar-producing areas have in the past had special 
links with importing countries which have led to special arrangements 
guaranteeing relatively stable prices to producers. Only the unfortunate 
smaller producing countries were fully exposed to the vagaries of the 
'free' market until the establishment of the International Sugar Agreement 
(See Chapter 12), In any case proceeds from sugar exports have been 
relatively stable# particularly since the Second World War (UN, 1958:
Tàble 13),
This particular cause of import fluctuations is only possible where 
a substantial share of the home market is met by domestic supplies and 
where these domestic supplies tend to be fairly unstable. Both of these 
conditions are likely to occur only in agricultural products normally produced 
in the industrial countries. Grains# meats# citrus fruits# sugar and 
tobacco are the only exports from underdeveloped countries which are likely 
to be affected by unstable outputs in industrial countries. Between them 
they amount to about 18 per cent of total underdeveloped-country exports,^
But some of this is exported to other underdeveloped countries. Rice# for 
example# forms 2,2 per cent and most of it is exported to Asian countries. 
Sugar forms a substantial part of several underdeveloped countries' exports, 
but we have already noted that all the important sugar-exporting countries 
are taken care of under quota arrangements with the main importers, Britain, 
the US and the Soviet bloc, Argentina is the only underdeveloped country 
where grain and meat form a significant share of exports. Citrus fruits 
amount to a mere 0,8 per cent of the total exportsol underdeveloped countries. 
Cyprus# Morocco, Algeria# Israel and South Africa are the only relatively 
poor countries where their export is important. Moreover# most of their 
citrus exports flow to non-citrus producing countries such as Britain and 
Northern Europe (UN# 1962: Table 2-10), The US produces about 90 per cent
of its own tobacco consumption# but the residual tobacco imports have been 
very stable (UN, 1958: Table 16), European imports have fluctuated rather 
more# but this probably affected US tobacco exports more than underdeveloped 
country exports.
The upshot of this review of the effects of variations in domestic 
outputs of products which compete with exports of underdeveloped countries is
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that it is unlikely that any important impact upon the stability of exports 
from all save a very few underdeveloped countries would arise from this cause, 
Improvements in agricultural techniques including pest control have in any 
case already helped to moderate year-to-year instability in most temperate 
zone agricultural production.
Changes in Technology
Mineral and textile exports from underdeveloped countries are liable 
to face unpredictable changes in demand because of changes in technology 
which alter the proportions of different materials required in the production 
process. However, this is an area where lack of empirical studies precludes 
any generalizations on the relative importance this may have in causing 
short-term instability in underdeveloped countries* exports» In any case, 
short of the policing of technical progress which Albert Hirschman (1959) 
suggests, there seems little that could be done to prevent it. But such 
misfortune could establish a good case for special compensatory long-term 
aid.
Trade Restrictions in Industrial Countries
All industrial countries are guilty of the imposition of tariffs, 
quota restrictions, levies or other measures which reduce the size of the 
markets available to exports from ynderdeveloped countries. These are 
objectionable mainly because they place obstacles in the way of international 
specialization and attempts by underdeveloped countries to increase their 
earnings of foreign exchange by selling goods to the industrial countries.
But they also tend to increase the instability of exports from underdeveloped 
countries. Anything which restricts the size of a market and reduces the 
number of potential consumers will tend to reduce the price elasticity of
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demand for commodities sold in it. Any change in supply will then lead to 
a larger fall or increase in price. Also protection keeps domestic producers 
in business behind the barriers. Tlie larger the share of the market supplied 
by them the more likely that any changes in their output will produce 
magnified repercussions in demand for the residual supplies from abroad.
The UN, 1962: Table 2-10 lists the major primary commodities and
gives the production, imports and trade barriers in North America, Western 
Europe and Japan. Tin ore and bauxite are the only primary products which 
gain entry to all of these industrial countries free of all restrictions. 
Every other product meets some form of trade barrier in at least several 
countries. The hardest hit, however, are clearly the temperate zone 
agricultural products and sugar. For these and the processed metals 
aluminum, copper, lead and zinc the objective of protecting domestic 
producers is quite obvious. For other products such as coffee, tea, cocoa 
and bananas a combination of revenue tariffs and internal revenue duties 
substantially raises prices and restricts demand.
The effect of these policies on underdeveloped countries* export 
instability is impossible to quantify, but it seems unlikely to be large 
unless there are frequent changes in the incidence of these various 
restrictions. The total increase in sales of exports from underdeveloped 
countries to industrial countries which would result from removal of these 
restrictions is probably not large. Underdeveloped countries are by no 
means the sole suppliers of these imports into industrial countries; indeed 
they are minor exporters of most of the major commodities entering 
international trade. Reduction of barriers to trade in commodities would 
probably lead to substantial increases in North American exports of cereals,
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dairy products, oil seeds, tobacco, aluminum and coal; and in eastern European 
and USSR exports of meat, sugar, coal, cereals, lumber, aluminum, lead, 
zinc and petroleum. Underdeveloped countries would benefit to some extent,
"but the resultant increase in earnings might be quite small." (UN, 1962:
Vol 1, po 38)0 Their largest gains would be in tropical products, particularly 
the beverages and bananas. But even here estimates of the likely increases 
in imports for 12 Western European countries from abolition of all duties 
and fiscal charges are low: 11 per cent for coffee, 8 per cent for cocoa,
tea negligible, and bananas 5 per cent (UN, 1962; Vol 1, p. 21). There 
might also be some increase in sugar, cotton and petroleum. Abolition of 
restrictions on other products would bring few benefits to underdeveloped 
countries, (p. 39).
If these estimates of the net long-term effects of remoyal of all 
restrictions are approximately correct the implication is that the 
restrictions have relatively little effect on short-term instability.
If only small increases in the size of their markets occurred as a result 
of removal of restrictions demand elasticities would hardly increase 
significantly. The products in which their gains would be significant 
are not produced in the industrial countries so the domestic competition 
effect on the stability of demand for their exports would be minor.
Altogether, abolition of existing restrictions would probably improve 
the stability of underdeveloped countries’ exports, but only to a minor 
degree.
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Policies of the European Economic Community
As far as EEC agricultural policy is concerned the system of protection 
which is being adopted seems liable to worsen the instability of primary-product 
markets through the introduction of variable levies. This system involves 
setting the tariff on an imported primary product at a height which is 
adjusted according to the difference between the average level of domestic 
production prices and the import price. This means that if the supply of 
exports increases and their international price falls EEC levies will be 
increased with the net result of checking any increase in export sales 
to EEC members. The levy system applies to temperate zone products and would 
affect approximately $200 million worth of meat and cereals from underdeveloped 
countries, most of which, $180 million are exported by Latin America, 
principally Argentina. Total underdeveloped country exports to the rest 
of the world amount to approximately $20 billion so the sum affected by the 
EEC levy system is a very tiny proportion of the total. Moreover the 
adoption of the levy system is a less drastic change of protective system 
than it seems at first glance. Actually many industrial countries used 
quotas for the same purposes previously. Most agricultural imports have 
been treated as residual supplies, only allowed entry after domestic 
production has been sold off. However, such policies are deliberately 
chosen policies and clearly there are alternative ways of compensating 
domestic producers for the effects of foreign competition. Either variable 
quotas or levies will tend to increase instability in primary-product 
markets and as chosen policies of rich countries can be a clear object of 
attack as damaging the interests of poor countries. Once again the quantitative 
significance is probably minor, but at least the issue of principle is 
more explicit.
Competition from Industrial Countries
Since most of the world’s primary product exports in fact come from 
the rich industrial countries their policies as exporters may also be 
subject to criticism if they have led to increased instability in commodity 
markets. The US actually exports almost 38 per cent of world tobacco 
exports, 44 per cent of cotton, 15 per cent of rice and 82 per cent of 
soya beans. However, the probability is that the policies of the US, particularly 
in the case of cotton, have tended to stabilize rather than destabilize 
world markets. In their own interest managers of the US stocks have sold 
when prices were high and stockpiled when prices were low.
It has also been claimed that sales of tin and aluminum by the 
Soviet Union have had destabilizing effects on these markets and that control 
over Manchurian soybeans by China disturbs that market (Swerling, 1963: 
po 69)o But there is no evidence that these were not isolated and possibly 
miscalculated sales rather than the politically motivated actions which 
Swerling suggests.
Conclusions and Suggestions
After considering these various ways in which industrially 
developed countries' sins of commission or omission may add to the instability 
problems of underdeveloped countries the question of degree of responsibility 
remains unsettled. Clearly if the industrial countries could maintain 
perfectly stable growing demands for underdeveloped countries' exports the 
instability of the latter would be decreased, but equally clearly this is 
an impossibility. It is in the nature of economic policy that the strength 
and sometimes even the direction of its effects are uncertain. Governments,
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even in the rich industrial countries, are usually forced to base their
policy decisions on partial and inaccurate information. The very process of
growth is itself liable to produce fluctuations. There are no natural forces 
making it likely that the stream of technical progress should be stable. 
Consequently it is very difficult to prevent the relatively minor swings
in demand which have occurred outside the crisis years. The only really serious
fluctuations in industrial countries' demands for imports took place at 
the time of Korea. Such emergency purchases could only be avoided by the 
carrying of large strategic stockpiles, which America at present does 
but which few other countries feel they can afford.
In so far as fluctuations in industrial activity or national income 
are to blame for the instability of export earnings of poor countries, and 
we have found only a little support for this, it forms another argument for 
encouraging stable growth in the industrial nations. But it is very 
doubtful that their governments need any urging in this matter. There are 
strong internal pressures upon them to maintain high levels of employment 
and to avoid inflation,and the current 'league-table' attitude to economic 
growth keeps pressure on governments in this area too.
Perhaps other features of the problem are more amenable to policy 
action. Variable import quotas or levies which act to restrict demand 
in the fact of increased supplies obviously increase the instability of 
the commodity markets which are affected and can be condemned for this 
reason, as well as for all the more traditional welfare economics (essentially 
free trade) arguments. The objective of such policies is usually to 
maintain relatively high and stable incomes for certain, normally 
agricultural, producers. But this can be achieved more efficiently by
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deficiency payments to producers while leaving markets free. Unfortunately 
the variable levy is the chosen instrument of the EEC agricultural policy, 
chosen after years of intensive argument and negotiation and it is most 
unlikely that it will be abandoned in the foreseeable future. Fortunately 
the commodities most affected arc important to only a. few Latin American 
underdeveloped countries.
It has been noted above that all forms of protection and of heavy 
internal taxation on underdeveloped-country exports must tend to increase 
their short-term instability. But this effect also seems likely to be small 
and there are other more cogent reasons for attacking these particular 
policies of the rich nations.
It was also noticed that the evidence on the effect of changes in 
stocks of imported goods on the stability of demand for commodity imports 
was ambiguous and inconclusive. However, rich countries might ensure that 
any stock changes were consciously stabilizing by the deliberate operation 
of government financed stocks of imports. A government agency or statutory 
corporation could be provided with finance and permitted to purchase 
commodities at floor prices which would be adjusted according to its 
holdings of the commodities. When commodity prices rose above a prearranged 
ceiling price the authority would be permitted to sell from its stocks. 
Fairly elaborate proposals have been worked out on these lines by L, St, 
Clare Grondona, (1939 and 1958) His advocacy is based on a combination of 
strategic arguments and benefits of stability to producers and consumers 
alike with reflected benefits to the industrial nations through increased 
stability in the incomes of primary exporting regions. Most of his 
argument assumes the carrying out of such a program by the UK with
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with possible imitation by other rich industrial countries.
For our purposes the relevant consideration is the effect on 
underdeveloped countries' export proceeds. Would they be made appreciably 
more stable? This depends on the degree of success industrial countries 
could achieve, through stock operations, in reducing fluctuations in their 
expenditure on imports of primary products and the importance of these in 
underdeveloped-country exports in general and to particular underdeveloped 
countries.
We have already listed and discussed the major determinants of 
changes in industrial countries' imports. In so far as they are all merely 
fluctuations and not the start of new trends a buffer stock can, at least 
in principle and probably in practice, moderate their net effect on any 
country's demand for imports of a commodity which is storeablo at 
reasonable cost. Where variation in supply causes the fluctuation in prices, 
official stocks of imports could help reduce price instability, but as has 
been pointed out repeatedly in preceding chapters this may destabilize 
total export earnings for such commodities.
In Chapter 12 the main arguments for and against international buffer 
stocks were discussed. Most of them apply equally to national stocks. High 
costs and risks of failure to anticipate trends are probably the most 
important of the objections. Fear of balance of payments effects and the 
potential threat to exporting countries' bargaining power are other relevant 
questions in relation to national schmes.
Buffer stocks are expensive. However it may be rather easier to 
persuade governments to finance national stocks held on their own soil than 
to provide finance for international stocks which are outside their control.
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Tlie intelligent operation of such stocks of imported goods by the US, the UK^ , 
and the EEC would cover a very large volume of underdeveloped-country exports 
and considerably reduce fluctuations in demand for them. For illustrative 
purposes, some characteristics of such a scheme in the UK are discussed below. 
Table 14:1 sets out the main UK commodity imports from underdeveloped countries, 
Meat g fruit and vegetables probably present too many problems of refrigeration 
and storage for use in any stock policy. For the other products listed 
storage problems would not be too serious or expensive. This leaves 5„3 billion 
dollars worth of commodities which include approximately 5,2 billion dollars 
of underdeveloped country exports. The quantity of any product wkiich would 
be required in stabilization stocks would vary according to its normal 
pattern of fluctuations^ the target prices or quantities of imports held 
to be desirable, and the range of variation permitted before purchases or 
sales take place under the stock policy. Assume the stock aims at moderating 
fluctuations in the prices of selected UK commodity Imports once tltey vary 
more than ten per cent up or down from a preset target price. The target
price can be set by a coïnbination of a formula and the discretion of the
officials and probably should be different for each commodity to take 
account of different characteristics and determinants of trend for each. 
Variations on a formula which includes realised average prices of previous 
years or quarters and an estimate of the average for the current year
(e,g, 10% EP^ + 40%  ^ 25% P^  ^   ^25% P^„3 where E stands for expected,
P for price and the t suffixes indicate the period for which each price is 
relevant.) should help to prevent the target price from departing too far 
from the real trend price. An additional safeguard against over-commitment 
of funds to purchase of a commodity where the trend in prices is strongly
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downward is to make automatic reductions in the stock's buying price whenever 
the stock reaches predetermined quantities®(Cf® Grondona* 1958; pp. 32 and 44*)
Since the stock would be attempting to prevent day-to-day prices from 
departing widely from the norm probably a fairly wide margin around the target 
should be free from stock intervention* say - 10 per cent of target* It is 
very difficult to say just what would be the appropriate stock pile for each 
commodity* but probably an average holding equal to two months* imports would 
be sufficient* This would cost a little over $ 500 million* possibly less* 
since purchases would always be made at low prices* There would however be 
some economies in reductions of privately owned stocks* These official stocks 
of important food and raw material commodities could also be regarded as 
replacing reserves of foreign exchange to some extent* The actual extent 
depends upon the reasons for any particular balance of payments deficit* If 
the cause were partly unusually high prices for the UK’s commodity imports 
the automatic release of commodities from stock to counter this would 
relieve domestic firms of the need to buy imports « However* if the trouble 
lay in domestic inflation or poor export performance only a government 
take-over of the stocks* and sale of the commodities at the going prices 
whatever their height would save foreign exchange.
The annual financial cost* once the stocks had been built up* would 
be of the order of $ 30 million* assuming they could be financed by the 
sale of bonds with an effective interest cost of 6 per cent. Additional 
costs would be handling charges* storage facilities and administration*
The latter would be minor salaries to professional staff including 
commodity experts and consultants on specific problems of maintaining 
quality during storage etc* and clerical staff* Grondona has obtained
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expert estimates of the capital costs of constructing suitable storage for 
the various types of commodities* Taken together with the costs of the 
maximum stock it seems unlikely that total annual costs would exceed $ SO 
milliona(Grondona* 1958: pp. 49=50 and Appendix III) Against this cost the 
scheme would offset profits from the operation of the stock* Since purchases 
would normally take place at 10% below the trend price and sales at 10% 
above* the scheme should make profits on its normal transactions* The 
more short-tem instability the larger the turnover of stock and the bigger 
the profits. Readjustments of the buying and selling points could be made 
as experience is gained so as to increase the effectiveness of the 
stabilizing operations without incurring too heavy a stock burden* However& 
even ignoring any profits on operations the total cost would probably be of 
the order of 0*1 to 0*2 per cent of the national income of the UK. This would 
be a fairly small cost even if the benefits to underdeveloped countries and 
to UK buyers were also relatively small. The UK as a whole would benefit 
as the operations of the scheme would obtain the same annual-average imports 
at lower prices unless there were serious errors of management*
Malaya and Pakistan are two countries which could expect a substantial 
improvement in the stability of exports*proceeds from rubber* jute and 
cotton from such action» Most ex-British African territories could expect 
some benefits to stability of their exports of copper* cocoa* groundnuts* 
cotton* sisal and coffee because so much of their trade is still directed 
to Britaino
If the US and the EEC operated similar schemes the stabilization 
effects should be very widespread and powerful. However* pi'obably the 
principal merit of this suggestion is that it does not require any
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Sinterrstional coomperation. These policies can be set on foot unilaterally
by any government which can set aside some resources for stock piling 
commodities.
One possible fear for primary exporters could be that the existence 
of these stocks would increase the bargaining power of the rich countries» 
It should be noted that the operations of the stocks do not lead to the 
opposition of a large government monopoly to the commodity exporters» The 
stock authorities merely stand ready to buy or sell at announced prices» 
They do not initiate transactions. They do not bargain* Naturally importers 
would not buy on the world market at a price higher than the selling price 
of the stock as long as it holds stocks* but equally no seller need sell 
below the floor price as long as it has funds to buy* There is no obvious 
reason why this should work adversely for exporting countries* Indeed* in 
the initial period while the stocks are being built up only the floor 
price would be operative*^
Bilateral Contracts
Apart from stock policies there are several other schemes which 
industrial countries could negotiate with their normal underdeveloped 
country trading partners® Bilateral trading agreements which fix prices 
and quantities in advance give a measure of certainty to the export 
earnings of the partner* Provided they are entered freely by both sides 
and revised or renegotiated fairly frequently the benefits of certainty 
and stability may outway the less desirable characteristics of such 
schemes* These are: 1) they tend to be fairly short-term. The prices
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and quantities in the contracts are usually subject to annual renegotiation* 
so that they merely reduce day-to-day and seasonal fluctuations. The changes 
when they come are liable to be more drastic. Few countries are willing to 
risk having to buy at prices well above those of the free market if free 
prices should decline and few sellers are willing to continue a contract 
v;here free prices are on a rising trend. 2} Such contracts tend to 
destabilize the free m a r k e t 3) The arrangements have to be run by 
governments or through trade associations and either of these may run into 
ideological difficulties in many countries a 4) They may encourage movements 
away from free international trade and so lead to inefficiencies* 5) They 
may give too much bargaining power to the importing countries which could 
enable exploitation of a weak seller* particularly where contracts are 
renegotiated and the alternative to acceptance of the buyer’s terms is to 
seek new outlets in unfamiliar markets. Given goodwill on both sides such 
schemes could undoubtedly decrease the short-term instability of some 
exports from underdeveloped countries. If this element of goodwill is 
lacking then a very careful examination of the contracts and prospects is 
called for from underdeveloped countries before entering such an agreement. 
(Caveat vendor rather than the usual legal ’caveat emptor*). With a less 
rigid form of agreement* utilizing a target price determined by formulae 
which allow for trend and agreement on quantities to be purchased or sold 
at lower and upper limit prices which differ by fixed percentages from the 
target price might make such schemes longer lasting and remove any element 
of deliberate exploitation. A UN committee's report (1955para. 134)was 
unimpressed by bilateral contracts* They said* "We do not feel « « * 
that a greater resort to this method would be likely to reduce market
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instability appreciably," Probably the most important such contracts between 
rich countries and underdeveloped countries in recent experience have been 
the British bulk purchase agreements during and after the second World War^^^ 
the US sugar quotas* and the arrangements in the French Franc Area between 
metropolitan France and its ex-dependencies.
Bilateral Compensatory Finance Schemes
A hybrid scheme g a cross of bilateral contracts with compensatory 
financing* presents a very flexible approach to the problem of underdeveloped 
country export fluctuations® At its simplest two countries agree on a target 
price for a traded commodity and compensate each other through financial 
transfers for departures of actual prices above or below the target price.
At its most complex many commodities and many countries could be involved* 
when it approaches the more generalCF proposals of UN* 1961. Versions of 
bilateral compensation have been put forward recently by Arthur Haslewood 
(1959) and James Meade (1963). A UN study (1962 d) discusses many of the 
problems which might arise in ClF schemes related to single commodities.
The main advantages and disadvantages of general CF schemes of the 
OAS type have already been outlined. In our view relatively minor 
modifications of the attitudes of the International Monetary Fund* and of 
the facilities available to these underdeveloped countries whose exports 
tend to be highly unstable are probably a superior solution to the balance 
of payments difficulties of underdeveloped countries. This does not prejudge 
the issue as far as this more direct and simple approach to CF is concerned. 
Many of the criticisms remain relevant* but additional arguments come into play,
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10 Simplicity, Such a scheme requires only that agreement be reached 
between two countries on the method of determining the target price (and 
quantity) for one commodity. If this works it can readily be extended to 
other commodities and other nations may be attracted by the example.
2« Such schemes can be directed to the countries where the problem 
seems more serious* Thus a relatively small effort may yield considerable 
benefits* For example* Malaya* Pakistan and Ghana are three countries 
which have experienced very unstable export earnings mainly for reasons 
beyond their control and largely due to concentration on particularly 
unstable commodities: rubber* jute and cocoa. A large proportion of their 
exports of these commodities is exported to Britain* Bilateral CF agreements 
with each of these countries for the respective principal export would 
undoubtedly effect some moderation of fluctuations in the amounts of 
foreign exchange available to them from exporting these goods» If the USA 
were to make similar agreements with Malaya and Pakistan the stabilizing 
effect would be doubled* Extension to tin in the case of Malaya and cotton 
in the case of Pakistan would have a smaller* but still probably significant 
effect*
So Since there are no controls imposed on prices or quantities 
traded many such schemes could be developed between various industrial 
countries and their normal suppliers without creating rigidities in trading 
patterns» This allows world trade to develop in the most efficient way with 
consequent benefits to both producing and consuming nations.
4. Compensation would never be for the full amount of the departure 
from the target price so that manipulation of prices would be unlikely to 
bring gains*
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5, Instead of two-way automatic transfers it might have some 
advantages to make compensation from rich to poor countries via short 
term loans, A dip in export prices below trend would give the underdeveloped 
country suppliers an automatic credit line in the rich country partner. It 
could use this or not depending on its needs. For example a surge in other 
exports’ earnings might offset the drop in the main export and make it 
unnecessary for the country to use all or even part of the available credit. 
Repayment of outstanding loans would be obligatory when prices rose above the 
norm and discretionary at other times* This automatically available credit 
could have substantial indirect benefits through increasing general 
confidence in the underdeveloped countries® balance of payments position. 
Motives for short-term capital flight would be reduced* investors* 
confidence increased* even when the credit is untouched.
Doubts were raised in earlier chapters as to the usefulness of gross 
export earnings* particularly of one commodity* as a guide to net export 
earnings let alone the overall balance of payments position. For this 
reason* an automatic overdraft system seems to me to be superior to one 
which requires automatic transfers.
For commodities where price and quantity fluctuations are frequently 
in opposite directions normal export proceeds may be a better target base
than prices. But then rather more stringent precautions against manipulation
12by the exporting country may be required,
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Conclusions
It is rather difficult to establish from the statistics that fluctuations 
in the industrial countries have been a major cause of underdeveloped country 
export instability. Even if it were true the recommendation which follows is 
one the rich countries are following on their own account. Other aspects of 
their economic policies* particularly with regard to agriculture are probably 
destabilizing* but quantitatively their effects may be very small. However* 
there are certain positive policies which industrial nations acting 
independently could adopt and which might yield significant benefits because 
their effects can be directed towards those primary products and exporters 
which experience most instability. Combinations of specific policies such 
as holding buffer stocks of certain imports and operating bilateral 
compensatory credit schemes seem to this writer to offer some hopes of 
assisting moderation of fluctuations in the exports of some of the countries 
which have experienced particularly severe instability in the past.
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Table 14
UK Commodity Imports from Underdeveloped Countries* 1962 ($ millions)
SÎTC Division Total Imports 
$ million
Imported from Percent from 
Underdeveloped Underdeveloped
01 Meat and meat preparations
04 Cereals and preparations
05 Fruits and Vegetables
06 Sugar and honey
07 Coffee* tea* cocoa* spices
08 Feed stuff for animals 
12 Tobacco
22 Oil seeds* etc.
23 Crude rubber (including 
synthetic)
26 Textile fibres (crude)
28 Metal ores and scrap
33 Petroleum* etc,
68 Non-ferrous metals
Total
876
682
825
180
475
190
226
150
172
671
390
1490
675
7002
Countries 
$ million
^-•w rfii ; , , jv«ir 5!-'rpTTrrtrjwrftjCTB:Trr.-/gw?.‘»
187
150
288
115
430
136
97
95
141
282
167
1270
280
3640
Countries
21 
22 
35 
64 
91 
72 
43 
63
82
42
43 
85
41
52
Source: Extracted from OECD. Foreign Trade* Analytical Abstracts, Series B, 
Jan-Dee 1962* UK.
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Footnotes to Chapter 14
lo UN* 1962: Vol. 1* p* 48. A subsequent passage points out that 
supply is also relevant® "In addition to variations in demand* forces 
affecting supply have also contributed to the instability of primary 
commodity markets," It is fairly clear that demand is emphasised and supply 
downgraded as the causal factor in commodity trade instability,
2a The US and the UK between them account for almost a quarter 
of world imports® Coppock* 1962: Table 4=6* p. 61 « Geographically concentrated 
exporters and their main customers are shown in Michaely* 1962s Table 5* p* 25,
3o Coppock* 1962: p« 96. His analysis of export instability and 
proportion of exports going to the US yielded a correlation coefficient of
-.27 which is rather low* but ranking in thirds confirms the association*
weak though it is (p. 115).
4, Scott* 1963: p, 137, "Other raw materials" include mainly: 
softwood* hardwood* pitwood* reclaimed rubber* molasses* straw for paper* 
rags* etc, and waste paper» (p. 228),
5, Brown* 1960: p, 33 (The actual correlation coefficients are
not published),
6, Brown* 1960: pp, 65=66. Unfortunately none of the statistical 
evidence for these claims is given in the publication®
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7« Calculated from UN* 1962 e: Table K  Figures for 1961 save 
for a few products where 1960 data were used. The data are for primary 
exporting regions and include Australia and New Zealand so the percentages 
should be slightly less,
8. There is no reason why the stock authorities however should 
not use the data put out by international organizations such as FAO and the 
CICT and seek their advice on commodity questions.
9. Grondona* in both of the studies cited above sets out much 
more elaborate pros and cons which time and space forbid in this brief 
discussion.
10o See section on multilateral long-term contracts in
Chapter 12.
11. These are described and criticized in Leubuscher* 1956* and 
Betts* 1956a
12. Cf. "Possible ways of inducing fluctuations . . « domestic 
price supports* exchange rates* direct and indirect subsidies on exports* 
quantitative controls* inventory adjustment* barter and other trade 
agreements , . « shunt deals with non-participating countries and so on. 
Over a wide range of actions by which deviations in earnings might be 
induced and claims for compensation generated." UN op.cit.* p. 70*
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Chapter 15 
Summary of Principal Findings
This study set out with the object of exploring the causes and 
consequences of short-term fluctuations in the export earnings of 
underdeveloped countries and considering what policies might be helpful®
Despite the severe limitations imposed by inadequate and unreliable 
data some interesting*though mainly negative* conclusions can be drawn from 
the various analyses presented above®
The main conclusion of the first section of the book is that probably 
the importance of short-term export instability to underdeveloped countries 
has been exaggerated. There is little evidence to show that in general their 
economies have been damaged. In most cases fluctuations in income do not 
appear to be at all closely related to fluctuations in export earnings* Many 
countries with highly unstable exports have relatively stable incomes. Many 
with stable exports have serious domestic instability® In few countries is 
there evidence of strong current or lagged association between domestic 
variables and export fluctuations. This lack of relationship cannot be 
explained simply by the relative quantitative importance of exports in 
their economies* for even with countries chosen for high ratios of exports 
to gross national product the lack of correlation holds. Probably the main 
reason for the lack of a strong relationship between domestic variables 
and export fluctuations lies in relatively low values of the foreign-trade 
multiplier in most underdeveloped countries and distributed lags in 
reactions to an initial change in exporters* incomes. This gains some support
5Ï
from the fairly high correlation between import instability and export 
fluctuations5 which emphasizes the high marginal propensity to import 
normal in such economiest Instability of investment seems^ at most % 
very weakly related to fluctuations in the importing power of exports.,
Both simple and multiple-Xeast-sqiiares-regression analyses yield no 
support for the thesis that export instability tends to reduce capital 
formation® The results actually appear to support the opposite conclusion®
Such analyses of the effects on the "efficiency" of investment„ as were 
possiblej; do not demonstrate any tendency for export fluctuations to 
affect this adversely® Most of the inaicators used, however^ were very 
unrelLobleo
These conclusions are derived from both, cross - country and 
time-series analyses and arc supported by the more detailed case studies 
carried out in Secti on T T„
Comparison of ins tab l 111)- in exports of undcn devci oped countries 
and of industrial nations, oF p> imary protects art uf manufactures rcveo.Is 
a much greater overlap and much .smaller differences than most discussions 
have assumed. Commonly hold explanations ci the extra instability 
experienced by exports o f underdeveloped countries ^uch as : J) specializatiovt 
on primary products * 2) commodity concentration, 3‘j geographical concentration 
of destination of exports are found to explain very little if any of the 
extra instability experienced by underdeveloped countries® Examination of 
twelve underdeveloped countries whicli have cleaily experienced great export 
instability in the period 1946-58 reveals that the reasons ai*e very specific 
for each® National economic policies, wars and civil strife have been major 
causes in se ve r a 1, S e c i a 1 i z a t i or,no t. m crely o n p r i m a r y pro du c t s , but on
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a particular product such as natural rubber or jute which has been 
peculiarly subject to instability explained the fluctuations in the 
rest® For most underdeveloped countries variations in the supply of 
exports seem to have been more important than fluctuations in demand 
in causing instability in their export proceeds® Again evidence from 
the five case studies seems to confirm these conclusions on causes of 
export instability®
These sets of conclusions on both the importance of export 
instability and its causes have an important b e a r i n g  on policy 
proposals® Clearly if short-term export fluctuations do not inflict 
serious damage on most underdeveloped countries® economies the possible 
benefits to underdeveloped countries of even the best possible schemes 
for stabilization may be very small® Consequently schemes which would 
cost a great deal to establish and run efficiently become unattractive® 
The resources would be better employed elsewhere g perhaps in providing 
increased investment or more education and training in underdeveloped 
countries® For this and many other reasons & such as the effects on 
allocative efficiencyj, possibly only the simplest and cheapest forms of 
national policies should be considered by most underdeveloped countries® 
Of course individual countries which for particular reasons suffer high 
instability in exports which does affect their domestic economies may 
consider more elaborate schemes worthwhile®
Similarly* in the field of international policy, comparatively 
minor changes in the policies of the IMF* changes which it has made or 
is now making* should give underdeveloped countries most of the 
facilities they require to meet balance of payments difficulties steming
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from export fluctuations.
While the role of industrial fluctuations as a cause of export 
instability in underdeveloped countries has been overstressed in the 
post-war era it is undoubtedly one cause. However the industrial economies 
are already committed to full employment and stable growth and need little 
urging on this count® Some other aspects of their policies * particularly 
protection of agriculture and some industries probably exacerbate short-term 
fluctuations in underdeveloped country exports as well as frustrating their 
expansiono Reduction of these barriers to trade and the adoption of certain 
positive policies such as buffer stocks of imported commodities and 
bilateral credit arrangements may be capable of alleviating directly and 
relatively cheaply some of the worst cases of export instability®
As this study has evolved it has developed an implicit and rather 
obvious plea® This is that before attempting to prescribe a cure one 
should in general be sure: a) that the patient really is sick, b) that 
one has an accurate diagnosis of the causes, c) that the prescribed cures 
are not liable to be worse than the disease®
The study has not established that fluctuations in export earnings 
do no damage to underdeveloped countries, but it has shown that the 
contrary view that the internal consequences of export instability are 
serious is not upheld by examination of the only readily obtainable 
evidence® Probably what is required now is much more detailed, preferably 
"in the field' investigation of the domestic consequences of fluctuations. 
Equally the study does not show that stabilization policies are all 
irrelevant or ineffective in dealing with export fluctuations® Rather it 
suggests the need to weigh very carefully the national or international
,16
benefits and costs from any scheme before endorsing it® An increase in the 
availability of credit for countries with temporary balance of payments 
difficulties seems to the author to be the policy likely to do most good 
and least harm by enabling deficit countries to decide for themselves what 
domestic policies they wish to adopt®
One major gap in this study is the slight attention given to 
seasonal and intra-seasonal variations in prices of exportable commodities, 
The principal reasons for neglecting this aspect are the relative absence 
of data and the belief that the average yearly incomes from exports were 
what most affected governments' policies due to the uncertainties attached 
to shorter-term estimates and the normal accounting conventions® However, 
this neglect may have biased our findings a little against schemes which 
aim at moderating price fluctuations, for they may have succeeded in 
smoothing out intra-year price instability even when unsuccessful with 
yearly average prices®
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Appendix I 
Method.^  and Datr
Throughout this study short-term export instability has bean defined 
as fluctuations in the value of export proceeds about calculated trend values 
In most of our analyses these are measured as a/erage-annual-percentage 
deviations in the dollar value of exports from a five^ ycaî-î'dOv^ ing-average 
of export values5 centered on the middle year. This is felt to be the best 
Indicator of what most economists mean by short-torm instability. Tlie use 
of annual data is probably justified on the basis of the widely accepted 
conventions of annual budgeting and balance of payments' accounting.
Moreover^ quarterly and monthly data are frequently unavailable and may 
require correction for so as on 8.1 variations. The éliminât ion of trend is 
required lest a constant increase or decrease be interpreted as an indicator 
of instability e.g. by one widely used measure of fluctuations a country 
whose expofts had increased by a steady ten percent per annum would appear 
less stable than one whose exports had risen and fallen by nine percent 
on alternate years over the same period. (UN, 1952: pp. 77-79).
Statistics using other methods of eliminating trend and calculating 
fluctuations have been used in Gome of the analyses. In particular^ indices 
of instability drawn from Coppock (1962: Chapter 2 and Table A-2) are 
calculated in a rather different manner. Uis veasure* a "log variance" 
measures assumes a constant percentage increase or decrease in export 
proceeds and corrects annual changes for His index seeks to show
"typical year to year relative changes corrected for trend Influence," It
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is the square root of the logarithmic variance of the series. Broadly speaking* 
it measures fluctuations as deviations from a trend line which curves gradually 
upwards or downwards (as sketched on normal graph paper) indicating a constant 
percentage increase or decrease. The Coppock index correlates very well with 
a measure which corrects for trend by least-squares regression and even with 
the simpler United Nations measure discussed above. Correlation coefficients 
were approximately 0.9 in both cases. Both it and any measure which assumes 
a single constant trend is liable to exaggerate instability if more than one 
trend is present. In the case of exports, in many primary producing countries 
a sharply rising trend from 1946 to the early 1950®s was followed by a level 
or gently rising trend in the later 1950's.
The question of trend is very important in any discussion of export 
fluctuations. Fluctuations in export earnings are a problem which most 
countries should solve without making costly changes in their allocation 
of resources. Balance of payments' deficits arising from a temporary dip in 
export proceeds should be met by financial measures, use of reserves and 
international credit, rather than devaluations or controls intended to lead 
to import substitution which would make fundamental changes in the economy. 
Changes in export earnings which are due to underlying trend factors such 
as changes in production conditions at home or abroad or the development 
of substitutes form a quite separate problem. They require fundamental 
adaptations of the exporting country to the new situation. They are not 
reversible changes and consequently use of reserves or borrowing only 
postpones the day of reckoning and cannot solve the problem. This study 
is mainly concerned with fluctuations in exports which are likely to be 
reversed in the fairly immediate future* say in one or two years. This is
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the sort of instability for which marketing board schemes, national and 
international buffer stocks and compensatory financing schemes etc, are, 
at least in principle, feasible solutions. Consequently for our purposes 
it is only that part of changes in exports which can be attributed to 
temporary, reversible fluctuations which is relevant. Changes due to trend 
factors have to be eliminated.
In general, exports can be understood as merchandise exports. This 
is similar to all the UN and International Monetary Fund discussions cited 
at various points in the text. However, the Coppock indices include 
"invisible exports" as well as commodities. For most underdeveloped 
countries this is seldom a large item (although for some tourism is of 
growing importance) and will seldom affect a country's ranking by degree 
of export instability.
It should also be noted that it is with export proceeds, not prices 
that we are normally concerned. It is necessary to emphasize this as 
statements about prices may well not hold for proceeds. F.xport prices 
for a particular country's exports may be very unstable while the total 
proceeds received remain relatively stable. Quantity changes may have 
compensated changes in prices more often than not. Another distinction 
worth bearing in mind is that between the total value of world exports 
of a commodity and an individual country's exports of that commodity.
The factors which determine the degree of instability of these two items 
can be quite different. The total value of exports of petroleum have 
been very stable in the post-war era, but at least two countries whose 
exports consist mainly of petroleum have experienced very high instability 
of export proceeds.
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Fluctuations in the total value of each country's exports form the 
main subject of this study. This stems from our interest in the domestic 
consequences of instability in exports. In general it can be expected 
that it is export proceeds rather than prices which influence producers' 
incomes, national or regional incomes and ability to purchase imports, 
particularly imports of capital goods. The separate influence of price and 
quantity fluctuations have, however, not been entirely neglected.
In the main statistical sections two broad approaches to the problem 
of testing relationships between export instability and various domestic 
variables such as national income or investment have been followed. The 
first of these is cross-sectional or cross-country least-squares regression 
analysis, both simple and multiple. The hypothesis tested by this is of the 
form: those countries which have relatively unstable exports tend to have 
relatively unstable national incomes, investment, or other domestic 
variables. In the multiple regressions the influence of other variables 
upon the dependent variable is estimated and allowed for in estimating 
the influence of exports. Secondly, time-series analyses are shown which 
examine and compare the movements over time between the various dependent 
variables and export proceeds. This method has the merit of revealing 
the time lags which may be involved. The cross-country analyses largely 
avoid the problem of lagged relationships because each index of instability 
sums up the average experience of each country over a large number of 
years, 1946 to 1958 or 1948-1958 in most cases, for each variable measured. 
Thus if exports and gross national product were compared, any influence 
which fluctuations in exports had upon fluctuations in gross national 
product would be revealed unless the time lags were very long indeed.
■ 3 À 1
Where data do not permit a quanti'lac.iv- approach more general 
qualitative discussion is used as seems appropriate.
In the sections on policy the general criteria used differ between 
national and international policies. National policies are evaluated mainly 
in the context of general national economic welfare* not merely on the 
criterion of their effectiveness in moderating instability. This involves 
discussion of longer-term side effects of policies, particularly effects 
on allocation of domestic resources and on long-term export earnings. Any 
likely effects on economic growth are stressed since this is taken to be 
the main policy objective for underdeveloped countries. Overall world 
economic welfare is regarded as the appropriate criterion for assessing 
international commodity agreements and compensatory finance schemes.
However* effects on underdeveloped countries are generally weighted more 
heavily than effects on the economies of industrial countries, For example, 
some Inefficiency in the international allocation of resources i^  regarded 
as tolerable if it would significantly improve the current living standards 
or prospects of growth for underdeveloped countries.
The statistical data used are described throughout the text in 
footnotes and appendices. However* some general description and warning 
is appropriate. Statistical series on exports are probably fairly accurate 
for most countries. Data on national income are, however, often very 
unreliable. But the normal sources of error often affect the absolute totals 
more than the changes in the totals. The subsistence sector, or some other 
activity, may be consistently undervalued, but changes .in it may be much 
more easily estimated. There is, therefore, some reason for regarding 
measures of fluctuations and of rates of growth as having greater reliability
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than the absolute magnitudes. Moreover, the indices which are frequently u^ed 
in the analyses are averages of trend-corrected changes over a fairly large 
number of years, usually 10 to 13 years. Most of the analyses involve a 
relatively large sample of countries, usually between 20 and 56 and the 
probability that random errors in individual estimates will cancel out becomes 
fairly high.
All of the statistical results are subject to some checks upon their 
reliability. The usual formal statistical tests of significance, t^ tests, 
chi square (X^ ) tests and 'F' ratio rests are applied to the results 
appropriate. General economic reasoning is used to establish whether the 
results are reasonably credible. In the tests of statistical significance 
the relatively easy criterion of 5 per cent significance level is used. The 
result is generally accepted as statistically significant if it reaches this 
level of significance or better. If the statistical measure fails to reach 
this level the statistical relationship is regarded as "not proven". The 
apparent relationship could have arisen by chance.
The relatively easy criterion is deliberately chosen because it is 
our position that the domestic economies of most underdeveloped countries 
are apparently not very seriously affected by short-term export instability. 
Choice of the easy criterion "loads the dice" a little in favour of the 
opposite viewpoint. Because of the probable inaccuracies in the basic data 
and the complexity of the relationships it might be argued that even less 
exacting standards for proving association should be used. On the other 
hand, proponents of the view that short-term export instability does severe 
damage to the economies of underdeveloped countries generally wish to 
propose expensive national or international schemes which may themselves
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inhibit efficiency and growth. It would seem reasonable that the burden of 
proof should be upon them.Imprecision in the basic data normally leads 
statisticians to demand higher rather than lower standards for accepting 
statistical analyses as evidence of association.
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